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TWELFTH ANNUAL
TENTH CIRCUIT SURVEY

THE JUDGES OF THE UNITED STATES COURT
OF APPEALS FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
CHIEF JUDGE WILLIAM
HOLLOWAY, JR.

J.

The son of a former Oklahoma governor,
Judge Holloway was born in Hugo,
Oklahoma, in 1923. He and his family
moved to Oklahoma City in 1927. He
served as a First Lieutenant in the Army
during World War II. He then returned to
complete his undergraduate studies at the
University of Oklahoma, receiving his B.A.
in 1947. He graduated from Harvard Law
School in 1950.
In 1951 and 1952, Judge Holloway was
an attorney with the Department of Justice
in Washington, D.C. Afterwards, he returned to private practice in Oklahoma City
where he was appointed to the Tenth Circuit by Lyndon B. Johnson in 1968 and became Chief Judge on September 15, 1984.
He is a member of Phi Beta Kappa and Phi
Gamma Delta.

JUDGE JAMES K. LOGAN
Judge Logan was born in Quenemo,
Kansas, in 1929. He received his A.B. from
the University of Kansas in 1952 and was
graduated magna cum laude from Harvard
Law School in 1955. He went on to be U.S.
CircuitJudge Walter Huxman's law clerk in
1956 and then practiced with the Los Angeles firm of Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher. He
became Dean of the University of Kansas
Law School in 1961 and served in the capacity until 1968.
Since 1961 he has been a visiting professor at Harvard Law School, The University
of Texas Law School, Stanford University,
and the University of Michigan. He was a
commissioner for the U.S. District Court
from 1964 until 1967 and was a candidate
for the U.S. Senate in 1968.
Judge Logan is a Rhodes Scholar, a
member of Phi Beta Kappa, Order of the
Coif, Beta Gamma Sigma, Omicron Delta
Kappa, Pi Sigma Alpha, Alpha Kappa Psi,
and Phi Delta Phi. He has co-authored numerous books on estate planning and administration. In 1977 he was appointed to
the United States Court of Appeals for the
Tenth Circuit.

JUDGE JAMES E. BARRETT
The son of the late Frank A. Barrett, who
served as Wyoming's Congressman, Governor, and U.S. Senator, Judge Barrett was
born in 1922 in Lusk, Wyoming. He attended the University of Wyoming for two
years prior to his service in the Army during World War II. After the War, he attended Saint Catherine's College at Oxford
University. He received his LL.B. from the
University of Wyoming in 1949. In 1973
he was given the Distinguished Alumni
Award from his alma mater.
Prior to his appointment, Judge Barrett
had been involved in private practice in
Lusk and had served as County and Prosecuting Attorney for Niobrara County;
Town Attorney for the towns of Lusk and
Manville; and attorney for the Niobrara
County Consolidated School District. In
1967 he was appointed by Governor Stanley K. Hathaway to serve as Wyoming Attorney General and he remained in that
position until 1971.
Judge Barrett is a member of the Judicial
Conference Subcommittee on Federal Jurisdiction, the U.S. Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Court of Review, and is a
trustee of Saint Joseph's Children's Home.
He was appointed to the Court in 1971.

JUDGE MONROE G. McKAY
Judge McKay was born in Huntsville,
Utah, in 1929 and lives in Provo. He graduated from Brigham Young University in
1957 with high honors. He received his
J.D. from the University of Chicago and became the law clerk for Justice Jesse A. Udall
of the Arizona Supreme Court in 1960.
From 1961 to 1974,Judge McKay was with
the firm of Lewis and Roca in Phoenix, taking two years out to serve as Director of the
United States Peace Corps in Malawi, Africa. He was a law professor at Brigham
Young University from 1974 until he was
appointed to the Tenth Circuit Court of
Appeals in 1977.
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THE HONORABLE JEAN

S.

BREITENSTEIN,

1900-1986

IN MEMORIAM
To
THE HONORABLE JEAN S. BREITENSTEIN
1900-1986
The Board of Editors of
THE DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
humbly dedicate this volume

JEAN S. BREITENSTEIN 1900-1986
Jean S. Breitenstein served as a federal judge for over thirty-one
years, more than twenty-eight of which were spent on the Tenth Circuit
Court of Appeals. During the preparation of this issue, the legal community lost this most respected of judges. He contributed much to the
law and to the people with whom he came in contact. It is with deep
admiration that we dedicate this issue of the Denver University Law Review
to The Honorable Jean S. Breitenstein.
Last year this Review took the long overdue step of profiling Judge
Breitenstein in the Eleventh Annual Tenth Circuit Survey. We urge
each of you to read that profile, authored with formidable clarity and
grace by Walter A. Steele, for it presents a picture of a great lawyer, a
great judge, and a great man. Judge Breitenstein contributed much to
the legal profession both before and after his appointment to the federal
bench. He worked tirelessly, even until the time of his death, and his
opinions and personal qualities made him, as Mr. Steele noted, "as universally respected and revered as any judge on any court in the land."
At the celebration honoring Judge Breitenstein for his thirty years on
the federal bench, Judge Logan of the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals
commented:
"A great judge has intelligence, wisdom, energy, and a sense
that life is a matter of love, loyalty, courage, hope, and service.
A great judge is cognizant of the trust imposed by the office
and of his responsibility to administer that trust to the best of
his abilities impartially and with compassion. By all of those
standards you, Jean Breitenstein, are a great judge. We are
privileged to have served with you."
While of course not serving with Judge Breitenstein, we too have
benefitted from his life and career. His memory serves as an ongoing
challenge to those of us engaged in the study of the law.

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW

OVERVIEW

A substantial number of cases considered by the Tenth Circuit during the survey period involved judicial review of administrative agency
decisions. Such has been the case in the past and is likely to remain the
case in the future due to the pervasiveness of thejurisdiction of administrative agencies. The most important of those cases will be discussed
here. Whilejudicial deference to an agency's decisions remains the rule,
the agency's actions were reversed in most of the significant administrative law cases handed down during the survey period. Of the four cases
discussed herein, only one affirmed the agency's decision.
I.

EXEMPTIONS TO THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT UNDER
SECTIONS

7(C)

AND

7(D):

JOHNSON V. UNITED STATES

DEPARTMENT OFJUSTICE

A.

Background

In Johnson v. United States Department of Justice,' the Department of
Justice sought reversal of a district court order requiring full disclosure
of all files pertaining to the FBI's investigation of the plaintiff, Johnson,
for bank fraud and embezzlement. 2 The files were withheld under Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) 3 exemptions pertaining to criminal investigations and unwarranted invasions of personal privacy.
Following Johnson's 1981 FOIA request, the Bureau released four
of the thirty-eight file pages in their entirety and eleven with excisions,
but withheld the remaining twenty-three pages. 4 The withheld information detailed: 1) the identities of persons interviewed by the Bureau
during its investigation of Johnson and the information received from
them; 2) the identities of third persons mentioned during the interviews;
3) information received from a local law enforcement agency; and, 4) the
identities of FBI agents not publicly known to have participated in the
investigation. 5 The Bureau claimed that this information was exempt
from disclosure under FOIA exemptions 7(C) and 7(D). 6 After an in
I. 739 F.2d 1514 (10th Cir. 1984).
2. Id. at 1515.
3.

5 U.S.C. § 552 (1982).

4. Johnson, 739 F.2d at 1515.
5. Id. at 1516.
6. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (1982) provides in part:
(b) This section does not apply to matters that are -.
(7) investigatory records compiled for law enforcement purposes, but only to
the extent that the production of such records would . . . (C) constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, (D) disclose the identity of a confidential
source and, in the case of a record compiled by a criminal law enforcement authority in the course of a criminal investigation. . . confidential information furnished only by a confidential source.
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camera review 7 of the entire file, the district court summarily ordered
the file to be disclosed. Judge Kerr supported his decision with the conclusory statement that the FOIA "requires that said file be made available for review by plaintiff, and . . .the information in the FBI file in
question does not fall within any of the exceptions to the general policy
of the Freedom of Information Act requiring disclosure .....
B.

The Tenth Circuit Decision
1. The 7(D) Exemption

The issue of the scope of a 7(D) exemption was a question of first
impression in the Tenth Circuit. 9 The court noted that the circuit courts
are divided on the question of what must be shown before information
may be categorized as "confidential" within the meaning of subsection
7(D).1 0
The Second, Fourth and Eighth Circuits apply the rule, first set out
in the Fourth Circuit case of Deering Milliken, Inc. v. Irving,"1 that confidentiality is found under an express assurance or where such assurance
could reasonably be inferred. 12 The Fourth Circuit also held that the
existence of an express or implied assurance of confidentiality "is ordinarily a question of fact."' 3 Although the Second and Eighth Circuits
use the "express or reasonably inferred" standard,' 4 only the Second
Circuit has explicitly adopted the Fourth Circuit's approach that the issue of confidentiality is a question of fact. To date, the Eighth Circuit
has been silent on this subject.
The District of Columbia Circuit and Third Circuit have adopted a
less rigorous standard by holding that the agency need only state that
the information was provided by a confidential source in order for the
exemption to apply. 15 The District of Columbia Circuit cited comments
in the legislative history of the 1974 FOIA amendments in support of its
holding,' 6 while the Third Circuit stated that requiring more detail
would significantly increase the likelihood that the source and substance
7. In camera review is authorized by 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B) (1982).
8. Johnson, 739 F.2d at 1516 (quoting Record, vol. I at 110).
9. Id. at 1518.
10. Id. See supra note 6.
11. 548 F.2d 1131, 1137 (4th Cir. 1977).
12. The language of this rule is directly attributable to a House and Senate Joint Explanatory Statement concerning the 1974 FOIA amendments, which states:
The substitution of the term "confidential source" [for "informer"] in section
552(b)(7)(D) is to make clear that the identity of a person other than a paid informer may be protected if the person provided information under an express
assurance of confidentiality or in circumstances from which such an assurance
could be reasonably inferred.
CoNF. REP. No. 1200, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 13, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws 6285, 6291.
13. Deering Miiken, 548 F.2d at 1137.
14. Parton v. United States Dep't ofJustice, 727 F.2d 774 (8th Cir. 1984); Keeney v.
FBI. 630 F.2d 114 (2d Cir. 1980).
15. Conoco, Inc. v. United States Dep't ofJustice, 687 F.2d 724 (3d Cir. 1982); Lesar
v. United States Dep't of Justice, 636 F.2d 472 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
16. Lesar, 636 F.2d at 492 n. 114 ("remarks of Sen. Hart: the law enforcement agency
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of the information would be revealed.17
A third approach has been taken by the Sixth and Seventh Circuits.
Although the Seventh Circuit initially applied the "express or reasonably inferred" standard,' 8 the court in Scherer v. Kelley 19 signaled a
change in the standard to be applied. In considering the disclosure of
information gathered in the course of a law enforcement investigation,
the court found it implicit in FBI affidavits that the information was received under an expressed assurance of confidentiality or in circumstances where such an assurance could reasonably be inferred. 20 In
Miller v. Bell, 2 ' the court clarified the new standard by holding that, in
the absence of record evidence to the contrary, "promises of confidentiality are inherently implicit in FBI interviews conducted pursuant to a
criminal investigation." '2 2 The Seventh Circuit stated that the standard,
the least rigorous of the three standards currently being applied, was
necessary for the protection of confidential sources and the preservation
23
of the efficacy of FBI criminal investigations.
After examining these three standards, the Tenth Circuit, Judge
Seymour writing, found that the "inherently implicit" approach of the
Sixth and Seventh Circuits "best reconcile[d] the general desirability of
broad disclosure under the FOIA with the concern that, absent a robust
7(D) exemption, law enforcement agencies would be faced with a 'drying up' of their sources of information and their investigative work
thereby would be seriously impeded."'24 Although the court was correct
in emphasizing the goal of the 7(D) exemption with respect to protecting sources and maintaining the efficacy of criminal investigations, 25 it
has significantly understated the FOIA goal of disclosure.
The FOIA was passed as a revision of section 3 of the Administrative Procedure Act. 26 Section 3 contained vague language capable of
broad interpretation and came to be viewed not as a disclosure statute,
but rather as a withholding statute. 2 7 The FOIA was intended to provide "a workable formula which encompasses, balances and protects all
interests yet places emphasis on thefullest responsibledisclosure." 28 This policy
. . . need only 'state that the information was furnished by a confidential source and it is
exempt.'" (quoting from S. REP. No. 1200, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1974)).
17. Conoco, 687 F.2d at 730.
18. Maroscia v. Levi, 569 F.2d 1000 (7th Cir. 1977) (the information clearly was acquired either under express assurances of confidentiality or where assurance could reasonably be inferred).
19. 584 F.2d 170 (7th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 964 (1979).
20. Id. at 176.
21. 661 F.2d 623 (7th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 960 (1982).
22. Id. at 627.
23. Id.

24. Johnson, 739 F.2d at 1518.
25. See supra note 6; see also Lesar, 636 F.2d at 490 n.108.
26. Pub. L. No. 89-554, § 552, 80 Stat. 378, 383 (1966) (codified as amended at Pub.
L. No. 90-23, § 552, 81 Stat. 54-56 (1967)).
27. EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 79 (1973) (citing S. REP. No. 813, 89th Cong., 1st Sess.
5 (1965); H.R. REP. No. 1497, 89th Cong. 2d Sess. 5-6 (1966)).
28. Id. at 80 (quoting S. REP. No. 813, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1965)) (emphasis
added).
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favoring reasonable disclosure has not changed since the 1974 FOIA
amendments. 29 In providing for exemptions from the disclosure requirements of the FOIA, Congress recognized that the executive branch
has valid reasons for keeping certain information confidential. 30 The
existence of such exemptions does not, however, detract from the
FOIA's policy of favoring disclosure because the Act's statutory exemptions "are to be narrowly construed with all doubts resolved in favor of
disclosure" 3 ' and a federal agency that attempts to use one of the nine
32
exemptions has the burden ofjustifying nondisclosure.
In adopting the "inherently implicit" standard, the Tenth Circuit
chose an approach that is not conducive to disclosure. Theoretically,
more information would be available for release were an agency required to explicitly assure its sources of confidentiality or conduct interviews under circumstances where confidentiality could be reasonably
inferred as opposed to where such an assurance was inherently implicit.
Moreover, confidential sources and the efficacy of investigatory techniques would not be jeopardized by a requirement that an agency provide express assurances of confidentiality. This approach would strike a
reasonable balance between the competing policies underlying the 7(D)
exemption and the FOIA goal of disclosure.
Furthermore, by holding that the presumption of confidentiality can
be overcome only by evidence in the record, the court has placed the
burden of disclosure on the citizen and greatly reduced the agency's
burden ofjustifying nondisclosure. This approach further conflicts with
the overall goal of the FOIA by requiring the party with the least knowledge of the facts and circumstances to submit record evidence sufficient
to rebut the presumption of confidentiality before the court will require
disclosure.
However, the Tenth Circuit chose to adopt the minority view held
by the Sixth and Seventh Circuits and, therefore, searched the record
for evidence which would rebut the presumption of confidentiality. Because no such evidence was found, the court held that the information
had been provided with the understanding that it would be kept
33
confidential.
The court also addressed another 7(D) exemption issue: whether
or not local law enforcement agencies fall within the meaning of "confidential sources."'3 4 Relying on Lesar v. United States 3 5 and Church of
29. See, e.g., New England Apple Council v. Donovan,
1984) (citing Federal Bureau of Investigation v. Abramson,
30. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1)-(9) (1982).
31. Alirez v. NLRB, 676 F.2d 423, 425 (10th Cir. 1982).
Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352, 361-62 (1976) ("[Dlisclosure,
objective of the Act."); Mink, 410 U.S. at 79-80 (the Act is
information previously inaccessable).
32. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B) (1982).
33. Johnson, 739 F.2d at 1518.
34. Id.
35. 636 F.2d 472, 489-91.

725 F.2d 139, 141 (1st Cir.
456 U.S. 615, 630-31 (1982)).
See also Department of the Air
not secrecy, is the dominant
intended to permit access to
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Scientology v. United States Department of Justice,3 6 the Tenth Circuit concluded that such agencies may be properly characterized as confidential
sources. 3 7 The court also held that the individuals who provided information to the FBI were plainly "confidential sources" within the mean38
ing of exemption 7(D).
The Johnson court found it unnecessary to examine the file in camera. Instead, having concluded that the information withheld under the
7(D) exemption was obtained from confidential sources under an inherently implicit assurance of confidentiality, the court held the undisclosed
39
documents to be exempt from disclosure.
2.

The 7(C) Exemption

The names of the FBI agents involved in the investigation ofJohnson were withheld by the Bureau under subsection 7(C), which authorizes an agency to withhold information gathered in the course of a
criminal investigation to the extent that disclosure would constitute an
unwarranted invasion of personal privacy. 40 Relying on its own decision
in Alirez v. NLRB 41 as well as on opinions from the First, Seventh, and
District of Columbia Circuits, 4 2 the Tenth Circuit held that the proper
test under subsection 7(C) is to balance the asserted privacy interests
against the public interest in disclosure., The privacy interests at stake in
Johnson were the FBI agents' interestin avoiding both unofficial questioning about the investigation and harassment from individuals angered by the investigation. 43 The public interest asserted in Johnson was
based on allegations of improper use of law enforcement investigations. 44 After examining the undisclosed material, the court found no
evidence that the FBI agents had acted improperly during the
45
investigation.
Although the court did review the undisclosed material for evidence
of improper conduct by the FBI agents, the privacy claim was decisively
supported by a presumption in favor of the law enforcement agency.
Such a presumption has been recognized by the First, Fourth, Seventh,
and District of Columbia Circuits 4 6 and stems from the recognition that
the mere possibility of threats or harassment should weigh heavily in the
36. 612 F.2d 417, 420-28 (9th Cir. 1979).
37. Johnson, 739 F.2d at 1518.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. See supra note 6.
41. 676 F.2d 423 (10th Cir. 1982).
42. New England Apple Council, 725 F.2d 139; Miller, 661 F.2d 623; Baez v. United
States Dep't ofJustice, 647 F.2d 1328 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
43. Johnson, 739 F.2d at 1519.
44. Johnson alleged that an attorney for a third party caused the FBI to initiate its
investigation ofJohnson in order to aid the third party's position in a separate action. Id.
45. For an overview of disclosure of files from unlawful investigations, see Note, FOIA
Exemption 7 and Broader Disclosure of Unlawful FBI Investigations, 65 MINN. L. REV. 1139
(1981).
46. New EnglandApple Council. 725 F.2d at 142-43; Miller, 661 F.2d at 629-30; Baez, 647
F.2d at 1339; Nix v. United States, 572 F.2d 998, 1005-06 (4th Cir. 1978).
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balancing of public and private interests. 4 7 Although the District Court
for the District of Columbia, in 1981, held that the names of government
48
investigators are not entitled to protection under the 7(C) exemption,
that view is not in keeping with precedent in the District of Columbia
Circuit 49 nor has it been adopted by any other circuit.
At first blush, the requirement of an actual showing of a furthering
of public interest, when considered with the strong presumption in favor
of privacy interests, seems contrary to the FOIA policy of favoring disclosure. This, however, is not the case, because although the language of
subsection 7(C) 50 is similar to that of subsection 6,51 which covers files
not related to criminal investigations, there is a crucial difference between the scope of these two exemptions. Although 7(C) originally included the "clearly unwarranted" standard of exemption 6, the word
"clearly" was deleted during conferences on the 1974 amendments. 52
The purpose of the deletion was to broaden the grounds for nondisclosure under 7(C) because of the inherent differences between investiga53
tory and noninvestigatory files.
After weighing the public interest asserted by Johnson against the
privacy interests of the government agents, the Tenth Circuit held that
all the material withheld by the Department of Justice under 7(C) was
within the scope of the exemption and need not be disclosed. 54 Thus,
the court concluded that the Department of Justice had properly invoked FOIA exemptions 7(C) and 7(D), and reversed the district court
55
order requiring disclosure.
II.
A.

THE DUrY TO PROMULGATE RULES

Background

It is a general rule of administrative law than an agency need not
promulgate detailed rules concerning each and every aspect of a pro47. See, e.g., New EnglandApple Council, 725 F.2d at 142 ("the protection of exemption

7(C) is not limited to cases involving an actual showing of harassment or other harm to
government officials") (emphasis in original).
48. "The policy reasons for withholding the names of [private] third parties do not
apply to government employees involved in the investigation since, (1) there can be no
suspicion of wrongdoing on their part and (2) their continued cooperation is not at stake."
Iglesias v. CIA, 525 F. Supp. 547, 563 (D.D.C 1981).
49. See, e.g., Baez, 647 F.2d 1328.
50. See supra note 6.
51. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6) (1982) states that the exemption section shall not apply to
"personnel and medical files and similar files the disclosure of which would constitute a
clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy."
52. See Congressional News Syndicate v. United States Dep't ofJustice, 438 F. Supp.
538, 541 (D.D.C. 1977).
53. "[T]hat an individual's name appears in files of the latter kind, without more, will
probably not engender comment and speculation, while . . . an individual whose name
surfaces in connection with an investigation may, without more, become the subject of
rumor and innuendo." Id.
54. Johnson, 739 F.2d at 1519.
55.

Id.
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gram or course of action. 56 Although prospective rulemaking 5 7 is the
favored procedure,5 8 adjudication is an alternative. 59 Despite the usual
existence of this alternative, a statute may create a duty to promulgate
rules concerning some or all of the subject matter within the purview of
the statute.
Twice during the survey period the Tenth Circuit was asked to determine whether particular statutes imposed a duty on the Secretary of
the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) to promulgate
rules. In both cases, the subject of the rules was the distribution of financial assistance by HHS and in both cases the court found that such a
duty exists. 60
B.

Estate of Smith v. Heckler

Estate of Smith v. Heckler 6 ' was originally brought as a class action
suit on behalf of all Medicaid recipients residing in Colorado nursing
homes. The plaintiffs alleged that the Secretary of HHS had a duty to
ensure that Medicaid recipients residing in Medicaid-certified homes actually received the level of payments they were entitled to under Title
XIX of the Social Security Act 62 (the Act). The plaintiffs also alleged
that the Secretary had a duty to promulgate regulations necessary to
63
fulfill the requirements of Title XIX.

Prior to Estate of Smith, HHS used a procedure, known as the survey/certification system, to determine whether state plans for medical
assistance complied with the federal standards under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1396a(a) and its implementing regulations. 64 Under this system, the
Secretary would review the results of the nursing home surveys taken by
the states pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(33). 65 Facilities would then
56. SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194 (1947); American Power & Light Co. v. SEC,
329 U.S. 90 (1946).
57. Administrative Procedure Act § 4, 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1982).
58. See generally Mayton, The Legislative Resolution of the Rulemaking Versus Adjudication
Problem in Agency Lawmaking, 1980 DuKE L.J. 103 (1980) (explaining the aspects of notice
and comment rulemaking).
59. 5 U.S.C. § 554 (1982).
60. For a related discussion of the duty imposed by the Administrative Procedure Act,
5 U.S.C. §§ 551-59 (1982), to promulgate rules, see Yamada, Rulemaking Requirements Related to Federal FinancingAssistance Programs, 39 FED. B.J. 89 (1980).
61. 747 F.2d 583 (10th Cir. 1984).
62. 42 U.S.C. § 139 6 -1 3 96p (1982).
63. 747 F.2d at 587-88.
64. The implementing regulations referred to are Standards for Payment for Skilled
Nursing and Intermediate Care Facility Services, 42 C.F.R. § 442 (1985).
65. Under § 1396a(a)(33)(A) a state plan for medical assistance must provide that the
states "be responsible for establishing a plan . . . for the review by appropriate professional health personnel of the appropriateness and quality of care and services furnished
to recipients of medical assistance under the plan." Section 1396a(a)(33)(B) requires that
a state
perform. . . the function of determining whether institutions and agencies meet
the requirements for participation in the program . . . except that, if the Secretary
[of Health and Human Services] has cause to question the adequacy of such determinations, the Secretary is authorized to validate [s]tate determinations and,
on that basis, make independent and binding determinations concerning the ex-
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be certified by the Secretary for participation in the Medicaid program if
the Secretary was satisfied that the facility was in compliance with the
implementing regulations. Once certified, the facility then became eligible for Medicaid funds.
In conducting the surveys, states were required to use federal
66
forms.
The plaintiffs alleged that the principal form provided for the
survey, Form SSA-1569, evaluated only the level of health care theoretically available as opposed to the actual level of care provided by the
nursing home. The Secretary admitted that Form SSA-1569, and indeed the whole program, was "facility-oriented rather than patient-oriented," but denied the existence of a duty to reverse the focus of the
67
evaluation process.
In reversing the district court, the Tenth Circuit, Judge McKay writing, held that the Secretary does have a duty to ensure that nursing
homes actually provide high quality health care, a duty that does not
cease at the time of certification, but instead "is a duty of continued
supervision."- 68 The court noted that the focus of the Act is not on the
physical facilities, but on the actual health care to be provided. 6 9 The
court also noted that, although the district court had correctly pointed
out that the state has significant responsibilities under the Act, nothing
in the Act indicated that the state's responsibility relieves the Secretary
70
of the duty of ensuring compliance with the purposes of the Act.
In holding that the Secretary has "a duty to ensure more than paper
compliance" with the Act, 7 1 the court stated that "[it would be anomolous to hold that the Secretary has a duty to determine whether a state
plan meets the standards of the Act while holding that the Secretary can
certify facilities without informing herself as to whether the facilities actually perform the functions required by the state plan."' 72 The court
tent to which individual institutions and agencies meet the requirements for
participation.
66. 42 C.F.R. § 431.610(f)(1) (1985).
67. The district court concluded that a patient oriented system of review was feasible
and probably desirable, but that the Secretary had no duty to establish such a system. The
holding was based, in part, on a construction of 42 U.S.C. § 1396(a)(9)(A) requiring the
states, rather than the Secretary, to establish and enforce the standards and methods for
assuring high quality medical assistance. The district court also concluded that the "look
behind" provision of section 1396a(a)(33)(B) granted the Secretary authority to intervene
to protect public funds, but did not create a duty to establish a patient oriented system of
review. The district court also held that the general rulemaking provision of 42 U.S.C.
§ 1302 (1982), stating that the Secretary "shall make and publish such rules and regulations ...as may be necessary," did not, alone, impose any duty on the Secretary. Furthermore, the court held that if a duty were created by section 1302 in conjunction with section
1396a(a)(33)(A), it was satisfied by enacting detailed regulations setting forth the grounds
for obtaining federal funds for state Medicaid programs. See Estate of Smith v.
O'Halloran, 557 F. Supp. 280 (D. Colo. 1983), rev'd, 747 F.2d 583 (10th Cir. 1984).
68. 747 F.2d at 589.
69. Id. The court relied on 42 U.S.C. § 1396 (1983) in which funds are appropriated
"[ftor the purpose of enabling each [s]tate ...to furnish (1)medical assistance.., and (2)
rehabilitation and other services."
70. 747 F.2d at 589.
71. Id. at 589-90.
72. Id.
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found that this federal responsibility was clearly
evidenced by the "look
73
behind" provision and its legislative history.

The court concluded that, in view of the Act's establishment of a
patient-oriented system and the accompanying authority to promulgate
necessary regulations under section 1302 of the Act, 74 the Secretary's
failure to do so was arbitrary and capricious. 7 5 The case was remanded
with directions that a writ of mandamus issue directing the Secretary of
Health and Human Services to promulgate regulations enabling her to
determine if nursing home facilities receiving Medicaid funds are actually providing the high quality medical and rehabilitative care specified
76
in the Medicaid Act.
C.

Pulido v. Heckler

In Pulido v. Heckler,77 the Tenth Circuit reviewed a district court's
decision 78 that the Secretary of Health and Human Services was not

under a duty to promulgate rules for the payment of certain travel expenses pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 4010) and 1383(h). 79 The case was

originally filed as a class action to compel the Secretary to engage in
notice and comment rulemaking on: (1) the criteria for change in locations for both disability benefit hearings under Title II of the Social Se73. Id. at 590 (citing H.R. REP. No. 1157, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 57, repnnted in 1980
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5526, 5570).

74. See supra note 67.
75. 747 F.2d at 590.
76. Id. at 591-92.
77. 758 F.2d 503 (10th Cir. 1985).
78. Pulido v. Heckler, 568 F. Supp. 627 (D. Colo. 1983).
79. Section 4010) provides in part:
There are authorized to be made available for expenditure ... such amounts as
are required to pay travel expenses ... to individuals for travel incident to medical examinations...

in connection with disability determinations ...

and to par-

ties, their representatives, and all reasonably necessary witnesses for travel within
the United States . . . to attend reconsideration interviews and proceedings
before administrative law judges with respect to any determination under the
subchapter. The amount available . . . for payment for air travel by any person
shall not exceed the coach fare for air travel between the points involved unless
the use of first-class accommodations is required (as determined under regulations of the Secretary) because of such person's health condition or the unavailability of alternative accommodations; and the amount available for payment for
other travel by any person shall not exceed the cost of travel . . . by the most
economical and expeditious means of transportation appropriate to such person's
health conditions, as specified in such regulations.
Section 1383(h) provides in part:
The Secretary shall pay travel expenses . . . to individuals for travel incident to
medical examinations ... in connection with disability determinations under this
subchapter, and to parties, their representatives, and all reasonably necessary witnesses for travel within the United States ... to attend reconsideration interviews
and proceedings before administrative law judges with respect to any determination under this subchapter. The amount available . . . for payment for air travel
by any person shall not exceed the coach fare for air travel between the points
involved unless the use of first-class accommodations is required (as determined
under regulations of the Secretary) because of such person's health condition or
the unavailability of alternative accommodations; and the amount available for
payment for other travel by any person shall not exceed the cost of travel ... by
the most economical and expeditious means of transportation appropriate to
such person's health condition, as specified in such regulations.
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curity Act 80 and supplemental security income benefits under Title XVI
of the Act, 8 ' and (2) standards for payment of travel expenses to attend
the hearing.
The Tenth Circuit began its analysis by noting that the Secretary
had conceded that sections 401(j) and 1383(h) imposed a duty to promulgate regulations, but denied the existence of a duty to issue regulations on other aspects of the payment of travel expenses.8 2 The court,
however, examined the provisions of 42 U.S.C. § 405(a) 83 and agreed
with the Eighth Circuit 8 4 that the language of the section imposed a duty
on the Secretary to promulgate rules that " 'regulate and provide for the
nature and extent of the proof and evidence' " and which cover " 'the
method of taking and furnishing the same.' "85 The court held that because the availability of payment of travel expenses can determine
whether a claimant can attend a hearing to offer proof, regulations
about such payments are encompassed by the requirement that the Secretary promulgate rules for "the method of taking and furnishing"
86
proof.
The court also held this duty was not extinguished by subsequent
appropriations acts. 8 7 Instead, those appropriations were characterized
as only limiting the Secetary's discretion to reimburse claimants LUr
travel of less than seventy-five miles without affecting her duty to pro88
mulgate rules for travel over seventy-five miles.
The court rejected the Secretary's argument that, even if there did
exist a duty to promulgate the requested rules, she had the discretion to
determine when the regulations would be proposed. 89 The court did
not discuss the existence or scope of such discretion, but instead simply
held that any discretion that did exist was impermissibly abused by the
80. Federal Old-Age, Survivors and Disability Insurance Benefits, 42 U.S.C. §§ 401-

33 (1982).
81. Supplemental Security Income for the Aged, Blind, and Disabled, 42 U.S.C.

§§ 1381-1383c (1982).
82. 758 F.2d at 506.
83. 42 U.S.C. § 405(a) (1982) provides:
The Secretary shall have full power and authority to make rules and regulations
and to establish procedures, not inconsistent with the provisions of this subchapter, which are necessary or appropriate to carry out such provisions, and
shall adopt reasonable and proper rules and regulations to regulate and provide

for the nature and extent of the proofs and evidence and the method of taking
and furnishing the same in order to establish the right to benefits hereunder.
84. The Eighth Circuit held that "as to the kinds of rules and regulations mentioned
in the second half of § 405(a), the Secretary is not simply empowered to make rules, he is
commanded to do so." McCoy v. Schweiker, 683 F.2d 1138, 1143 (8th Cir. 1982) (emphasis
in original).
85. 758 F.2d at 506 (citing McCoy, 683 F.2d at 1143).
86. Id. at 506-07.
87. The appropriations include Act of Oct. 1, 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-51, 95 Stat. 958;
Act of Dec. 15, 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-92, 95 Stat. 1183; Act of Mar. 31, 1982, Pub. L. No.
97-161,96 Stat. 22; Act of Oct. 2, 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-276, 96 Stat. 1186; Act of Dec. 21,
1982, Pub. L. No. 97-377, 96 Stat. 1830, each implementing H.R. REs. 4560, 97th Cong.,
Ist Sess. (1981) (limiting travel expense payments by providing that payments under 42
U.S.C. § 1383(h) be made only when travel of more than 75 miles is required).
88. 758 F.2d at 507.
89. Id.
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delay of over four years. 9 0 The court also held that congressional uncertainty about the desirability of the seventy-five mile threshold for payment 9 ' could not support the Secretary's position because any issued
regulations could, if necessary, be modified to apply to whatever distance Congress might choose.92
The court also rejected the Secretary's argument that her intent to
publish proposed regulations regarding travel expenses constituted a
sufficient basis for not ordering her to promulgate the regulations. The
court agreed with the district court's reading of American Trucking Associations v. Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Railway Co.9 3 and held that public
notice of an intent to publish proposed regulations was of little significance. 9 4 The court found that a timetable was necessary to ensure that
the regulations would be promulgated. Therefore, the court, in addition to reversing the district court's order, remanded the case for determination of an appropriate timetable. 95
D.

Analysis

Although the task of statutory construction is certainly not new to
the Tenth Circuit, the examination of statutes to determine whether
they create a duty to promulgate rules has been an infrequent endeavor
for the court. Prior to this survey period, the Tenth Circuit's last treatment of this issued occurred in Sanchez v. United States. 9 6 Sanchez was an
action brought under a section of the Federal Tort Claims Act
(FTCA). 9 7 The plaintiffs were passengers in an automobile that was
struck from behind by an automobile driven by a student enrolled in a
Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) school. The complaint alleged that there
had been a failure to promulgate rules prohibiting the type of student
conduct that had led to the plaintiffs' injuries.
The court held that there was no common law duty owed by the BIA
to the general public to promulgate rules governing student conduct.9 8
The court also held that "the fact that a school has [statutory] authority
to promulgate regulations to govern the conduct of students is not germane." 99 The court, however, failed to cite or examine relevant statutory language' 0 0 in its brief discussion of the absence of a statutory duty
to promulgate regulations.
Sanchez may be reconciled with Estate of Smith and Pulido on two
90. Id.
91. Id. See H.R. REP. No. 618, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 19 (1984) (stating that the 75-mile
limit should be reconsidered).
92. 758 F.2d at 507-08.
93. 568 F. Supp. 627, 632 (D. Colo. 1983) (citing American Trucking Ass'ns, Inc. v.
Atchinson, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Corp., 387 U.S. 397 (1967)).
94. 758 F.2d at 508.
95. Id.
96. 506 F.2d 702 (10th Cir. 1974).
97. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1983).
98. 506 F.2d at 704-05.
99. Id. at 705.
100. E.g., 25 U.S.C. §§ 1(a), 9, 282, 283 (1983).
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grounds. In Sanchez, the court held that there was no assurance the
BIA's regulatory prohibition of certain conduct would have any effect
upon BIA students. The court, therefore, found that there was no "legal
causation" between the failure to promulgate such regulations and the
plaintiffs' injuries.' 0 ' In Estate of Smith, however, the failure to promulgate regulations ensuring state compliance with federal standards for
medical care was held to be the cause of substandard care in Medicaid
facilities. 10 2 Similarly, the failure to promulgate regulations concerning
payment of travel expenses was held to be the cause of the Pulido plaintiffs' uncertainty as to their entitlement to reimbursement.10 3 Thus, the
existence of a direct causal connection between a failure to act and the
purported injury, which was lacking in Sanchez, provides one explanation
for the disparate outcomes.
Secondly, both Pulido and Estate of Smith involved the distribution of
benefits from the government to members of the general public. Pulido
involved direct money benefits, while Estate of Smith involved high quality
medical and rehabilitative care for persons who otherwise could not afford such care. Sanchez, on the other hand, was simply an action for
damages under the FTCA.
Thus, considerations of public policy seem to provide a basis for
reconciling Sanchez with Pulido and Estate of Smith. The plaintiffs in the
Social Security Act cases were aided by the apparent presumption that,
absent some showing of unreasonableness or congressional intent to the
contrary, public policy is best served when the Social Security Act is construed so as to maximize the distribution of benefits to qualified recipients. In Estate of Smith, the Tenth Circuit held that the overall purpose of
the Medicaid Act and the general rulemaking provisions of 42 U.S.C.
§ 1302 combined to create an implied duty to promulgate regulations
necessary to further the purposes of the Act. In Pulido the Tenth Circuit
construed a statutory requirement to promulgate regulations concerning "the method of taking and furnishing" proof to include a duty to
promulgate regulations dealing with the payment of travel expenses to
hearings. In both cases the court seems to have been motivated by a
desire to have the Secretary promulgate rules maximizing distribution of
benefits. The plaintiffs in Sanchez, however, were denied relief due, in
part, to the apparent purpose of the FTCA, an Act which was intended
to provide only limited exceptions to the doctrine of sovereign immunity. 104 The Tenth Circuit presently seems to be motivated by a desire
to further the purpose of the underlying statute in these duty-to-promulgate cases.
101.
102.
103.
104.

506 F.2d at 705.
See supra notes 61-76 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 77-95 and accompanying text.
Cf. PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF ToRTS,1034 (W. Keeton ed. 1984).
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III.

BENDER K CLARK:

APPEALABILITY OF A REMAND ORDER AND THE

APPROPRIATE STANDARD OF PROOF

A.

Facts

In February of 1977, Jack J. Bender filed a non-competitive oil and
gas lease offer with the Bureau of Land Management (BLM). After
Bender was awarded first priority, but before the lease was issued, the
leasehold was determined by the BLM to be within an undefined addition to the Scanlon Known Geologic Structure.10 5 Because public lands
within a Known Geologic Structure (KGS) 10 6 can be leased only by competitive bidding, 10 7 Bender's lease offer was rejected by the BLM.
Bender challenged the BLM's decision before the Interior Board of
Land Appeals (IBLA), arguing that the land was not within a KGS. The
IBLA held that the inclusion of land within a KGS would not be disturbed absent a "clear and definite" showing of error.' 0 8 The IBLA,
however, also found that the data was insufficient to determine whether
or not the land was properly included within a KGS and, therefore,
granted Bender's request for an evidentiary hearing before an administrative law judge (ALJ). 10 9 After the hearing, the ALJ held that Bender
had failed to make a "clear and definite" showing of error and recommended that Bender's appeal be dismissed. l 1o Bender then filed exceptions to the ALJ's entire record. The IBLA, afer reviewing the entire
record, found that Bender failed to make a "clear and definite" showing
that the BLM decision was in error and therefore affirmed the ALJ's
decision. II I
On review, the district court held that Bender need only have
shown by a preponderance of the evidence that the BLM decision was in
error to have overcome the government's prima facie case and remanded the case to the BLM."I 2 On appeal the Tenth Circuit addressed
two issues: (1) whether the remand order was a "final decision" sufficient to vest the court with appellate jurisdiction over the matter;' 1 3 and
(2) if so, whether the district court erred in holding that Bender could
overcome the government's case by a preponderance of the evidence
showing.
105. JackJ. Bender, 40 I.B.L.A. 26, 28 (1979).
106. A known geologic structure was defined as "the trap in which an accumulation of
oil or gas has been discovered by drilling and determined to be productive, the limits of
which include all acreage that is presumptively productive." BLM Oil and Gas Leasing
Regulations, 43 C.F.R. § 3100.0-5(1) (1985).
107. "Ifthe lands to be leased are within any known geological structure of a producing oil or gas field, they shall be leased to the highest responsible qualified bidder by
competitive bidding. 30 U.S.C. § 226(b) (1982).
108. Bender, 40 I.B.L.A. at 27.
109. Id. at 29. The IBLA may grant a hearing before an ALJ pursuant to 43 C.F.R.
§ 4.415 (1985).
110. JackJ. Bender, 54 I.B.L.A. 375, 377 (1981).
111. Id. at 389.
112. Bender v. Clark, 744 F.2d 1424, 1426 (10th Cir. 1984).
113. Id. See 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1982) ("The courts of appeals ... shall have jurisdiction
of appeals from all final decisions of the district courts of the United States . . .except
where a direct review may be had in the Supreme Court.")
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Appealability of a Remand Order

Although the Tenth Circuit acknowledged the general rule that a
remand to an agency for further proceedings is usually not final and,
therefore, not appealable, it noted that the rule is not applicable when
the rule would violate "basic judicial principles." ' " 14 The court also
noted that the Supreme Court in Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan
Corp. 115 held that the finality requirement of section 1291 has long been
given a practical rather than a technical interpretation" 16 and examined
the "collateral order" doctrine, which was established in Cohen. The
Tenth Circuit noted that for an order to be collateral, and therefore appealable under Cohen, "the matter raised on appeal must not be a step
toward a final judgment in which it would 'merge,' it must not affect, nor
be affected by, the decision on the merits, and it must be so independent
of the action that appellate review need not await final disposition of the
merits."' 17 The court then concluded that the issue of what legal standard to apply, when measured against the Cohen standard, was so intertwined with the determination of the existence of a KGS "that it is not
collateral to the merits of the dispute."' 18
The court continued its analysis by concluding that when the issue
is a "serious and unsettled" question of law, not within a trial court's
discretion, an order may be appealable when there exists an urgent need
for review of an important question. 1 9 However, these tests, urgency
and importance, were simply threshold tests for the court in determining the order's appealability. The final test applied by the court involved a balancing of competing interests.
The court held that in instances where an issue is not collateral, but
justice requires immediate review because of the urgent need to decide
an important question, a balancing approach is necessary to determine if
an appellate court has jurisdiction. The balancing test used by the
Tenth Circuit was "whether the danger of injustice by delaying appellate
review outweighs the inconvenience and costs of piecemeal review."' 120
On balance, the court held that the need for review clearly outweighed
the competing concerns. This decision was based in part on the finding
that the standard of proof issue is a "serious and unsettled" one in oil
114. See, e.g., Ringsby Truck Lines, Inc. v. United States, 490 F.2d 620, 625 (10th Cir.
1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 833 (1974), in which the Tenth Circuit found that "basic judicial principles" justified adoption of the general rule that a remand to an agency is not a
final decision and therefore not appealable. For the origin of the death knell exception to
the finality requirement, see Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 370 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir.
1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 1035 (1967).
115. 337 U.S. 541 (1949).
116. Id. at 546.
117. 744 F.2d at 1427.
118. Id.
119. Id. (citing Cohen, 337 U.S. at 547).
120. Id. This balancing test has been used by the Tenth Circuit to determine appealability in other contexts. See, e.g., Paluso v. Mathews, 562 F.2d 33, 35-36 (10th Cir. 1977)
(important question of federalism merited appealability), on rehg, 573 F.2d 4 (10th Cir.
1978); Seiffer v. Topsy's Int'l. Inc., 520 F.2d 795 (10th Cir. 1975) (class action by itself did
not merit appealability), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1051 (1976).
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and gas leasing, thereby making it an important question. 12 1 The preeminent consideration for the court, however, was the likelihood that
the government could be foreclosed from appealing the order in future
proceedings, a possibility that amply demonstrated the urgent need for
immediate review. 122 Thus, the court used the factors of "urgency" and
"importance" both as threshold tests to determine if the application of a
balancing test was necessary and also as the factors to be weighed
against the inconvenience and cost of piecemeal review.
C.

The Appropriate Standard of Proof

The Tenth Circuit held that the use of the "clear and definite" standard by the IBLA in informal hearings was based on internal agency
policy instead of statutory or judicial authority.' 2 3 'The court concluded
that, in the absence of a congressional determination of the standard to
be applied, it is for a court, and not an agency, to decide the proper
standards. 124 The court then examined the issue of whether the district
court erred in ordering that the preponderance of the evidence standard
be used.
The Tenth Circuit noted that proof by a preponderance of the evidence is the traditional standard used in civil and administrative proceedings. The court rejected the government's argument that the
preponderance standard is applicable only in hearings conducted under
the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). The court noted that even
hearings outside the APA cannot violate basic principles of fairness and,
therefore, must use a standard of proof that considers all of the competing interests. 125 The court concluded that the preponderance standard
must be applied unless a higher standard is required because of the nature of the case and the sanctions or hardships imposed. The court
noted that the clear and definite standard is generally appropriate only
in cases involving matters such as deportation, parental rights or loss of
livelihood where "particularly important individual interests or rights"
26
are determined. 1
The government did not offer any reason in support of using the
"clear and definite" standard other than its own interests, relying instead on the principle that judicial deference should be shown towards
an administrative determination of a technical factual question. The
government claimed that such judicial deference should therefore permit an agency to impose a higher standard of proof on individuals challenging agency action. The court noted, however, that the
government's argument "confuses the scope ofjudicial review of factual
determinations by an agency with the standard of proof applicable in
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.

744 F.2d at 1428.
Id.
Id. at 1429.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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administrative hearings conducted to determine such matters" and con2 7
cluded that judicial deference is required only in the former situation. 1
The Tenth Circuit therefore affirmed the district court's order that the
case be remanded to the IBLA for determination under the preponderance of evidence standard.
D.

Analysis

The Tenth Circuit's characterization of Bender as presenting a
unique jurisdictional question never previously addressed by any circuit
court' 28 was based solely on the fact that the order being appealed had
remanded the case for the application of a different standard of proof
than that normally applied by administrative agencies. The finality of
other types of orders has been considered many times by the judiciary
without a consensus as to the proper approach.' 29 The trend has been
to expand the court's jurisdiction to hear appeals by broadening the definition of "final."
An expansive construction was given to the finality requirement of
28 U.S.C. § 1291 in Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp.13 0 Cohen involved a stockholder's derivative suit brought in a federal district court
under diversity jurisdiction. When the trial court refused to apply a New
Jersey statute requiring that the plaintiffs post a bond, the defendant
immediately appealed. Out of that appeal came what is now known as
the "collateral order" doctrine.
The doctrine expands the definition of "final decision" to include
final determinations by a district court on issues that meet certain requirements even though the action as a whole has not been terminated.
The Cohen Court read the finality requirement of section 1291,131 in
conjunction with the exceptions for certain interlocutory matters as enumerated in 28 U.S.C. § 2892,132 as prohibiting only appeals from decisions that are "tentative, informal or incomplete" as well as those
127. Id. at 1430.
128. Id. at 1426.
129. See, e.g., McGourkey v. Toledo and Ohio Cent. Ry. Co., 146 U.S. 536 (1892). In
determining the finality of a court order referring a case to a special master, the McGourkey
court stated "[pirobably no question in equity practice has been the subject of more frequent discussion in this court than the finality of decrees.... The cases, it must be conceded, are not altogether harmonious." Id. at 544-45. Nearly 60 years later the Supreme
Court quoted the above passage and continued:
This lamentation is equally fitting to describe the intervening struggle of the
courts; sometimes to devise a formula that will encompass all situations and at
other times to take hardship cases out from under the rigidity of previous declarations; sometimes choosing one and sometimes another of the considerations that
always compete in the question of appealability, the most important of which are
the inconvenience and costs of piecemeal review on the one hand and the danger
of denying justice by delay on the other.
Dickinson v. Petroleum Conversion Corp., 338 U.S. 507, 511 (1950).
130. 337 U.S. 541 (1949).
131. For the text of the finality requirement, see supra note 113.
132. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a) (1982) states:
[T]he courts of appeals shall have jurisdiction of appeals from:
(1) Interlocutory orders .. .granting, continuing, modifying, refusing or dissolving injunctions, or refusing to dissolve or modify injunctions... ;
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decisions which although "fully consummated . . . are but steps towards [a] final judgment in which they will merge."133
The Supreme Court held that decisions are appealable when they
"finally determine claims of right separable from, and collateral to,
rights asserted in the action, too important to be denied review and too
independent of the cause itself to require that appellate consideration
be deferred until the whole case is adjudicated."1 3 4 The Court also recognized that appellate review of the issue could not wait until final disposition of the case because "[w]hen that time comes, it will be too late
effectively to review the present order, and the rights conferred by the
13 5
statute, if it is applicable, will have been lost, probably irreparably."
Thus, the elements of the "collateral order" doctrine as established in
Cohen are: (1) that the order completely resolve the issue it addresses
without being tentative, informal or incomplete; (2) that the issue addressed be independent and separable from the main dispute; (3) that
the issue be "important;" and (4) that a showing be made that effective
review will be impossible at the time the dispute is resolved.
Six months after Cohen, the Supreme Court decided Dickinson v. Petroleum Conversion Corp. 136 There the Court was faced with determining
the appealability of an order that settled less than all the claims
presented in the action. 13 7 The Court, in dicta, stated that the most
important of the several considerations involved in determing appealability are "inconvenience and costs of piecemeal review on the one hand
and the danger of denying justice by delay on the other."1 38 The Court
then went on to make an ad hoc determination based on the facts before
it. 139

The Tenth Circuit decided Bender v. Clark by combining the tests
ennunciated in Cohen and Dickinson. The court used two of the four criteria in Cohen as the threshold test, following that with the balancing test
mentioned in the Dickinson dicta. One criterion borrowed from Cohen
was that effective review will be impossible if the appeal is delayed until
(2) Interlocutory orders appointing receivers, or refusing orders to wind up receiverships or to take steps to accomplish the purpose thereof... ;
(3) Interlocutory decrees ... determining the rights and liabilities of the parties
to admiralty cases ....
The Court concluded that these exceptions indicated that the purpose of the statute was

"'to allow appeals from orders other than final judgments when they have a final and irreparable effect on the rights of the parties." 337 U.S. at 545.
133. 337 U.S. at 546.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. 338 U.S. 507 (1950).
137. A similar problem today would be resolved under FED. R. Civ. P. 54(b), which
allows for a final judgment on less than all the claims brought before a trial court and
which became effective prior to the court's decision in Dickinson. Because that rule was not
in effect at the time that the order under review in Dickinson was issued, the Court declined

to consider it in their decision. Id. at 512.
138.

See supra note 129.

139. After noting that FED. R. Civ. P. 54(b) was inapplicable, see supra note 137, the
Court stated: "We will not, therefore, try to lay down rules to embrace any case but this."
338 U.S. at 512.
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final disposition of the case. It.is from this requirement that the "urgent" element of the threshold test was taken. The Tenth Circuit cited a
First Circuit decision 14°1 in support of the proposition that urgency was
the dispositive concern, 14 ' but the Tenth Circuit did not provide an explicit statement of what characteristics make a claim "urgent."
The test relied on by the First Circuit in In Re Continental Investment
Corp. was "whether irreparable harm would result to appellants, not
from the district court order itself, but from a delay in obtaining appellate review of it.' 142 The Tenth Circuit appears to have impliedly
adopted the First Circuit's test as is evidenced by the court's statement
that the most important consideration in allowing the Department of
Interior to pursue its appeal was the fact that "because the government
in such a case has no avenue for obtaining judicial review of its own
administrative decisions, it may well be foreclosed from again appealing
the district court's determination at any later stage of this
14 3
proceeding."
The second criteria adopted from Cohen was that the issue must be
important. The Tenth Circuit explicitly provided the elements of an
"important question" by interpreting Cohen as identifying an important
issue as one which is "serious and unsettled, and not within the trial
court's discretion."' 44 Because both parties admitted that the standard
of proof used was a serious and unsettled one, the Tenth Circuit had no
trouble labeling the issue as important in applying the tests in Bender.
After the threshold showing of urgency and importance, the court
applied the balancing test from Dickinson. In so doing, the Tenth Circuit
equated the elements that define "urgent" and "important" with "the
danger of denying justice by delay" and then balanced those considera145
tions against the inconvenience and costs of piecemeal review.
Only time will tell whether the test espoused in Bender will be widely
adopted by other jurisdictions and rise to the level of the collateral order doctrine. It is quite probable, however, that this test is merely an146
other attempt to conclusively define finality.
Bruce M1lcLartv

140. In Re Continental Investment Corp., 637 F.2d I (Ist Cir. 1980). See infra text accompanyilg note 142.
141. 744 F.2d at 1427.
142. 637 F.2d at 5.
143. 744 F.2d at 1428.
144. Id. at 1427.
145. Id.
146. See .ipra note 129.

ANTITRUST LAW

OVERVIEW

Three Tenth Circuit antitrust decisions rendered during the past
survey period will be discussed in this article.' These cases involved
several issues in antitrust law. In Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp. v. Aspen
Skiing Co. ,2 the court reviewed claims made by Aspen Highlands that the
Aspen Skiing Company had monopolized the market for skiing services
in the Aspen area, thereby violating section 2 of the Sherman Act. 3 The
Tenth Circuit applied both the "intent" doctrine and the "essential facilities" doctrine to conclude that the Ski Company had violated a "duty
to deal" with the Highlands Corporation. 4 This was the Tenth Circuit's
first use of the essential facilities doctrine, a recent development in antitrust law which is being applied by the courts as an avenue of analysis
parallel to the intent doctrine in analyzing section 2, Sherman Act
claims. 5 The application of the essential facilities doctrine to monopolists will be a subject of focus in this survey.
In World of Sleep, Inc. v. La-Z-Boy Chair Co. ,6 the court ruled on the
admissability of conspiracy evidence, the continued application of the
per se rule in vertical price fixing conspiracies, the proof of damages
required in antitrust cases and, finally, the proof of injury required in a
Robinson-Patman Act case. Finally, in Monfort of Colorado, Inc. v. Cargill,
Inc.,7 the court reviewed the issue of when a company has standing, pursuant to section 16 of the Clayton Act, to seek injunctive relief against its
competitor's horizontal acquisition of a competing firm.
1. In a fourth antitrust case, City of Chanute v. Kansas Gas & Elec. Co., 754 F.2d 310
(10th Cir. 1985), the issue on appeal was the propriety of a district court grant of a preliminary injunction. Little substantive antitrust law was discussed in the Tenth Circuit's opinion, and therefore it will not be addressed in this survey.
In a fifth case, however, the court, in Rural Elec. Co. v. Cheyenne Light, Fuel & Power
Co., 762 F.2d 847 (10th Cir. 1985), ruled, consistent with the Supreme Court's decision in
Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire, 105 S. Ct. 1713 (1985), that municipalities are protected by the "state action" immunity to federal antitrust laws when state legislation or
constitutional provisions authorize the challenged municipal action. But the Tenth Circuit's decision in Cheyenne Light has lost much of its force because of the enactment of the
Local Government Antitrust Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-544, 98 Stat. 2750 (1984), which
states in pertinent part: "No damages, interest on damages, costs, or attorneys fees may
be recovered under section 4, 4A or 4C of the Clayton Act (15 U.S.C. 15, 15a, or 15c) from
any local government, or official or employee thereof acting in an official capacity."
Therefore, Cheyenne Light, and Town of Hatie for that matter, retain validity only for claims
arising before September 24, 1984. See Pub. L. No. 98-544, § 6, 98 Stat. 2750 (1984).
2. 738 F.2d 1509 (10th Cir. 1984), af'd, 105 S. Ct 2847 (1985).
3. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1982).
4. Aspen, 738 F.2d at 1520-22.
5. See generally Note, Unclogging the Bottleneck: A New Essential Facility Doctrine, 83
COLUM. L. REV. 441, 446-47 (1983).
6. 756 F.2d 1467 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 77 (1985).
7. 761 F.2d 570 (10th Cir. 1985), cert. granted, 106 S. Ct. 784 (1986).
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TO DEAL AND THE INTENT AND ESSENTIAL

FACILITIES DOCTRINES: ASPEN HIGHLANDS SKIING CORP. V.
ASPEN SKIING CO.

In Aspen Highlands Skiing Corporation v. Aspen Skiing Company, 8 the
Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's finding of monopolization
based upon the defendant's refusal to deal with the plaintiff, Aspen
Highlands. In doing so, the court applied both the intent and essential
facilities doctrines in finding a section 2, Sherman Act violation.
A.

Background

Aspen Highlands Skiing Corporation (Aspen Highlands) owns and
operates Aspen Highlands, a skiing facility located near Aspen, Colorado. Aspen Skiing Company (Aspen Skiing) operates three skiing facilities, Ajax Mountain, Buttermilk and Snowmass, in the same vicinity.9
From the 1962-63 skiing season until the 1971-72 season, Aspen Highlands and Aspen Skiing offered joint multi-day lift tickets which enabled
skiers to ski any of the four mountains. This joint ticket was discontinued in 1972 but was reinstituted in 1973 until the end of the 1976-77
season. 10 Profits from the joint tickets were allocated between the companies based on actual use at the four ski areas. Before the 1977-78
season, Aspen Skiing offered to continue the joint ticket sales if Aspen
Highlands would accept a fixed percentage of 13.2 percent of revenues,
a figure equal to that received by Aspen Highlands in the 1976-77 season, but below the percentage received in previous years. Aspen Highlands objected, claiming that the poor 1976-77 season upon which the
figure was based was a result of external circumstances not likely to recur. The parties eventually settled on a fixed percentage of fifteen percent. " The following season, 1978-79, Aspen Skiing proposed a fixed
percentage of 12.5 percent. Aspen Highlands again preferred to divide
revenues based on the former system of actual usage. Aspen Skiing declined and the parties ultimately failed to reach an agreement on joint
ticket sales. 12
Subsequently, Aspen Skiing offered a multi-day joint ticket for use
only at the three mountains which it operated. In an attempt to offer
skiers a product more marketable than a single mountain lift ticket,
Aspen Highlands introduced a package which included vouchers that
were theoretically negotiable at the Aspen Skiing mountains.' 3 Aspen
Skiing refused to accept the vouchers. Aspen Highlands unsuccessfully
attempted to negotiate with Aspen Skiing to remove all objections to the
vouchers. Aspen Skiing eventually raised single day ticket prices to the
point where it was no longer economically feasible for Aspen Highlands
8. 738 F.2d 1509 (10th Cir. 1984), aff'd, 105 S. Ct. 2847 (1985).
9. Id.at 1512.
10. Id.

11. Id.
12. Id.at 1513.
13. Id.at 1521.
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to offer the voucher package. 14 Additionally, Aspen Skiing initiated a
national advertising campaign that implied that there were only three
15
skiing mountains in the Aspen area.
Based on these facts, Aspen Highlands brought suit against Aspen
Skiing under section 4 of the Clayton Act, 16 alleging unlawful monopolization in violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act, 1 7 and conspiracy to
restrain trade in violation of section 2 of the Sherman Act.' 8 The jury
found in favor of Aspen Skiing on the section 1 claim and in favor of
Aspen Highlands on the section 2 claim.' 9
The Tenth Circuit, after disposing of an important procedural issue, 2 0 affirmed the decisions that Aspen Skiing was guilty of monopolization. The primary issue which the court addressed was the validity of
the theory that Aspen Skiing had a duty to deal with Aspen Highlands.
It determined that Aspen Skiing was guilty of monopolization and
agreed that a duty to deal was properly imposed based on two alternative theories: the intent doctrine, which determines whether the defendant had a purpose to create or maintain a monoply; and the essential
facilities doctrine, which is applied when a business or group of businesses control a scarce facility. The Tenth Circuit affirmed the lower
court based on both theories. 2 1 By the actions of Aspen Skiing, the
court determined that Aspen Skiing did, in fact, have an intent to mo14. Id.
15. Aspen, 105 S. Ct. at 2852.
16. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1982) provides in pertinent part:
Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section [pertaining to foreign persons], any person who shall be injured in his business by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue therefore in any district court of the United
States in which the defendant resides or is found or has an agent, without respect
to the amount in controversy, and shall recover threefold the damages by him sustained, and the cost of suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee.
Id. (emphasis added).
17. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982) provides in pertinent part:
Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in
restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations,
is declared to be illegal. Every person who shall make any contract or engage in
any combination or conspiracy hereby declared illegal shall be deemed guilty of a
felony.
18. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1982) states, in part:
Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or
conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or
commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed
guilty of a felony.
19. 738 F.2d at 1513.
20. The defendant, Aspen Skiing Company, argued that the district court erred in its
instructions to the jury concerning the relevant market. The objection made by the defendant to the trial court in the pre-trial conference, however, was not that the market
definition was incorrectly defined but that the market definition should be determined by
the court as a matter of law and should not be submitted to the jury as a question of fact.
In response, the plaintiff, Aspen Highlands, asserted that the defendant could not raise on
appeal the issue of market definition because that particular question was never raised by
objection at the trial level. The Tenth Circuit agreed with Aspen Highlands and held that
Aspen Skiing's proposed instructions would also not suffice to preserve the issue. Finally,
the circuit court concluded that in light of the above facts Aspen Skiing did not adequately
apprise the trial court of the grounds for the objection which it wished to raise on appeal.
738 F.2d at 1513-16.
21. 738 F.2d at 1520-22.

DENVER UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 63:2

nopolize. Further, by defining the joint lift ticket as a scarce facility, it
held that Aspen Skiing's refusal to participate with Aspen Highlands resulted in monopolization and again, affirmed a duty to deal. Interestingly, the Supreme Court, Justice Stevens writing for the majority,
affirmed the Tenth Circuit, but based its decision exclusively on the interest doctrine.2 2 According to the Court, Aspen Skiing's actions did
constitute an intent to monopolize. However, the Court did not address
the issue of the possible application of the essential facilities doctrine.
B.

The Intent Doctrine and the Essential FacilitiesDoctrine

Since the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Colgate,23 in
1919, courts have not imposed antitrust liability for a single monopolist's refusal to deal with a particular party unless the refusal was based
upon an intent to increase or preserve the monopoly. 24 Lawful monopolists - those who, for example, have obtained market power through
superior skill, foresight, and industry2 5- have been accorded wide discretion in choosing with whom they wish to do business. 26 This principle has come to be known as the Colgate doctrine. 2 7 The monopolist's
discretion, however, is not unlimited. The refusal to deal may not be
motivated by an intent to monopolize. The intent test, derived from
dicta in the Colgate case, 28 and more recently expressed in United States v.
Grinnel Corporation,29 is one of two theories under which a duty to deal
can be imposed on a monopolist.
A second theory for imposing a duty to deal upon a monopolist is
the "essential facilities" or "bottleneck" doctrine. Under this theory, a
business or group of businesses cannot limit access to a facility or product, if that facility or product is scarce and essential to the manufacture
or provision of a secondary product or service.30 The elements necessary to the establishment of liability under the essential facilities doctrine are: 1) control of the essential facility by a monopolist; 2) a
competitor's inability to duplicate the facility; 3) denial of the use of the
22. Aspen Highlands v. Aspen Skiing Co., 105 S. Ct. 2847, 2861-62 (1985).
23. 250 U.S. 300 (1919).
24.

Note, The Monopolist's Refusal to Deal: An Argunent for a Rule of Reason, 59

TEX.

L.

1107 (1981).
25. See United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 430 (2d Cir. 1945).
26. Note, supra note 5, at 443.
27. Note, supra note 5, at 461; Note, supra note 24, at 1107.
28. Colgate, 250 U.S. at 307 ("In the absence of any purpose to create or maintain a
monopoly, the act does not restrict the long recognized right of a trader or manufacturer
engaged in an entirely private business, freely to exercise his own independent discretion
as to parties with whom he will deal.") (emphasis added).
29. 384 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1966) ("The offense of monopoly under § 2 of the Sherman Act has two elements: (1) the possession of monopoly power in the relevant market
and (2) the willful acquisition or maintenance of that power as distinguished from growth
or development as a consequence of a superior product, business acumen, or historic
accident.").
30. See Note, Refusals To Deal By Vertically Integrated Monopolists, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1720,
1722 (1974).
REV.
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facility to a competitor; and, 4) the feasibility of providing the facility. 3 1
Noticeably, there is not an expressed element of intent; the essential
facilities doctrine focuses on the detrimental effect on competitors. 3 2
There has been considerable confusion in the application of the essential facilities doctrine. Many courts apply the doctrine to section 1,
Sherman Act concerted activity cases, while others apply it to section 2
monopolization cases. 33 In the seminal essential facilities case, United
States v. Terminal Railroad Association, 34 the Supreme Court considered
the actions of a group of competitors who owned a single corporation
which in turn owned the only terminal for rail traffic coming into the city
of St. Louis from the west. The Court held that the company had a duty
to deal with non-proprietor railroads on reasonable terms and to provide access to the terminal. However, the Court did not specify whether
its ruling was based on section 1 or section 2 of the Sherman Act.
Some courts have strained to find some combination which permits
application of the essential facilities doctrine to section 1 claims. 35 It is
not difficult to understand the application of the essential facilities theory to section 1 claims involving a group of persons who control a facility.3 6 In such cases, any limitation to access by a group of persons
without a business justification should be construed as a conspiracy to
restrain trade or limit competition.
The appropriateness of the essential facilities analysis becomes
doubtful, however, when applied to a single firm's refusal to deal. Section 1 of the Sherman Act speaks only to concerted action. To apply an
essential facilities analysis to a single firm, courts must base their application on section 2 of the Sherman Act. However, proof of a section 2
violation has traditionally been a two element process. The plaintiff
must first establish that the defendant possesses monopoly power in the
relevant market. Second, that power must have been derived as a consequence of the willful acquisition or maintenance of the monopoly power
and not from "a superior product, business acumen, or historic accident. ' 13 7 By applying the essential facilities theory to a single firm monopolist, a court may impose a duty to deal on single firm monopolists
without consideration as to the intent of that monopolist. This would be
in direct contravention of the Colgate/Grinnel section 2 intent
requirement.
In Aspen, the Tenth Circuit first determined with respect to satisfaction of the traditional section 2 elements that the first element, market
power, was not at issue. The court held that Aspen Skiing did not pres31. Aspen, 738 F.2d at 1520 (citing MCI Communications, Inc. v. AT & T, 708 F.2d
1081, 1133 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 891 (1983)).
32. Byars v. Bluff City News Co., 609 F.2d 843, 856 (6th Cir. 1979) (but suggesting
this neat theoretical dichotomy may be somewhat blurred in practice).
33. Note, supra note 5, at 452.
34. 224 U.S. 383 (1912).
35. See Note, supra note 5,at 453 and cases cited therein.
36. See, e.g., Byars, 609 F.2d 843, 854 (6th Cir. 1979).
37. Grinnel Corporation, 384 U.S. at 571.
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ent an issue as to the sufficiency of the evidence on the district court's
definition of the market.3 8 The court then needed only to address the
possible misuse of that monopoly power. For this, the court relied on
both the intent theory and the essential facilities doctrine.
The question must be asked whether the essential facilities doctrine
should be a basis, either alone or in conjunction with an intent analysis,
for imposing a duty to deal on a single firm if that doctrine does not
include a finding of intent as a necessary element. The answer according to Colgate and its progeny is no. As discussed above, Colgate and
Grinnel mandate a finding of intent.
The Tenth Circuit treated the two duty-to-deal theories as overlapping but potentially alternate independent theories of liability.3 9 However, the essential facilities analysis in the section 2 context is
unnecessary and inconclusive because a court will be required to find
40
intent before a duty to deal is appropriately imposed.
The Tenth Circuit relied on MCI Communications, Inc. v. AT&T for
the elements necessary to establish liability under the essential facilities
doctrine. 4 1 The Seventh Circuit in MCI cited Hecht v. Pro-Football,
Inc.,42 in which the District of Columbia Circuit reversed the district
court for failing to give the essential facilities instruction to the jury.
The instruction was to be given with respect to claims of violations of
sections 1 and 3 of the Sherman Act, both of which require a contract or
combination restraining trade or commerce. In Hecht, the illegal contract was the agreement between the defendants, Pro-Football, Inc., operator of the Washington Redskins, and the District of Columbia
Armory Board, operator of Robert F. Kennedy Stadium. The Seventh
Circuit, in MCI, subsequently applied the analysis of Hecht to MCI, which
was not a Sherman Act section 1 or section 3 case, but a section 2 case.
Thus, the Seventh Circuit's reliance on Hecht, and the Tenth Circuit's
subsequent reliance on MCI, were misplaced.
Furthermore, it is doubtful whether the Supreme Court would affirm a duty to deal based exclusively on an essential facilities analysis.
The Supreme Court affirmed the Aspen holding based exclusively on the
Tenth Circuit's intent doctrine analysis. The Court specifically declined
43
to address the essential facilities issue.
II.

CONSPIRACY EVIDENCE, THE PER SE RULE, MEASURE OF DAMAGES,
AND INJURY UNDER THE ROBINSON-PATMAN

SLEEP v.

ACT: WORLD OF

LA-Z-Bov

The Tenth Circuit addressed a variety of antitrust issues in World of
38.
39.
40.
41.

738 F.2d at 1513-16.
Id. at 1520 n.13 (citing Byars, 609 F.2d at 857).
738 F.2d at 1520 n.13.
See supra note 31 and accompanying text.

42. 570 F.2d 982 (D.C. Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 956 (1978).
43. 105 S. Ct. at 2862 n.44.
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Sleep v. La-Z-Boy. 4 4 After disposing of an argument by the defendant,
Montgomery Ward, regarding the timeliness of the appeal, 4 5 the court
considered the admission of hearsay evidence to establish a conspiracy
under the Sherman Act, the per se rule of analysis of a vertical price
fixing charge, lost profits as an element of damages under section 4 of
the Clayton Act, and proof of damages for recovery for a Robinson-Patman Act violation.
A.

Background

World of Sleep, Inc. is a high-volume price discounter of retail bedding products, located in Denver, and controlled and operated by
Thomas Hansen. 4 6 In 1975 and 1976, Hansen purchased television and
newspaper advertisements which highlighted World of Sleep's lower
prices in comparison to prices for La-Z-Boy chairs sold by Montgomery
Ward and La-Z-Boy Showcase Shoppe. Montgomery Ward was displeased with World of Sleep's promotion strategy and complained to
La-Z-Boy. Hansen testified that the vice president of sales and marketing for La-Z-Boy, Gary Schroeder, telephoned him to request that the
ads be discontinued. Schroeder could not recall making this call. 4 7 LaZ-Boy then notified World of Sleep that it was past due on its account
and requested a current financial statement, which Hansen refused to
provide. 48 La-Z-Boy subsequently placed various credit restrictions on
World of Sleep, and eventually severely limited the number of chairs
which could be sold to World of Sleep. World of Sleep discontinued the
49
La-Z-Boy line in August, 1977.

Based on these events, World of Sleep filed suit alleging a violation
of section 1 of the Sherman Act 50 by defendants La-Z-Boy Chair Company, Montgomery Ward, and Art Mauldin, owner of La-Z-Boy Showcase Shoppe, for allegedly conspiring to maintain the retail price of LaZ-Boy chairs. 5 ' Additionally, World of Sleep claimed that La-Z-Boy
52
Chair Company had violated section 2(e) of the Robinson-Patman Act
44. 756 F.2d 1467 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 77 (1985).
45. Id. at 1471. Montgomery Ward contended that even though notices of appeal
were filed by both World of Sleep and La-Z-Boy within thirty days of the district court
order awarding attorneys fees, their failure to file a notice of appeal within thirty days of
the order denying motions for new trial should have rendered the appeals untimely. The
court applied the rationale of Gurule v. Wilson, 635 F.2d 782 (10th Cir. 1980), wherein
the court held that a decision on the me-its which does not dispose of an outstanding
request for attorneys fees is not final for purposes of appeal. The court noted that Gurule
had been subsequently overruled by its recent decision in Cox v. Flood, 683 F.2d 330
(10th Cir. 1982). However, the court held that the Cox decision was rendered after the
appeals were filed in World of Sleep and the Cox rationale would not be retroactively applied.
World of Sleep, 756 F.2d at 1471 (citing E.E.O.C. v. Gladdis, 733 F.2d 1373 (10th Cir.
1984)).
46. 756 F.2d at 1472.
47. Id
48. Id.
49. Id. at 1472-73.
50. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982). See supra note 17.
51. 756 F.2d at 1470.
52. 15 U.S.C. § 13(e) (1982).
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by discriminating in its advertising allowances. 53
The district court granted summary judgment for Mauldin. The
jury found in favor of the remaining defendants on the Sherman Act
claim, and returned a verdict in favor of World of Sleep on the Robin54
son-Patman Act claim.
B.

The Price Fixing Conspiracy Claims
1. Evidence of Conspiracy

The Tenth Circuit affirmed the summary judgment for the defendant, Mauldin Corporation. The court held that, pursuant to the federal
rules of evidence governing hearsay, 55 a co-conspirator's hearsay testimony is inadmissable in the absence of sufficient independent evidence
of a conspiracy involving the defendant. 56 The.words or actions of a coconspirator are admissable only after the court has established the existence of a conspiracy with independent evidence of that conspiracy. 5 7 In
the instant case, World of Sleep wished to present, as hearsay evidence
against the Mauldin Corporation, tapes of telephone calls made by a LaZ-Boy representative to Hansen in which the La-Z-Boy representative
told Hansen that Mauldin had been requested to "hold the line" on LaZ-Boy chair prices. 58 World of Sleep presented, as independent evidence of the conspiracy, surveys which indicated that Mauldin's advertising became less price-oriented after this request. The Tenth Circuit
agreed with the trial court that these survey results did not constitute
evidence sufficient to establish a conspiracy. Therefore, the trial court
had properly excluded the tapes of the telephone conversations and
59
granted summary judgment in Mauldin's favor.
The Tenth Circuit reached a similar conclusion regarding World of
Sleep's conspiracy claim against Montgomery Ward. Montgomery Ward
claimed on appeal that the trial court had erred in not granting it a directed verdict because the evidence relating to the price fixing charge
was insufficient to raise ajury issue. The court merged the hearsay analysis applied to Mauldin with the rule addressing the quantum of conspiracy evidence necessary to raise a jury issue, as recently established in
Monsanto Co. v. Spray Rite Service Corp.6 0
53. 756 F.2d at 1470. La-Z-Boy unsuccessfully raised a counter claim under the Colorado Unfair Practice Act, COLO. REV. STAT. § 6-2-105 (1973), alleging that World of Sleep
had unlawfully sold La-Z-Boy chairs below cost. The jury found against this claim and the
Tenth Circuit affirmed. 756 F.2d at 1480-81.
54. Id. at 1470.
55.

FED. R. EvID. 104, 801.

56. 756 F.2d at 1474.
57. See United States v. Peterson, 611 F.2d 1313, 1330 (10th Cir. 1979), cert. denied,
447 U.S. 905 (1980). Peterson set forth a test whereby the court must determine, prior to
the admission of hearsay, that the party seeking admission of the hearsay statement has

shown by independent evidence that it is more likely than not that: 1) the conspiracy existed; 2) the declarant and defendant were members of the conspiracy; and 3) the statement was made during the course of and in furtherance of the objects of the conspiracy.
58. 756 F.2d at 1474.

59. Id.
60.

104 S. Ct. 1464 (1984).

The Tenth Circuit held that although the Monsanto case
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A plaintiff seeking relief under section 1 of the Sherman Act bears
the burden of introducing evidence sufficient to support a finding of an
unlawful contract, combination, or conspiracy. 6 1 The Supreme Court,
in Monsanto, held that a jury may not infer a conspiracy agreement
merely from complaints by a buyer, or even from the fact that the seller
terminated his business with the buyer due to the complaints. 6 2 The
Tenth Circuit, in World of Sleep, noted that the district court's determination that the taped telephone conversations were admissable against
Montgomery Ward was based solely on the type of evidence held to be
insufficient by Monsanto to raise a factual issue of conspiracy- complaints by the seller, Montomery Ward, who competes with the pricecutting plaintiff, World of Sleep. 63 Therefore, the trial court had improperly admitted the co-conspirator hearsay evidence. Furthermore,
Montgomery Ward's complaints, standing alone, were insufficient to
raise ajury question, in accordance with Monsanto. Therefore, the Tenth
Circuit held that the trial court improperly allowed the Sherman Act
claim against Montgomery Ward to be submitted to the jury. 64
With respect to the Sherman Act claim against La-Z-Boy, however,
the taped telephone conversations which were inadmissable as to
Mauldin and Montgomery Ward were held to be admissable by the
court. The tapes were not co-conspirator hearsay, but rather were party
admissions by La-Z-Boy. 6 5 The holding regarding Mauldin was not that
a conspiracy with La-Z-Boy did not exist, but that evidence of the alleged conspiracy was inadmissable against Mauldin. Hence, La-Z-Boy
could still be accused of conspiring with Mauldin. 66 The court stated
that evidence, including the tapes and the fact that although World of
Sleep refused to agree to price fixing other buyers had agreed to the
arrangement, was sufficient to submit the conspiracy issue to the jury
67
regarding La-Z-Boy.
2.

The Per Se Rule of Vertical Price Fixing

After affirming the trial court's decision that the evidence was sufficient to send the section 1 Sherman Act claim against La-Z-Boy to the
jury, the Tenth Circuit considered the instructions given to the jury on
that claim. The district court had instructed the jury to consider the
dealt with the measure of conspiracy evidence sufficient to avoid a directed verdict for a
defendant that was a manufacturer, the Monsanto analysis is equally applicable in a case
where the defendant is not a manufacturer but is a "dealer-competitor." 756 F.2d at 1475.
61. Id. at 1475 (quoting Monsanto, 104 S. Ct. at 1471 n.8).
62. 756 F.2d at 1475.
63. Id
64. Id. Because the jury had found for Montgomery Ward on this claim, it was unnecessary to reverse the trial court as to this part of its decision.
65. Id. at 1476 n.2 (citing FED. R. EvID. 801(d)(2)(E)).
66. 756 F.2d at 1476 n.2 (citing United States v. Sangmister, 685 F.2d 1124, 1126-27
(9th Cir. 1982); United States v. Coppola, 526 F.2d 764, 776 (10th Cir. 1975)).
67. 756 F.2d at 1475-76 (citing Black Gold, Ltd. v. Rockwool Industries, Inc., 729
F.2d 676, 685-86 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 178 (1984)). For a discussion of the
Black Gold decision, see Note, Eleventh Annual Tenth Circuit Survey: Antitrust, 62 DEN. U.L.

REV. 25, 26-33 (1985).
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claim under the rule of reason. 68 Under the rule of reason, courts must
balance the anti-competitive and pro-competitive effects of the complained of actions. 69 World of Sleep argued that the per se rule should
have been applied instead. 70 According to the per se rule, if a practice
falls within a specified category of activities, it is deemed illegal without
any inquiry as to pro-competitive effects. The plaintiff must simply
71
prove that the defendant did the proscribed practice.
In 1983, the Tenth Circuit rejected the application of the per se rule
in Mid West Underground Storage, Inc. v. Porter,72 a case involving a conspiracy to eliminate competition. This appeared to conform with the judicial trend away from the per se rule and toward the rule of reason. 73 In
World of Sleep the court noted this trend, citing in particular Continental
T. V, Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, 74 wherein the Supreme Court ruled that non75
price vertical restraints are to be judged under the rule of reason.
However, the Tenth Circuit observed that the Supreme Court in Monsanto had declined to abrogate the application of the per se rule in vertical price fixing agreement cases. 76 Therefore, Monsanto required that
the Tenth Circuit apply the per se standard to this case.
La-Z-Boy argued that the per se rule applies only when a specific
price has been maintained, and not when an agreement was intended
merely to maintain general price levels. 7 7 The Tenth Circuit rejected
this argument, relying in part on United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co. 78
In that case, the Supreme Court said that the test is not whether a specific price was intended to be maintained, but whether a dealer had been
deprived of the ability to exercise his independent judgment in making
79
pricing decisions.
World of Sleep had introduced evidence that La-Z-Boy intended to
pressure Mauldin into maintaining a certain price level.8 0 Accordingly,
the Tenth Circuit reversed and remanded on this issue, ordering the
trial court to instruct the jury that the alleged agreement, if it existed,
was illegal per se.8 1
3.

Lost Profits from Licensee Sales

World of Sleep, prior to dropping the La-Z-Boy chair line, had licensing agreements with four other stores in the Denver area whereby
68. 756 F.2d at 1476.
69. See National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679 (1978).
70. 756 F.2d at 1476.
71. See United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940); Lipner, Antitrust's Per Se Rule: Reports of its Death Are Greatly Exaggerated, 60 DEN. L.J. 593 (1983).
72. 717 F.2d 493 (10th Cir. 1983).
73. See Lipner, supra note 71, at 593-94.
74. 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
75. Id.
76. 756 F.2d at 1476-77. See also Monsanto, 104 S. Ct. at 1469.
77. 756 F.2d at 1476-77.
78. 310 U.S. 150 (1940).
79. Id. at 221.
80. 756 F.2d at 1477.
81. Id.
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World of Sleep sold merchandise, including La-Z-Boy chairs, to these
licensees and provided them warehouse facilities and advertising.8 2 LaZ-Boy had unsuccessfully argued at trial that it should have been
awarded the lost profits that it could have realized on sales of La-Z-Boy
chairs to its licensee stores. The Tenth Circuit stated that under section
4 of the Clayton Act, 83 a plaintiff must prove an antitrust violation, the
fact of damage or injury, and measurable damages. 8 4 After determining
that the injury-in-fact requirement was satisfied by World of Sleep's
proof of at least some damage flowing from an unlawful conspiracy, the
court considered the question of what level of proof was necessary to
support an award of damages. The Tenth Circuit quoted Story Parchment
Co. v. Paterson Parchment Paper Co.,85 wherein the Supreme Court concluded that it is enough for a plaintiff to establish the extent of damages
"as a matter ofjust and reasonable inference, although the result may be
only approximate." '86 The Tenth Circuit concluded that "[i]f proof of a
profit and loss history were required, no plaintiff could ever recover
'8 7
losses resulting from his inability to enter a market."
World of Sleep had proffered evidence of damages through an expert witness, who introduced a method by which lost profits could be
calculated.8 8 Other evidence tended to prove the unique character of
La-Z-Boy chairs and World of Sleep's inability to effectively replace that
brand. Therefore, the court ruled that the trial court had improperly
excluded evidence of lost licensee sales profits, and ordered that the
trial court admit this evidence on retrial. 89
C.

Injury Under the Robinson-Patman Act

La-Z-Boy manufactured two very similar lines of chairs. Generally,
La-Z-Boy offered a promotional allowance of $2.25 to $3.00 per chair on
one line, but provided only advertising aids to stores carrying the other.
Montgomery Ward sold the first line and, therefore, received the promotional allowance, while World of Sleep carried the second line and
rarely received an advertising allowance. 9 0 World of Sleep alleged that
this constituted a violation of section 2(e) of the Robinson-Patman Act.
On appeal, La-Z-Boy argued that the issue should not have gone to the
jury. It claimed that World of Sleep had offered no evidence of actual
injury as required by section 4 of the Clayton Act. 9 '
82. Id.

83. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1976). See supra note 16.
84.
209 (3d
85.
86.

756 F.2d at 1478 (citing Danny Kresky Enterprises Corp. v. Magid, 716 F.2d 206,
Cir. 1983)).
282 U.S. 555 (1931).
Id. at 563.

87. 756 F.2d at 1478.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 1479.
90. Id.
91. 15 U.S.C. § 13(e) (1976). The court stated in a footnote that the facts more properly gave rise to a section 2(d) claim than a section 2(e) claim. Section 2(e) applies when a
seller performs promotional services for the buyer, while section 2(d) applies when the
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The Tenth Circuit held that the Supreme Court, inJ Truitt Payne Co.
v. Chrysler Motors Corp.,92 had established the test for damages with respect to violations of section 2(a) of the Robinson-Patman Act. 93 Under
section 2(a), the plaintiff must show actual injury arising from an antitrust law violation. 94 Because section 2(e) damages are also governed
by section 4 of the Clayton Act, the court extended this test to section
2(e) violations. Therefore, a plaintiff must establish not only that he
failed to receive a promotional allowance but also that his ability to com95
pete was adversely affected as a result.
World of Sleep failed to show that its ability to compete was adversely affected in any manner by being denied the promotional allowance. Testimony established that World of Sleep had been very
successful with the La-Z-Boy chair line.9 6 The Tenth Circuit concluded
that World of Sleep had failed to prove injury-in-fact as required by section 4 of the Clayton Act, and the Robinson-Patman jury decision was
therefore reversed by the court.
III.

STANDING TO SEEK INJUNCTIVE RELIEF TO PREVENT A
COMPETITOR'S MERGER: MONFORT OF COLORADO, INC.
v. CARCILI INC

A.

Background

In Monfort of Colorado, Inc. v. Cargill,Inc.9 7 the Tenth Circuit affirmed
a district court order granting injunctive relief to Monfort of Colorado,
Inc., thereby precluding a competitor's horizontal acquisition of a third
competing firm. Excel Corporation is a wholly owned subsidiary of the
defendant, Cargill, Inc. 98 Monfort is the fifth largest beef packer in the
country, and Excel is the second largest. 99 Excel signed an agreement
with Land O'Lakes, Inc. to acquire Land O'Lakes' Spencer Beef Division, the country's third largest beef packer.10 0 Monfort brought suit
pursuant to section 16 of the Clayton Act,' 0 ' to enjoin Excel's acquisiseller pays the buyer a price allowance for the services to be rendered by the buyer. 756
F.2d at 1479 n.6.
92. 451 U.S. 557 (1981).
93. 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1976) provides in pertinent part:
It should be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce.., to discriminate in
price between different purchasers of commodities of like grade and quality ...
where the effect of such discrimination may be substantially to lessen competition
or tend to create a monopoly.
94. 756 F.2d at 1479 (citingJ. Truett Payne, 451 U.S. at 562).
95. 756 F.2d at 1479 (citingJ. Truett Payne, 451 U.S. at 563-64 n.4).
96. 756 F.2d at 1480.
97. 761 F.2d 570 (10th Cir. 1985), cert. granted, 106 S. Ct. 784 (1986).
98. 761 F.2d at 572.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. 15 U.S.C. § 26 (1982) provides in pertinent part:
[Any corporation . . . shall be entitled to sue for and have injunctive relief...
against threatened loss or damages by a violation of the antitrust laws ....
when and
under the same conditions and principles... upon ... a showing that the danger
or irreparable loss or damage is immediate, a preliminary injunction may issue...
[emphasis added].
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tion of Spencer Beef. Monfort claimed that the acquisition would violate section 7 of the Clayton Act, 1 2 and section 1 of the Sherman
Act. 10 3 The district court ruled in favor of Monfort. 10 4 On appeal, the
primary issue was whether Monfort had standing to seek injunctive
relief.
B.

Standing to Seek Injunctive Relief Pursuant to Section 16
of the Clayton Act

The concept of standing in antitrust cases has continued to be a
troublesome area for the courts.' 0 5 This has been most evident in cases
involving section 4 of the Clayton Act, which provides treble damages to
persons injured by violations of the antitrust laws. 06 There is an underlying fear in the federal courts that failure to limit the scope of section 4
standing under the antitrust laws could lead to duplicative or excessive
recoveries based on a single violation. 10 7 In Monfort, however, the danger of duplicative or excessive damages did not exist since section 16
injunctive relief was requested. ' 0 8
The court therefore distinguished Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-OMat, Inc.,109 the landmark case which established that plaintiffs in section 4 cases must prove actual injury of the type the antitrust laws were
intended to prevent. The Tenth Circuit said that section 16 does not
require actual injury and, therefore, does not foreclose claims for which
the injury has not yet occurred."10 The court needed to inquire only
into the causal connection between the "threatened injury and the putative antitrust violation.""' The court likened this inquiry to proximate
cause analysis. 1 2 Based on these conclusions, the court considered
whether Excel's acquisition of Spencer Beef would be the proximate
cause of a future antitrust injury to Monfort.
In support of the causation argument, Monfort alleged that the acquisition of Spencer Beef by Excel would allow Excel to engage in pred102. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1982). This section provides, in part, that "No corporation engaged in commerce shall acquire, directly or indirectly, the ... assets of another corporation.., where ... the effect of such acquisition may be substantially to lessen competition,
or to tend to create a monopoly."
103. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982). See supra note 17.
104. 591 F. Supp. 683 (D.Colo. 1983). After discussing its findings and conclusions as
to the section 7 Clayton Act claim, the district court declined to reach the question of
whether a section 1 Sherman Act violation had taken place. Id. at 710.
105. See Saul, Antitrust Standing: Some Light at Last? 14 U. TOL. L. REv. 521 (1983); see also
Berger & Bernstein, An Analytical Frameworkfor Antitrust Standing, 86 YALE L.J. 809 (1977).
106. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1982). See supra note 16.
107. Saul, supra note 105, at 521 n.2; see also Note, Antitrust Ih4ury and Standing: A Question
of Legal Cause, 67 MINN. L. REV. 1011, 1014-15 (1983).
108. Monfort, 761 F.2d at 574.
109. 429 U.S. 477 (1977).
110. 761 F.2d at 575 (citing Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S.
100 (1969)).
111. 761 F.2d at 574.
112. Id. (citing Blue Shield of Virginia v. McCready, 457 U.S. 465, 477 (1982)). See also
Note, supra note 107, at 1032-39 (discussing proximate cause analysis with respect to section 4 of the Clayton Act).
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atory pricing and thereby drive competitors out of the beef packing and
fabricating business. Thus, the acquisition would ultimately lead to a
decrease in competition, which would be a violation of section 7 of the
Clayton Act.' '3 The Tenth Circuit agreed with Monfort. It noted that
reaching its decision was made more difficult by the fact that the predatory pricing was only threatened (as would be the case in any case in
which injunctive relief was being sought) but said that "Monfort's theory
of injury [was] logically related to harm caused by increased concentration of economic power."' 14 Since the Clayton Act was intended to be a
"prophylactic measure," it was not necessary to await the use of that
15
increased market power before injunctive relief was appropriate.'
Therefore, the Tenth Circuit held that Monfort had standing to seek an
injunction that would block Excel's acquisition of Spencer Beef.
The Tenth Circuit recognized that a potential for abuse exists when
competitors have the power to challenge each other's corporate mergers. The court said, however, that to forbid all private challenges to
mergers by competitors, as Excel proposed, would be too drastic, inasmuch as "Congress [has] created a private remedy for enforcing section
7 [of the Clayton Act] and hence apparently did not think that all private
challenges would be spurious."' 16 The court observed that even the
Justice Department was only asking that the court engage in a searching
scrutiny of private plaintiffs' allegations of injury before granting injunctive relief, but was not suggesting a complete denial of private party
7
standing in such cases.''
After disposing of the critical remedial issue of whether section 16
standing was appropriate, the Tenth Circuit easily affirmed the district
court's substantive ruling that a section 7 Clayton Act violation had occurred. The court ruled that the product and geographic markets which
had been applied by the district court, and its finding of a significant
entry barrier were not "clearly erroneous."' 8
David E. Doran

113.

See supra note 105.

114. 761 F.2d at 576. The court rejected arguments made by Excel that predatory
pricing would merely be a manifestation of "pure competition," stating that predatory
pricing was an evil that the antitrust laws were intended to prevent. Id. at 575.
115. Id. at 576.
116. Id.
117. Id. (citing a Justice Department amicus brief liled in an unrelated case). In sticcessfullv urging the Supreme Court to grant certiorari to the ,honr case, however, Justice
l)epartment lawyers argued that "allowing injunctions in circumstances like Ithose of the
.llonfort easel would 'increase substantially the likelihood that liling an antitrust suit will
become a routine tactic."
National l.aw Journal, January 27, 1986, at 28. col. 2.
118. 761 F.2d a[ 579.

CIVIL RIGHTS

OVERVIEW

This was a significant survey period for the Tenth Circuit in the area
of civil rights. The court examined the controversial issue of immunity
under section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871 for prosecutors and
police officers. Also under section 1983, the court decided that forensic
patients, like prisoners, have a constitutional right of adequate access to
the courts. Under Title VII, the court established a prima facie test for
determining discrimination in an academic setting. And, under the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), the court found that plaintiffs can collect future damages and applied the Supreme Court test for
determining an employer's willfulness in violating the ADEA.
I.

SECTION

1983 OF

THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF

1871

Section 19831 places personal liability upon any person who, acting
under color of state law, violates constitutional or other federally protected rights of another person. The Tenth Circuit further defined its
parameters in the three cases discussed below.
A.

The Absolute Immunity Defense to a Violation of a ConstitutionalRight:
Rex v. Teeples

Rex v. Teeples 2 examined the threshold question of whether a section
1983 claimant had suffered a violation of his constitutional rights, and
whether, in turn, one of the defendants was entitled to the absolute immunity defense afforded to prosecutors.
Randall Rex brought a section 1983 civil rights action against Police
Officer John Teeples and Chief Deputy District Attorney Donald Johnson, contending that Teeples violated his constitutional due process
rights by having him held under a state mental health statute, and that
Teeples and Johnson violated his due process rights by coercing him to
confess involuntarily. 3 The district court granted summary judgment
for both Teeples and Johnson, concluding that Johnson, as prosecutor,
had absolute immunity, and that the mental health hold and allegedly
coerced confession did not constitute constitutional violations and were
1. Section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982),
provides:
Every person who, under color of statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory . . . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen
of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws,
shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other
proper proceeding for redress.
2. 753 F.2d 840 (10th Cir.), cert denied, 106 S. Ct. 332 (1985).
3. Id. at 841.
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only cognizable under state tort law.4
On appeal, the Tenth Circuit reviewed the facts in the light most
favorable to Rex, the party opposing summary judgment. Rex was hospitalized after trying to commit suicide by carbon monoxide poisoning.
Teeples, a local police officer, suspected Rex of a local kidnapping,
questioned him, 5 and directed a doctor to place Rex under a seventytwo hour "mental health hold,"'6 allegedly because he did not yet have
probable cause to make an arrest but still wanted to question Rex. After
Rex was transferred to a second hospital, District Attorney Johnson advised Rex of his Miranda rights. 7 Rex allegedly signed a waiver of those
rights and then Teeples, and to a lesser extent, Johnson, interrogated
Rex. Rex eventually confessed to the kidnapping. Rex alleged that
Teeples and Johnson took advantage of his disorientation caused by the
suicide attempt, deceived him into believing that he was not a suspect,
and convinced him to talk without his attorney being present. 8 Rex was
later charged with attempted murder, second degree kidnapping and
third degree sexual assault. 9 Ultimately, he was not convicted of any of
these crimes.' 0
The Tenth Circuit had three issues to consider on appeal of the
district court's summaryjudgment forJohnson and Teeples: 1)whether
the alleged circumstances surrounding the seventy-two hour hold could
support a section 1983 claim of deprivation of liberty without due process; 2) whether the alleged circumstances surrounding Rex's confession could support a section 1983 claim of deprivation of liberty without
due process; and, 3) whether District Attorney Johnson's role in obtaining the confession entitled him to absolute immunity from the section 1983 claim. The court answered the first two questions
affirmatively, the third negatively and reversed and remanded for fur4.

Id.

5. Id. at 844 (Barrett, J., dissenting).
6. Under Colorado law, when a person appears to be mentally ill and appears to
present imminent danger to himself or others, a professional person, upon probable
cause, may place him in an approved facility for a seventy-two hour treatment and evaluation. CoLo. REv. STAT. § 27-10-105(1)(a) (Supp. 1984).
7. 753 F.2d at 841-42. The Colorado Court of Appeals has stated that Teeples did
not question Rex about the kidnapping until after Rex was under the mental health hold
and had been advised of his Miranda rights. People v. Rex, 636 P.2d 1282, 1284 (Colo. Ct.
App. 1981) (reversing the defendant's conviction for second degree kidnapping). The
Colorado Court of Appeals' statement of the facts is probably correct, in light of the fact
the Rex did not contend on appeal to the Tenth Circuit that Teeples questioned him
before advising him of his Miranda rights.
8. 753 F.2d at 842; see also People v. Rex, 636 P.2d 1282 (Colo. Ct. App. 1981).
9. 753 F.2d at 842.
10. Id. The sexual assault charges were dismissed. Rex was initially convicted of the
kidnapping charge, but the Colorado Court of Appeals reversed, holding that Rex's statements to Johnson and Teeples were involuntary and therefore inadmissable. People v.
Rex, 636 P.2d 1282, 1284 (Colo. Ct. App. 1981). Rex was then given a third trial in which
the involuntary statements were not introduced and he was again convicted of second
degree kidnapping. The Colorado Court of Appeals reversed that conviction for reasons
not relevant to this discussion. 753 F.2d at 842 (citing People v. Rex, 689 P.2d 669 (Colo.
Ct. App. 1984)).
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ther proceedings.I I
1. The Mental Health Hold
A threshold requirement of a section 1983 claim is that there be a
deprivation of a constitutional right. 12 The plaintiff must allege that the
act was committed under color of state or local law and that it subjected
the plaintiff to a "deprivation of any rights, privileges or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws."' 13 There is no simple test for determining when a police officer has crossed the constitutional line and
violated another's constitutional right. For example, if an officer has
made a wrongful arrest with a warrant and with probable cause, courts
14
have generally found that there has been no constitutional deprivation
6
5
unless the arrest was made maliciously' or for an improper purpose. '
Also, no constitutional deprivation has been found when only the
"slightest interference" with a personal liberty has been committed.' 7
The Tenth Circuit, Judge Seymour writing for the majority, adapted
the "improper purpose" rationale previously used to assess arrests
made by police officers, to the facts surrounding the seventy-two hour
mental health hold.' 8 The court noted that if Teeples had placed Rex
under the mental health hold without the probable cause required by
the state mental health statute,19 for the improper purpose of questioning him about the kidnapping, Rex would have suffered a denial of his
liberty without due process sufficient to support his section 1983 claim.
The propriety of the mental health hold had not been addressed by the
11. 753 F.2d at 842-44.
12. See, e.g., McKay v. Hammock, 730 F.2d 1367, 1371 (10th Cir. 1984). The rights
protected by section 1983 include all the rights protected by the fourteenth amendment,
such as those rights which are protected by the due process, privileges and immunities,
and equal protection clauses thereof. Annot., I A.L.R. Fed. 519, 524 (1969).
13. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982). See supra note 1.
14. E.g., Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 145 (1979) (The Supreme Court held that
the plaintiff, falsely held by the police, had only a cause of action under state tort law, not
section 1983, because the police arrested the plaintiff with probable cause and under a
valid arrest warrant. Justice Rehnquist wrote for the Court: "The Fourteenth Amendment
does not protect against all deprivations of liberty. It protects only against deprivations of
liberty accomplished without due process of law."); Atkins v. Lanning, 556 F.2d 485 (10th
Cir. 1977).
15. E.g., Reeves v. City of Jackson, 608 F.2d 644 (5th Cir. 1979) (stroke victim arrested and put in drunk tank).
16. Lessman v. McCormick, 591 F.2d 605, 609-11 (10th Cir. 1979) (woman arrested
for non-payment of traffic tickets, brought to police station and forced to meet with bank
employee about her non-payment of a loan); see also Sartin v. Commissioner, 535 F.2d 430,
434 (8th Cir. 1976) (black man married to a white woman arrested without probable cause
by police for drunken driving).
17. Atkins v. Lanning, 556 F.2d 485, 489 (10th Cir. 1977); see also Wise v. Bravo, 666
F.2d 1128, 1133 (9th Cir. 1981).
18. 753 F.2d at 843.
19. See supra note 6. The Tenth Circuit considered the mental health hold a possible
deprivation of the right to liberty without due process, under the fifth and fourteenth
amendments, instead of a violation of the fourth amendment right to be free from illegal
arrests without probable cause or a warrant. Therefore, the "probable cause" of which the
court speaks is the probable cause under the Colorado mental health statute that a person
will be a danger to himself or others, rather than the probable cause necessary for a valid
arrest.
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district court and there were no affidavits from either the doctor or
Teeples explaining why Rex was held. Hence, the Tenth Circuit ruled
that there were definite issues of fact making summary judgment on this
20
issue inappropriate.
2.

The Allegedly Involuntary Confession

The court likewise concluded that Rex had stated a constitutional
claim arising from the interrogation conducted by Teeples and Johnson
21
and reversed the summary judgment for the defendants on this issue.
The court ruled that the transcript of the taped interrogation and the
Colorado Court of Appeals' ruling, when viewed in a light most
favorable to the plaintiff, indicated that there was a factual issue regarding whether Rex's statements had been made voluntarily. The court observed that extracting an involuntary confession by psychological
coercion has been held to be a due process violation in other courts and
is, therefore, actionable under section 1983.22 Judge Barrett dissented,
arguing that although Officer Teeples may have participated in the interrogation of Rex, those actions had not "caused" a deprivation of
Rex's constitutional rights. 23 He noted that Teeples had not introduced
the confession at Rex's trial, had not made the decision that it be introduced, and had only taken the confession after being told that Rex had
been advised of his Miranda rights. Judge Barrett thus used the traditional tort analysis of proximate cause, whereby a defendant may be excused from liability if the actions of another defendant are an
intervening cause of the plaintiff's injuries. 24 In this case, the prosecutor at Rex's kidnapping trial and the trial judge acted as intervening parties to Teeples' liability, Judge Barrett claimed.
25
Tort law analysis is often used by courts in civil rights cases.
However, using the tort law analysis of proximate cause as a defense to a
20. 753 F.2d at 842-43. Judge Barrett dissented on this issue because he felt that it
was beyond dispute that Rex appeared dangerous to himself following his attempted suicide, rendering Teeples' conduct within the authority created by the mental health statute.
Id. at 845 (Barrett, J. dissenting).
21. 753 F.2d at 843.
22. Id. (citing Duncan v. Nelson, 466 F.2d 939, 944-45 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S.
894 (1972); Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315, 323 (1959)). It is interesting to note that
Rex could have asserted offensive collateral estoppel on the issue of whether his confession was involuntary. The Supreme Court has held, in Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90
(1980), that decisions of state courts on federal constitutional claims raised in state criminal proceedings may be asserted as collateral estoppel in section 1983 actions. Collateral
estoppel would have prevented relitigation of whether Teeples and Johnson extracted an
involuntary confession from Rex, thereby violating his constitutional rights. See, e.g., Williams v. Bennett, 689 F.2d 1370 (11th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 335 (1983).
23. 753 F.2d at 846 (Barrett, J. dissenting).
24. See W. KEETON, PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS 301 (1984).

25. See, e.g., Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 187 (1960) (the Supreme Court holding
that section 1983 "should be read against the background of tort liability"), overruled on
other grounds, Monell v. Department of Social Serv., 436 U.S. 658 (1978); Duncan v, Nelson,
466 F.2d 939, 942-43 (7th Cir.) (proximate cause analysis used to determine defendant's
liability); cert. denied, 404 U.S. 894 (1972); Soto v. City of Sacramento, 567 F. Supp. 662,
688 (E.D. Cal. 1983);Jackson v. Dillion, 518 F. Supp. 618. 622 (E.D.N.Y. 1981). See generally S. NAHMOD, CIVIL RIGHTS AND CIVIL LIBERTIES LITIGATION 83-86 (1979).
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constitutional violation does not follow the spirit, or the letter, of section 1983. Section 1983 provides a civil action to protect persons
against misuse of state power; 26 it is often used where there is no adequate state remedy. 2 7 Section 1983 is intended to provide a remedy for
violations of constitutional rights, those rights which are accorded the
highest value in our society. On the other hand, proximate cause analysis is derived from traditional tort law which protects rights of a presumably lower value. A state may, by statute, abolish recovery for tort
injuries but may not do the same to recovery for violation of constitutional rights. One who wrongfully sets in motion the violation of an
individual's constitutional rights should bear a higher degree of responsibility than that person should if a tort, not cognizable under the civil
rights laws, is ultimately committed against an individual. Proximate
cause analysis serves to equate the responsibility that one bears for causing a violation of a constitutional right with causing a tort. Therefore,
proximate cause analysis can, under some circumstances, serve to cut off
liability earlier than is appropriate given the status of constitutional
rights in our society. 28 Furthermore, a proximate cause analysis cannot
be justified as a way to prevent police officers from bearing the brunt of
liability because of prosecutors' and judges' absolute immunity from
suit; 29 police officers, too, can assert a qualified immunity to protect
30
themselves from this liability.
3.

Absolute Prosecutorial Immunity

The Tenth Circuit's decision that Rex had asserted a colorable section 1983 claim meant that it then had to decide if District Attorney
Johnson was absolutely immune from the claim. 3 1 The court held that
Johnson was not entitled to absolute immunity because his acts against
Rex were not part of "initiation and presentation of a prosecution,"
32
which is the Supreme Court standard set forth in Imbler v. Pachtman.
In Imbler, the Supreme Court held that a state prosecuting attorney
acting within the scope of his duties in initiating and pursuing a criminal
26. C. ANTIEAU,

FEDERAL CIVIL RIGHTS ACTS: CIVIL PRACTICE § 51, at 94 (1980).
27. See Annot., I A.L.R. Fed. 519, 522 (1969).
28. One commentator writes: "[T]hat law school favorite, proximate cause, occasionally appears to divert attention from the real issue, the existence of Section 1983 liability."
S. NAHMOD, supra note 25. The author analyzes use of the proximate cause analysis in
section 1983 actions, concluding that proximate cause standards from tort law should not
determine the extent of liability under section 1983, but instead, the extent of liability
should be solely a question of the scope of the constitutional breach. Id. at 83-86.
29. See Smiddy v. Varney, 665 F.2d 261, 267 (9th Cir. 1981) (police officer not liable
after district attorney files charges because prosecutor presumably exercises independent
judgment in determining if probable cause existed), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 829 (1982).
30. Absolute and qualified immunities are discussed infra, notes 43-48 and accompanying text.
31. Rex, 753 F.2d at 843.
32. 424 U.S. 409 (1976). See also Lerwill v. Joslin, 712 F.2d 435, 437 (10th Cir. 1983).
Absolute immunity defeats a suit at the outset. Imbler, 424 U.S. at 419 n.3. This is as
opposed to a qualified immunity, which only protects public officials from liability when
they have acted in good faith. Qualified immunity is discussed infra, notes 43-48 and accompanying text.
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prosecution is immune from a civil suit for damages under section
1983. 3 3 Imbler provides only this narrow holding, however, and gives no
guidance as to which of the many functions of a prosecuting attorney are
covered by absolute immunity. Lower courts have since held that a
prosecutor is not entitled to absolute immunity when he engages in investigatory or administrative functions outside his "quasi-judicial"
role.3 4 The courts have held that police-related functions are investiga35
tive and so are not protected by absolute immunity.
The Tenth Circuit noted that "advocacy" is the determinative factor
in deciding which of the prosecutor's functions are covered by absolute
s6
immunity, because it is a prosecutor's most "quasi-judicial" function.
The court concluded the District Attorney Johnson was not entitled to
absolute immunity because "giving Miranda warnings to a general suspect and participating in his interrogation is 'police-related' work and
[not] quasi-judicial." '3 7 The court reversed the district court's grant of
summary judgment for Johnson.
Judge Barrett, in dissent, argued that investigative and administrative functions pervade a prosecutor's duties and that "slicing," or dividing the functions into categories for determining entitlement to absolute
immunity is questionable.3 8 Judge Barrett characterized Johnson's interrogation of Rex as being part of an advocate's preparation before de39
ciding whether to initiate an action.
B.

Qualified Immunity: Bledsoe v. Garcia

In Bledsoe v. Garcia,40 the Tenth Circuit considered the qualified immunity defense asserted by a police officer. The court joined those
courts which have held that police officers may claim a qualified immunity to a section 1983 action for using excessive force in making an
4
arrest. 1
1.

Background

Qualified immunity, also known as the good faith defense, protects
33. 424 U.S. at 410, 431.
34. Coleman v. Turpen, 697 F.2d 1341, 1346 (10th Cir. 1982); McSurely v. McClellan, 697 F.2d 309, 318 (D.C. Cir. 1982); Marrero v. City of Hialeah, 625 F.2d 499, 503-05
(5th Cir. 1980). This is called the "functional approach" to the immunity question, See
Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 810-11 (1981); Taylor v. Kavanaugh, 640 F.2d 450,
452 (2d Cir. 1981). Courts examine the function rather than the status of the person
acting to determine if absolute immunity applies. Gray v. Bell, 712 F.2d 490 (D.C. Cir.
1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 1593 (1984); Lerwill v. Joslin, 712 F.2d 435 (10th Cir. 1983);
McSurely v. McClellan, 697 F.2d 309 (D.C. Cir. 1982); see also Note, Civil Rights, 5 Am.J.
TRIAL ADVOC. 357 (1981).

35.
F.2d 83
36.
37.

Marrero v. City of Hialeah, 625 F.2d 499 (5th Cir 1980); Apton v. Wilson, 506
(D.C. Cir. 1974).
753 F.2d at 843.
Id. at 844.

38. Id. at 845 (Barrett,

J.,

dissenting).

39. Id. at 845-46.
40. 742 F.2d 1237 (10th Cir. 1984).
41. Id. at 1240.
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a public official from liability if he can prove he acted in "good faith." '4 2
Section 1983 does not expressly establish qualified or absolute immunities under that section. 4 3 However, the Supreme Court in Pierson v.
Ray4 4 found that Congress did not intend to abolish all common law
immunities when it passed section 1983 and held that the good faith
defense available to police officers in common law false arrest and imprisonment actions is also available in a section 1983 false arrest and
imprisonment action. 45 The Court explained in a later case, Imbler v.
Pachtman,4 6 that it found this immunity to exist by first considering "the
immunity historically accorded the official at common law and the interests behind it," 4 7 and then by determining "whether the same considerations of public policy that underlie the common law rule likewise
countenance . . . immunity under § 1983."48
There is some question among the courts as to whether a police
officer can also assert a qualified immunity to a section 1983 claim of
excessive force in making an arrest. 49 To find an immunity, lower courts
have extended the Supreme Court's holding in Pierson to this arrest situ42. Qualified immunity originally entailed both subjective and objective elements.
The subjective test has been eliminated. Today, officials are not subject to liability under
section 1983 if "their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457
U.S. 800, 818 (1981). See generally Note, Eleventh Annual Tenth Circuit Survey: Civil Rights, 62
DEN. U. L. REV. 59, 65-66 (1985) (discussing the distinction between the subjective and
objective tests, as applied by the Tenth Circuit).
The defendant must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he acted in good
faith. S. NAHMOD, supra note 25, at § 8.01.
43. One commentator has even suggested that section 1983 "could be read to impose
strict liability on state and local government officials once a constitutional deprivation has
been established." Note, Developments In the Law-Section 1983 and Federalism, 90 HARV. L.
REV. 1133, 1209 (1977). See also Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 417 (1975) (Section
1983 "on itsface admits of no immunities.").
44. 386 U.S. 547, 554 (1966). See also Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367 (1951)
(establishing immunity of legislators from section 1983 liability).
45. 386 U.S. at 557. The Court also held that judges have absolute immunity from
section 1983 liability.
Id. at 553.
Justice Douglas' dissent in Pierson was highly critical of the absolute judicial immunity
holding. He did not discuss the qualified immunity issue, but his clear rejection of absolute immunity seems to imply a concurrent rejection of qualified immunity. See also C.
ANTIEAU, FEDERAL CIVIL RIGHTS AcTs § 98 (2d ed. 1980) ("There is no acceptable proof

that Congress intended to immunize any public servants from liability under § 1983. It is
more likely that Congress intended in § 1983 to do away with whatever immunities existed
under state laws . . . . Notwithstanding the foregoing, some courts-including the
Supreme Court-seem bound to rewrite the Civii Rights Acts so as to exempt certain publicservants from the law.").
46. 424 U.S. 409 (1975) (finding absolute immunity for prosecutors).
47. Id. at 421.
48. Id. at 424. The common law the Court refered to is not the common law of any
given state, but rather, as the Court stated in Pierson, "the prevailing view of common law
in this country." 386 U.S. at 555. See Note,Developments In the Law-§ 1983 and Federalism.
90 HARV. L. REV. 1133, 1211 n.126 (1977).

49. Excessive force has been defined as that force which is unreasonable and unnecessary under the circumstances and which violates universally accepted standards of decency. Hausman v. Tredinnick, 432 F. Supp. 1160, 1162 (E.D. Pa. 1977). Federal courts
have held that a police officer's use of excessive force is actionable under section 1983. See
Hausman v. Tredinnick, 432 F. Supp. 1160 (E.D. Pa. 1977); Everett v. City of Chester, 391
F. Supp. 26 (E.D. Pa. 1975).
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ation. 50 Thus, the Eighth Circuit, in Landrum v. Moats, 5 1 held that two
police officers who shot a burglary suspect in the back and killed him
used excessive force, but nevertheless were entitled to a "qualified immunity from liability based on [their] good faith belief in the propriety
of their actions and reasonable grounds for that belief."' 52 The court
then set out guidelines for determining good faith:
If police officers 1) believe that a certain amount of force is necessary to make an arrest, 2) believe that use of that amount of
force is lawful under the circumstances, and 3) have reasonable
grounds for each of the foregoing beliefs, then they are entitled
to the defense of good faith even if the 53use of force turns out, ex
post, to have been illegal or excessive.
The court concluded that the absence of a good faith defense at common law to charges of assault and battery was not decisive on the availability of a section 1983 defense to such charges in view of "the policies
54
and purposes of the section 1983 action."
Two federal district courts, however, have held that police officers
are not entitled to this good faith defense. One district court, in a decision affirmed per curium by the Sixth Circuit, 55 held that there is no good
faith defense to the use of excessive force when the cause of action is
based upon assault and battery. The court reached this decision by interpreting the immunity found in Pierson as applying only to actions for
false imprisonment and false arrest. 56 Another district court, in a case
involving a deputy sheriffs violence towards a jail inmate, held that
the good faith defense is not applicable to an excessive force claim because such force violates constitutional rights and is inherently
57
unreasonable.
2.

Bledsoe v. Garcia

Defendant Garcia, a police officer, came to the Bledsoe residence to
arrest Plaintiff, Betty Bledsoe's son, Larry, for failure to appear and to
50. Samuel v. Busnuck, 423 F. Supp. 99, 101 (D. Md. 1976) (Police have a good faith
defense to liability under a section 1983 action for excessive force, even though that force
was used to effect an "improvident and misguided arrest.") (citing Pierson, 386 U.S. at
557); Richardson v. Snow, 340 F. Supp. 1261 (D. Md. 1972) (defense available to charge of
excessive force used to effect an arrest without a warrant) (citing Pierson, 386 U.S. at 557).
51. 576 F.2d 1320 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 912 (1978).
52. Id. at 1327.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 1327-28, n.15.
55. Aldridge v. Mullins, 377 F. Supp. 850 (M.D. Tenn. 1972), afdper curiam, 474 F.2d
1189 (6th Cir. 1973).
56. 377 F. Supp. at 858-59. In Garner v. Memphis Police Dept., 600 F.2d 52 (6th Cir.
1979), the Sixth Circuit affirmed a district court finding that the defendant police officers
could assert a good faith defense because they had acted in good faith reliance upon a
state law allowing police officers to kill a fleeing felon. The court did not specifically overrule Aldridge, so presumably the Sixth Circuit continues not to recognize the good faith
defense when the claim against the police is for assault and battery.
57. Williams v. Thomas, 511 F. Supp. 535, 542 (N.D. Tex. 1981) ("The Court . . .
cannot acquiesce in the proposition that excessive force can be immunized from liability
merely by a detention officer's sincere conviction that such excessive force represents the
best response to a perceived problem of prison discipline.").
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investigate Larry's AWOL status. 58 Larry stepped outside the house to
talk to Officer Garcia and admitted that he was AWOL. He then asked
Garcia if he could tell his mother that he was going to jail. 59 Garcia,
upon hearing someone in the house tell Larry that he was "not going
anywhere with that son-of-a-bitch," asked two other officers to assist
him. When the police officers walked toward the house, Betty Bledsoe
blocked the door and told them they could not enter.60 Garcia arrested
61
her for interfering with the police.
Betty Bledsoe brought a section 1983 action against Officer Garcia,
claiming that Garcia had used excessive force in arresting her. 6 2 The
jury found for Garcia. 63 Bledsoe appealed, contending that the trial
court erred in instructing the jury that good faith is a defense to a sec65
64
The Tenth Circuit affirmed.
tion 1983 claim of excessive force.
The Tenth Circuit, Judge Holloway writing, first pointed to the
Eighth Circuit's holding in Landrum that good faith is a defense to a section 1983 action based on excessive force, 66 setting out Landrum's fourpart guideline for determining good faith. 6 7 Then, applying the
Supreme Court's criteria set forth in Imbler, the court examined the common law immunity accorded police officers making arrests, the interests
served by this immunity, and whether such an immunity would be consistent with section 1983's policies and history. 68 To do this, the Tenth
Circuit chose to look at the common law of arrest instead of assault and
battery. Bledsoe had argued that common law assault and battery was
applicable, 69 and to which there is no good faith defense. 70 The court
relied on the Restatement (Second) of Torts, which establishes a privilege to use force in making an arrest as long as the force is not in excess
of that which "the actor reasonably believes to be necessary." 7 1 Noting
that the underlying policy of the privilege was that police should not be
held liable for split-second decisions made when arresting possibly dangerous persons, the court held that the common law privilege of force
"provides a sufficient parallel for recognizing in a § 1983 suit a good
58. Bledsoe v. Garcia, 742 F.2d 1237, 1238.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id. Once inside the house, Garcia arrested a neighbor, Gail Wesson, for interfering with the duties of a police officer when she tried to prevent the officers from searching
the rooms. Id.
62. Id. at 1239. Gail Wesson joined Betty Bledsoe in her suit, claiming that Garcia
and another officer falsely arrested and imprisoned her. Wessonjoined Bledsoe in several
other claims. Those claims asserted by Wesson alone were denied by the court. Id. at
1242-43 (refuting plaintiffs' claims of erroneous jury instructions).
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 1240.
66. Id. at 1239.
67. Id. See supra text accompanying note 53.
68. 742 F.2d at 1239 (quoting Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 421 (1976)).
69. Id. at 1239.
70.
71.

See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 21-34 (1965).
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 118, 132 (1965).
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72
faith defense to a claim of excessive force in making an arrest."

3.

Analysis

The Tenth Circuit's holding in Bledsoe extends the common law
good faith defense to a section 1983 action based on excessive force.
The holding seems a logical and natural one, based as it is on the solid
ground of common law and the Supreme Court's and other circuits'
findings of a qualified immunity for police officers. However, the holding's implications deserve closer examination.
Officers using excessive force, particularly deadly force, potentially
act as " 'prosecutor, jury, judge and executioner,' -73 clearly in violation
of one's due process rights. 74 Excessive force also violates the fourth
amendment right against unreasonable search and seizure. 75 Because
excessive force is always a violation of constitutional rights and is, by
definition, unreasonable and unnecessary, should a police officer escape
liability merely by asserting that he acted in good faith? If he can assert
this defense, then section 1983's unique purpose and effect are diluted.
Balanced against the above argument is the public's interest in not
preventing its police officers from taking action because of fear of liability. Perhaps a middle ground can be reached by allowing police officers
only to use force proportionate to the crime for which the arrest is being
made. Thus, police officers would then be able to assert the good faith
defense only when they used excessive force in arresting a violent
felon. 76 This is an imperfect solution, however, because line-drawing
then begins between violent and non-violent felons and between felons
and misdemeanants, and everything has come full circle: should the police, when arresting someone, be liable under section 1983 for a splitsecond decision, or should there be a qualified immunity for police officers in this situation? The debate will continue.
C. Prisoners' Rights: Access To The Courts
During the survey period, the Tenth Circuit decided two cases on
prisoners' right of access to the courts. Ward v. Kort 7 7 is a case of first
impression in which the court held that forensic patients have a right of
access to the courts, and state provisions of legal assistance in lieu of a
law library requires counseling for prisoners through completion of a
habeas corpus or civil rights complaint. Nordgren v. Milliken, 7 8 a case decided concurrently with Ward, indicates the extent to which the Tenth
Circuit is willing to find a right of access to the courts. The court there
72.
73.
L. REv.
74.

742 F.2d at 1240.
Comment, Deadly Force to Arrest: Triggering ConstitutionalReview. 11 HARV. Civ. RTS.
361, 386 (1976) (quoting Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 106 (1945)).
Aldridge v. Mullins, 377 F. Supp. 850, 859 (M.D. Tenn. 1972), affid, 474 F.2d

1189 (6th Cir. 1973); C. ANTIEAU,
75.
76.
77.
78.
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See generally Comment, supra note 73, at 384.
Comment, supra note 73, at 373 (1976).
762 F.2d 856 (10th Cir. 1985).
762 F.2d 851 (10th Cir. 1985).

Ac-rs § 131 (2d ed. 1980).

1986]

CIVIL RIGHTS

held that the right of access does not require assistance beyond the initial pleading stage.
1. The Right of Access to the Courts
The right of access to the courts is protected by the due process
clauses of the fifth and fourteenth amendments 7 9 and "assures that no
person will be denied the opportunity to present to the judiciary allega80
tions concerning violations of fundamental constitutional rights."
The Supreme Court has found that prisoners have a constitutional right
of access to the courts 8 ' to bring habeas corpus and civil rights actions. 82 In Bounds v. Smith, 83 the Court further held that states must provide prisoners with adequate law libraries or legal assistance to assure
84
this access.
In Bounds, the Court found that access must be adequate, effective
and meaningful. 8 5 The Court emphasized that the right of access protects "our most valued rights" because it allows prisoners to file habeas
corpus and civil rights petitions. 86 To ensure that courts consider such
petitions, the Court held that states must provide prisoners with a law
library or legal assistance to research issues of venue, standing, exhaustion of remedies, proper parties plaintiff and defendant, and types of
relief.8 7

With current legal information, prisoners might determine

"whether a colorable claim exists and what facts are necessary to state a

cause of action." 8 8
2.

8
Ward v. Kort

9

The plaintiff, Ray Ward, was an indigent forensic patient at Colo79. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 579 (1973). The right of access to the courts
has also been found to be one of the privileges and immunities accorded citizens under
article four and the fourteenth amendment, and as part of the right to petition under the
first amendment. Ryland v. Shapiro, 708 F.2d 967, 971 (5th Cir. 1983). It has also been
found to be covered by the equal protection clause. Gilmore v. Lynch, 319 F. Supp. 105,
109 (N.D. Cal. 1970). The Tenth Circuit does not agree that it can be found under the
equal protection clause. See, e.g., Nordgren v. Milliken, 762 F.2d 851, 855 n.3 (10th Cir.
1985).
80. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. at 579.
81. Exparte Hull, 312 U.S. 546, 549 (1941).
82. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. at 579-80.
83. 430 U.S. 817 (1977).
84. Id. at 828.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 827. Both federal and state prisoners can petition for writs of habeas corpus
to challenge the fact or duration of their confinement. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241-2255 (1982).
State prisoners can challenge the conditions of their confinement by filing a section 1983
civil rights action and alleging that prison officials, acting under color of state law, have
deprived the prisoner of constitutional or federal rights. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982).
87. 430 U.S. at 825-26.
88. Id.
89. The author would like to express her gratitude to Professor Alfred J. Coco,
Professor of Law and Librarianship and Law Librarian at the University of Denver College
of Law. Professor Coco represented Plaintiff Ray Ward on appeal and provided the author
with background information pertaining to this case.
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rado State Hospital (CSH). 90 In 1980, he initiated a section 1983 civil
rights action, pro se, challenging the conditions of his confinement at
CSH. Ward claimed that the CSH superintendent failed to provide adequate access to legal materials, thereby denying him adequate access to
the courts. 9 ' CSH had no law library, the only legal books available being one set of the Colorado Revised Statutes kept in the administration
building. 92 The hospital instead had a contract for legal services with a
private attorney to provide twelve hours of counselling a week for the
patients. 9 3 The magistrate who heard the case found and stated in his
findings of fact that the attorney assisted the patients in obtaining the
necessary forms from the United States District Court for civil rights and
habeas corpus petitions, helped in drafting the pleadings, and provided
research of case law as required. 94 The magistrate recommended dismissal of the case and the district judge affirmed and adopted the magistrate's findings and conclusions and dismissed the action. 9 5 Ward
appealed to the Tenth Circuit.
The Tenth Circuit, Chief Judge Holloway writing for the majority,
considered two issues: 1) whether a prisoner's constitutional right of
access to the courts, defined by the Supreme Court in Bounds, applied to
forensic patients at a state hospital; and 2) if so, whether CSH's contracted legal services met Bounds' constitutional test of meaningful
access .96
To resolve the first issue, the court relied on a Seventh Circuit case,
Johnson by Johnson v. Brelje,9 7 that is directly on point. That court held
that defendants under criminal charges who are committed to a mental
facility because they are found unfit to stand trial have a constitutional
right of access to the courts. 9 8 The Tenth Circuit agreed with theJohnson by Johnson court that forensic patients are not on a "lower plane"
than prisoners and held that they, too, are entitled to a constitutional
right of access to the courts. 9 9 The Tenth Circuit then considered
whether CSH had afforded adequate access to the courts for its patients.
After reviewing the record, the Tenth Circuit held that the legal
services at CSH were constitutionally infirm because the contract attorney was not knowledgeable about civil rights law, did not prepare
habeas corpus and civil right complaints for the patients or give them
guidance in completing these complaints, and did not research any issues such as those set forth in Bounds: " 'jurisdiction, venue, standing,
exhaustion of remedies, proper parties plaintiff and defendant, and
90. 762 F.2d 856, 856-57 (10th Cir. 1985). Ward had been confined to CSH since
1969 when he was found not guilty of a criminal offense by reason of insanity. Id. at 857.
91.

Id.

92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 858.
701 F.2d 1201 (7th Cir. 1983).
Id. at 1207.

99.

Ward, 762 F.2d at 858.
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209

types of relief available.' "100 Instead, he merely advised patients that
they could get forms from the federal district court for civil rights actions, and so, the court found, did not provide adequate legal counsel.' 0 ' The court concluded that the magistrate's findings, which were
subsequently adopted by the district court, that the contract attorney
adequately assisted hospital inmates through the completion of federal
habeas corpus or civil rights complaints, were not supported by substan02
tial evidence and were clearly erroneous.'
Using the Bounds "touchstone" of adequate, effective, and meaningful access,' 0 3 the Tenth Circuit then held that if a state elects to employ
contract attorneys rather than provide an adequate law library, the attorneys must counsel the prisoners or forensic patients through the completion of a federal habeas corpus or civil rights complaint, including
"necessary research and consideration of the facts and the law."' 10 4
Dissenting, Judge Barrett argued that the CSH legal services contract satisfied Bounds because inmates need only minimal assistance to
file habeas corpus or civil rights forms 10 5 and have no more right to an
attorney who is an expert in civil rights than does anyone else. 10 6 Any
other interpretation of Bounds, he wrote, would mean a requirement of
"legal representation" in civil litigation. 10 7 Judge Barrett further
pointed out the expense entailed in providing law libraries and legal
services not only to prisons but also to mental hospitals treating forensic
patients.10 8 Finally, Judge Barrett argued that prisoners must expect to
live under restrictive and harsh conditions as part of their penalty.' 0 9
Ward, even more than Bounds, affirms the states' obligation to assure
all prisoners of their constitutional right of access to the courts. Bounds
requires states to assist prisoners in the filing of habeas corpus and civil
rights petitions. Ward clarifies this by requiring assistance through the
completion of the complaint. Furthermore, Ward extends this right of
access to forensic patients in mental hospitals.
The Tenth Circuit did not hold, however, that prisoners and forensic patients have a right to representation by counsel in habeas corpus or
civil rights trial proceedings.' 10 Nevertheless, the court made it clear
100. Id. at 860 (quoting Bounds, 430 U.S. at 825).
101. 762 F.2d at 859-61.
102. Id. at 860.
103. " 'Meaningful access' to the courts is the touchstone." Bounds, 430 U.S. at 823.
104. 762 F.2d at 860-61.
105. Id. at 861 (Barrett. J. dissenting). This argument is belied by an earlier Tenth
Circuit case, Bradenburg v. Beaman, 632 F.2d 120 (10th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S.
984 (1981). The court there held that the trial court had not erred in refusing to entertain
a prisoner's habeas corpus and civil rights complaint when the prisoner failed to show
evidence of exhaustion of state remedies and used the wrong jurisdictional basis. Id. at
122. See also Turner, When Prisoners Sue: A Study of Prisoner Section 1983 Suits in the Federal
Courts, 92 HARV. L. REV. 610 (1979) (concluding that pro se plaintiffs have very little chance
of succeeding in section 1983 actions).
106. 762 F.2d at 861 (Barrett, J. dissenting).
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 862 (quoting Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981)).
110. Ward, 762 F.2d at 860.
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that providing prisoners access to the courts must be more than a symbolic gesture; prisoners and forensic patients must be able to file correct, complete petitions so that a prisoner with a valid complaint can
bring it to the courts and not be in danger of losing the protection of
"our most valued rights.'''''
Are states, however, required to assist prisoners in the filing of all
civil actions? Furthermore, are states required to give any legal assistance to prisoners beyond the initial pleading stage? Another case decided by the Tenth Circuit during the survey period, Nordgren v.
Milliken,"12 addressed these questions and the Tenth Circuit answered
both in the negative.
3.

Nordgren v. Milliken

In Nordgren, the plaintiffs, indigent prisoners at the Utah State
Prison, brought a section 1983 action claiming that they were denied
access to the courts because of an allegedly inadequate prison law library and inadequate legal assistance. 1 3 The underlying causes of action for which the plaintiffs were alleging a denial of access included
defense of a paternity suit, modification of a divorce decree, an action
for unlawful conversion of a plaintiffs guns, and civil rights claims
against the prison staff.' 14 The magistrate in his report found that the
state provided only minimal law library facilities at the prison but had
provided services of contracted attorneys who helped prisoners prepare
and file initial pro se pleadings in all civil matters. 115 Therefore, the magistrate concluded, because there is no constitutional right to the assistance of counsel for prison inmates beyond the pleading stage, the prison
had provided constitutionally adequate services.l 16 The district court
adopted the magistrate's report and granted summary judgment for the
defendant prison officials. 17
On appeal, the prisoners contended that meaningful access to the
courts includes the provision of legal assistance at all stages of trial proceedings, not just the initial pleading stage, and for all types of civil
cases, not just habeas corpus and civil rights cases.' 18
Surveying Supreme Court and appellate court holdings, the Tenth
Circuit concluded that the right of access to the courts does not require
assistance to inmates beyond the completion of a habeas corpus or civil
111. Bounds, 430 U.S. at 827. See supra note 86 and accompanying text.

112.

762 F.2d 851 (10th Cir. 1985).

113.
114.

Id. at 851-52.
Id.

115. Id. at 852 & n.2.
116. Id. at 852.
117. Id. at 852-53.
118. Id. at 853. The prisoners also contended that the prison must provide legal assistance without the prison officials' prior determination that the inmates have meritorious
claims. The Tenth Circuit found that the attorneys were only determining which complaints were appropriate for court-appointed counsel or private counsel, and that this did

not infringe upon the right of access to the courts. Id. at 855 n.4.
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rights complaint.' 19 The court noted that Utah had already made a substantial effort to assist inmates by providing a library and legal assistance
and explained that it could not require more assistance of the state be120
cause of the burden that would be imposed.
In a footnote, the court determined that the prisoners' second contention - that a law library or legal assistance must be available for all
kinds of civil cases - had no factual basis because the state's contract
with the law firm provided for legal assistance in all civil matters, not
merely federal habeas corpus or civil rights actions. 12 1 However, the
court then reiterated its holding in Ward that prisoners are only entitled
to legal assistance through the completion of habeas corpus or civil
rights complaints, ' 2 2 which seems to suggest that the state's legal services contract provided assistance beyond that which is constitutionally
required.
4.

Analysis

In Ward, the Tenth Circuit held that prisoners must be assured of
adequate aid in filing habeas corpus and civil rights actions in order that
their rights be protected. Although Judge Barrett's dissenting argument
in Ward - that prisoners have no more right than anyone else to an
attorney expert in civil rights - misses the majority's point, it is well
taken as applied to the facts of Nordgren. In Nordgren, the plaintiffs
wanted legal assistance in filing divorce and paternity actions. The
Tenth Circuit apparently agreed with Judge Barrett's argument in Ward
and held that prisoners do not have a right to legal assistance in all civil
12 3
actions.
The court broke no new ground in addressing Nordgren's second
issue. The prisoners had argued that legal assistance only through the
filing of initial pleadings did not afford adequate access to the courts.
Stating as much in Bounds, the Supreme Court said:
[I]f the State files a response to a pro se pleading, it will undoubtedly contain seemingly authoritative citations. Without a
library, an inmate will be unable to rebut the State's argument.
It is not enough to answer that the court will evaluate the facts
pleaded in light of the relevant law. Even the most dedicated
trial judges are bound to overlook meritorious
cases without
1 24
the benefit of an adversary presentation.
Of course, the Court was referring to the filing of initial pleadings, but
the State may make motions throughout habeas corpus or civil rights
proceedings, and without a law library or legal assistance, a prisoner
cannot effectively make "an adversary presentation." However, the
Tenth Circuit balanced the prisoners' interests against a state's burden
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.

Id. at 853-55.
Id. at 855.
Id, at 855 n.4.
Id.
Id. at 855 n.4 (dictum).
Bounds, 430 U.S. at 826.
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in providing more legal assistance and concluded that the right of access
did not include assistance beyond the initial pleading stage. Thus, it
remains to be seen what future courts will hold is necessary to guarantee
access and where they will next draw the line.
II.

EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION IN AN ACADEMIC SETTING UNDER
TITLE

A.

VII:

CARLILE

. SOUTH

RouTT

SCHOOL DISTRICT

Background

Title VII prohibits employers from discriminating in employment
on the basis of sex. 125 The courts have developed two theories of Title
VII liability: disparate impact and disparate treatment. A disparate impact claim is appropriate when an employment practice discriminates
against all members of a protected class. 12 6 A disparate treatment
claim, on the other hand, lies when the employer has intentionally dis12 7
criminated against a particular member of a protected class.
In the leading Title VII disparate treatment case, McDonnell Douglas
Corp. V Green, 128 the Supreme Court held that a plaintiff must initially
establish a prima facie case of discrimination by showing:
i) that he belongs to a racial minority; ii) that he applied and
was qualified for a job for which the employer was seeking applicants; iii) that, despite his qualifications, he was rejected; and
iv) that, after his rejection, the position remained open and the
employer continued to seek applicants
from persons of the
29
complainant's qualifications. 1
Once this four-prong test is met, the burden shifts to the employer to
"articulate some legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the employee's rejection."' 3 0 If the employer does give a satisfactory reason,
the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to show that the employer's legitimate and non-discriminatory reason is a mere pretext for unlawful
discrimination. 13'
125. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 253 (codified as amended at
42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (1982)). Section 2000e-2(a)(l) states:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual with respect to his
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of
such individual's race, color, religion, sex or national origin.
Congress amended Title VII in 1972 to remove secular educational facilities from
Title VII's original exemption. Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No.
92-261, 86 Stat. 103 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-I (1972)).
126. Cohen, Sex Discriminationin Academic Employment: Judicial Deference and a Stricter Stan-

dard, 36 LAB. L.J. 67, 68 (1985). Protected classes under Title VII are distinguished by
race, color, religion, sex or national origin. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2.
127. Cohen, supra note 126, at 68.
128. 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
129. Id. at 802.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 804. In a later case, Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S.
248 (1981), in which the Supreme Court clarified the McDonnell Douglas allocation of
burdens and presentation of proof, the Court stated that a plaintiff shows pretext "either
directly by persuading the court that a discriminatory reason more likely motivated the
employer or indirectly by showing that the employer's proffered explaination is unworthy
of credence." Id. at 256.
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Courts have adapted the McDonnell Douglas prima facie test to differ-

ent fact situations. 132 In Smith v. University of North Carolina,' 3

3

a female

assistant professor of religion at the university raised a Title VII claim
that the university had discriminatorily refused to reappoint or promote
her. 1 34 The Fourth Circuit found it necessary to adapt the McDonnell
Douglas test to a university setting. The Smith prima facie test of discrimination requires:
1) That the plaintiff belonged to a disadvantaged class or to a
racial or religious minority; 2) That the plaintiff sought and was
qualified for reappointment or promotion; 3) That the plaintiff
was not reappointed or promoted; and 4) That, in the case of
reappointment, the college sought applicants to fill the position
from persons of plaintiffs qualifications; or in the case of promotion, the employer had promoted other persons possessing
35
similar qualifications at approximately the same time.'
The Ninth Circuit, in Lynn v. Regents of the University of California,13 6 has
adopted the Fourth Circuit's adaptation of the McDonnell Douglas prima
facie test.
B.

Carlile v. South Routt School District

This survey term, the Tenth Circuit also established a prima facie
test for employment discrimination in an academic setting. The case,
Carlile v. South Routt School District,137 involved a Title VII claim of sex
discrimination based upon refusal of a school board to renew the employment contract of a female high school teacher, Nettie Carlile, and
grant her tenure. The facts of Carlile are significantly distinguishable
from other academic discrimination cases. The Tenth Circuit chose to
ignore this, however, thus making its decision of questionable value to
future courts deciding similar cases.
Carlile taught English and history at a public high school in rural
Colorado.' 3 8 After consistently receiving good and excellent evaluations from the principal for two and one-half years of teaching, Carlile
suddenly received a poor teaching evaluation from an acting principal,
who also recommended to the district that her contract not be renewed
for a fourth year.139 There had been rumors during the period in which
132. See A. LARSON & L. LARSON, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION § 50.22 (1985). In a
footnote in McDonnell Douglas. the Supreme Court noted that "[tihe facts necessarily will
vary in Title VII cases, and the specification above of the prima facie proof required from
respondent is not necessarily applicable in every respect to differing factual situations,"
thereby allowing courts to adapt the McDonnell Douglas prima facie test as they find necessary. 411 U.S. at 802 n.13.
133. 632 F.2d 316 (4th Cir. 1980).
134. Id. at 321.
135. Id. at 340.
136. 656 F.2d 1337, 1341 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 823 (1982).
137. 739 F.2d 1496 (10th Cir. 1984).
138. Id. at 1498.
139. Under Colorado state law, a teacher employed for the fourth successive year automatically receives tenure, so the non-renewal of Carlile's contract was the equivalent of a
denial of tenure. COLO. REV. STAT. § 22-63-112 (1973 & Cum. Supp. 1980).
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Carlile received her negative review that the head coach of the boys'
basketball team was intending to resign. The coach did resign one
140
month after the district formally denied renewal of Carlile's contract.
The school district then hired a male teacher to teach history and coach
the boys' basketball team.1 4 ' Carlile then brought an employment discrimination action against the school district, claiming that the district's
failure to renew her contract and grant her tenure was based on gender,
14 2
in violation of Title VII.
The trial court applied the Lynn four-prong prima facie test, 14 3 and
determined that Carlile failed to establish a prima facie case of discriminatory motive underlying her termination. 144 The trial court found that
Carlile did not pass the second and fourth prongs of the test. She did
not meet the second prong, that of qualifying for the available position,
because the school district needed someone who could coach boys' basketball and teach, and she did not meet the fourth prong, the showing
that the school district had hired someone with the same qualifications,
because the district hired someone with different qualifications, includ45
ing the ability to coach boys' basketball.'
The Tenth Circuit, Judge McKay writing, agreed that the fourprong prima facie test set out in Lynn and Smith was appropriate in any
academic setting, including local public schools as well as universities,' 46 and held that the trial court's application of that test had not
been clearly erroneous.1 4 7 The court held that the non-renewal of Carlile's contract was tantamount to a denial of tenure. Therefore, the district court was not clearly erroneous in applying the four-prong test,
originally designed to apply to a denial of tenure, to the school district's
14 8
decision not to renew Carlile's contract.
C. Analysis
The Tenth Circuit in Carlilejoins other circuits in adapting the McDonnell Douglas prima facie test to the academic setting. However, the
court's treatment of Carlile as just another case of discrimination in an
academic setting provides no answers to the questions raised by the facts
of Carlile.
The Smith and Lynn prima facie tests were adapted for the situation
where a university professor's academic qualifications are evaluated for a
promotion, reappointment, or tenure. The situation in Carlile was very
different. The only similarity among the cases is that all three arose in
140. 739 F.2d at 1498.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. In its opinion, the Tenth Circuit wrongly stated that the trial court applied the
Smith test. Id. at 1500. See Lynn, 656 F.2d at 1341.
144. Carlile, 739 F.2d at 1499.
145.

Id. at 1501.

146. Id. at 1500.
147. Id. at 1501.
148.

Id.

1986]

CIVIL RIGHTS

an academic setting. Carlile, as the trial court found, 149 did not involve
denial of tenure based on lack of academic qualifications; rather, denial
was based on the lack of the suddenly-added qualification of coaching
boys' basketball. Carlile could never hope to meet this requirement.
This fact distinguishes Carlile from Smith, Lynn, and other academic discrimination cases. 1 50 The Tenth Circuit does not shed light on the distinction, treating the situation as only a contract renewal and tenure
decision.
Perhaps the problem is not the test, but its application. At least one
court has determined that a sudden change in qualifications establishes
a prima facie case of discrimination. 1 5 1 Furthermore, the Supreme
Court in McDonnell Douglas found that plaintiffs "must be given a full and
fair opportunity to demonstrate by competent evidence that the presumptively valid reasons for rejection were in fact a cover up for a racially discriminatory decision."' 15 2 McDonnell Douglas had refused to
rehire the plaintiff, citing his participation in demonstrations against the
company.' 5 3 While the Court found that the company's reasons for not
rehiring the plaintiff successfully rebutted the plaintiffs claim of discrimination,' 5 4 it also found that the inquiry did not end there. The plaintiff
had to be given an opportunity to show that white employees committing equally serious and disruptive acts against the company were "nevertheless retained or rehired."' 155 Likewise, the school district's reason
for discharging Carlile should merely have rebutted Carlile's prima facie
case of discrimination, not defeated her claim of qualification for the
job. Carlile should then have had an opportunity to demonstrate that
the combination of the teaching and coaching positions was a pretext, by
showing that in similar situations male teachers who could not also
coach were not discharged. This application of the test is necessary to
prevent employers from adding qualifications that not only discriminate
against employees but also destroy the employees' chances of establishing a prima facie case to challenge this discrimination. This will be the
outcome if the courts have only Carlile to rely on when similar situations
arise in the future.
149. 739 F.2d at 1499.
150. But see Civil Rights Div. v. Amphitheater Unified School Dist., 680 P.2d 517 (Ariz.
Ct. App. 1983). Amphitheater is possibly the only other case with a fact situation similar to
Carlile's. It is a disparate impact case, however. The Arizona Court of Appeals held that
the school district's combining of a biology teaching position with a football coaching position had a disparate impact on women.
151. Geisler v. Folsom, 735 F.2d 991, 996-97 (6th Cir. 1984). In Geis/er, the plaintiff
applied for an engineering position and one week later the employer changed the educational requirement for the position. The Sixth Circuit held that this established a prima
facie case of discrimination.
152. 411 U.S. 792, 805 (1973).
153. Id. at 796.
154. Id. at 804.
155. Id.
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PRUDENTIAL FEDERAL SAVINGS

A.

Background

The Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) 156 is the principal source of law on age discrimination. Enacted in 1967, the ADEA
makes it unlawful for an employer to discriminate against persons between the ages of forty and seventy because of their age. Administration
and enforcement of the act is entrusted to the Equal Employment Op57
portunity Commission (EEOC).'
The only Tenth Circuit case during this survey period that involved
the ADEA was EEOC v. Prudential.'5 8 The EEOC claimed that Prudential Federal Savings had violated the ADEA by firing several employees.
At trial, the jury found that the termination of one employee violated the
act and accordingly awarded him both legal and equitable relief. Both
parties appealed to the Supreme Court; it vacated and remanded the
Tenth Circuit's original decision to be reconsidered in light of a 1985
Supreme Court decision, Trans World Airlines v. Thurston. 1 59 The Tenth
Circuit's subsequent decision is notable because the court held for the
first time that future damages are available under the ADEA. The Tenth
Circuit also discussed the ADEA conciliation requirement and the appropriate content ofjury instructions regarding the plaintiffs burden of
proof. Finally, the court adopted the standard set forth in Thurston for
determining whether or not an employer has willfully violated the
0
ADEA. 16
B.

The Tenth Circuit Decision on Remand
1.

Conciliation

When a private party files a charge with the EEOC, 16 1 or when the
EEOC itself institutes an action, the EEOC must "promptly notify all
persons named in such charge" and "seek to eliminate any alleged unlawful practice by informal methods of conciliation, conference and persuasion." 162 This conciliation requirement allows employers to comply
voluntarily with the Act before any formal action is filed. 16 3 Courts regard the conciliation requirement as jurisdictional and may grant summary judgment to the employer if they deem the EEOC's conciliation
156. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-34 (1982).
157. 29 U.S.C. § 633a (1982).
158. 763 F.2d 1166 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 312 (1985).
159. 105 S.Ct. 613 (1985) (airline's violation of ADEA was not willful according to the
standard adopted by the Court).
160. Prudential, 763 F.2d at 1174-75.
161. The ADEA allows a private party to file a charge with the EEOC alleging unlawful
discrimination. The individual must then wait 60 days before bringing suit. 29 U.S.C.
§ 626(d) (1982). The party's right to bring a private action terminates if the EEOC commences an action on behalf of the employee. 29 U.S.C. § 626(c)(1) (1982).
162. 29 U.S.C. § 626(d) (1982).
163. Brennan v. Ace Hardware Corp., 495 F.2d 368, 374 (8th Cir. 1974).
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efforts inadequate.164 However, many courts prefer to stay the proceedings to allow the EEOC to comply fully with the conciliation
65
requirement.'
In Prudential, the defendant argued that the EEOC had not satisfied
its statutory duty to conciliate.' 6 6 The Tenth Circuit disagreed, holding
the the EEOC need only make a limited effort to conciliate to satisfy the
Act's minimal jurisdictional requirement. If the EEOC's initial effort is
not sufficient, the court held, then the district court can stay the proceedings to allow compliance instead of dismissing the action.' 6 7 Here,
the court concluded, the EEOC had sufficiently tried conciliation because it had told Prudential who the charging parties were, what specific
misconduct they alleged, and what remedies they sought. The EEOC
16 8
had also invited conciliation on several occasions.
2.

The Instruction on Age as a Determinative Factor

In an ADEA action, the plaintiff has the burden to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the employer was motivated by the
plaintiff's age in discharging or not hiring the plaintiff.' 69 However,
plaintiffs cannot always find direct evidence of an employer's motivation
in making an employment decision. Under Title VII, as discussed earlier, 170 the McDonnell Douglas formula allows an inference of discriminatory motive through the use of objective facts when direct evidence is
7
not available. ' '
Courts also apply the McDonnell Douglas formula in ADEA cases but
disagree on how to apply it.17 2 As the First Circuit pointed out in Loeb v.
164. 3 A. LARSON & L. LARSON, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION § 102.24(b) (1984) [hereinafter cited as LARSON & LARSON]. See, e.g., Marshall v. Tecumseh Prod. Co., 19 Fair
Empi. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1400 (W.D. Tenn. 1978) (summary judgment proper since conciliation efforts failed to satisfy jurisdictional requirements).
165. LARSON & LARSON, supra note 164, at § 102.24(b). See, e.g., Marshall v. Sun Oil
Co., 592 F.2d 563, 566 (10th Cir.) (The court held that when further conciliation efforts
are required for satisfaction of the jurisdictional requirement, it is proper to grant a stay of
proceedings. Summary judgment is inappropriate because it effectively denies access to
the courts.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 826 (1979).
166. 763 F.2d at 1168-69. The court basically reaffirmed the principles set forth in Sun
Oil.
167. Prudential, 763 F.2d at 1169.
168. Id.
169. Loeb v. Textron, 600 F.2d 1003, 1018 (1st Cir. 1979); 2 C. ANTIEAU, FEDERAL
CIVIL RIGHTS ACTS: CIVIL PRACTICE § 579 (1980).
170. See supra notes 125-55 and accompanying text.
171. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973). The formula provides that the plaintiff must first establish a prima facie case of discrimination by showing:
1) that he belongs to a minority; 2) that he applied and was qualified for ajob for which the
employer was seeking applicants; 3) that, despite his qualifications, he was rejected; and
4) that, after his rejection, the position remained open and the employer continued to seek
applicants from persons of plaintiff's qualifications. Id. The burden of proof then shifts to
the employer who is then allowed to offer legitimate reasons for the employee's rejection.
Id. If the employer's reasons for rejection rebut the plaintiff's prima facie case, the plaintiff
is then given the opportunity to show that the employer's reasons for rejection were
merely a pretext for discrimination. Id. at 804.
172. See, e.g., Blackwell v. Sun Elec. Corp.. 696 F.2d 1176, 1179 (6th Cir. 1983) (AlcDonnell Douglas does not provide exclusive criteria for establishing a prima facie case); Cuddy
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Textron,1 7 3 a leading ADEA case, several problems arise in applying the
McDonnell Douglas formula to ADEA cases. First, the employer's decision
to discharge an employee often results from mixed legal and discriminatory motives. 17 4 The McDonnell Douglas formula does not address this
situation. 17 5 Second, under the ADEA, a plaintiff has an express right to
a jury trial. 17 6 Since the McDonnell Douglas formula was created for
judge-tried Title VII proceedings, adapting the formula to jury trials
may confuse the jurors when they attempt to interpret and apply the
formula. 1 77 Therefore, the First Circuit concluded, in the "mixed motive" situation, courts must instruct the jury that the plaintiff has to
prove by a preponderance of the evidence that although several motives
may have precipitated his discharge, age was the determinative fac17 9
tor.178 This is now the predominant rule in the circuits.
Prudential apparently had mixed motives in discharging the plaintiff. Using language from McDonnell Douglas, Prudential had requested
the trial court to instruct the jury to find for Prudential unless the EEOC
proved that Prudential's other reasons for the discharge were merely a
pretext for discrimination. 180 The Tenth Circuit agreed with the trial
court's refusal to so instruct the jury on the grounds that such instructions would confuse the jury into thinking that age had to be the only
factor motivating Prudential's discharge.' 8 ' The Tenth Circuit then
v. Carmen, 694 F.2d 853, 857 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (court applied a test analogous to McDonnell
Douglas formula); Ackerman v. Diamond Shamrock Corp., 670 F.2d 66, 70 (6th Cir. 1982)
(court prefers to decide ADEA claims using a case-by-case approach, rather than by adhering to a mechanical application of the McDonnell Douglas formula); Jackson v. Sears, Roebuck and Co., 648 F.2d 225, 229-30 (5th Cir. 1981) (court applies McDonnell Douglas
formula); Sutton v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 646 F.2d 407, 412 (9th Cir. 1981) (same); Stanojev v. Ebasco Services, Inc., 643 F.2d 914, 920 (2d Cir. 1981) (A prima facie case is
established when the plaintiff proves he is qualified for the job and it is filled by someone
else. These two criteria are derived from the McDonnell Douglas formula.); Smith v. University of North Carolina, 632 F.2d 316, 335 (4th Cir. 1980) (The McDonnell Douglas formulation is applicable to ADEA cases, but the elements of a prima facie case need not be recited
in jury instructions.).
173. 600 F.2d 1003 (1st Cir. 1979).
174. Id. at 1019. This combination of legal and discriminatory motives is often referred to as "mixed motives." Id.
175. Id.
176. 29 U.S.C. § 626(c)(2) (1982); see also Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575 (1978) (right
to jury trial under ADEA).
177. Loeb, 600 F.2d at 1016-17; see also Schickman, The Strengths and Weaknesses of the
McDonnell Douglas Formula in Jury Actions Under the ADEA, 32 HASTINGS L.J. 1239, 1258
(1981) ("[T]he extensive McDonnell Douglas instruction focuses the jury's attention upon
prima facie elements, articulations, and proof of pretext, which loom in importance while
the judge speaks. As a result, the basic questions of age as a 'but for' factor may be
forgotten.").
178. 600 F.2d at 1019. The court also suggested that the judge should use the McDonnell Douglas formula to allocate the burden of proof and organize the evidence, but should
not read the formula to the jury. Id. at 1016.
179. Blackwell v. Sun Elec. Corp., 696 F.2d 1176, 1181 (6th Cir. 1983); Bunch v.
United States, 680 F.2d 1271, 1283 (9th Cir. 1982); Tribble v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp.,
669 F.2d 1193, 1196-97 (8th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1080 (1983); Geller v. Markham, 635 F.2d 1027, 1035 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 945 (1981); Loeb v. Textron, 600 F.2d 1003, 1019-20 (1st Cir. 1979).
180. Prudential, 763 F.2d at 1170.
181. Id.
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held that an ADEA plaintiff need not show that age was the sole motivating factor in the employment decision as long as the plaintiff can prove
18 2
that the age factor made the difference.
3.

Future Damages

The ADEA has a two-part remedial scheme. The first part incorpo3
rates the remedial provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). 18
The FLSA provides for recovery of back pay' 8 4 and attorney fees ' 8 5 and
for recourse to injunctive relief.'8 6 The second part of the ADEA's remedial scheme includes the power to grant whatever relief is necessary
to carry out the purposes of the Act.' 8 7 The first part plainly states that
the remedies available to ADEA plaintiffs are those given under FLSA,
but the second part provides for unlimited legal or equitable relief. Because of this discrepancy, courts interpreting this section of the ADEA
conflict on whether it allows the award of future damages, or "front
88
pay."1
In this same section, the ADEA expressly permits reinstatement as a
remedy. 189 All circuits now hold that front pay is available when reinstatement is not possible. 9 0° Some of these circuits have modified the
front pay remedy by holding that front pay is available only when the
plaintiff has requested reinstatement, 191 whereas other circuits hold that
a plaintiff does not waive his right to front pay if he does not request
reinstatement. '

92

In Prudential,the Tenth Circuit held for the first time that front pay
182. Id. The court relied on an earlier decision. Perrell v. FinanceAmerica Corp., 726
F.2d 654, 656 (10th Cir. 1984), which held that the standard of proof necessarily requires
the jury to focus on the effect of the plaintiffs age.
183. 29 U.S.C § 201-19 (1982). The ADEA incorporates sections 211 (b), 216 (b)-(e)
and 217 of the FLSA. 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1982). The ADEA further provides that its
"provisions . . . shall be enforced in accordance with the powers, remedies, and procedures provided in sections . . . of this title." Id.
184. 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (1982). Back pay equals the difference between salary together
with specific monetary benefits which would have vested prior to trial and the value of
benefits and earnings from other jobs from discharge to the trial date. Monroe v. PennDixie Cement Corp., 335 F. Supp. 231, 234-35 (N.D. Ga. 1971).
185. 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (1982).
186. 29 U.S.C. § 217 (1982).
187. 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1982). "In any action brought to enforce this chapter the
court shall have jurisdiction to grant such legal or equitable relief as may be appropriate
. . including
m
without limitation judgments compelling employment, reinstatement or
promotion." Id.
188. Front pay is "payment for wages that would have been earned subsequent to trial
but for the alleged discrimination." LARSON & LARSON, supra note 164, at § 103.44.
189. 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1982).
190. Wildman v. Lerner Stores Corp., 771 F.2d 605 (1st Cir. 1985); Maxfield v. Sinclair
Int'l, 766 F.2d 788 (3d Cir. 1985); O'Donnell v. Georgia Osteopathic Hosp., Inc. 748 F.2d
1543, 1551 (11 th Cir. 1984); Whittlesey v. Union Carbide Corp., 742 F.2d 724, 727-29 (2d
Cir. 1984); Davis v. Combustion Eng'g, Inc., 742 F.2d 916, 922-23 (6th Cir. 1984); Gibson
v. Mohawk Rubber Co., 695 F.2d 1093, 1100-01 (8th Cir. 1982); Cancellier v. Federated
Dept. Stores, 672 F.2d 1312, 1319 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 859 (1982).
191. Ventura v. Federal Life Ins. Co., 571 F. Supp. 48, 50 n.2 (N.D. Ill. 1983); Monroe
v. Penn-Dixie Cement Corp., 335 F. Supp. 231, 235 (N.D. Ga. 1971).
192. Koyen v. Consolidated Edison Co., 560 F. Supp. 1161, 1169 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
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is an available remedy under the ADEA. It found that the ADEA's grant
of power to award "legal and equitable relief as may be appropriate to
effectuate the purposes of [the Act]" is "a significant addition"l 9 3 to the
remedies available under FLSA, necessary to effect the Act's purpose by
compensating a wronged employee and deterring other unlawful discrimination. 19 4 The court found that although reinstatement is the preferred remedy under the ADEA, courts could award future damages in
lieu of reinstatement when reinstatement is not appropriate-for example, when the employer is hostile toward the employee. 195 The court
brushed aside any argument that the uncertainty of front pay made it
unavailable as a remedy, stating that this reason would only serve to
"exonerate a wrongdoer from liability."' 19 6 Citing ways to make front
pay less speculative, the court further dispelled the uncertainty argument. Factors to be taken into account include: 1) the employee's duty
to mitigate the damages; 2) other employment opportunities available to
the employee; 3) the period in which the employee, exercising "reasonable efforts," may become reemployed; 4) the employee's work and life
expectancy; and 5) discount tables to figure the present value of future
damages. 197 Also, the court noted that front pay was not speculative in
this case because it involved a pension that had already vested in the
employee. 198 Holding that reinstatement is to be preferred over front
pay, the court remanded the case to the trial court to determine why
front pay in this instance would be more appropriate than
reinstatement. 199
20 0
Judge Barrett dissented as to the award of future damages,
agreeing with ChiefJudge Seth's dissent in Blim v. Western Electric Co. ,201
a case in which the Tenth Circuit assumed, without deciding, that front
pay is an available remedy under the ADEA. Judge Seth had acknowledged the ADEA's grant of equitable power to the courts but argued
that it could not be used to "expand or override the limited legal remedies available under the ADEA." ' 20 2 Looking to the Act's legislative history, Judge Seth concluded in Blim that Congress intended to limit the
193. 763 F.2d at 1171.
194. Id. at 1171-72 (quoting Koyen v. Consolidated Edison Co., Inc., 560 F. Supp.
1161, 1168 (S.D.N.Y. 1983)).
195. 763 F.2d at 1172-73. Reinstatement may be inappropriate because of the employer's animosity, the lack of a comparable job for the employee to re-enter, the employee's rank in the company, or because the employee's job has been taken. Note, Front
Pay: A Necessary Alternative to Reinstatement Under the Age Discriminationin Employment Act, 53

FORDHAM L. REV. 579, 598-601 (1984) [hereinafter cited as Note, Front Pay].
196. 763 F.2d at 1173, (quoting Koyen v. Consolidated Edison Co., 560 F. Supp. at
1169); see alsoJ. Truett Payne Co. v. Chrysler Motor Corp., 451 U.S. 557, 566-67 (1981)
(courts must be willing to accept uncertainty of damages or the wrongdoer will not be held
accountable).
197. 763 F.2d at 1173 (quoting in part Koyen, 560 F. Supp. at 1168-69).
198. See also Loeb v. Textron, 600 F.2d 1003, 1021 (1st Cir. 1979) (award of pension
benefits plainly authorized under ADEA: part of the "amounts owing .
in section
626(b)).
199. 763 F.2d at 1173.
200. Id. at 1175 (Barrett J., dissenting).
201. 731 F.2d 1473 (10th Cir. 1984).
202. Id. at 1481 (Seth, C.J., dissenting).
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Act's legal remedies to "unpaid minimum wages and unpaid overtime
compensation" available under the FLSA, meaning "items of pecuniary
or economic loss such as wages, fringe, and other job-related benefits,"
20 3
which he claimed did not include front pay.
4.

The Instruction on Willfulness

A final issue the court addressed in Prudential was the employer's
willfulness in violating the ADEA. As discussed earlier, the ADEA incorporates the FLSA's remedial provisions. One of these provides for an
award of liquidated damages. 20 4 Congress provided a good faith exception to FLSA's automatic liquidated damages award through a later act,
the Portal-to-Portal Act (PPA), 20 5 but the ADEA does not expressly incorporate the PPA section. Likewise, the ADEA's legislative history
does not disclose any congressional intent that the ADEA incorporate
the FLSA's good faith exception. 20 6 Most courts have held that it does
not.

20 7

While the liquidated damages award under the FLSA is automatic,
under the ADEA it is only payable where there is a "willful" violation of
the Act. 20 8 As the ADEA's legislative history does not define "willful," 20 9 courts must interpret the term when awarding damages.
Before the Supreme Court decided Trans World Airlines v. Thurston,2 10 the circuits were in conflict on what constitutes willfulness and
had established four separate tests. The Fifth Circuit developed the
most liberal test: "Did the employer know the ADEA was in the picture?" 2 11 The Tenth Circuit adopted this "in the picture" test and applied it in the earlier Prudentialopinion, which was subsequently vacated
203. Id. (quoting H.R. REP. No. 950, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 504, 535). It has been argued, however, that the ADEA's legislative
history indicates that Congress' reason for incorporating FLSA remedies was not to limit
remedies under the ADEA, but instead to keep ADEA administration under the Department of Labor instead of creating a new bureaucracy. Note, Front Pay, supra note 195, at
593-94. See also O'Donnell v. Georgia Osteopathic Hosp. Inc. 574 F. Supp. 214, 218-19
(N.D. Ga. 1982). The O'Donnell court found that ADEA section 626(b), which provides
that "amounts owing to a person as a result of a violation of this chapter shall be deemed
to be unpaid minimum wages or unpaid overtime compensation," can logically only be
read as authorizing front pay. The court relied on Pavlo v. Stiefel Laboratories, Inc., 22
Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 489, 493-94 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
204. 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (1982) is incorporated into the ADEA at 29 U.S.C. § 626(b)
(1982). Liquidated damages are an amount equal to the pecuniary loss of wages, salary
increases and other employment benefits. Koyen v. Consolidated Edison Co., 560 F.
Supp. 1161, 1164 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
205. 29 U.S.C. §§ 251-62 (1982).
206. Note, Liquidated Damages and Statute of Limitations Under the "Willful" Standard of the
FairLabor StandardsAct andAge DiscriminationIn Employment Act: Repercussions ofTrans World
Airlines, Inc., v. Thurston, 24 WASHBURN L.J. 516, 529 (1985) [hereinafter cited as, Note,
Liquidated Damages].
207. Note, Liquidated Damages, supra note 206, at 529.
208. 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1982).
209. Wehr v. Burroughs, 619 F.2d 276, 281-82 (3d Cir. 1980).
210. 105 S. Ct. 613 (1985).
211. Hedrick v. Hercules, Inc., 658 F.2d 1088, 1096 (5th Cir. 1981); Coleman v. Jiffy
June Farms, Inc., 458 F.2d 1139, 1142 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 948 (1972).
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by the Supreme Court. 2 12 A more stringent test, the "reckless disre21 3
gard" test, was adopted by the Second, Third and Sixth Circuits.
Under this test, a violation was regarded as willful when " 'the employer
. . . knew or showed reckless disregard for the matter of whether its
conduct was prohibited by the ADEA.' ",214 More stringent still was the
2 15
"knowing" test, adopted by the Fourth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits,
whereby the employer was liable if he acted with knowledge of the Act
or knew or should have known that his actions violated the Act. The
most stringent test was the "specific intent" test, created by the First
Circuit where willfully meant "voluntarily and intentionally, and with
2 16
specific intent to do something the law forbids."
In Thurston, the Supreme Court held that the "reckless disregard"
test is the appropriate test.21 7 The Court rejected the most liberal test,
the "in the picture" test, noting that an employer is required to post
ADEA notices and, therefore, would always know of the Act, thereby
meeting the willfulness test. 2 18 The Court also explicitly rejected the
2 19
most stringent test, the "specific intent" test.
The Supreme Court's position in Thurston as to whether the ADEA
incorporates the FLSA's good faith exception is unclear. In a footnote,
the Court stated that the ADEA did not incorporate section I I of the
PPA (the good faith section). 220 However, elsewhere in the opinion, the
Court found that Trans World Airlines did not willfully violate the
ADEA because it acted "reasonably and in good faith." 22 1 Perhaps this
means that although the ADEA did not specifically incorporate the good
faith exception, courts must consider good faith when determining willfulness. 2 22 The Tenth Circuit did just that in its subsequent decision in
Prudential.
In Prudential,the trial court had combined the "specific intent" test
with the "knowing" test in its jury instructions on willfulness. 2 23 In its
original decision, the Tenth Circuit rejected this test in favor of the lib212. Prudential 1, 741 F.2d 1225, 1233-34 (10th Cir. 1984), vacated and remanded, 105 S.
Ct. 896 (1985); see also Mistretta v. Sandia Corp., 639 F.2d 588, 595 (10th Cir. 1980).
213. Goodman v. Heublein, Inc., 645 F.2d 127, 131 (2d Cir. 1981); Wehr v. Burroughs
Corp., 619 F.2d 276, 283 (3d Cir. 1980); Blackwell v. Sun Electric Corp., 696 F.2d 1176,
1184 (6th Cir. 1983).
214. Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston, 105 S. Ct. 613, 624 (1985) (quoting Air
Line Pilots Ass'n v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 713 F.2d 940, 956 (2d Cir. 1983)).
215. Spangnuolo v. Whirlpool Corp., 641 F.2d 1109, 1114 (4th Cir. 1981), cert. denied,
454 U.S. 860 (1982); Syvock v. Milwaukee Boiler Mfg. Co., 665 F.2d 149, 155-56 (7th Cir.
1981); Kelly v. American Standard, Inc., 640 F.2d 974, 980 (9th Cir. 1981).
216. Loeb v. Textron, 600 F.2d 1003, 1020 n.27 (1st Cir. 1979).
217. 105 S. Ct. at 624.
218. Id. at 625.
219. Id. at 624 n.19. A test requiring anything more than "reckless disregard" would
probably be incorrect. Note, Liquidated Damages, supra note 206, at 539.
220. 105 S. Ct. at 625 n.22.
221. Id. at 626.
222. Note, Liquidated Damages, supra note 206, at 531.
223. PrudentialH1,763 F.2d at 1174. The trial court instructed:
"A willful violation occurs when a person acts with specific intent to violate the
law ....
In other words, you can find . .. willful violation of the law ... if you
find . . . that Prudential knew, or should have known . . . that [its decisions]
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eral "in the picture" test. 2 -4 The Supreme Court vacated and remanded
the decision to be reconsidered in light of Thurston. In its subsequent
decision, the Tenth Circuit adopted the "reckless disregard" test. 2 -5 It
went on to state that "this standard is elucidated by the Court's holding
that a violation is not willful when the employer acts 'reasonably and in
good faith.' "226 The Tenth Circuit concluded that it could not determine as a matter of law whether Prudential had acted in good faith and
2 2 7so remanded the case to the trial court to make this determination.
Nora Kelly

were in violation of the law and were intentionally and knowingly done in violation thereof."
Id.
224.
Ct. 896
225.
226.
227.

Prudential 1. 741 F.2d 1225. 1233-34 ( 10th Cir. 1984), vacated and remanded. 105 S.
(1985).
Prudential1H. 763 F.2d at 1174.
Id.
Id. at 1175.

COMMERCIAL LAW

OVERVIEW

The cases examined in this survey article involve various facets of
the Tenth Circuit's decisions in the area of commercial law. The most
significant case handed down in this area was one in which the court
mounted an attack against the Federal Reserve Board's attempt to impermissibly aggrandize its jurisdiction through an expanded definition
of a "bank."
Another significant commercial law decision held that standby letters of credit, representing primary obligations of the issuing bank, fall
within the Federal Deposit Insurance Act's definition of a "deposit" and
thus constitute insured deposits. During the past survey period, the
Tenth Circuit's emphasis also became more pronounced in focusing on
the substance rather than the form of commercial transactions. Its refusal to exalt form over substance was illustrated not only in a case involving a commercial lending transaction, but also in a consumer credit
transaction. Additionally, the court announced an expanded "likelihood
of confusion" test in a trademark infringement case. Finally, this article
includes a synoptic survey of opinions handed down in the area of bankruptcy law.
I.

NONBANK BANKS: DIMENSION FINANCIAL CORP.
V. BOARD OF GOVERNORS

In Dimension FinancialCorp. v. Board of Governors,' the Tenth Circuit

prohibited the Federal Reserve Board (Board) from improperly altering
its definition of "demand deposit" and "commercial loan" as a vehicle
for expanding the parameters of its jurisdiction. These definitional
changes were made in Regulation y,2 promulgated under the Bank
Holding Company Act (Act).3 The Board's expanded definitional and
jurisdictional regulation would have included limited-service financial
institutions, known as nonbank banks, within the Act's definition of a
"bank," thereby allowing the Board to regulate such institutions' expansion and growth.
i. 744 F.2d 1402 (10th Cir. 1984). cert. granted. 105 S. Ct. 2137-38 (1985) [Editors
Note: Subsequent to the submission of this survey article, the United States Supreme
Court affirmed the Tenth Circuit decision in Board of Governors v. Dimension Financial
Corp., 106 S.Ct. 6$1 (1986).].
2. 12 C.F.R. § 225 (1985).
3. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1841-50 (1982). The Act constitutes a comprehensive federal framework for the supervision and regulation of bank holding companies. A "bank holding
company" is a company which controls a "bank." 12 U.S.C. § 1841(2)(1) (1982). The Act
vests broad regulatory authority in the Board over such companies "'to restrain the undue
concentration of commercial banking resources and to prevent possible abuses related to
the control of commercial credit." S. REP. No. 1084 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 24, reprinted in
1970 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5519, 5541.
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Background

The scope of the Board's regulatory power is limited by the Act's
definition of the word "bank." This definition has been narrowed by
several statutory changes since the Act's inception. 4 Since 1970, however, the Act has defined a "bank" as any institution that: "(1) accepts
deposits that the depositor has a legal right to withdraw on demand, and
(2) engages in the business of making commercial loans." 5 Since this
narrowed definition requires the presence of both the demand deposit
and commercial loan elements, many nonbank banks 6 fall outside the
Act's jurisdiction and the Board's control. In an attempt to bring these
nonbank banks within its purview, the Board redefined both compo7
nents of the Act's definition of a "bank" by amending Regulation y.
The revised regulation broadened the definition of "demand deposit"
to include deposits, like NOW accounts, which "as a matter of practice"
are payable on demand. 8 Additionally, Regulation Y expanded the definition of "commercial loan" to include such items as money market and
interbank transactions. 9
B.

The Tenth Circuit Decision

In Dimension, the revised Regulation Y was challenged through a petition for review of the Board's changes. The Tenth Circuit, Chief
Judge Seth writing, set aside both the demand deposit and the commercial loan elements of the Board's amended regulation.' 0 The court did
4. The original 1956 Act simply defined a bank as "any national banking association
or any state bank, savings bank, or trust company." 12 U.S.C. § 1841(c) (1964) (amended
1966). Congress amended that statutory definition in 1966, and a "bank" was then defined as an institution that accepted deposits which "the depositor has a legal right to
withdraw on demand." See S. REP. No. 1179, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 7, reprintedin 1966 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD.NEws 2385, 2391. In 1970, the Act was further amended to exclude all
institutions which did not "engage in the business of making commercial loans." 12
U.S.C. § 1841(c) (1982).
5. 12 U.S.C. § 1841(c) (1982).
6. The term "nonbank banks" generally refers to an entity that is considered a bank
under some criteria but does not satisfy both elements of the Act's definition. Nonbank
banks fall under the regulatory power of the Comptroller of the Currency, not the Federal
Reserve Board. See C. GOLEMBE & D. HOLLAND, FEDERAL REGULATION OF BANKING 83-84

(1983). See generally Lobell, Nonbank Banks: Controversy Over a New Form of Consumer Bank, 39
Bus. LAw. 1193 (1984) (discussing nonbank banks and their relationship to the Bank
Holding Company Act); Note, The Demise Of The Bank/Nonbank Distinction: An Argument For
Deregulating The Activities Of Bank Holding Companies, 98 HARV. L. REV. 650 (1985) (discussing the regulation of bank holding companies and how nonbank banks avoid these
regulations).
7. 12 C.F.R. §§ 225.2(a)(l)(A), (B) (1985). The Federal Reserve Board amended
Regulation Y under section 2(c) of the Act. 12 U.S.C. § 1841(c) (1982). See generally Loeser, Bank Hotding Company Regulation: The Federal Reserve Board's Recent Revision Of Regulation
1, 101 BANKING L.J. 525, 542-44 (1984) (discusses the changes to the definition of "demand deposit" and "commercial loan").
8. 12 C.F.R. § 225.2(a)(l)(A) (1985).
9. 12 C.F.R. § 225.2(a)(l)(B) (1985). A commercial loan is "any loan other than a
loan to an individual for personal, family, household, or charitable purposes" including
"the purchase of retail installment loans or commercial paper, certificates of deposit, bankers' acceptances, and similar money market instruments." Id.
10. Dimension, 744 F.2d at 1411.
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not discuss the changed demand deposit definition, however, as it had
already been considered in an earlier Tenth Circuit opinion.II Thus,
the court focused solely on the Board's new and changed view of what
constitutes a "commercial loan" under the Act, and in particular, the
inclusion of money market and interbank transactions under the Board's
new definition.
In concluding that the Board's new definition of "commercial loan"
was not consistent with the purpose of the Act, the Tenth Circuit addressed the following considerations: (1) the term's general meaning as
used in business and in regulatory agencies, including the Board's usage; (2) the Board's purpose for the definitional changes; (3) the legislative history of the Act; and (4) the Board's authority under the Act to
2
promulgate rules and regulations.'
In examining the general meaning of the term "commercial loan,"
the court concluded that the new definition was adopted without reference to the actual meaning of the term. It first noted that the Board's
changed definition was a departure from the term's prevailing usage em13
ployed by businesses, by Congress, and by other regulatory agencies.
Furthermore, the court found that the common understanding of the
term reflected the Board's own definition before 1982.14 Only after
1982 did the Board begin to alter its position that money market and
interbank transactions qualified as commercial loans.15
Next, the Tenth Circuit examined the Board's purpose for effectuating the changes. It determined that the Board altered the "commercial
loan" definition solely to implement a new Board policy; to halt the fast16
paced changes occurring in businesses providing financial services.
The Board considered it necessary to bring nonbank banks under its
11. See First Bancorporation v. Board of Governors, 728 F.2d 434 (10th Cir. 1984). In
First Bancorporation, the court stated that the statutory definition of demand deposit was a
deposit giving the depositor "a legal right to withdraw on demand." Id. at 436 (quoting 12
U.S.C. § 1841(c) (emphasis added)). The court disagreed with the Board's determination
in that case that NOW accounts are demand deposits within the meaning of the Act. The
court stated that since the lending institution reserves the legal right to demand prior
notice of withdrawal, it is not a bank under the Act. First Bancorporation, 728 F.2d at 436.
See also Note, Eleventh Annual Tenth Circuit Survey: Administrative Law, 62 DEN. U.L.
REV. 17-18 (1985) (discussing changed definition of "demand deposit").
12. Dimension, 744 F.2d at 1404-11.
13. Id. at 1404-06. The Comptroller of the Currency and the FDIC both took positions contrary to the Board. Id. at 1410.
14. Id. at 1405-06. In 1972, 1976, and 1981 the Board rendered opinions or gave
advice that money market funds, certificates of deposit, bankers' acceptances, broker call
loans, and commercial paper were not commercial loans. Id. at 1405.
15. The consistent position of the Board abruptly halted in December of 1982, when
it announced that the Dreyfus Corporation's proposed purchase of a state bank would be
considered a purchase of a "bank" under the Act because the Act's term "commercial
loans" included the purchase of "commercial paper, bankers' acceptances, and certificates
of deposit, the extension of broker call loans, the sale of federal funds, the deposit of
interest bearing funds and similar lending vehicles." Id. at 1406. The Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation (FDIC) disagreed with the Board's change of position and permitted the acquisition of the bank. Id.
16. Id. at 1405-06.
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jurisdiction to accomplish this goal. 17 The court was severe in its criticism of the Board's actions, 18 finding that the redefinition and expansion of jurisdiction would cause extensive and disruptive changes in
other agencies and in businesses providing financial services to the public. 19 In short, a pervasive restructuring of this country's financial system would occur.
The court also analyzed the Act's legislative history, which revealed
that Congress intended to exclude from Board regulation those institutions whose only commercial credit activity is the purchase of money
market or interbank transactions. 20 Finally, the court examined the
Board's authority under the Act to make regulations 2 1 and held that the
Act constricts the subject matter of the Board's functions basically
within the confines of "anticompetitive considerations." ' 22 The court
recognized the narrow scope of the statute and its clearly specified purpose and analyzed the Board's concomitant operation within these limitations. It held that such proposed action requires a congressional
change in the agency's jurisdiction, and the Board could not sua sponte
exercise powers not provided for or denied by Congress. 23 Thus, the
Board's power is narrowly confined within the limits set by Congress.
Regardless of the perceived need for change, such changes are for Congress and not for the Board to implement.
C.

Conclusion

The Tenth Circuit was justified in prohibiting the Board from
broadening its sphere of influence through the expansion of a definition. This decision's impact reaches far beyond the setback to the Board
in curtailing nonbank banks' commercial activities. In demanding that
17. The Board's departure from the accepted meaning of a commercial loan was to
provide, via an expansion ofjurisdiction, a "regulatory device to change the course of the
development of financial institutions which had taken place in conformance with the Act as
construed by the Board from the outset." Id. at 1407.
18. "In short, the new definition has nothing to do with the original meaning of the

term.

. .

but instead was a device to accomplish an end-a change in the Board's jurisdic-

tion." Id. at 1405.
19. The court viewed the proposed changes as causing
divestitures of old acquisitions, sale of assets, [and] changes in permitted uses of
excess funds by state chartered and other institutions. It [would] also . . . have a
drastic impact on many other types of business arrangements and on the way

business [is] conducted, [and] who could insure deposits and changes in regulatory authority from states to the "fed."
Id. at 1406.
20. Id. at 1408.
21. 12 U.S.C. § 1844(b) (1982) authorizes the Board "to issue such regulations and
orders as may be necessary to enable it to administer and carry out the purposes of this
chapter and to prevent evasions thereof."
22. See, e.g., Western Bancshares, Inc. v. Board of Governors, 480 F.2d 749, 753-54
(10th Cir. 1973) (The 1970 amendments were designed to protect against noncompetitive
practices; no "public good" provisions were included.).
23. Dimension, 744 F.2d at 1409. See also Patagonia Corp. v. Board of Governors, 517
F.2d 803 (9th Cir. 1975) (FDIC not empowered to alter the definition of "subsidiary," the
scope of which Congress carefully considered); Garvey v. Freeman, 397 F.2d 600 (10th
Cir. 1968) (power of agencies to carry on government activities is circumscribed by the
authority granted) (quoting Stark v. Wickard, 321 U.S. 288, 309-10 (1944)).
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agencies not broadly interpret their mandate from Congress, this decision will remind the agencies to remain within the confines of their
rulemaking authority. This decision also illustrates the Tenth Circuit's
refusal to renounce its responsibilities by chanting an indiscriminate litany of deference to agency expertise. The Federal Reserve Board's attempted four-fold division of this country's tripartite political structure
was thus effectively arrested as was the peril to this nation's financial
structure.
II.

STANDBY LETrERS OF CREDIT: PHILADELPHIA GEAR CORP. v. FEDERAL
DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORP.

In Philadelphia Gear Corp. v. Federal Deposit Insurance Corp.,24 the
Tenth Circuit addressed another federal agency attempt to alter a definition in a statute it was delegated to administer. In this case, however,
the agency, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), attempted to refine a definition to exclude certain transactions, whereas in
Dimension, the Federal Reserve Board attempted to broaden a definition
to include certain entities.
A.

The Facts

This case arose out of the 1982 failure of the Penn Square Bank in
Oklahoma City. The plaintiff, Philadelphia Gear, was a trade supplier
that furnished equipment to Orion Manufacturing Corporation (Orion),
a Penn Square customer. Upon Orion's application, Penn Square issued
an irrevocable standby letter of credit for the benefit of Philadelphia
Gear in April of 1981.25 The letter of credit provided that drafts drawn
26
upon it must be accompanied by certain requisite documents.
On July 5, 1982, the Comptroller of the Currency declared Penn
Square insolvent and appointed the FDIC as receiver. 27 Two days
later-seventeen days after the insolvency-Philadelphia
Gear
presented to the receiver drafts for payment on the letter of credit totaling $724,728.50. Philadelphia Gear then received a formal notice from
Penn Square's liquidator stating that the receiver disaffirmed any and all
obligations under the letter of credit and also stating that it would not
honor any drafts thereon. The liquidator then returned the unpaid
24. 751 F.2d 1131 (10th Cir. 1984), cert. granted. 106 S. Ct. 245 (1985).

25. Id. at 1133. The letter of credit was issued on April 23, 1981, for $145,200 and
expired August 1, 1982. That same day, Orion executed an unsecured note for $145,200
in favor of Penn Square as security for the letter of credit.
26. Id. The letter of credit required that drafts drawn upon it must be accompanied
by Philadelphia Gear's signed statement showing that they had invoiced Orion and that
the invoices remained unpaid for at least 15 days. Copies of all invoices were also required. These invoices were to be verified for authenticity with Orion before payment. A
few days later, the letter of credit was amended by deleting the statement about verifying
invoices and the following language was added: "This credit shall be automatically reinstated from time to time for any sum or sums up to $145,000 upon presentation of described documents. This credit and all reinstatements are irrevocable and shall expire on
August 1, 1982." Id.
27. Id.
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drafts.28
Philadelphia Gear, as beneficiary, sought to enforce the standby letter of credit by suing the FDIC in its corporate capacity as insurer for
$100,000 in deposit insurance proceeds. The company also sued the
FDIC in its official capacity as receiver for Penn Square for the letter of
credit's total uninsured outstanding balance of $624,728.50.29 The
Oklahoma federal district court rendered judgment in favor of Philadelphia Gear on all of the issues dealing with deposit insurance, and in
favor of the FDIC in its capacity as receiver on the question of the total
30
value of the letter of credit.
B.

The Tenth Circuit Decision

The FDIC presented three legal issues in its appeal to the Tenth
Circuit. 3 ' The first issue considered by the court was whether the
standby letter of credit issued by Penn Square represented a "deposit"
within section 1813(t)(1) of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act and was
thus a deposit insured by the FDIC. 3 2 The FDIC argued that the letter
of credit failed to meet two elements of the statutory definition: (1) it
was not issued in exchange for "money or its equivalent," and (2) it was
not a letter upon which the bank is "primarily liable." The agency contended that the "money or its equivalent" element of the definition was
unsatisfied because no advance was made on Orion's promissory note.
Since Philadelphia Gear did not present the requisite documents enumerated in the letter of credit before Penn Square's insolvency, the
FDIC argued that Orion's note was nonnegotiable because it repre33
sented only a contingent obligation.
The Tenth Circuit rejected this argument, stating that the negotiability of an instrument must be determined from the face of the instrument3 4 and that the negotiability of Orion's note was not predicated on
the presentation of documents under the letter of credit. 3 5 Thus the
court affirmed the district court's holding that the transfer qualified as
28. Id. at 1134.
29. Id. at 1133.
30. Id.

31. A fourth issue was presented in this case. As cross-appellant, Philadelphia Gear
claimed that the district court erred in construing the amount of the letter of credit as the
aggregate sum of $145,200 rather than the $724,628.50. The Tenth Circuit found that the
district court properly determined the total value of the letter of credit by construing an
ambiguous clause against its drafter, Philadelphia Gear. Id. at 1139-50. Further discussion of this issue is beyond the scope of this article.
32. 12 U.S.C. § 1813(/)(1) (1982) defines a deposit as:
[T]he unpaid balance of money or its equivalent received or held by a bank in the
usual course of business and. . . which is evidenced by. . . a letter of credit...
on which the bank is primarily liable: Provided, that, without limiting the generality of the term "money or its equivalent," any such account or instrument must be
regarded as evidencing the receipt of the equivalent of money when credited or
issued in exchange for. . . a promissory note upon which the person obtaining
any such credit or instrument is primarily or secondarily liable . ...
33. PhiladelphiaGear, 751 F.2d at 1134. See U.C.C. § 3-104(l)(B) (1978).
34. 751 F.2d at 1134. See U.C.C. § 3-105(2)(a) (1978).
35. 751 F.2d at 1134. See U.C.C. § 3-105(l)(d) (1978).
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one in which "money or its equivalent" was issued in exchange for the
promissory note. Since Penn Square had agreed to make funds available
for the benefit of Orion, and in return Orion had executed a promissory
note obligating it to repay advances made by the bank, the court found
36
that a commercial transaction had occurred.
The FDIC also argued that a second element of section 1813(/)(1)'s
definition was not met since the letter of credit in issue was not one on
which the bank was "primarily liable." The agency maintained that the
section's language referring to letters of credit on which the bank is primarily liable was intended to refer to commercial letters and not to
37
standby letters of credit such as the one issued by Penn Square.
In support of this position, the FDIC contended that a standby letter of credit is essentially a guaranty of the account party's performance
because the issuing bank's obligation is triggered only in the event that
the account party defaults on the underlying contract. 38 The agency argued that such letters were not within the ambit of a national bank's
39
authority to act as a guarantor of another party's debts.
The Tenth Circuit rejected this contention and refused to defer to
the FDIC's interpretation. 40 The court noted that the agency's position
was inconsistent with federal regulations promulgated by the Comptrol42
ler of the Currency 4 1 and with the prior position taken by the FDIC.
The court compared standby letters of credit with a surety's contract
guaranteeing a principal's debt, 4 3 but differentiated the two on the
grounds that a bank issuing a standby letter of credit assumes signifi36. 751 F.2d at 1134.
37. Id. at 1135. Generally, the key document presented under a letter of credit is a
certificate of default by the customer on the underlying obligation. For a discussion of the
similarities and differences between a commercial and a standby letter of credit, see B.
CLARK, THE LAW OF BANK DEPOSITS, COLLECTIONS AND CREDIT CARDS, § 8.2, at 8-5 (rev.

ed. 1981). This argument was based on the assertion that the agency assisted in drafting a
significant portion of the statute in question and is charged with administering its
provisions.
38. 751 F.2d at 1136.
39. Id. See First Empire Bank-New York v. FDIC, 572 F.2d 1361, 1367 (9th Cir.) (recognizing the rule that national banks are not authorized to enter into guarantees), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 919 (1978); 12 U.S.C. § 24 (1982).
40. The FDIC asserted that deference is often given to an agency's interpretation of a
statute it administers, especially if Congress has expressly delegated authority to an agency
to elucidate a specific provision of the statute. Since the court found no evidence that
Congress explicitly delegated authority to the FDIC to refine the definition of deposit and
since the agency had not acted as if it possessed such authority, the court refused to give
the FDIC interpretation substantial deference. Instead, the court examined three factors
in giving weight to the agency's interpretation of section 1813(0(1): the agency's thoroughness, the validity of its reasoning, and consistency with its other pronouncements.
751 F.2d at 1135.
41. Id. at 1136 (quoting 12 C.F.R. § 7.7016 (1985)). 12 C.F.R. § 7.7016 states that
-[a] national bank may issue letters of credit permissible under the Uniform Commercial
Code or the Uniform Customs and Practice for Documentary Credits to or on behalf of its
customers. The Uniform Commercial Code contemplates that banks may issue standby
letters of credit."
42. See, e.g., FDIC v. Freudenfeld, 492 F. Supp. 763, 767 (E.D. Wis. 1980) (A standby
letter of credit is not a guaranty according to the FDIC.).
43. 751 F.2d at 1136.
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cantly less conditional liability than does a surety. Unlike an ordinary
' 44
guarantor who in many instances will be able to assert "real defenses,
the liability of a bank issuing a standby letter of credit is nearly absolute;4 5 it must pay claims against the letter even if the account party has
legal defenses for nonpayment. Thus, the court held, as it has previously done under different facts, 4 6 that standby letters of credit represent primary and not secondary obligations of the issuing bank.
The FDIC also contended that the federal deposit insurance fund is
structured to exclude standby letters of credit from the scope of section
1813 (1)(1)'s definition of deposit. It reasoned that Congress had established specific guidelines to be applied in determining the proper assessment amount each member bank should contribute to the insurance
fund, which amount was predicated on the amount absolutely due upon
a bank's failure. 4 7 Since an issuing bank's liability under a standby letter
of credit relies upon the account party's default on its contract with the
letter's beneficiary, such liabilities are contingent. It was never Congress' intention that "the FDIC attempt to evaluate and assess the risks
'48
associated with such contingent liabilities."
This contention was curtly dismissed by the Tenth Circuit. It found
no language in either the statute or its legislative history that would limit
the definition of a deposit to exclude standby letters of credit. 49 The
court held that these instruments were thus within the statutory definition of a "deposit," and that letters of credit constitute insured deposits.
The second issue considered by the court was whether Philadelphia
Gear, as beneficiary of a standby letter of credit, was the insured depositor entitled to recover the deposit insurance proceeds. Since records of
the insolvent bank are conclusive as to a claimant's entitlement to deposit insurance, 50 the FDIC argued that the drafts presented two days
and seventeen days after Penn Square's insolvency were unrecorded
51
contingent liabilities at the time of insolvency.
In deciding that Philadelphia Gear was the insured depositor, the
44. Id. See U.C.C. § 3-415, comment 1 (1978).
45. Philadelphia Gear, 751 F.2d 1136; see also J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, HANDBOOK OF
THE LAW UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 18-2 ( 2d ed. 1980). Compare U.C.C.
§ 3-415 (1978) (simple contract defenses are afforded an ordinary guarantor) with U.C.C.
§ 5-114 (1978) (issuance of a letter of credit has obligations not exclusively contractual in
nature to beneficiary).
46. See Fidelity Bank v. Lutheran Mutual Life Insurance Co., 465 F.2d 211, 213 (10th
Cir. 1972) (bank primarily liable on letter of credit issued to assure compliance with conditions of a loan commitment); see also Voest-Alpine Int'l Corp. v. Chase Manhattan Bank,
707 F.2d 680, 682 (2d Cir. 1983) (bank's obligation to the beneficiary is primary, direct
and independent of any claims arising in the underlying sale transaction).
47. See 12 U.S.C. § 1817 (1982).
48. 751 F.2d at 1137.
49. Id. (citing 12 U.S.C. § 1813(l)(1) for the definition of "deposit," and 12 U.S.C.
§ 1813(a)(1) which includes within the definition of a deposit, "a letter of credit . . . on
which the bank is primarily liable.")). See generally 1950 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
3765-3779.
50. See 12 U.S.C. § 1822(c) (1982); 12 C.F.R. § 330.1(b) (1985) (records of the closed
bank decide claimants).
51. 751 F.2d at 1138.

COMMERCIAL LA W

1986]

233

Tenth Circuit adopted the Ninth Circuit's approach on the issue by stating three conditions which must be met before drafts presented after
insolvency are claims reimbursable through insurance proceeds. 5 2 First,
the claims must be in existence prior to insolvency and not dependent
on obligations arising after insolvency. Second, the total liability must
be certain when the beneficiaries sue the bank's receiver. Finally, the
claims must be made in a timely manner, before assets are distributed
from the receivership estate. 5 3 Applying the Ninth Circuit test, the
court held Orion's default, at least as to the claims presented two days
after the receiver took over the bank, occurred before the insolvency
and were provable claims. 54 Since the court believed that Philadelphia
Gear, as beneficiary, was the only party permitted to make a demand on
the issuing bank for amounts under the letter of credit, logically it
should be considered the depositor in the event the issuing bank became insolvent. 5 5 Therefore, the court held that Philadelphia Gear was
the "depositor" for purposes of entitlement to the insurance proceeds.
The third issue the court considered was whether prejudgment interest should be assessed against the FDIC in its capacity as insurer on
the $100,000 deposit insurance proceeds. The Tenth Circuit reversed
the district court on this issue by holding that prejudgment interest
should not be awarded. 56 The court noted that although the FDIC has
the capacity to sue and be sued, 5 7 it did not necessarily follow that this
waives the sovereign immunity doctrine on claims for prejudgment interest. An express waiver of sovereign immunity is necessary. 58 Even
though Congress expressly recognized that delays would occur in paying some insurance claims, 59 no express waiver of its immunity to prejudgment interest was present. 6°
C.

Conclusion

Since bank insolvency is of increasing concern, this case gives some
indication of how beneficiaries of standby letters of credit can minimize
the adverse effects such bank failures can cause their business dealings.
By structuring letters of credit to be negotiable on their face, beneficiaries can better insulate their financial transactions from being uninsured, contingent obligations.
52.
69 (9th
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.

First Empire Bank-New York v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., 572 F.2d 1361, 1367Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 919 (1978).
751 F.2d at 1138.
Id.
Id.
Id.
12 U.S.C. § 1819 (1982).
751 F.2d at 1138.
12 U.S.C. § 1821(f) (1982).
751 F.2d at 1139.
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STATUTORY DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENTS OF CREDITOR STATUS:
EUSTACE . COOPER AGENCY, INC.

The Facts

In Eustace v. Cooper Agency, Inc.,6 1 the plaintiff, Sadie Eustace, entered into an installment credit contract with Bogue Brothers, an appliance dealership, for the purchase of a washer and dryer. This contract
was assigned to the Cooper Agency, a financing entity which purchased
acceptable security agreements and sales contracts from Bogue Brothers. 6 2 Eustace brought this action against Bogue Brothers and the
Cooper Agency under the Truth in Lending Act 63 (TILA) and Federal
Reserve Board Regulation Z.6 4 She alleged that the defendants failed to
comply with statutory and regulatory requirements by not disclosing the
65
creditor status of Cooper Agency in the credit contract.
The district court initially held that Eustace failed to establish that
Cooper Agency was a "creditor" as defined by the TILA. Consequently,
the installment contract's failure to identify Cooper Agency's creditor
66
status was immaterial and did not constitute a violation of the TILA.
B.

The Tenth Circuit Decision

On appeal, the Tenth Circuit reversed the district court, holding
that the Cooper Agency was a "creditor" under the TILA6 7 and Regulation Z68 since credit had been extended. Several features of the Cooper
61. 741 F.2d 294 (10th Cir. 1984).
62. Id. at 297-98.
63. 15 U.S.C. § 1601-1667(e) (1982).
64. 12 C.F.R. § 226 (1985).
65. Eustace, 741 F.2d at 294-95. The complaint alleged that the defendants failed:
(1) to identify both creditors in the transaction; (2) to make the disclosures using the prescribed terminology; (3) to make all required disclosures clearly, conspicuously and in
meaningful sequence; and (4) to make all required disclosures on one side of the page.
Also, the complaint alleged that improper additional information was disclosed. In short,
the alleged violations appear to be technical ones.
66. Id. In this case, the court applied the law relevant at the time the transaction
arose. The definition of "creditor" and the notification requirements have since been
modified. The court stated, however, that the same result would occur if the most current
law was applied. Eustace, 741 F.2d at 300 n. I. See also S. REP. No. 536, 97th Cong., 2d
Sess. 71, reprinted in 1982 U.S. CONG. AD. NEws 3054, 3125 (amended section 1602(f)
excludes "arrangers of credit" except for those who regularly extend commercial credit.);
Griffith, Recent Developments in the Effort to Simplify Truth in Lending, 19 TULSA L.J. 30, 56-58,
62-67 (1983) (comparing new and old versions of the Act). Compare 15 U.S.C. § 1602(f)
(1976) (creditor is person who regularly extends consumer credit which is payable in more
than four installments) with 15 U.S.C. § 1602(0 (1982) (creditor is person who regularly
extends consumer credit which is payable in more than four installments and is the person
to whom the debt is initially payable on the face of the instrument). Compare 12 C.F.R.
§§ 226.1-1002 (1970) with 12 C.F.R. §§ 226.1-.29 (1985).
67. The Act, as cited in Eustace, provided in pertinent part:
The term "creditor" refers only to creditors who regularly extend, or arrange for
the extension of, credit which is payable by agreement in more than four installments or for which the payment of a finance charge is or may be required,
whether in connection with loans, sales of property or services, or otherwise.
15 U.S.C. § 1602(f) (1976) (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 1602(f) (1982)).
68. Regulation Z, as cited in Eustace, provided in pertinent part:
(5) "Creditor" means a person who in the ordinary course of business regularly
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Agency's relationship with Bogue Brothers caused the court to characterize it as an entity extending credit. First, a dealer financing agreement existed under which Cooper Agency agreed to purchase
acceptable sales contracts and security agreements from Bogue Brothers. Second, Bogue Brothers agreed to prepare such contracts on forms
furnished by and satisfactory to the Cooper Agency. Third, Bogue
Brothers assigned all of its installment contracts to financing entities,
sixty-five percent of which were assigned to Cooper Agency. 69 Finally,
there were no more than two or three contracts which Bogue Brothers
requested Cooper Agency to return and which Cooper Agency did not
purchase. 70 Therefore, in light of all these facts, the court found
Cooper Agency to be a "creditor" for purposes of TILA disclosure requirements. The court's finding of an actual extension of credit was bolstered by the fact that Cooper Agency gave no prior approval to the
buyer's credit application since it had recourse against Bogue
7
Brothers. 1
Addressing the second issue, which was contingent on finding that
Cooper Agency was a creditor, the court held that the failure to so identify the Cooper Agency in the installment credit contract was not a mere
technical violation of the Act, but instead warranted relief to the debtor
as provided for under the Act. The TILA requires that each creditor
must be clearly identified 72 and that the failure to do so imposes liability
under the Act.

73

The court found that the contract failed to identify Cooper Agency
as a creditor based on two circumstances. First, although Eustace's copy
of the contract stated that "[t]he foregoing security is hereby assigned
extends or arranges for the extension of consumer credit or offers to extend or
arrange for the extension of such credit, which is payable by agreement in more
than four installments, or for which the payment of a finance charge is or may be
required, whether in connection with loans, sales of property or services, or
otherwise.
12 C.F.R § 226.2 (1980) (current version at 12 C.F.R. § 226.2 (1985)).
69. 741 F.2d at 298. Additionally, Bogue Brothers had been doing business with the
Cooper Agency for 10 years and was its largest source of business. Id. at 298.
70. Id.
71. The court noted the difference between this transaction and similar cases decided
in other circuits. See also Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Cenance, 452 U.S. 155, 156-60 (1981)
(per curiam). In Cenance, the dealer first submitted the buyer's credit application to the
Ford Motor Credit Company (FMCC) for approval. It was only after the dealer was notified that the buyer passed FMCC's credit check, that the dealer and buyer executed a retail
installment contract. FMCC then repurchased the installment contract without recourse
against the dealer. Cenance, 452 U.S. at 155-57. There was no need for Cooper Agency, on
the other hand, to give prior approval to the buyer's credit application since Cooper
Agency purchased contracts with recourse against Bogue Brothers. The prior approval/recourse distinction was deemed to be of secondary significance by the Tenth Circuit. Cf. Eustace, 741 F.2d at 298; Boncyk v. Cavanaugh Motors, 673 F.2d 256 (9th Cir.
1981). And in Joseph v. Norman's Health Club Inc., 532 F.2d 86, 90 (8th Cir. 1976), the
court stated:
In interpreting the Act, the Federal Reserve Board and the majority of courts
have focused on the substance, rather than the form, of credit transactions, and
have looked to the practices of the trade, the course of dealing of the parties, and
the intention of the parties in addition to specific contractual obligations.
72. 12 C.F.R. § 226.8 (1985).
73. 12 C.F.R. § 226.6 (1985).
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under the terms of the Seller's Recourse, recommendation, Assignment
74
and Guaranty on the reverse side hereof unless otherwise indicated,"
her copy did not contain, on the reverse side, such quoted language or a
statement that the contract was assigned to the Cooper Agency. Second, although the contract copy did contain a reference to the Group
Creditor Life Policy pursuant to the agency agreement of Cooper
Agency, this statement was found not to be sufficiently clear to identify
Cooper Agency as a creditor. 75 Despite the fact that Eustace acknowledged that she was making payments directly to the Cooper Agency, the
Tenth Circuit held that even a showing of actual knowledge does not
excuse a creditor's failure to comply with the mandatory disclosure requirements, or prevent recovery under the mandatory remedial provi76
sions of the Act and the regulations.
The court concluded that since the contract did not clearly notify
Eustace of the assignment to the Cooper Agency or its status as a credi77
tor, the mandatory disclosure requirements of TILA were not met.
C.

Conclusion

According to Eustace, a loose interpretation of "creditor" will be applied to those who regularly extend credit. Not only will a financing
entity be regarded as a "creditor" when it gives prior approval to credit
transactions without recourse, the entity will also be regarded as a
"creditor" when it gives no prior approval but has recourse. Additionally, the argument that a financing entity such as the Cooper Agency has
in effect accepted afait accompli by merely accepting an assignment of a
completed agreement without prior approval will not be accorded much
deference. Once a financial entity falls within the definition of a creditor, fastidious compliance with the consumer credit rules is mandated.
This holding should not be affected by applying current consumer credit
law. Eustace highlights that what appears to be a mere oversight will not
necessarily be regarded as a mere technical violation which requires no
remedy.
IV.

TRADEMARK INFRINGEMENT AND THE "LIKELIHOOD

OF CONFUSION"

TEST: AA1OCO OIL CO. V RAINBOW SNOW

In Amoco Oil Co. v. Rainbow Snow, 78 the Tenth Circuit court expanded and clarified the "likelihood of confusion" test to be applied in a
trademark infringement case. 79 In this case, Amoco Oil Company
74.

Eustace, 741 F.2d at 300.

75. Id. (citing Boncyk v. Cavanaugh Motors, 673 F.2d 256, 260 (9th Cir. 1981)).
76. 741 F.2d at 301.
77. Id. (citing Ford Motor Co. v. Cenance, 452 U.S. 155 (1981)).
78. 748 F.2d 556 (10th Cir. 1984).
79. Id. at 557-58. The provisions of 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1) (1982) govern the trademark
infringement determination. That section imposes liability for the "use in commerce [of]
any reproduction, counterfeit, copy, or colorable imitation of a registered mark . . . likely
to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive .... ." Id. (quoting 15 U.S.C.
§ 1114(1) (1982) (emphasis added)). This "likelihood of confusion" test was also deemed

1986]

COMMERCIAL LA W

(Amoco) appealed the district court's denial of its motion for a preliminary injunction prohibiting the appellee's use of the name "Rainbow
Snow" to describe his snow cone business.8 0
A.

The Facts

In 1976, Amoco created the Rainbow Oil Company division (Rainbow Oil) to operate self-service gas stations in Salt Lake City, Utah.
Since that time, Rainbow Oil has operated exclusively under the
82
"Rainbo" trademark,8 1 and this mark appears on service station signs.
The Rainbo stations have sold convenience foods since 1976, and in
83
1980 ice slush drinks were introduced at two Rainbow stations.
During the summer of 1982, Van Leeuwen operated a snow cone
business in the Salt Lake City area under the name of Rainbow Snow,
Inc. 8 4 The snow cones were sold from booths displaying the name
"Rainbow Snow" beneath a rainbow logo. 85 Some of these booths were
86
in close proximity to Rainbo stations.
In December of 1982, Amoco filed suit against Van Leeuwen, seeking injunctive relief and alleging that use of the "Rainbow Snow" mark
constituted trademark infringement. 8 7 In its decision, the Utah federal
district court initially noted the general rule regarding likelihood of confusion; would an ordinary consumer likely be confused as to the source
of the product. 88 It then applied the factors enumerated in the Restate-

ment of Torts89 to determine if there was a likelihood of confusion. Its
conjunctive application of these two legal standards led the district court
to focus solely on the issue of confusion as to source. Implicit in its
decision was the conclusion that confusion was unlikely because proapplicable to Amoco's pendent state claims of infringement under UTAH CODE ANN. § 703-13 (1953); its claim of false designation of origin, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1976); and its
common law claims of unfair competition and deceptive trade practices, Amstar Corp. v.
Domino's Pizza, Inc., 615 F.2d 252, 258 (5th Cir. 1980).
80. Amoco, 748 F.2d at 557.
81. Amoco registered its "Rainbo" service mark and trademark with the United States
Patent Office in 1978 and with the State of Utah in 1982. id.
82. The word "Rainbo" appears in white letters against a black background and below
a red-orange-yellow-blue truncated rainbow logo. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id. During the summer of 1981, Van Leeuwen sold snow cones from two stands in
the Salt Lake City area under the name "Sno Shop," and in October 1981, he reserved the
name "Rainbow Snow" with the State of Utah as the name for his expanded snow cone
business.
85. The Rainbow Snow booths are blue with a 180-degree, red-orange-yellow-green
rainbow appearing on the upper half of the booth, and the name "Rainbow Snow" appears
in white below the rainbow. Id. See supra note 82.
86. Id. at 557. Some Rainbow Snow booths were located adjacent to Rainbo stations,
while others were within a few blocks.
87. See supra note 79.
88. The district court stated the rule as follows: "[i]t is the generally accepted rule that
a designation is confusingly similar to a trade-mark if an ordinary prospective purchaser,
exercising due care in the circumstances, is likely to regard it as coming from the same
source as the trade-marked article." Amoco, 748 F.2d at 558 (quoting Avrick v. Rockmont
Envelope Co., 155 F.2d 568, 572 (10th Cir. 1946) (emphasis added)).
89.

RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 729 (1938).

The RESTATEMENT factors are:
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spective purchasers would not believe that Rainbow Snow cones
originated with the Rainbow Oil Company. 90 The district court determined that Amoco had established none of the four prerequisites to the
issuance of a preliminary injunction, 9 1 and thus denied the motion.
92
Amoco appealed this adverse decision to the Tenth Circuit.
B.

The Tenth Circuit Decision

In short, the Tenth Circuit held that the district court erred when it
"limited its inquiry to the issue of confusion of source, and did not consider potential confusion which might result from a belief in common
sponsorship or affiliation.' '9 The Tenth Circuit agreed that the factors
enumerated in the Restatement should be applied, 94 but stated that the
95
district court considered those factors in too narrow a context.
The Tenth Circuit considered only whether Amoco had shown a
substantial "likelihood of success on the merits," 9 6 and premised
Amoco's ability to establish this prerequisite on its demonstrating a substantial likelihood that it would prevail on the issue of likelihood of con(a)

the degree of similarity between the designation and the trade-mark or trade

name in

(i) appearance;
(ii) pronunciation of the words used;
(iii) verbal translation of the pictures or designs involved;
(iv) suggestion;
(b) the intent of the actor in adopting the designation;
(c) the relation in use and manner of marketing between the goods or services
marketed by the other;
(d) the degree of care likely to be exercised by purchasers.
90. 748 F.2d at 559.
91. To obtain a preliminary injunction the moving party has the burden of
establishing:
"(1) substantial likelihood that the movant will eventually prevail on the merits;
(2) a showing that the movant will suffer irreparable injury unless the injunction
issues; (3) proof that the threatened injury to the movant outweighs whatever
damage the proposed injunction may be cause the opposing party; and (4) a
showing that the injunction, if issued, would not be adverse to the public
interest."
Id. at 557 (quoting Lundgrin v. Claytor, 619 F.2d 61, 63 (10th Cir. 1980)).
92. Amoco appealed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1) (1982).
93. 748 F.2d at 559 (emphasis added).
94. Id. at 558. For Tenth Circuit cases where the court has applied the RESTATEMENT
criteria, see Beer Nuts, Inc. v. Clover Club Foods Co., 711 F.2d 934, 940 (10th Cir. 1983);
Drexel Enterprises v. Richardson, 312 F.2d 525, 528 (10th Cir. 1962). Other courts have
also used some formulation of this same test. See, e.g., Soweco Inc. v. Shell Oil Co., 617
F.2d 1178, 1185 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 981 (1981); McGregor-Doniger Inc.
v. Drizzle Inc., 559 F.2d 1126, 1130 (2d Cir. 1979); AMF Inc. v. Sleekcraft Boats, 559 F.2d
341, 348-49 (9th Cir. 1979); Union Carbide Corp. v. Ever-Ready Inc., 531 F.2d 366, 38182 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 830 (1976); Fotomat Corp. v. Cochran, 437 F. Supp.
1231, 1242 (D.Kan. 1977).
95. Amoco, 748 F.2d at 558-59. "[Tlhe Restatement factors should be considered not
only in the context of confusion of source, but also in the context of confusion that results
from a mistaken belief in common sponsorship or affiliation." Id. at 558. Implicit in this
holding is that the district court failed to consider whether prospective purchasers would
believe Rainbo and Rainbow Snow were somehow related to or affiliated with each other.
96. The court's sole concern with the first prerequisite to the issuance of a preliminary
injunction was premised on its belief that the district court's determination that confusion
was unlikely may have affected its resolution of the other three prerequisites. Amoco, 748
F.2d at 556, 559.

COMMERCIAL LA W

1986]

fusion.9 7 In determining that the district court had placed too
restrictive an interpretation on the confusion requirement, the Tenth
Circuit remanded the case with instructions that the district court assess
the likelihood of confusion which might result from a belief in common
sponsorship or affiliation, and concomitantly consider the Restatement
98
factors.
The Rainbow Snow case cannot be read solely as a decision which
aligned the Tenth Circuit with other circuit courts in giving the "likelihood of confusion" test a wider scope than simply an inquiry into confusion of source. 9 9 The question of confusion, whether of a sensory or
conceptual nature,' 0 0 or of source or affiliation, is determinative of an
infringement claim, and the Tenth Circuit's decision indicates that the
test involved in trademark infringement law is becoming both increasingly expansive and subjective.' 0 1

V.
A.

BANKRUPTCY DECISIONS

The Effect of Primary Use of Collateralon Exemption and Lien Avoidance
Status: In re Reid

In In re Reid, 10 2 the Tenth Circuit considered whether certain paintings owned by the debtors were exempt from attachment under the personal property exemption categories described in the Oklahoma
exemption statute' 0 3 and the Federal Bankruptcy Code lien avoidance
statute.' 0 4 Both statutes require that items which fall within the exemption categories must be "held primarily for the personal, family or
97. Id. at 558.
98. Id. at 559.
99. See Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pussycat Cinema Ltd., 604 F.2d 200,
204-05 (2d Cir. 1979); James Burrough Ltd. v. Sign of the Beefeater, Inc., 540 F.2d 266,
274 (7th Cir. 1976); see also Control Components, Inc. v. Valtek, Inc., 609 F.2d 763, 770
(5th Cir. 1980).
100. See Beer Nuts, Inc. v. Clover Club Foods Co., 711 F.2d 934, 940 (10th Cir. 1983)
(similarity of sight, sound, and meaning must each be considered).
101. For an informative case discussing the general area of trademark infringement
law, see Soweco, Inc. v. Shell Oil Co., 617 F.2d 1178 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S.
981 (1981) see also Beer Nuts, Inc. v. Clover Club Foods Co., 711 F.2d 934 (10th Cir. 1983)
("Beer Nuts" and "Brew Nuts"); Beatrice Foods Co. v. Neosho Valley Coop. Creamery
Ass'n, 297 F.2d 447 (10th Cir. 1961) ("Meadow Sweet" and "Meadow Gold"); Nebraska
Consol. Mills Co. v. Shawnee Milling Co., 198 F.2d 36 (10th Cir. 1952) ("Mother's Best"
and "Mother's Pride").
102. 757 F.2d 230 (10th Cir. 1985).
103. OKLA. STAT. tit. 31 § i(A)(3), (7) (Supp. 1980). The pertinent portion of the
Oklahoma exemption statute provides:
[Tihe following property shall be reserved to every person residing in the state,
exempt from attachment or execution and every other species of forced sale for
the payment of debts, except as herein provided:
(3) All household and kitchen furniture held primarily for the personal, family
or household use of such person or a dependent of such person;
(7) All books, portraits and pictures, and wearing apparel, that are held primarily for the personal, family or household use of such person or a dependent of
such person.
104. 11 U.S.C. § 522(f) (1982). Section 522(f) provides in part:
Notwithstanding any waiver of exemptions, the debtor may avoid the fixing of a
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0 5
household use" of the debtor.
In In re Reid, the debtors, Wayne and Dorothy Reid, operated a family business which received fifteen religious paintings from a customer as
payment for services rendered. 10 6 The Reids hung all fifteen paintings
throughout their house. They then pledged these paintings to two
banks as collateral for loans, the proceeds of which were used for business purposes. Both security agreements indicated, however, that the
10 7
paintings were held primarily for personal, family and household use.
The Reids filed a voluntary bankruptcy petition approximately one year
after the loans were made, and sought to exempt the paintings from
attachment for payment of debts under the Oklahoma exemption statute. '0 8 One of the banks commenced this action in the bankruptcy court
claiming that the paintings were not exempt under the Oklahoma statute
and that the debtors could not avoid security interest liens on the property under the Federal Bankruptcy Code lien avoidance statute. 10 9
The bankruptcy court found that the paintings were not exempt and
the liens were not avoidable, because, under all the circumstances, the
paintings were not held primarily for personal, family or household
use.10 Although the paintings were located in the debtors' home, the
bankruptcy court found that their "most important use. . .[was] pledging them commercially for commercial loans."" 1 The bankruptcy court
asserted three reasons for its conclusion. First, the paintings were received by the Reids as a business entity and as payment on a series of
commercial transactions. Second, the paintings were pledged as collateral for business loans shortly after the Reids received them and placed
them in their home. Finally, the Reids themselves indicated in their list
of assets that the paintings were a "unique collection" by not incorporating them into their general description of furniture, fixtures and ac-

lien on an interest of the debtor in property to the extent that such lien impairs an
exemption to which the debtor would have been entitled . . .if such lien is (2) a nonpossessory, nonpurchase-money security interest in any (A) household furnishings, household goods . . . that are held primarily
for the personal, family, or household use of the debtor or a dependent of the
debtor.
105. OKLA. STAT. tit. 31, § I(A)(3), (7) (Supp. 1980); 11 U.S.C. § 522(0(2)(A) (1982).
The debtor is allowed to choose between use of state or federal exemption provisions. In
re Reid, 757 F.2d at 231 n.1; 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(2)(A) (1982).
106. In re Reid, 757 F.2d at 231-32. The paintings were 200 to 300-year-old "classic
religious paintings" valued at approximately $187,000. A credit of $125,000 was given to
the customer's company accounts when the paintings were received. Id. at 232, 235.
107. Id. The Reids stressed the wording in the security agreements as strong evidence
that the banks recognized the personal, family and household use of the paintings. Id. at
232. The Tenth Circuit never addressed the issue of whether the banks were required to
adopt the characterization of the goods given in the security agreements furnished by
them.
108. OKLA. STAT. tit. 31, § I(A)(3), (7) (Supp. 1980). See supra note 103. Objections
were filed by the trustee in bankruptcy and the two banks involved. Reid, 757 F.2d at 231.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 232. In the proceedings, the bankruptcy court assumed that the paintings
fell within the personal property exemption categories described in the Oklahoma exemption statute and found that the creditors' security interests were nonpossessory, nonpurchase-money liens subject to 11 U.S.C. § 522(f) avoidance provisions. Id.
11. Id.

1986]

COMMERCIAL LA W

cessories. 1 12 The district court affirmed the judgment. 113
On appeal, the issue before the Tenth Circuit was whether the
bankruptcy court erred in finding that the paintings were not held primarily for personal, family or household use. The court stated that it
was bound to accept the findings of the bankruptcy judge unless they
were clearly erroneous.' 4 The Tenth Circuit found that sufficient evidence was introduced in the bankruptcy hearing to support the bankruptcy court's findings that the paintings were received by the debtors as
a business entity and not as individuals.l 1 5 Next, the court held that the
bankruptcy court, in finding that the most important use of the paintings
was pledging them commercially for commercial loans,' 16 was not required to adopt the characterization of the items given in the security
agreement. 'i1 Finally, the court held that despite the location of the
items in the debtor's home, the bankruptcy court could properly find
that the paintings were primarily used for business rather than for
household purposes, which was deemed to be a secondary use.' '8 Thus,
the Tenth Circuit agreed with and affirmed the lower court's decision
that the paintings were not held primarily for personal, family or household use and did not fall within the exemption and lien avoidance
112. Id. at 232, 235 n.6.
113. Id. at 232.
114. The Tenth Circuit concluded that the clearly erroneous standard of review is appropriate in a "core bankruptcy proceeding" under both the 1978 Bankruptcy Act and the
Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984. Id. at 234 n.5. The court
stated that the bankruptcy case before them was a " 'core proceeding' because it involved
the determination of 'exemptions from the property of estate,' defined as a 'core proceeding' under § 157(b)(2)(B) of the 1984 Act." Id. at 234 n.5; cf. 1616 Reminc, Ltd. Partnership v. Atchison & Keller Co., 704 F.2d 1313, 1318 (4th Cir. 1983) (use of clearly
erroneous standard unconstitutional in non-core contexts).
115. 757 F.2d at 234. To support this finding, the court noted the following:
(1) although the Reid's was a family-run business, some of the company employees were
not members of the Reid family; (2) the Reids received the paintings as payment of debts
owed the business; (3) "credit" was given to the customer's company accounts in the
amount of $125,000 for the paintings; and (4) that the Reids were seeking to discharge in
bankruptcy some of the costs incurred "in producing this $125,000 worth of work." Id. at
235.
116. Id. The Tenth Circuit also found that sufficient evidence supported the bankruptcy court's finding that the paintings' most important use was pledging them commercially for commercial loans, in that the paintings were pledged as collateral within a period
of six days from the first installment and a period of a few months from the second installment. Additionally, Wayne Reid testified on numerous occasions that the loan proceeds
were used exclusively for business purposes. Id. at 234-35.
117. Id. at 235. See In re Currie, 34 B.R. 745, 747-48 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1983) (evidence
of actual use of collateral controlled over security agreement classification of collateral as
consumer goods held for family, personal or household purposes); In re Noggle, 30 B.R.
303, 305, (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1983) ("classification of property in a security agreement is
not dispositive of questions dealing with whether the property may be claimed as exempt
or whether a lien on such property may be avoided.").
118.

Reid, 757 F.2d at 235 (quoting 3 COLLIER ON BANKRUrrCY

522/12 (15th ed.

1985) ("Presumably, those goods which are primarily for occupational use ... do not fall
within the [personal, family or household use] exemption, even though there may also be a
secondary personal use.")); see also Security Building & Loan Ass'n v. Ward, 174 Okla. 238,
50 P.2d 651,656 (1935) (even though goods may have characteristics of "household furniture," courts have held with practical unanimity that furniture devoted to commercial purposes does not fall within the exemption statute).
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statutes.' 19
The test applied by the Tenth Circuit in denying exempt status to
these items was that use controls over nature, characterization and location of the collateral. Thus, even though an item might fall within the
applicable exemption categories of the statutes by virtue of its nature as
personal property, it will not automatically be exempt by virtue of its
classification as "household furniture even if the item is located in the
home."' 120 Neither will an item be automatically exempt by its characterization adopted by the parties to a security agreement. Although the
paintings were "used" in the Reid's home as ornamentation, their incidental placement was not afforded much deference by the court. The
"actual use" itself should be carefully scrutinized. The items must be
held "primarily" for household or personal use. In looking at the "primary use" of the collateral, the court will consider such factors as the
source of the collateral as well as its future use.
B.

Reopening of Bankruptcy Estate

SUA SPONTE: IN RE MULLENDORE

In In re Mullendore,12 1 the court addressed the issue of whether it is
an abuse of discretion for a bankruptcy judge to reopen an estate sua
sponte for the purpose of ordering the debtor estate to pay fees to the
referees' salary and expense fund.' 22 In the original action, the district
judge who handled the Mullendore bankruptcy proceeding did not assess a fee payable to this fund. The bankruptcy judge who replaced the
then-deceased district judge closed the estate on July 17, 1979. After
discovering that no charges were made or paid to the credit of the referees' fund, the bankruptcy judge reopened the estate on his own motion
on November 7, 1979. The judge then ordered the debtor estate or the
debtors to pay the amount of $14,256.06 to the clerk of the bankruptcy
court for deposit into the referees' fund.' 23 The Mullendores appealed
the district court's affirmance of the bankruptcy court's order.
On appeal, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision,
beginning with the initial premise that a bankruptcy court is vested with
the authority to exercise original jurisdiction to reopen estates if cause is
shown. 124 The court then noted that although the duty to reopen an
estate is a discretionary one in many instances, it in effect becomes an
119.

120.
121.
122.
ary and

Reid, 757 F.2d at 236.

Id.
741 F.2d 306 (10th Cir. 1984).
See 11 U.S.C. § 68(c)(2) (1982) which states: "Additional fees for the referees salexpense fund shall be charged, in accordance with the schedule fixed by the con-

ference . . . of this Title."

123. Mullendore, 741 F.2d at 308 n.2.
124. Id. at 308. See 11 U.S.C. § I l(a)(8) (1982). The appellants cited In re Barlean, 290
F. Supp. 260 (D. Mont. 1968), for the proposition that "cause shown" refers to causes
which, if known to the adjudicating authority, would have altered the decision or order.
See Mullendore, 741 F.2d at 308 n. 1. They argued that if the fee assessment matter had
been reconsidered by the original district judge, the results would not have been different,
and thus disputed the bankruptcy judge's decision to reopen the estate. The Tenth Circuit
briefly distinguished the Mullendores' cited authority on the ground that the court in
Barlean reached the correct result and, therefore, the motion to reopen was denied. The
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affirmative duty of the court "whenever prima facie proof exists that the
estate has not been fully administered." 125 In this case, the court found
that the estate was reopened within a reasonable time to properly complete the administration of the estate. The Tenth Circuit thus held that
the bankruptcy court did not abuse its discretion in reopening the estate
sua sponte for the purpose of ordering the debtor estate to pay fees for
the referees' fund.
In reaching this conclusion, however, the court cursorily bypassed
the sua sponte initiation of the reopening. 126 Relying on rather scanty
authority, the court noted in response to the Mullendores' contention
that the bankruptcy judge had no authority to reopen the estate that" 'it
has been suggested that perhaps the court could make a reopening order sua sponte.' ",127 The Tenth Circuit court bolstered its position by
citing a Second Circuit opinion, In re InternationalMatch Corp. 12 8 That
opinion held that where the referee in bankruptcy had fraudulently
taken excess commissions in violation of a court order, it was proper for
the court, upon the recommendation of a special master, to reopen the
estate and to order the recovery of the sums involved. 12 9 The Tenth
Circuit, however, failed to mark the distinction between reopening an
estate on the recommendation of a master and reopening an estate by a
bankruptcy judge sua sponte. The sua sponte reopening of an estate has
thus materialized in the Tenth Circuit in those situations in which
proper administration of an estate must be completed.
Next, the Mullendores contended that the bankruptcy judge erred
in presuming that the earlier failure of the district judge to assess the fee
was merely an oversight. The Tenth Circuit held that regardless of the
reasons for the earlier failure of the district judge to assess these fees,
fees for the fund are chargeable against each case in an arrangement
confirmed under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Act.13 0 This statement
withstood the Mullendores' further contention that no services were
court concluded that in the appellant's situation the correct result was not reached by the
adjudicating authority at the time he acted. Id. at 308.
125. Mullendore, 741 F.2d at 308 (citing In rejoslyn's Estate, 171 F.2d 159, 164 (7th Cir.
1948)).
126. Mullendore, 741 F.2d at 308. After stating that an "interested party" could reopen
an estate, the court failed to determine whether the bankruptcy judge was such an interested party. Apparently, a bankruptcy judge would fall within the classification of an "interested party" when the referees' fund is the object to be benefited.
127. Id. at 308 (quoting I COLLIER ON BAN'~uTrcY
2.50 (14th ed. 1976)).
128. 190 F.2d 458 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 870 (1951).
129. Id. at 460-61.
130. Mullendore, 741 F.2d at 309 (citing 11 U.S.C. § 68(c)(2) (1976), which states that
"fees ... shall be charged . . . against each [chapter 11] case . ." (see supra note 122); 11
U.S.C. § 65 (1976), providing that the judicial Conference of the United States is to determine "schedules of graduated additional fees to be charged ...
;" and THE 1948 REPORT
OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATEs 31, stating that "[aidditional charges
for the referees' salary and expense funds . . . shall be collected . . . in all straight bank-

ruptcy cases . . ."). The additional charges for the referees' salary and expense fund in
those Chapter 11 cases administered before a district court without a reference to a referee in bankruptcy appear to have been based on policy considerations of uniform costs of
administration and for provision of funds necessary to maintain the referees' salary and
expense fund.
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performed by a referee sufficient to justify an assessment for the fund.
The Tenth Circuit held that even in Chapter 11 cases administered without reference to referees, such fees are chargeable to the estate.' 3 ' The
court then stated that these fees must be paid in full unless they have
been waived. Since there had been no waiver, and no deposit covering
these fees had been made, the court found that the Chapter 11 arrange13 2
ment had been erroneously confirmed.
Finally the Mullendores contended that the discharge in bankruptcy
released the former debtors in possession from any provable debt owed
to the United States.' 33 The court first stated than an unsecured debt
includes within its confines unsecured priority debts, and that the fees
for the referees' fund are such priority debts. 13 4 The Tenth Circuit
found, however, that the requirement that such a debt must be provided
for by the arrangement in order to be discharged by the confirmation of
the arrangement had not been satisfied. " 'If a plan does not provide for
the payment of some consideration for the modification or alteration of
a creditor's rights, the debt owed to that creditor is not affected by the
discharge which results from confirmation of the plan.' ,1'35 Since the
district judge did not assess a fee payable to the referees' salary and
expense fund, and the arrangement did not provide for the payment of
such fees, the fees were not discharged by the confirmation of the
arrangement.
The complete administration of an estate is the primary goal when
an estate is reopened. In re Mullendore thus illustrates that the non-payment of fees for the referees' fund falls under the aegis of "cause
shown" to enable a bankruptcy court to exercise its jurisdiction to reopen an estate.
C.

Bankruptcy Automatic Stay Protection: Fortier v.
Dona Anna Plaza Partners

In Fortierv. Dona Anna Plaza Partners,13 6 the Tenth Circuit held that
11 U.S.C. § 36213 7 stays litigation only against the debtor and affords no
protection to solvent co-defendants of that debtor. In this case, shopping center buyers (the Fortiers) sued the developer-seller (Peterson)
for damages in connection with the development, construction and sale
of the Dona Anna Plaza Shopping Center. 138 In a suit brought in the
131. The appellants relied on 11 U.S.C. § 771 (1976) which states: "The confirmation
of an arrangement shall discharge a debtor from all his unsecured debts and liabilities
provided for by the arrangement, except as provided in the arrangement or the order
confirming the arrangement, but excluding such debts as, under section 35 of this title, are
not dischargeable."
132. Mulendore, 741 F.2d at 309-10.
133. 741 F.2d at 310.
134. Id. (citing 9 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY
9.32 (14th ed. 1976) and 11 U.S.C.
§ 104(a) (1976)).
135.

741 F.2d at 310 (quoting 9 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY

136. 747 F.2d 1324 (10th Cir. 1984).
137. 11 U.S.C. § 362 (1982).
138. 747 F.2d at 1328.

9.32 (14th ed. 1976)).
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United States District Court for the District of New Mexico, the Fortiers
alleged that Peterson was negligent in instructing his architect, Armstrong, to ignore certain parking lot design recommendations concerning soil conditions. Armstrong complicated the trial proceedings by
filing for bankruptcy in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the
Southern District of California five days before the trial was to begin.
All pending proceedings against Armstrong were automatically stayed
pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 362.139 The damage action was immediately
removed by the Fortiers to the United States Bankruptcy Court for the
District of New Mexico. 140 The next day, the Fortiers filed a complaint
seeking relief from the automatic stay that became effective in the New
Mexico bankruptcy court. The New Mexico bankruptcy judge lifted the
stay and allowed the case to proceed. Thus, the case was transferred
back to the New Mexico district court. The district court rendered judg14 1
ment in favor of the Fortiers against Peterson and Armstrong.
On appeal, Peterson contended that Armstrong's bankruptcy filing
stayed the litigation against all parties and thus divested the district
court of jurisdiction to hear the case. 14 2 The Tenth Circuit dismissed
Peterson's contention, stating that the language of 11 U.S.C § 362 stays
only proceedings "against the debtor," and that no language in the statute purports to extend the stay to causes of action against solvent co3
defendants of the debtor.14
The court reasoned that it would be contrary to the legislative purposes underlying an automatic stay to extend stay protections to solvent
co-defendants of the debtor.144 Therefore, the Tenth Circuit refused to
extend Armstrong's automatic stay to Peterson and joined other circuit
courts in concluding that 11 U.S.C. § 362 stays litigation only against
139. Id. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (1982) provides in pertinent part:
(a) Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, a petition filed under
section 301, 302, or 303 of this title . . . operates as a stay, applicable to all entities, of(1) the commencement or continuation . . . of a judicial . . . proceeding

against the debtor that was or could have been commenced before the commencement of the case under this title, or to recover a claim against the
debtor that arose before the commencement of the case under this title
140. Id. The Fortiers' action was filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1478 (1§82) and local
Bankruptcy Rule 1-118.
141. 747 F.2d at 1328-29.
142. Id. at 1329. Peterson also argued that the New Mexico bankruptcy court had no
jurisdiction to lift the stay since an automatic stay imposed by 11 U.S.C. § 362 must be
obtained from the court in which the debtor filed his bankruptcy petition, in this case the
California bankruptcy court. This argument was never addressed by the Tenth Circuit
since the court found that an automatic stay applied "only to the debtor." Id. at 1329.
Peterson raised four other arguments as well, but they are outside the scope of this article.
Id. at 1325.
143. Id. at 1330. See supra note 139.
144. Since the legislative purpose for an automatic stay is to permit the debtor to reorganize his affairs without creditor harassment and to allow organized claim resolution, the
court stated that it is not logical to extend the stay to solvent co-defendants. Id. at 1330.
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the debtor. 1

Riisa Steinhardt

145. Id. (citing Williford v. Armstrong World Indus.. Inc.. 715 F.2d 124, 126-27 (4th
Cir. 1983); Wedgeworth v. Fibreboard Corp., 706 F.2d 541, 544 (5th Cir. 1983); Austin v.
Unarco Indus.. Inc. 705 F.2d I, 4-5 (Ist Cir.) cert. dismissed. 463 U.S. 1247 (1983); Pitts v.
Unarco Indus.. Inc. 698 F.2d 313 (7th (:ir-. 1983); Lynch v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp.,
710 F.2d 1194 (6th Cir. 1983)). See also /i re Convention Masters. Inc.. 46 B.R. 339, 341
(Bankr. D. Md. 1985).

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

OVERVIEW

During this survey period the Tenth Circuit grappled with a variety
of constitutional questions. From its earnest and helpful attempt to apply and clarify the concept of flexible due process in a trilogy of government employment cases to its knee-jerk application of a century-old rule
to uphold the constitutionality of a state law banning religiously motivated polygamy, the court has dealt with these issues with varying degrees of proficiency.
The cases addressed in this article cover a wide range of important
constitutional issues. In addition to due process and freedom of religion, the Tenth Circuit examined the constitutionality of the Utah Drug
Paraphernalia Act, the free speech protections of door-to-door public
service solicitation, and the validity of Wyoming's election laws. Of special interest to Colorado, the court ruled on the constitutionality of the
state's water conservancy district system and the state supreme court's
attorney disciplinary procedures.
I.

THE FREE EXERCISE CLAUSE: POTTER V. MURRAY CITY

In Potter v. Murray City,' the Tenth Circuit rejected an opportunity
to reexamine the constitutional implications of a statutory ban on all
polygamy, even if entered into on the basis of a good faith religious
belief. The court blindly relied upon the 1879 landmark case, Reynolds v.
United States, 2 ignoring current free exercise clause analysis.
A.

Facts and Tenth Circuit Decision

The plaintiff, Royston E. Potter, was employed as a police officer for
the defendant, Murray City. While employed by Murray City, Potter had
two wives. The defendants "terminated plaintiff's employment because
of plaintiff's religious beliefs and practices and particularly by reason of
his plural marriage or cohabitation and for his failure to support, obey
and defend Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution of the State of
3
Utah."
The defendants stipulated to the following facts: 1) the plaintiff's
polygamy was the result of a good faith religious belief; 2) such beliefs
were immune from state scrutiny; 3) neither the plaintiff's two wives nor
his five children were either neglected or deprived; 4) the plaintiff's
wives had consented to the plural marriages; and, 5) the plaintiff's performance as a police officer was "exemplary" and unaffected by his mul1. 760 F.2d 1065 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 145 (1985).
2. 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
3. Potter v. Murray City, 585 F. Supp. 1126, 1128 (D. Utah 1984).
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4

tiple marriages.
Potter brought this action under the free exercise clause of the first
amendment 5 and under the Civil Rights Act. 6 He sought damages
against Murray City, the city's Civil Service Commission, and Police
Chief Gillen, and sought declarative and injunctive relief against the
State of Utah, its Governor, and its Attorney General to declare Utah's
anti-polygamy constitutional provision and statute void. 7 The district
court, at the request of Utah, joined the United States as a party because
the act enabling Utah to join the Union was conditioned upon a ban on
8
polygamy.
The Tenth Circuit based its decision on the fact that the Supreme
Court's 1879 Reynolds decision upholding a conviction for bigamy over a
free exercise claim has never been directly overruled. 9 The court cited a
number of cases relying upon Reynolds to support the proposition that
" '[the] activities of individuals, even when religiously based, are often
subject to regulation by the States in the exercise of their undoubted
power to promote the health, safety and general welfare.' "10 The
Tenth Circuit apparently concluded that the Supreme Court's subsequent cases are in complete accord with the Reynolds free exercise analysis. The court therefore deferred a reexamination of the
constitutionality of a state ban on religiously motivated polygamy.
Reynolds stands for the idea that the free exercise clause protects
only religious beliefs from prohibition under the states' police powers.
Religiously motivated actions obtain no first amendment protections
under Reynolds.' I Although Reynolds was the ratio decidendi of Potter, the
Tenth Circuit did appear to show some awareness of the modern
trend. 12
B.

Discussion
1.

Reynolds v. United States

Both the trial and appellate courts, but more emphatically the
Tenth Circuit, relied upon the Supreme Court's decision in Reynolds v.
4. Id. at 1129. In addition, the parties stipulated that between 5,000 and 10,000
members of polygamous families resided in Utah; that there had been only 25 criminal
prosecutions for polygamy in Utah since 1952; that there had been no criminal prosecution of the plaintiff; and that the Utah Department of Employment Security had not denied
him unemployment benefits. Id.
5. "Congress shall make no law . . . prohibiting the free exercise [of religion]
.... "U.S. CONST. amend. I.
6. Potter, 585 F. Supp. at 1128. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982).
7. Id. UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-101 (1953) codifies the mandate of article III, § I of
Utah's constitution by making polygamy a third-degree felony.
8. Potter, 585 F. Supp. at 1128. The Utah Enabling Act, Act ofJuly 16, 1894, 28 Stat.
107 (1894).
9. 760 F.2d 1065, 1068-70 (10th Cir. 1985).
10. Id. at 1069 (quoting Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 220 (1972)). See ibifa note
18 and accompanying text.
11. See infra text accompanying note 15.
12. 760 F.2d at 1069 n.6.

19861

CONSTITUTIONAL LA W

United States. '3 In Reynolds, the Court dealt with the question of whether
the free exercise clause would protect an individual from criminal conviction under a federal anti-polygamy statute when the defendant had
taken a second wife with the permission of his church and in the good
faith belief that it was his religious duty to do so on pain of eternal damnation. 14 In affirming the defendant's conviction, the Court espoused
the belief-action dichotomy in free exercise clause analysis.1 5 The Court
held that while the free exercise clause provides absolute protection to
individual religious beliefs, the government is completely unfettered by
the first amendment in the regulation or prohibition of religious
actions. 16
The plaintiff's argument that the Supreme Court's later decisions
have overruled Reynolds was prematurely rejected by the Tenth Circuit.
While the belief-action dichotomy is still recognized, actions motivated
by sincere good faith religious beliefs have been offered protection from
government regulation when the regulations are not in the least restrictive form available to serve compelling state interests, thus unduly infringing upon the free exercise rights of individuals. ' 7 The district court
did make a half-hearted attempt to apply this "least restrictive alternative-compelling interest"'18 requirement as an alternative to the beliefaction dichotomy theory. 19 Almost as an afterthought, the Tenth Circuit in Potter declared that the state's ."compelling interest" in banning
polygamy is to protect the "fundamental values" of the monogamous
marital relationship. 20 The court never mentioned the state's burden of
proving a "compelling interest." The court also failed to examine the
possible alternative means of protecting this alleged interest which
would be less destructive to the plaintiWs religious practices. 2 1 The
court was satisfied that monogamy is so "inextricably woven into the
fabric of our society" that it was unnecessary to examine whether or not
13. 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
14. In Reynolds, the plaintiff proved at trial that the accepted doctrine of "the Church
of Jesus Christ of the Latter Day Saints, commonly referred to as the Mormon Church,
. . . [was] that the failing or refusing to practice polygamy . . . would be punished, and

that the penalty . . . would be damnation in the life to come." Id. at 161.
15. Id. at 166.
16. "Laws are made for the government of actions, and while they cannot interfere
with mere religious belief and opinions, they may with practices." 98 U.S. at 166; cf. Freeman, A Remonstrancefor Conscience, 106 U. PA. L. REV. 806, 826 (1958) (constitutional protection of free exercise must, by definition, mean protection of actions taken in the practice
of religious beliefs).
17. Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 718 (1981) (state interest in regulating unemployment benefits does not outweigh religious conviction against producing weapons);
see also, Freeman, supra note 16.
18. Thomas, 450 U.S. at 718; see also Bob Jones University v. United States, 461 U.S.
574, 602-04 (1983); United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 258 (1982); Wisconsin v. Yoder,
406 U.S. 205, 221 (1972); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963); United States v. Dickens, 695 F.2d 765, 772-73 (3d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1092 (1983). See generally, L.
TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 14-10 (1978).
19. L. TRIBE, supra note 18, at 855.
20. 760 F.2d at 1070.
21. In fact "the state defendants have not presented any empirical evidence that monogamy is superior to polygamy, nor has the Utah Legislature ever considered whether its
anti-polygamy laws are wise." Id. at 1069.
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the state could pursue alternatives less burdensome upon the plaintiffs
22
admittedly sincere and legitimate religious belief and practice.
The cases cited by the court in support of Reynolds2 3 referred to
Reynolds for the very limited proposition that actions motivated by sincere
religious belief are not entirely immune from state regulation to promote health, safety and general welfare. 24 The Supreme Court's adoption of the "least restrictive alternative-compelling interest" test for
determining the limited conditions under which free exercise rights may
be burdened in these cases demonstrates a conscious abandonment, if
not an implicit overruling, of Reynolds' broader holding that the free exercise clause provides no protection for religiously inspired acts. 2 5 At
the very least, the current Supreme Court free exercise analysis required
the Tenth Circuit to reexamine the polygamy issue in that light. 26 The
Supreme Court's current framework for analysis requires the government to present evidence proving the existence of some compelling government interest 2 7 which would be substantially undermined by the
granting of a narrow exemption tailored to avoid a substantial burden
on the specific religious practice in question. 28 Since the defendants in
Potteroffered no evidence to support the assertion that Utah had a compelling state interest in the exclusivity of monogamy as its sole marital
22. It is interesting that the district court did discuss this possibility but found it impossible to allow a religiously based exception to Utah's polygamy prohibition that would
not "engulf the prohibition itself.., irremediably eroding the police power of the state
and its compelling interest." 585 F. Supp. at 1140. The Tenth Circuit omitted any analysis weighing less harmful alternatives or balancing the competing interests.
23. In addition to the Tenth Circuit's omission of the "least restrictive alternative"
arm of the Supreme Court's free exercise test, it is significant that the court affirmed without comment the district court's holding that "the question of a compelling public interest
is one of law to be determined by the court," not one offact to be proven by the state to the
satisfaction of the trier of fact. 585 F. Supp. at 1142 (emphasis added). Such an analysis
emasculates the requirements of Reynolds and is unsupported by authority. The cases
make it clear that the question of compelling state interest is one of fact. The burden of
proving that fact rests upon the governmental entity seeking to impinge upon the free
exercise rights of an individual in furtherance of those interests. See infra the cases cited in
note 27. The Tenth Circuit's silence on this issue leaves it unclear whether it has adopted
the district court's maverick position on this question.
24. 760 F.2d at 1069-70.
25. Bob Jones, 461 U.S. at 603; Lee, 455 U.S. at 257; Yoder, 406 U.S. at 219-20; Sherbert,
274 U.S. at 403; Dickens, 695 F.2d at 772; United States v. Carroll, 567 F.2d 955, 957 (10th
Cir. 1977) (dicta).
26. "The Court rightly rejects the notion that actions, even though religiously
grounded, are always outside the protection of the Free Exercise Clause of the First
Amendment. In so ruling, the Court departs from the teaching of Reynolds v. United
States. . . promis[ing] that in time Reynolds will be overruled." Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S.
at 247 (Douglas, J., dissenting in part). Referring to Reynolds, Professor Tribe has noted
that "[flew decisions better illustrate how amorphous goals may serve to mask religious
persecution . . . . The question, after Sherbert, must be whether the monogamy-promotion goal is sufficiently compelling, and the refusal to exempt Mormons sufficiently crucial
to the goal's attainment to warrant the resulting burden on religious conscience." L.
TRIBE, supra note 18, at 854.
27. " 'The state may justify a limitation on religious liberty by showing that it is essential to accomplish an overriding governmental interest.' " BobJones, 461 U.S. at 603 (quoting Lee, 455 U.S. at 257-58); see also, Thomas, 450 U.S. at 718; 'oder, 406 U.S. at 215;
Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 406.
28. Bob Jones, 461 U.S. at 604; Lee, 455 U.S. at 258-61; Thomas, 450 U.S. at 718-19;
Yoder, 406 U.S. at 221; Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 407; Dickens, 695 F.2d at 772.
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29

and demonstrated an absolute failure to consider alternatives
30
less harmful to the plaintiff's sincere religious beliefs and practices,
Potter should have been granted the summary judgment relief he requested. The longevity of the rationale for this decision by the Tenth
Circuit is in doubt.
form,

II.
A.

FREEDOM OF SPEECH

Door-to-DoorPublic Interest Canvassing: Association of Community
Organizations for Reform Now (ACORN) v. Municipality of
Golden

In ACORN,3 ' a public interest group successfully challenged the
constitutionality of a municipal ordinance requiring door-to-door canvassers to apply to the city council for exemptions before being permitted to canvass for support.
1. Facts
ACORN is a non-profit corporation whose purpose is to organize
low and middle-income people on the neighborhood level to petition
for redress on issues of importance to their community.3 2 Through
door-to-door canvassing they solicit donations, inform people of
ACORN's work, encourage the signing of petitions, and encourage
membership in the organization.3 3 In the fall of 1980, they planned to
canvass support in the city of Golden, Colorado, for opposition to the
Colorado Public Service Company's planned utility rate increase and
34
winter disconnect policy.
ACORN was aware of the existence of a Golden municipal ordinance which generally prohibited uninvited door-to-door solicitation.3 5
The ordinance provided for an exemption to be granted by the city
council upon its determination that such door-to-door canvassing was
for charitable, religious, patriotic, or philanthropic purposes or "otherwise provide(d) a service or product so necessary to the public welfare of
29. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
30. The Tenth Circuit never addressed the issue. The trial court, however, found that
no religious exception to the rule could be permitted without swallowing up the prohibition of polygamy. The court appeared to fear that "[tihe gate would be open . . . to
everyone who might desire more than one wife at a time" leading to the demise of monogamy through "the false assertion of religious motivation for physical gratification." 585 F.
Supp.at 1139.
31. 744 F.2d 739 (10th Cir. 1984).
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 742.
35.
"It is illegal for any person, firm or corporation... to solicit or have solicited in
its name money, donations of money or property, or financial assistance of any
kind; or to conduct polls, opinion samples or other informational canvassing
from house to house or from business to business within the city limits unless so
invited or requested by the owners or occupants of the house or business."
Id. at 741-42 n.l (quoting GOLDEN MUN. CODE § 4.44.010 (1974)).
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the residents of the city" that it could not be considered a nuisance.3 6
No other decision-making criteria were delineated by the ordinance.
Groups seeking exemptions were to file written applications with the city
containing, among other things, the purpose for the canvassing and the
intended use of the funds solicited. 3 7 Violation of the ordinance was a
38
misdemeanor.
After consulting counsel, ACORN decided not to apply for the exemption. ACORN maintained that their activities did not fall within the
activities qualifying for exemption and that the requirement of an appli39
cation for an exemption abridged their first amendment rights.
ACORN sent the city a letter informing it of the date of the canvass, and
providing a list of the canvassers, a description of ACORN's program,
and its Colorado certificate of registration. 40 The canvassing went forward on November 5, 1980, as planned, and the following day the
Golden police told the canvassers to cease and desist and issued several
citations. 4 ' The canvassing stopped shortly thereafter and ACORN
brought suit in federal district court against the city of Golden and the
Golden Police Department under sections 1983 and 1988 of the Civil
Rights Act, and under the first and fourteenth amendments, seeking to
42
enjoin enforcement of the ordinance.
The trial court found for the defendants. 4 3 The court reasoned that
since it was likely that ACORN would have been granted an exemption
36.
"Exemptions. The provisions of this chapter shall not apply to persons and organizations granted exemptions. The city manager shall issue exemptions to persons and organizations after the city council has determined that such solicitation
. . . [or polling] . . . is [for a] charitable, religious, patriotic or philanthropic purpose or otherwise provides a service or product so necessary for the general welfare of the residents of the city that such activity does not constitute a nuisance to
the residents of the city."
744 F.2d at 742 n.l (quoting GOLDEN MUN. CODE § 4.44.020 (1974)).

37.
"In order to obtain an exemption as provided for in this chapter, the applicant
shall file with the city manager a sworn application in writing containing the following information:
A. The applicant's name and the names and addresses of officers and directors of such applicant;
B. The name and purpose of the cause for which the exemption is sought
and the specific anticipated use of the proceeds or information;
C. The method whereby the goods or services are to be sold and delivered,
donations solicited or polls conducted;
D. The time period during which the solicitation, peddling or polling is to
be carried on;
E. Whether or not any commissions, fees, wages or emoluments are to be
expended in connection with such solicitation, peddling or polling, and the
amounts thereof."
744 F.2d at 742 n.l (quoting GOLDEN MUN. CODE § 4.44.030 (1974)).

38. "Any person violating the provisions of this chapter is guilty of a misdemeanor
and. . . shall be subject to a fine of not less than ten dollars, nor more than one hundred
dollars." Id. (quoting GOLDEN MUN. CODE § 4.44.040).
39. 744 F.2d at 742.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 744.

1986]

CONSTITUTIONAL LA W

had it applied for one, the only question to be decided was whether an
ordinance requiring an application for an exemption for door-to-door
canvassing was unconstitutional on its face. 4 4 The district court stressed
that although the ordinance could be characterized as vague and indefinite, it was not unconstitutional because it was the city council and not
the police who made the decision as to which groups received
45
exemptions.
2.

The Tenth Circuit Decision

The Tenth Circuit, Judge Holloway writing, overturned the lower
court's ruling, finding the ordinance unconstitutionally vague on its face
and an unjustifiable "time, place, and manner" restriction on the plain46
tiffs' first amendment rights.
The city's argument that ACORN never applied for an exemption
and had therefore never been denied an exemption from the ordinance
brought the issue of ripeness before the Tenth Circuit. The court held
that the denial of an exemption was unnecessary in a facial challenge to
a law alleged to violate the first amendment. 4 7 The Tenth Circuit also
acknowledged that the Supreme Court has held that when faced with a
law requiring the acquisition of a permit or license as a prerequisite to
exercising the first amendment right of free speech, an individual or
48
group is free to ignore the prerequisite.
The Tenth Circuit also found that the language of the ordinance
setting out the grounds for an exemption was impermissively vague.
Unlike the district court, the majority's concern for the imprecision of
the ordinance was not assuaged by the fact that the decision to grant or
deny a permit was made by the Golden City Council instead of by the
police. 4 9 The court held that vague and imprecise laws regulating free
expression give municipal officials the "unguidt._ discretion" to arbitrarily decide which groups are entitled to exercise their first amend50
ment rights.
The Supreme Court has found public service solicitation, as practiced by ACORN in this case, to be protected under the first amendment. 5 ' Laws licensing or permitting first amendment rights of free
44. Id. at 743-44.

45. Id. at 743.
46. Id. at 750 (McWilliams, J., dissenting). Judge McWilliams agreed with the trial
court.
47. 744 F.2d at 744.
48. Id. See Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147, 151 (1969); Jones v.
Opelika, 316 U.S. 584, 602 (1942)(Stone, J., dissenting), vacated, 319 U.S. 103 (1943);
Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 452 (1938).
49. 744 F.2d at 747.

50. Id.
51. Secretary of State v. Joseph H. Munson Co., Inc., 467 U.S. 947 (1984) (25% expense limit ordinance vacated); Village of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 444 U.S. 620 (1980) (75% charitable use of funds ordinance vacated); Hynes v.

Mayor of Oradell, 425 U.S. 610 (1976) (advance notice of political canvassing ordinance
vacated); see also ACORN v. City of Frontenac, 714 F.2d 813 (8th Cir. 1983) (canvassing
and soliciting clearly protected by first amendment).
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expression have always been carefully scrutinized. 5 2 The Court has required such laws to be narrowly drawn so as to effectuate compelling
government interests with a minimum of adverse effect on first amendment rights. 53 The Tenth Circuit found Golden's anti-solicitation ordinance overly broad in general, but took special exception to the
ambiguous drafting of the exemption section. 54 This section provided
insufficient procedures and decision-making criteria with which to guide
the council and to prevent arbitrariness in the exemption granting process. 5 5 The Tenth Circuit found the city's case-by-case method to be
"precisely the sort of discretionary process that the Supreme Court has
56
condemned."
Golden's final defense was that the ordinance was a reasonable
"time, place, and manner" restriction serving a legitimate government
interest. 5 7 A reasonable "time, place, and manner" restriction is one
which is content neutral, narrowly tailored to serve important government interests, and leaves open ample and adequate alternate means for
dissemination of the message. 58 The Supreme Court has also found
that free speech may not be denied in one place merely because there
are alternate forums for expression in existence elsewhere. 59 Although
alternative, more expensive, and perhaps less effective forms were available to ACORN, a denial of an exemption would have silenced its primary means of disseminating its message. Granting exemptions for
organizations which the council found charitable, scientific, or "necessary for the general welfare" required an impermissible inquiry into the
content of the applicant's message. 60 Such a requirement is not content
neutral, and as such was an unconstitutional "time, place, and manner"
restriction. 6 1 Therefore, the Tenth Circuit's rejection of Golden's ordi62
nance is in harmony with recent Supreme Court decisions.
52. Munson, 467 U.S. 947; NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963) (attorney regulation
prohibiting encouragement of racial discrimination suits overbroad); Thornhill v. Ala., 310
U.S. 88 (1940) (anti-picketing ordinance overbroad); Schneider v. N. J., 308 U.S. 147
(1939) (anti-leafletting ordinance overbroad); Strasser v. Doorley, 432 F.2d 567 (1st Cir.
1970) ("newsboy" licensing ordinance overbroad); Natco Theatres v. Ratner, 463 F. Supp.
1124 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (Movie theater licensing ordinance overbroad).
53. Button, 371 U.S. 415.
54. 744 F.2d at 748.
55. Indeed, examples of past grants and denials of exemptions showed a lack of procedural continuity and a penchant for arbitrary decisions. See 744 F.2d at 748 nn.6 & 7.
56. 744 F.2d at 749 (citing Munson, 467 U.S. at 959 n.12).
57. Id. See, e.g., Walker v. City of Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307 (1967); Adderly v. Fla.,
385 U.S. 39 (1966).
58. Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 104 S. Ct. 3065, 3069 (1984);
National Drug Coalition, Inc. v. Bolger, 737 F.2d 717, 723 (7th Cir. 1984).
59. Schneider, 308 U.S. at 163.
60. 744 F.2d at 749.
61. Id. at 750. See Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455,461 (1980) (regulation of speech in a
public forum must be narrowly drawn to serve substantial state interests); Police Dept. v.
Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95-96 (1972) (first amendment denies government the power to restrict expression due to content).
62. Regan v. Time, Inc., 104 S. Ct. 3262, 3265 (1984) (prohibiting reproduction of
currency in a newsmagazine is unconstitutional restriction due to content); Carey 447 U.S.
at 461-62.
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Drug ParaphernaliaLaws: Murphy v. Matheson

In Murphy v. Matheson,6 3 Murphy, the owner of a "head shop,"
brought a pre-enforcement challenge to the Utah Drug Paraphernalia
Act, 64 seeking to enjoin enforcement of the Act and also seeking a declaratory judgment that the Act was unconstitutional. 6 5 Murphy's claims
under the first and fourteenth amendments of the United States Constitution were, first, that the Act's overly broad language unconstitutionally
restricted the free flow of commercial and non-commercial speech and,
second, that the Act's vagueness and its forfeiture-without-hearing
66
clause violated due process protections.
1.

Facts

The Utah Legislature enacted the Utah Drug Paraphernalia Act in
1981 in an attempt to combat drug use. 6 7 The Act first defined drug
paraphernalia as any physical object used or intended to be used at any
stage in the illicit controlled substance use process, from inception to
ingestion. 6 8 It also included a non-exclusive list of such items for illustrative purposes. 69 The next section listed "logically relevant factors"
for the trier of fact to consider in determining whether or not an object
was "drug paraphernalia." 70 The Act made it a criminal offense to possess or use drug paraphernalia or to knowingly deliver or advertise drug
63. 742 F.2d 564 (10th Cir. 1984).
64. UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 58-37a-1 to 37a-6 (Supp. 1985).

65. 742 F.2d at 567.
66. Id.
67. "It is the intent of this chapter to discourage the use of narcotics by eliminating
paraphernalia designed for processing, ingesting, or otherwise using a controlled substance."

UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-37a-2 (Supp. 1985).

68.
As used in this chapter.
"Drug paraphernalia" means any equipment, product
or material used, or intended for use, to plant, propagate, test, analyze, package,
repackage, store, contain, conceal, inject, ingest, inhale, or to otherwise introduce
a controlled substance into the human body in violation of chapter 37, title 58,
and includes, but is not limited to: [a list of twelve types of items].
UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-37a-3 (Supp. 1985).

69. Id.
70.
In determining whether an object is drug paraphernalia, the trier of fact, in addition to all other logically relevant factors, should consider:
(1) Statements by an owner or by anyone in control of the object concerning its use;
(2) Prior convictions, if any of an owner, or of anyone in control of the
object, under any state or federal law relating to a controlled substance;
(3) The proximity of the object, in time and space, to a direct violation of
this chapter;
(4) The proximity of the object to a controlled substance;
(5) The existence of any residue of a controlled substance on the object;
(6) Instructions whether oral or written, provided with the object concerning its use;
(7) Descriptive materials accompanying the object which explain or depict
its use;
(8) National and local advertising concerning its use;
(9) The manner in which the object is displayed for sale;
(10) Whether the owner or anyone in control of the object is a legitimate
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paraphernalia. 7 1 Finally, the Act declared that no property rights could
exist in these items, eliminating any need for a hearing before or after
their taking. 7 2 Therefore, the district court found the statute constitutionally sound in all of the challenged areas and the plaintiff appealed.
2.

The Tenth Circuit Decision

The plaintiff asserted that the Act's ban on advertising drug paraphernalia 73 unconstitutionally restricted the free flow of commercial
speech. 74 He further argued that even if his individual conduct were not
protected, the overbreadth doctrine allowed him to assert the rights of
others whose first amendment rights could be substantially infringed by
the Act. 75 The Tenth Circuit, Judge Holloway writing, held that the
overbreadth exception to standing requirements did not apply in commercial speech cases. 76 The court noted that the chilling effect on a
supplier of like or related items to the community, such as a licensed distributor
or dealer of tobacco products;
(11) Direct or circumstantial evidence of the ratio of sales of the object to
the total sales of the business enterprise;
(12) The existence and scope of legitimate uses of the object in the community; and
(13) Expert testimony concerning its use.
UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-37a-4 (Supp. 1985).

71.
(1) It is unlawful for any person to use, or to possess with intent to use,
drug paraphernalia to plant, propagate, cultivate, grow, harvest, manufacture,
compound, convert, produce, process, prepare, test, analyze, pack, repack, store,
contain, conceal, inject, ingest, inhale or otherwise introduce a controlled substance into the human body in violation of this chapter. Any person who violates
this subsection is guilty of a class B misdemeanor.
(2) It is unlawful for any person to deliver, or possess with intent to deliver,
or manufacture with intent to deliver, any drug paraphernalia, knowing that the
drug paraphernalia will be used to plant, propagate, cultivate, grow, harvest,
manufacture, compound, convert, produce, process, prepare, test, analyze, pack,
repack, store, contain, conceal, inject, ingest, inhale, or otherwise introduce a
controlled substance into the human body in violation of this act. Any person
who violates this subsection is guilty of a class A misdemeanor.
(3) Any person 18 years of age or over who delivers drug paraphernalia to a
person under 18 years of age who is three years or more younger than the person
making the delivery is guilty of a third degree felony.
(4) It is unlawful for any person to place in this state in any newspaper,
magazine, handbill, or other publication any advertisement, knowing that the
purpose of the advertisement is to promote the sale of drug paraphernalia. Any
person who violates this subsection is guilty of a class B misdemeanor.
UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-37a-5 (Supp. 1985).

72. "Drug paraphernalia is subject to seizure and forfeiture and no property right can
exist in it."

UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-37a-6 (Supp. 1985).

73. UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-37a-5(4) (Supp. 1985). See supra note 71.
74. 742 F.2d at 567.
75. Id. See, e.g., Village of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 444 U.S. 620,
634 (1980) (third-party overbreadth challenge of charitable solicitation ordinance);
Broadrick v. Okla., 413 U.S. 601, 610-12 (1973) (third-party overbreadth challenge of
state employee anti-partisan politics statute).
76. 742 F.2d at 568 (citing Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates,
Inc., 455 U.S. 489,497 (1982) (overbreadth doctrine doesn't apply to commercial speech);
Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 565 n.8 (1980)
(overbreadth doctrine not applicable to electric utility advertising); Bates v. State Bar, 433
U.S. 350, 381 (1977) (not applicable to attorney advertising); Stoianoffv. Mont., 695 F.2d
1214, 1224 (9th Cir. 1983) (not applicable to drug paraphernalia advertising); New Eng-
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third party's exercise of free speech has been held unlikely to occur in
the commercial speech area because the strong profit motive involved
will resist regulatory restraints. 77 The Tenth Circuit therefore conto the
cluded that the plaintiff had no standing to make a facial challenge
78
others.
of
rights
speech
commercial
the
asserting
by
statute
The court also rejected the plaintiffs first amendment claims made
on his own behalf. The court relied primarily on the Supreme Court's
79
reasoning in Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc.,
which upheld a village ordinance regulating the sale of smoking accessories displayed within close proximity to literature encouraging the use of
controlled substances. The Tenth Circuit concluded that such speech
was speech proposing an illegal transaction and therefore was not protected by the first amendment. 80 Any effect the ban may have had on
legitimate commercial speech was held to be minimal. 8 ' A statute must
substantially infringe upon first amendment rights in order to be found
unconstitutionally overbroad. 8 2 "That some unconstitutional applications of the law can be imagined is insufficient to invalidate the statute
83
on overbreadth grounds."
The Tenth Circuit also rejected the plaintiffs claim that the Act was
void for vagueness in violation of due process. 8 4 Laws carrying criminal
penalties may be challenged as unduly vague. 85 Criminal violations
must be clearly defined so that a person of ordinary intelligence has a
reasonable opportunity to be informed as to what conduct is prohibited.
They must also provide explicit standards to prevent arbitrary and capricious enforcement. 86 The Tenth Circuit examined the Utah Drug Paraphernalia Act for vagueness in terms of whether the language of the
statute was sufficient to provide fair notice and fair enforcement.
Murphy based the "fair notice" prong of his vagueness attack upon
section 3 of the Act which defines drug paraphernalia as "any. . . product . . . used, or intendedfor use to . . . grow, . . . manufacture, . . . [or]
land Accessories Trade Ass'n v. City of Nashua, 679 F.2d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 1982) (not applicable to drug paraphernalia advertising)).
77. 742 F.2d at 568 (citing Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 565 n.8; Bates, 433 U.S. at 381).
78. 742 F.2d at 568.
79. 455 U.S. 489, 495-96 (1982).
80. 742 F.2d at 568; see also Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human
Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 388 (1973) (discrimination in help-wanted ads); Camille Corp. v.
Phares, 705 F.2d 223, 227 n.2 (7th Cir. 1983) (drug paraphernalia ads); Florida Businessmen for Free Enter. v. City of Hollywood, 673 F.2d 1213, 1217 (11th Cir. 1982) (drug
paraphernalia ads); Casbah, Inc. v. Thone, 651 F.2d 551, 564 (8th Cir. 1981) (drug paraphernalia ads), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1005 (1982). It is interesting to note, however, that
the court did not impose the imminent threat standard here, as it did in National Gay Task
Force v. Board of Educ., 729 F.2d 1270 (10th Cir. 1983) (advocating illegal conduct at
some indefinite future time is not regulable).
81. 742 F.2d at 569.
82. Schaumburg, 444 U.S. at 634; Weiler v. Carpenter, 695 F.2d 1348, 1350 (10th Cir.
1982).
83. 742 F.2d at 569 (citing Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 618; Pennsylvania Accessories Trade
Assoc., Inc. v. Thornburgh, 565 F. Supp. 1568, 1572 (M.D. Pa. 1983)).
84. 742 F.2d at 569.
85. See, e.g., Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972).
86. 408 U.S. at 108-09.
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ingest ... a controlled substance."' 8 7 The court admitted that taken in
isolation the "intended for use" language was ambiguous as to whether
the mens rea requirement of intent applied to the person charged with the
crime of possessing or delivering the forbidden articles or to the state of
mind of someone else in the chain of possession or delivery.8 8 The
court found that this deficiency was cured because, when the statute is
read as a whole, it becomes clear that the intention must be linked to
89
the party accused of performing the illegal act.
The Tenth Circuit held that this "scienter" requirement saved the
statute from being unconstitutionally vague.9 0 The vagueness of a criminal statute may be cured if it includes a requirement that the violator
knows that what he does is illegal or probably illegal. 9 ' However, the
Tenth Circuit, in reading in such a high scienter requirement while validating the Act, actually has rendered it virtually unenforceable. The
paraphernalia vendor can simply argue that he had no intention for his
inventory to be used illegally. It seems that the primary intention of the
seller of paraphernalia (or any other wares for that matter) is for the
customer to buy it so that the seller makes a profit. It is impossible for
the seller of any product to know whether or not the buyer intends to
92
use it for a lawful purpose.
9 3
The court also found that some of the "logically relevant factors"
provided to guide law enforcement officials were vague, but, when taken
as a whole, provided objective criteria to enable police to evaluate particular circumstances. 94 Admitting that even law enforcement officials
are confused by the "logically relevant factors," the court held that the
issue of arbitrary enforcement was not ripe for decision. 9 5 In pre-enforcement challenges for vagueness, the main thrust of the court's in96
quiry is the notice requirement.
The Tenth Circuit found section 6 of the Act 9 7 an unconstitutional
taking of property without provision for a hearing, a violation of the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment. Section 6 made drug paraphernalia subject to seizure and forfeiture with no legal means of redress by the owner. 98 Although section 6 declared that "no property
right can exist" in drug paraphernalia, the court found that "sellers of
alleged drug paraphernalia have a vital property interest in their
87. See supra note 68 (emphasis added).
88. 742 F.2d at 570.
89. Id. at 570-71.
90. Id. at 573.
91. Id. (citing Note, The Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 109 U. PA. L.
REV. 67, 87 n.98 (1960)).
92. For example, could a gun dealer who sells "Saturday Night Specials" ever be
charged with intending them to be used in committing crimes? Such a result is unlikely to
become the law.
93.

UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-37a-4 (Supp. 1985).

94.
95.
96.
97.
98.

742 F.2d at 574.
Id.
Flipside, 455 U.S. at 503.
See supra note 72.
742 F.2d at 574.
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inventories." 9 9
Seizure of property before notice and a hearing is permissible
under limited circumstances,10 0 but the requirements of due process are
violated by a statute permitting the seizure and forfeiture of property
without providing for any notice or hearing.' 0 1 While the seizure and
forfeiture section of the statute was found unconstitutional, the Tenth
Circuit found that it could be severed from the rest of the Act, which had
02
been held constitutional.1
III.

DUE PROCESS: TERMINATION OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES

In a trio of cases, the Tenth Circuit examined the constitutional interests implicated and due process protections required in dismissing
government employees.
A.

Military Employment and Homosexuality: Rich v. Secretary of the
Army

In Rich v. Secretary of the Army, 10 3 the plaintiff, Rich, brought suit
challenging his honorable discharge from the Army for fraudulent enlistment. Rich was charged with deliberately concealing and misrepresenting his homosexuality on his reenlistment forms, and prior
statements he had made to his superiors were given as evidence in sup04
port of this allegation.'
The Tenth Circuit, in an opinion authored by Judge Holloway, affirmed the decision of the trial court denying Rich's request for reinstatement. The court first agreed that the Army's charge that Rich had
concealed and fraudulently misrepresented his homosexuality on the
enlistment forms was reached in accordance with Army regulations
which were neither arbitrary nor capricious, and was supported by the
substantial evidence of Rich's own admissions. 10 5 The court then proceeded to Rich's constitutional arguments.
1.

Procedural Due Process

The Army procedures for discharging personnel for fraudulent entry do not require a hearing; Rich claimed that his discharge was therefore a violation of due process.I°6 A litigant must show that he has been
deprived of a protected liberty or property interest before he can claim
99. 742 F.2d at 577.
100. See Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663 (1974) (seizure of
yacht used for smuggling drugs); see also Casbah, 651 F.2d at 562 (seizure of drug
paraphernalia).
101. 742 F.2d at 577; see also Windfaire, Inc. v. Busbee, 523 F. Supp. 868, 872 (N.D. Ga.
1981) (provided post-seizure notice and hearing).
102. 742 F.2d at 578 (forfeiture clause "not so interwoven with the remainder of the
statute that the other portions of the Act cannot stand alone").
103. 735 F.2d 1220 (10th Cir. 1984).
104. 516 F. Supp. 623 (D. Colo. 1981).
105. 735 F.2d at 1225.
106. Id. at 1226.
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the protections of procedural due process. 10 7 The court, relying on
Board of Regents v. Roth 108 and Asbill v. Housing Authority of the Choctaw
Nation,' 0 9 held that in order to be considered a property interest for
procedural due process purposes, the plaintiff must have a "legitimate
claim of entitlement" and not just an abstract desire to continue in his
position of employment. 10 The Tenth Circuit held that, because the
Army has the power to promulgate procedures for discharging personnel and had complied with those procedures, the plaintiff had no legitimate claim of entitlement to his job: he had "no property interest in the
continuance of his Army Career."II1
The court next rejected Rich's contention that he had been deprived of a protected liberty interest without a hearing."1 2 Rich claimed
that as a result of his discharge he had been unable to receive unemployment benefits or obtain alternative employment. 1 3 The federal courts
have recognized a protected liberty interest in one's reputation 1 4 and
freedom to take advantage of alternative means of employment. 115 The
Tenth Circuit limited redress for deprivation of these liberty interests,
however, by making recovery contingent upon proof that the harm to
plaintiff's reputation and future career had resulted from defendant's
"'"ublication of information which was false and stigmatizing.' "116
The court found that the Army did not publicize the grounds of
plaintiff's dismissal and only released the information to the Colorado
Department of Employment at the plaintiffs request."17 Therefore,
there was no deprivation of a liberty interest which would have entitled
18
Rich to a hearing."
107. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972) (no property interest in non-tenured teaching position); Perry v. Sinderman, 408 U.S. 593 (1972) (implied property interest in non-tenure teaching system).
108. 408 U.S. 564 (1972) (non-tenured professor had no claim of entitlement).
109. 756 F.2d 1499 (10th Cir. 1984) (employee of Housing Authority had no claim of
entitlement in continued employment).
110. 735 F.2d at 1226.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Roth, 408 U.S. 564; Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433 (1971) (reputation
interest affected by posting notice forbidding sale of liquor to claimant); cf. Paul v. Davis,
424 U.S. 693 (1976) (no reputation interest affected by distribution of photo indentifying
claimant as shoplifter).
115. Roth, 408 U.S. 564; Miller v. City of Mission, 705 F.2d 368 (10th Cir. 1983) (assistant police chief stigmatized by public dissemination of reasons for firing).
116. 735 F.2d at 1227 (quoting Asbill, 756 F.2d at 1503 (emphasis in original)).
117. Id. See also Marwill v. Baker, 499 F. Supp. 560 (E.D. Mich. 1980) (no deprivation
of liberty interest where publication of information is made by plaintiff or at his
insistance).
118. Refusing to rule on whether homosexuality was either a constitutionally protected
privacy interest or a suspect class for equal protection purposes, the court held that the
government had an overriding interest in keeping the armed services heterosexual. 735
F.2d at 1228-29.
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Substantive Due Process: Privacy

Following the district court, 11 9 the Tenth Circuit also relied heavily
upon Beller v. Middendorf' 20 in denying the plaintiff's substantive due
process claim. 12 1 The court focused on the military's special need to
maintain a way of life different and separate from civilian life in consid22
ering the merits of Rich's claim.'
The court skirted the issue of whether or not homosexuality is protected by the constitutional right to privacy.' 23 The courts are divided
on this issue. 124 The Tenth Circuit held that, even assuming arguendo
that homosexuality was a protected privacy interest, the government had
25
an overriding interest in keeping the armed services heterosexual.'
3.

First Amendment

Rich further argued that the Army's policy prohibiting homosexuality infringed upon his first amendment rights to associate, discuss personal issues, or speak out for change of the system. 126 The Tenth
Circuit dismissed these arguments by explaining that Rich had been discharged for falsifying enlistment forms regarding his sexual practices,
not for gay advocacy or or associating with homosexuals.' 2 7 Relying
upon Brown v. Glines 128 and Parker v. Levy,' 2 9 the court found that
whatever "incidental effect . . . the Army [regulations had] upon First
Amendment rights is entirely justified by the special needs of the
0
military."13
B.

Civilian Employees: Walker v. United States

Walker v. United States 31 also dealt with falsifying information on
employment forms. However, in Walker the plaintiff was a probationary
civilian employee of the military. 132 He received notice that he was to
119. 516 F. Supp. at 625.
120. 632 F.2d 788 (9th Cir. 1980) (discharge of Navy personnel for homosexuality is
not a denial of due process), cert. denied sub nom. Beller v. Lehman, 452 U.S. 905 (1981).
121. Rich argued that his military record proved there was no rational connection between his sexual orientation and his suitability for service. 735 F.2d at 1227.
122. Id. at 1227 n.7.
123. Id. at 1228.
124. Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney, 403 F. Supp. 1199 (E.D. Va. 1975) (anti-sodomy law upheld), aff'd mem., 425 U.S. 901 (1976); De Santis v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 608
F.2d 327 (9th Cir. 1979) (no homosexual constitutional protection from employment discrimination); Lovisi v. Slayton, 539 F.2d 349 (4th Cir. 1976) (no right to privacy protection from anti-sodomy law for married couple if third party present); cf New York v.
Onofre, 51 N.Y.2d 476, 434 N.Y.S.2d 947, 415 N.E.2d 936 (1980) (anti-sodomy law invalid as to consensual acts between adults), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 987 (1981).
125. 735 F.2d at 1228.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 1229.
128. 444 U.S. 348 (1980) (circulating petitions on Air Force bases).
129. 417 U.S. 733 (1974) (Army physician called for blacks to refuse to serve in
Vietnam).
130. 735 F.2d at 1229.
131. 744 F.2d 67 (10th Cir. 1984).
132. Id. at 68.
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be dismissed on the ground that he had falsified his employment appli133
cation. He was given five days to respond before his termination.
Despite Walker's written and oral denials of the allegations of falsification, which were the only means of participation he was allowed in the
proceedings, the government found that the charges were supported by
substantial evidence and dismissed him.' 3 4 Walker brought suit claiming that he had been deprived of liberty and property interests protected
35
by the due process clause.1
As in Rich, the Tenth Circuit held that the due process right to be
heard in a meaningful time and manner is only mandated when the lib36
erty or property interest of an individual has been adversely affected. 1
13 7
Following Board of Regents v. Roth,
the court found that as a probationary employee, Walker did not have a sufficient entitlement to government employment for his employment to qualify as a property interest
38
deserving the protections of procedural due process.'
In contrast to Rich, however, the court found that, because Walker
had been dismissed on the grounds of lying on his employment application, his valuable liberty interest in his "good name, reputation and integrity, and . . . freedom to take advantage of other employment
opportunities"' 39 had been implicated. Relying on Miller v. City of Mis14
sion,140 the Tenth Circuit found that federal personnel procedures l
which allowed disclosure of plaintiff's personnel file (containing the reasons for his dismissal) to other federal and state agencies was both a
public dissemination of stigmatizing information and a barrier to his securing future federal employment.14 2 It is notable that the Tenth Circuit did not take the opportunity to explain its denial of a similar
reputation-based liberty interest in Rich. However, Rich can be distinguished by the fact that Rich had requested the dissemination of his personnel records to the Colorado Department of Employment,14 3 whereas
in Walker the government had released the plaintiff's personnel records
to the State of Oklahoma and federal agencies without his
44
permission. 1
The Tenth Circuit rejected the defendant's argument that Walker
was not stigmatized by the release of his records because he could chal133. Id.
134. Id.
135. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
136. 744 F.2d at 68. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976), Armstrong v.
Manzo, 380 U.S. 545 (1965).
137. 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
138. 744 F.2d at 68.
139. Id. at 69.
140. 705 F.2d 368 (10th Cir. 1983) (public dissemination of reasons for assistant police
chief's firing).
141. Federal Personnel Manual, ch. 294, subch. 7-2-b (February 6, 1976); 5 C.F.R.
§ 294.702(c) (1983).
142. 744 F.2d at 69.
143. See supra text accompanying note 117.
144. 744 F.2d at 69.
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lenge the basis for his dismissal in a state administrative hearing. 14 5
The court found that Walker was entitled to procedural safeguards at
the time of his dismissal in order to avoid the stigma. "Appellant should
not be forced to reestablish his innocence every time he applies for ben46
efits or a job."'
The court then turned to the question of what process was due.
Miller requires that notice of the charges must be given a reasonable
time before a hearing in order to give the individual a meaningful opportunity to be heard. 14 7 Miller further requires that, except in extremely unusual situations, the individual must be given a pretermination
hearing in order to be afforded a meaningful time within which to be
48
heard. '
The Tenth Circuit found several defects with the termination procedures employed against Walker. While not requiring a formal trial-type
proceeding, the Tenth Circuit held that Walker should have been given
the opportunity to confront the person or persons who alleged that he
had lied on his employment application. 149 The court also found that
the five days notice did not give the plaintiff adequate time to prepare
his defense. 150 In addition, the fact that the plaintiff's response to the
charges was heard by the same office which had made the initial decision
to terminate him led the court to conclude that this office could not be
the "impartial tribunal" required by the Constitution.' 5 ' In light of the
important liberty interests at stake, the court held that the government
52
had not complied with the requirements of procedural due process.'
C.

ProbationaryCivil Service Employees: Sipes v. United States

The plaintiff in Sipes v. United States 153 alleged that his termination
as a preservation packager at an Air Force base was in retaliation for his
exercise of free speech.1 54 Sipes had complained to the Inspector General about what he maintained were discriminatory citations for infractions given by his superiors. Sipes further argued that his dismissal
arbitrarily deprived him of protected liberty and property interests in
55
violation of due process.'
If a Civil Service employee is discharged before working a full year,
he is not entitled to a pretermination hearing and other discharge proce145. Id. at 70. In fact Walker did challenge the allegation in front of the Oklahoma
Unemployment Commission successfully.
146. Id.
147. 705 F.2d at 372.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 71.
152. Id.
153. 744 F.2d 1418 (10th Cir. 1984).
154. Sipes got his job pursuant to the Vietnam Era Veterans Readjustment Act, Pub. L.
No. 93-508, 88 Stat. 1578 (1974) (codified at 38 U.S.C. §§ 101-5228 (1983)).
155. 744 F.2d at 1419.
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dures afforded permanent, nonprobationary employees.1 56 Again, the
Tenth Circuit, Judge Holloway writing, held that Sipes was required to
demonstrate that he had a liberty or property interest in continued employment before he could gain the protections of procedural due process. Otherwise he must accept the procedures provided by statute or
regulation. The court held that, in this case, these procedures had been
15 7
complied with by the government.
Relying again on Board of Regents v. Roth 158 and, more specifically,
Walker v. United States,' 59 the court found that Sipes did not have a sufficient claim of entitlement to his employment to create a property interest protected by procedural due process. 1 6 0 The court rejected Sipes'
assertion that the goals behind the Vietnam Era Veterans Readjustment
Act (VEVRA) created an entitlement.161
The court also rejected Sipes' claim that his dismissal and consequent ejection from the VEVRA program deprived him of a liberty interest in his livelihood. Citing Asbill v. Housing Authority of the Choctaw
Nation 162 and Rich v. Secretary oftheArmy, 163 the court held that Sipes had
failed to show that his termination had stigmatic consequences resulting
from the publication of substantially false characterizations of the reasons for his termination. 64 The court found both that the government
had not made public any information concerning Sipes' termination and
16 5
that the reasons given for his dismissal were not stigmatizing.
The Tenth Circuit's procedural due process analysis demonstrated
a judicial desire to keep clear of mundane personnel decisions made by
administrative agencies. The court's handling of Sipes' first amendment
claims also reflects this attitude. Sipes claimed that he was terminated
for complaining to the Inspector General about being discriminatorily
cited for infractions by his superiors. Following the Supreme Court in
Connick v. Myers,'1 66 the Tenth Circuit held that such communications by
a public employee are not expressions of opinion on matters of public
concern. The Tenth Circuit further held that the first amendment does
not require the court to look carefully into the discretion used by government officials in making personnel management decisions. Apparently, in government personnel manners, the court will not strictly
scrutinize what may be retaliations for expressions of personal
67
concerns. 1

156. Id. at 1420 (citing 5 U.S.C. § 4303(f) (1983)).
157. Id.
158. 408 U.S. 564 (1972). See supra note 107 and accompanying text.
159. 726 F.2d 1499 (10th Cir. 1984). See supra note 138 and accompanying text.
160. 744 F.2d at 1421.
161. Id.
162. 726 F.2d 1499 (10th Cir. 1984).
163. 735 F.2d 1220 (10th Cir. 1984).
164. 744 F.2d at 1421-22. The government did not "call into question the plaintiff's
good name, reputation, honor, and integrity." Id. at 1422.
165. Id. at 1423.
166. 461 U.S. 138 (1983) (assistant district attorney fired after opposing a transfer and
circulating a questionnaire on department policy).
167. 744 F.2d at 1423.
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IV.

ATTORNEY DISCIPLINARY PROCEDURES AND DUE PROCESS: RAZATOS
K COLORADO SUPREMJE COURT

A.

Facts

In Razatos v. Colorado Supreme Court, 168 the plaintiff, Razatos, sought
a declaratory judgment that Colorado Rule of Civil Procedure 252,169
violated the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.' 70 Rule
252 governs the procedures of an attorney disciplinary hearing before
the Colorado Supreme Court.
Grievances filed against Razatosl7 were heard by a three-member
Hearings Committee according to Rule 249.172 The Committee recommended that Razatos' license to practice law be suspended for three
years. 173 The Committee's findings were approved by a Hearing Panel
which prepared a report which was adopted by the Colorado Supreme
Court.' 7 4 After Razatos' request for rehearing was denied he appealed
17 5
to the United States Supreme Court, but his appeal was denied.

B.

The District Court Decision

Razatos then brought suit in United States District Court. The district court held that since the jurisdiction for discipline of Colorado attorneys lies with the Colorado Supreme Court and the United States
Supreme Court (the only court with appellate jurisdiction over the highest court in the state), the district court lacked original jurisdiction over
Razatos' claim. In addition, the district court felt that federal district
courts lack subject matter jurisdiction over these matters. 17 6 Because
the district court found that Razatos failed to raise a federal question,
the court declined to hold that the disciplinary procedure outlined in
177
Rule 252 violated due process.
168. 746 F.2d 1429 (10th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 2019 (1985).
169. The attorney disciplinary rules, COLO. R. Civ. P. 241-59, were repealed effective
January 1, 1982. They were replaced by COLO. R. Civ. P. 241.1-.25. 746 F.2d at 1431 n.1.
COLO. R. Civ. P. 252 was reenacted as COLO. R. Civ. P. 241.20.
170. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
171. Razatos was both a real estate broker and an attorney. The disciplinary hearings
arose over a transaction in which Razatos represented a client in the purchase of a bar.
The issue was whether Razatos was adequately representing his client in the capacity of an
attorney, or whether he was merely acting as a real estate broker. 746 F.2d at 1431 (citing
plaintiff's amended complaint).
172. The Hearings Committee holds a formal hearing in which witnesses are sworn and
a complete record is developed. The Committee report is submitted to a nine-man Hearings Panel. If a majority of the panel approves a report finding wrong-doing, the panel
makes recommendations to the Colorado Supreme Court for appropriate disciplinary action. COLO. R. Civ. P. 249.
173. 549 F. Supp. 798, 799 (D. Colo. 1982), afd, 746 F.2d 1429 (10th Cir. 1984), cert.
denied, 105 S. Ct. 2019 (1985).
174. People v. Razatos, 636 P.2d 666 (Colo. 1981), appeal dismissed sub nom. Razatos v.
Colorado Supreme Court, 455 U.S. 930 (1982).
175. Razatos v. Colorado Supreme Court, 455 U.S. 930 (1982) (appeal dismissed for
lack of a substantial federal question).
176. 549 F. Supp. at 801.
177. Id.
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The Tenth Circuit Decision

Writing for the Tenth Circuit, Judge Seymour overturned the trial
court, ruling that it did have subject matter jurisdiction over the issues
in this case.' 7 8 Relying on District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 179 the court stated that a federal district court lacks subject matter
jurisdiction over the judicial decisions of a state supreme court when the
state court takes on a non-judicial function, such as the promulgation of
rules for attorney discipline. However, a federal district court does have
jurisdiction to resolve constitutional and other federal issues.180
The Tenth Circuit agreed with the district court's rejection of
Razatos' argument that where the credibility of a witness is of the utmost
importance to a case, it is a denial of due process if the final arbiter of
fact does not personally hear the testimony. 18 1 The court relied on the
flexible due process analysis employed by the Supreme Court in evaluating what process is due when liberty or property interests are threatened
in other than formal judicial proceedings.' 8 2 Flexible due process requires a three-step inquiry into the nature of the individual interest affected, namely: (1) the risk of the erroneous deprivation of that interest
through the challenged procedures; (2) the probable value of any additional procedural safeguards; and, (3) the governmental interest in administrative efficiency.18 3 In balancing these interests, the Tenth Circuit
relied heavily upon the interpretation of this three-step analysis em18 4
ployed by the Supreme Court in United States v. Raddatz.
The Razatos court first found that the plaintiff did indeed have a
crucial liberty interest in pursuing his profession as a lawyer and was
entitled to procedural due process protections. 185 Although the court
characterized the attorney disciplinary hearings as "quasi-criminal.," because of the possibility of losing one's livelihood, it held that such disciplinary hearings do not require the elaborate procedural protections
afforded a defendant in a criminal trial.18 6
The court rejected Razatos' allegations that the Hearings Committee's determinations as to credibility were unreliable and thus presented
the risk of erroneous determination. 18 7 The Tenth Circuit found that
review of the Heaiings Committee's findings of fact, first by the Hear178. 746 F.2d at 1434.
179. 460 U.S. 462 (1983). In Feldman, a Virginia attorney attacked the constitutionality
of a District of Columbia rule which required completion of law school to qualify for the
bar. The Court held that the district court did not have jurisdiction, but only because the
rule was "inextricably intertwined" with the state court decision. Id. at 486-87.
180. 746 F.2d at 1432-33.
181. Id. at 1434.
182. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
183. Id. at 335.
184. 477 U.S. 667 (1980). In Raddatz, the Court upheld a provision in the Federal
Magistrates Act, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) (1982), which allowed a district court to use a
record developed during a magistrate's hearing to decide a motion to suppress.
185. 746 F.2d at 1435.
186. Id. at 1435-36.
187.

Id.
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ings Panel and then by the Colorado Supreme Court, was sufficient evidence that Colorado's procedures adequately guarded against an
erroneous determination.1 88 The fact that the plaintiff was permitted to
file exceptions to the Hearings Panel's report, that the issues were extensively briefed, and that the "clear and convincing evidence" standard
of fact finding was employed, bolstered the credibility of the Colorado
Supreme Court's final decision. The court also found that, although not
expressly provided for in the rules of procedure, the state supreme court
retained the power to rehear the case de novo if it questioned the report
of the Hearings Panel.1 89
Finally, the Tenth Circuit found that the interest in protecting the
public from incompetent and corrupt lawyers ranks high among important state interests. 190 The court held that the administrative process,
with the present procedural safeguards, served this interest while freeing the state supreme court from the time consuming task of personally
developing the record in disciplinary proceedings. 19 1 Therefore, placing additional fact finding burdens upon the supreme court is unwarranted so long as the court properly exercises its discretion in
conducting de novo review of the findings of fact in the appropriate circumstances. 192 Razatos' case did not present that set of circumstances.
V.

A.

BALLOT ACCESS: BLOMQUIST V. THomsoN

Facts

In Blomquist v. Thomson 193 the plaintiffs, members of the Wyoming
Libertarian Party, brought suit against the defendant in her official capacity as Wyoming Secretary of State, claiming that certain sections of
the Wyoming Election Code 19 4 violated the right of freedom of association and the right to cast votes effectively under the first and fourteenth
amendments.1

95

Where fundamental constitutional rights are adversely affected by
state law, the state has the burden of proving that the law serves a compelling interest and employs the means least burdensome to those rights
in order to serve that interest. 19 6 Wyoming conceded that the ballot
access provisons affected fundamental constitutional rights of the plaintiffs while the plaintiffs conceded that the ballot restriction provisions
served legitimate interests of the state. 19 7 Therefore, the question to be
188. Id. at 1436.
189. Id. at 1434.
190. Id. at 1436.
191. Id. at 1437.
192. Id.
193. 739 F.2d 525 (10th Cir. 1984).
194. Wyo. STAT. §§ 22-1-101 to -26-121 (1977).
195. Blomquist v. Thomson, 591 F. Supp. 768, 769-70 (D. Wyo. 1984).
196. Id. at 770; see Illinois State Bd. of Elections v. Socialist Workers Party, 440 U.S.
173, 184-85 (1979) (ballot access restrictions in Chicago could not be stricter than statewide); American Party of Tex. v. White, 415 U.S. 767, 780-81 (1974) (upheld minority
party ballot restrictions as meeting compelling state interest).
197. 591 F. Supp. at 774. The state required that a party demonstrate a modicum of
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resolved was whether the state had chosen the least restrictive means of
accomplishing its goal.
B.

The District Court Decision

The district court found that the challenged provisions made it impossible for a new political party to get on the ballot within a year of a
general election. 198 New parties were put at a distinct disadvantage as
compared to the established parties (i.e., the Republican and Democratic
parties). 19 9 The district court held that the election code unduly burdened plaintiffs' rights: "a state's election laws cannot operate to freeze
the political status quo."' 20 0 However, because the Wyoming Legislature was in session at the time, the court deferred ordering remedial
201
action, allowing the state to amend its election code.
The district court's major concern was over the fact that a new party
had to wait over two years to get on the ballot. 20

2

The Wyoming Legis-

lature subsequently amended the code to allow a new party seeking ballot access to file a petition by June 1 of any election year, containing the
signatures of 8,000 voters, the majority of whom could not be residents
of the same county. 20 3 The parties agreed to a compromise on the signature requirement since the plaintiffs had only two months left to file
the petition before the 1984 election. 20 4 In approving the amended
election code, the district court rejected the compromise worked out between the parties for the 1984 election year. The plaintiffs appealed on
the grounds that the two-county rule, 20 5 as well as the 8,000 signature
requirement as it applied to the Wyoming Libertarian party in the 1984
20 6
election year, were unconstitutional.
C.

The Tenth Circuit Decision

In analyzing the amended Wyoming Election Code the Tenth Circuit followed the framework set out by the Supreme Court in Anderson v.
support before granting it official recognition. The state sought to avoid frivolous candidacies, expensive run-off elections, and voter confusion from crowded ballots. Id.
198. Under the election code, a candidate from a minor party was required to file over
two years prior to a general election. In addition, the candidate was required to raise
sufficient support in a petition as well as having received ten percent of the vote in the last
general election in order to be listed on the ballot as an independent candidate. 591 F.
Supp. at 775 n.7.
199. Id. at 774. "[W]e must conclude that most of the provisions within the Code assume the existence of a two-party system consisting of Democratic and Republican parties." Id.
200. Id.
201. Id. at 777. The court took judicial notice of the fact that the Wyoming Legislature
had returned to session.
202. See supra note 198 and accompanying text.
203. 739 F.2d at 526.
204. They compromised at a requirement of 1,333 signatures. Id.
205. " 'To be valid, a petition shall contain the signatures of not less than eight thousand (8,000) registered electors eligible to vote in this state, the majority of whom may not
reside in the same county.' " 739 F.2d at 527 (quoting Wyo. STAT. § 22-4-201(d) (1984) (emphasis by the court)).
206. 739 F.2d at 526.
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Celebrezze. 20 7 Anderson requires a court to weigh the "character and magnitude" 20 8 of the alleged harm to the plaintiffs' first and fourteenth
amendment rights against the interests which the state claims will justify
20 9
the burden on the plaintiffs' rights.
The court noted that signature limitations by county in ballot access
rules had been found in previous cases to be a violation of the principal
of voter equality. 2 10 The Tenth Circuit held that Wyoming's two-county
rule fell within this class of ballot access rules which substantially burden
individual rights. 2 1 1 The court then weighed the state's interests asserted against the burden on the plaintiffs' rights. The court rejected
the state's argument that the two-county rule was necessary to discourage fraud or to ensure that the new party had a fairly broad base of
support before it was added to the ballot. 2 12 The state offered no rationale or evidence to support its contention that the rule discouraged
fraud. Likewise, the Tenth Circuit found that no compelling interest
was served by ensuring that the new party's support was geographically
2 13
diverse and, therefore, struck down the two-county rule.
Based upon the Anderson analysis, the court held that the June 1
deadline was burdensome to the plaintiffs' right of political association
because it fell before the most advantageous time to garner support,
after the major party primaries, when the major parties have offered
their platforms and candidates to the public. 21 4 The court found that
the time constraints placed on this particular party in the 1984 election
year were unreasonable. Due to the litigation, the time remaining for
the plaintiffs to obtain the requisite 8,000 signatures was severely
2 15
limited.
The Tenth Circuit stopped short of invalidating theJune 1 deadline
and never actually addressed the issue of whether the state had a valid
interest in requiring 8,000 signatures for a new party to gain ballot access. The court found that because the defendants had earlier agreed to
a compromise of 1,333 signatures for 1984 (which the plaintiffs had surpassed) 21 6 they could not later argue that they had a compelling state
interest in requiring 8,000 signatures. 2 17 This narrow holding was ap207. 460 U.S. 780 (1983).
208. 739 F.2d at 525 (quoting Anderson, 460 U.S. at 789).
209. 739 F.2d at 525.
210. Moore v. Ogilvie, 460 U.S. 780 (1983) (requirement that independent candidates'
petitions include at least 200 signatures from at least 50 of the state's 102 counties discriminates against the more populous counties in violation of equal protection clause);
Communist Party v. State Bd. of Elections, 518 F.2d 517 (7th Cir.) (requirement that not
more than 13,000 of 25,000 mandatory signatures come from the same county violates the

right to
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.
interest

vote effectively), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 986 (1975).
739 F.2d 528.
Id. at 529.
Id.
Id. at 528.
Id. at 528-29.
Id. at 529.
Id. "We do not see how the State can argue on appeal that it has a compelling
in plaintiffs meeting the 8,000 signature requirement this year when it specifically
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plied only to this particular plaintiff and solely for the purposes of the
1984 election. Although the court expressed strong disapproval of the
June 1 deadline, a decision on the constitutionality of that provision
awaits future litigation.
VI.

THE SUPREMACY CLAUSE AND RETROACTIVE LEGISLATION UNDER

THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE: TAXPAYERS FOR ANIMAS-LA PLATA
REFERENDUM (TAR) v. NIMAS-LA PLATA WATER
218
CONSERVANCY DisTRIcT

The Tenth Circuit's decision in TAR was an "important and unusual
appeal involv[ing] several constitutional issues." '2 19 The outcome of
this case has a potentially enormous effect upon the control of water
220
resources in Colorado.
A.

Facts

The Water Conservancy Act 22 ' was enacted by the Colorado legislature in 1937 to aid in the financing of local water projects. 22 2 The
keystone of this Act was the establishment of water conservancy districts
22 3with the power to raise finances through the levy of ad valorem taxes.
The Act allowed for the creation of a district by collecting the signatures of twenty-five percent of the irrigated land owners and five percent
of the non-irrigated land owners on a petition submitted for approval to
the district court for the county in which all or part of the proposed
water conservancy district was to be situated. 224 Opponents of the
water conservancy district could force a referendum on the issue by filing a petition in the district court opposing the establishment of the district, signed by twenty-five percent of the irrigated land owners and five
22 5
percent of the non-irrigated land owners.
In 1979, the Animas-La Plata Conservancy District successfully filed
a petition with the district court. 226 The plaintiff, Taxpayers for
Animas-La Plata Referendum (TAR), concerned about the environmental impact of the project, spent $10,000 in an unsuccessful petition
drive. 2 2 7 The district court decreed that the Animas-La Plata Conservancy District was officially organized in compliance with the Act. 2 28
agreed below that 1,333 signatures would satisfy that interest due to the shortened time
for obtaining signatures." Id. at 529.
218. 739 F.2d 1472 (10th Cir. 1984).
219. Id. at 1474.
220. See infra text accompanying notes 244-46.
221. COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 37-45-101 to -152 (1973 & Cum. Supp. 1985).
222. 739 F.2d at 1474.
223. Id.
224. COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-45-109 (1973 & Cum. Supp. 1985). The statute has additional requirements for the minimum number of signatures and a land value and ownership statement.
225. COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 37-45-112(2)(b), (5)(b) (1973).
226. 739 F.2d at 1474.
227. Id.
228. Id.
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The plaintiff then sought to attack the procedures used to create the
conservancy district in federal court, alleging that the Water Conservancy Act violated the due process and equal protection clauses of the
22 9
fourteenth amendment.
Faced with the possibility that every water conservancy district in
Colorado would be vulnerable to a similar attack if the Water Conservancy Act was found invalid, the state's legislature expeditiously passed
House Bill 1272.230 The bill retroactively validated and recreated each
existing water conservancy district in the state, including Animas-La
Plata. 23 t In response to the legislature's action, TAR amended its complaint to attack the constitutionality of House Bill 1272.232 The district
court upheld the constitutionality of the bill and, therefore, held that the
plaintiff's claims for declarative and injunctive relief were moot. 23 3 On
appeal, TAR renewed its attack on the constitutionality of House Bill
1272. TAR first alleged that the bill violated the supremacy clause of
the United States Constitution. 23 4 They also claimed that the bill constituted retroactive legislation and, as such, was violative of due
process.235

B.

The Tenth Circuit Decision
1. The Supremacy Clause

The plaintiff argued that the Colorado legislature's passage of
House Bill 1272 was an unconstitutional attempt to defeat the federal
court's jurisdiction over a federal question. 23 6 The Tenth Circuit, Judge
Barret writing, reviewed several Supreme Court cases which had found
certain state actions to be usurpations of federal court jurisdiction over
federal controversies. 23 7 The court found the instant case easily distinguishable. The Supreme Court cases had all involved attempts by the
states to divest the federal courts. of their power to adjudicate federal
issues. 23 8 In TAR, the Colorado legislature had, in effect, made the
229. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
230. CoLo. REV. STAT. § 37-45-153 (1973 & Cum. Supp. 1985).
231. 739 F.2d 1475. The court parenthetically observed that an amendment to exclude
the Animas La-Plata district from House Bill 1272 was rejected by the legislature.
232. Id.
233. Id.
234. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
235. 739 F.2d at 1476. TAR also claimed that the bill violated art. H, § I I of the Colorado Constitution which prohibits laws with retroactive operation. For the purposes of
this article, the state constitutional claims will not be addressed.
236. 739 F.2d at 1475.
237. See, e.g., General Atomic Co. v. Felter, 434 U.S. 12 (1977) (state court injunction
barred bringing suit in federal court); Donovan v. City of Dallas, 377 U.S. 408 (1964)
(state court injunction barred appeal to a federal court); Harrison v. St. Louis & San Francisco R.R., 232 U.S. 318 (1914) (state law revoked charter of railroad which asserted diversity of citizenship to remove suit to federal court); Sterling v. Constantin, 287 U.S. 378
(1914) (Governor of Texas declared martial law in order to restrain production of oil
well); United States v. Peters, 9 U.S.(5 Cranch) 115 (1809) (state refused to honor admiralty court judgment reversing state admiralty court).
238. See, e.g., Genral Atomic, 434 U.S. 12; Donovan, 377 U.S. 408. In both cases the state
court enjoined litigants from bringing an action in federal court.
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plaintiffs cause of action moot.2'- ' t There was no effort to remove the
case from the federal court's jurisdiction. Indeed, the district court had
exercised its jurisdiction by dismissing the action on the ground that the
plaintiffs claim, in light of House Bill 1272, no longer presented ajusticiable "case or controversy.

' 2 4t
1

"

Relying on Kremens v. Bartler 24

and

'2 4 2

Hall v. Beals,
the court held that in remedying the unconstitutional
characteristics of existing legislation, state legislatures may moot existing law suits.

2.

2 43

Due Process-Retroactive Legislation

The plaintiffs retroactive legislation claim was based on the theory
that its right to litigate this claim had been denied by the legislature's
action. Relying on Supreme Court decisions that stress the importance
of vesting rights in retroactive legislation claims, 2

44

the Tenth Circuit

denied TAR's due process claim as well. While the courts will not tolerate legislative interference with a fully adjudicated right, legislation that
moots pending claims and thereby eradicates accrued rights of action
24 5
has been upheld by the Supreme Court.
The court held TAR's claim "inchoate" and, therefore, an insufficient basis upon which to challenge an otherwise valid statute.' 4 6 in so
doing, the Tenth Circuit avoided a decision which might have resulted
in a revolution in the development of Colorado's water resources. Unless the legislature amends the Water Conservancy Act, however, it will
be faced with passing legislation to validate each new district through
"reenactment" or face the possibility of a legion of future lawsuits like
TAR.
John lcCarthy

239. 739 F.2d at1476. The court noted that even had the legislature intended to moot
TAR's suit, the bill was not in violation of the supremacy clause.
240. U.S. CoNsr. art. Ill, § 2.

241. 431 U.S. 119 (1977) (voluntarv commitment to mental hospital of minor children
by their parents mooted by change of statute).
242. 396 U.S. 45 (1969) (Colorado voting residency requirement changed from six
months to two months, mooting claim).
243. 739 F.2d at 1476.
244. FHA v. Darlington, Inc., 358 U.S. 84 (1958) (amendment to Veterans' Emergency
Housing Act of 1945): Swayne & Hovt, Ltd. v. United States, 300 U.S. 297 (1937) (Act
affirmed Secretary of State's power to regulate shipping); Graham v.Goodcell, 282 U.S.
409 (1931) (amendment to Internal Revenue Act): Hodges v. Snyder, 261 U.S. 600 (1923)
(consolidation of school district validated by legislation).
245. 739 F.2d at 1477 (citing Graham. 282 U.S. 409 (1931): Louisville & Nashville R.R.
v.Mottlev. 219 U.S. 467 (1911): McCullough v.Virginia, 172 U.S. 102 (1848).
246. Id.

BEE V. GREAVES:

A

PRETRIAL DETAINEE'S CONSTITUTIONAL

RIGHT TO REFUSE ANTIPSYCHOTIC DRUGS UNDER
THE FIRST AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS

INTRODUCTION

Daniel Howard Bee was forcibly medicated with Thorazine' while
held as a pretrial detainee in the Salt Lake County Jail. Bee subsequently filed an action for damages against various members of the jail
staff, alleging violations of several constitutional rights. 2 The federal
district court in Utah ruled against Bee's claims, granting the defendant's motion for summary judgment. In Bee v. Greaves,3 the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals found that pretrial detainees possess a
fundamental constitutional right to refuse unwanted antipsychotic medication. The court further held that only in emergency situations will a
pretrial detainee's fundamental rights be outweighed by the interests of
the state in maintaining jail safety and security.
The forced medication of a pretrial detainee with Thorazine brings
into issue a host of constitutional bases for both the protection of an
individual's rights and the competing governmental interests which may
limit this protection. The rights embodied in the constitutional concepts of due process, right to privacy, and freedom of thought and
speech meet in Bee to form a conflux of fundamental constitutional protection. This protection of an individual's rights is subsequently
weighed against governmental interests which flow from a state's duty to
prevent individuals from harming themselves or others while in confinement. This comment will outline the case law background pertinent to
Bee, evaluate the level of protection afforded Bee, and will focus upon
the difficulties with these protections within the context of the Tenth
Circuit opinion.
I.

FACTS

Daniel H. Bee was booked into the Salt Lake CountyJail on August
9, 1980. 4 Four days later, Bee was referred by the jail staff to the mental
health staff because he was hallucinating. On August 15, 1980, Bee
1. "Thorazine" is the brand name for chlorpromazine, a "psychotropic" drug or
tranquilizer. Because psychotropic drugs are much more potent than standard tranquilizers, they are frequently used to control major psychiatric disorders such as schizophrenia
and psychosis. T. BAN, SCHIZOPHRENIA: A PSYCHO-PHARMACOLOGICAL APPROACH 3 (1972).
See infra note 10.
2. See infra text accompanying note 14.
3. 744 F.2d 1387 (10th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 1187 (1985). This action
was brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976), which provides a federal remedy for "the
deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws."
4. Thorazine and Valium were specified in the booking sheet as Bee's required medication. Brief for Lake County Appellees at 3, Bee v. Greaves, 744 F.2d 1387 (10th Cir.
1984).

DENVER UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 63:2

complained of not receiving Thorazine and threatened suicide if not
provided with the drug. Bee was placed in isolation and evaluated by jail
psychiatrist Dr. Robert Greer. At the same time, Dr. Keith Greaves, the
jail physician, prescribed Thorazine for Bee. On August 26, the jail sent
Bee to the Utah State Hospital for an evaluation of his competency to
stand trial. Breck Lebegue, a physician, diagnosed Bee as schizophrenic. 5 Bee was prescribed Thorazine by Dr. Lebegue and then returned to jail on September 23.6 Dr. Lebegue subsequently wrote a
letter to the state trial court rendering his opinion that Bee was competent to stand trial. 7 The next day, the state court found Bee competent
to stand trial.8 The court ordered Bee medicated with Thorazine each
evening while awaiting trial. 9
On October 7, Bee, who had been taking Thorazine voluntarily,
complained of problems he was having with the medication.' 0 Nine
days later he refused to take Thorazine for a five-day period. Dr. Greer,
a jail psychiatrist, testified that Bee was "decompensating"
as a result.
Dr. Greer then issued an order stating that Bee was to be forcibly medicated any time he refused the Thorazine treatment.' 2 On October 21,
three jail officers and a jail medic forcibly injected Bee with Thorazine
for the purpose of "intinmidat[ing] him so he wouldn't refuse the oral
medication any more."' 3 Two days later, when Bee again refused the
medication, he was threatened with forced injections. Under the threat,
Bee acquiesced and took Thorazine orally. For at least three weeks following his initial refusal, the jail staff remained under a standing order
to medicate Bee forcibly should he again refuse treatment. Bee contin5. 744 F.2d at 1389. Schizophrenia is a medical term describing a group of disorders
characterized by multiple personalities, delusions, hallucinations, or certain other disturbances in thought forms. AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS 181-93 (3d ed. 1980).
6. 744 F.2d at 1389. Dr. Lebegue determined that Bee was mentally ill while in an
unmedicated condition and that he was threatening, violent, and hallucinating without
treatment. Dr. Lebegue also observed that in a medicated state Bee "normalized:" he had
improved thought processes, decreased incidences of violent behavior, and fewer hallucinations. Id.
7. 744 F.2d at 1389.
8. The state psychiatrists were of the opinion that Bee would require continued
Thorazine treatment in order to maintain his competency to stand trial. Brief for Lake
County Appellees at 4-5, Bee v. Greaves, 744 F.2d 1387 (10th Cir. 1984).
9. Although not explicitly stated, it is possible to infer from the facts that Bee was
medicated with Thorazine during his competency hearing. Brief for Lake County Appellees at 5, Bee v. Greaves, 744 F.2d 1387 (10th Cir. 1984).
10. There is significant evidence suggesting that Thorazine and other antipsychotic
drugs often produce severe side-effects in patients continually administered these medications. These side-effects include psuedo-parkinsonisms, a mask-like face, tremors, muscle
stiffness, and rigidity. Other side-effects are muscle spasms in the face, writhing and grimacing movements, protrusions of the tongue, drowsiness, weakness, dizziness, fainting,
dry mouth and blurred vision. See Davis v. Hubbard, 506 F. Supp. 915, 928-29 (N.D. Ohio
1980); Comment, Madness and Medicine: The ForcibleAdministration of Psychotropic Drugs, 1980
Wis. L. REV. 497, 530-39.
11. "It is unclear from the record what 'decompensating' means." 744 F.2d at 1389
n. 1. The term decompensating implies some sort of violent behavior, although there is
conflicting evidence as to the extent Bee was a threat to himself or others in the jail. Id.
12. Id. at 1390.
13. Id. at 1390 (quoting Record vol. III, Hughes Deposition at 24).
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ued taking Thorazine orally as a result of this prolonged intimidation.
Bee then brought suit in federal district court alleging violations of his
constitutional rights. He alleged infringement of his right to privacy, his
due process rights under the fourteenth amendment, and his rights to
14
free speech and thought.
II.
A.

BACKGROUND

Foundation of Individuals' Rights
1. Substantive Due Process and the Right to Privacy

Although first applied by the Supreme Court solely in the context of
economic regulation, the due process clause has developed in the last
few decades as one of several substantive bases for the protection of
personal rights.1 5 Because the issue is usually the extent to which the
government may intrude into such personal areas of protection, the
Court has simultaneously sought to balance these personal rights
against legitimate governmental interests. In his frequently-cited dissent in Poe v. Ullman, Justice Harlan summarized this test: "Due process
has not been reduced to any formula; . . . [it represents] the balance
which our Nation, built upon postulates of respect for the liberty of the
individual, has struck between that liberty and the demands of organized
society."' 6 The right to privacy is one of the personal interests which
the Supreme Court has afforded due process protection.
According to the Supreme Court, the right to privacy is "one aspect
of the 'liberty' protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment."' 7 The fourteenth amendment is not the only source of
the right to privacy. The right stems from various other constitutional
guarantees which, combined, create personal "zones of privacy."' 18
Although no exact definition of the right to privacy can be given due to
14. Id. at 1389-90.
15. See generally L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 890-96 (1978).
16. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 542 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
17. Carey v. Population Serv. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 684 (1977) (citing Roe v. Wade, 410
U.S. 113, 152 (1973)).
18. "Specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have penumbras, formed by emanations
from those guarantees that help give them life and substance." Griswold v. Connecticut,
381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965). Such "emanations" stem from the first amendment (right of
association), fourth amendment (freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures), fifth
amendment (freedom from testifying against oneself), and the ninth amendment ("The
enumeration in the Constitution of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people."). See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973); Griswold,
381 U.S. at 484; see also Glancy, The Invention of the Right to Privacy, 21 ARIz. L. REV. 1
(1978); Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890). One sociological basis for the right to privacy concept is the essays and philosophy of John Stewart
Mill:
There is a circle around every individual human being, which no government.
ought to be permitted to overstep; there is a part of the life of every person who
has come to years of discretion, within which the individuality of that person
ought to reign uncontrolled either by any other individual or by the public collectively. That there is, or ought to be, some space in human existence thus entrenched around and sacred from authoritative intrusion, no one who professes
the smallest regard to human freedom or dignity will call in question.

DENVER UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 63:2

the amorphous nature of its origins, it is clear that, throughout its evolution, the right has been applied only in the context of marriage or family, education, travel, and procreation.' 9 Attempts have been made,
however, to extend the right to privacy to other fact situations beyond
these four traditional areas.2 0 When the right is invoked the balancing
process utilized compares the individual privacy interest with the competing state interests.
In addition to perfecting a working model of the right to privacy,
and providing the nucleus for the modern abortion controversy, Roe v.
Wade21 represents a definitive example of how the Supreme Court balances fundamental individual rights against compelling state interests.
The Court in Roe held that as a fetus grows older and more mature, the
state has an increasing interest in deciding whether or not abortion is
proper.2 2 Thus, Roe provides an excellent illustration of the willingness
of the Court, in implementing its balancing process, to override a funda23
mental right through the recognition of a compelling state interest.
2.

Freedom From Bodily and Mental Restraint

One basic value developed by the Supreme Court in interpreting
the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment is a person's freedom from bodily restraint. This right to be free from unjustified intruJ. S. MILL, 2 PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 560-61 (1848).
19. Representative of the evolution of the right to privacy, its substantive due process
origins, and the characteristic individual/state interest balancing process are: Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399-400 (1923) (the right to study the German language outweighs
state interests of homogenization of American ideals; the due process clause protects the
right of an individual to contract, to engage in the occupation of his choice, to learn, to
marry, establish a home, raise children and to worship God); Pierce v. Society of Sisters,
268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925) (no state power to "standardize... children by forcing them to
accept instruction from public teachers only"); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942)
(fundamental right to marriage and procreation prohibits sterilization of habitual male
criminals in spite of valid state interest in controlling crime); Aptheker v. Secretary of
State, 378 U.S. 500 (1964) (individual's right to travel outweighs governmental interest of
controlling communist activities); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (right to
privacy protects individual's ability to have access to and use contraceptives).
20. In Roberts v. United StatesJaycees, 104 S. Ct. 3244, 3250 (1984), the Court noted
that relationships characterized by "relative smallness, a high degree of selectivity in decisions to begin and maintain the affiliation, and seclusion from others in critical aspects of
the relationship" are entitled to the same right of privacy protections as a family. However, the Court concluded that because theJaycees did not possess all of these characteristics, they were not entitled to such protections. See also Michael M. v. Superior Court, 450
U.S. 464 (1981) (Court rejected attack on California's statutory rape law, finding no right
of privacy protection for sexual behavior among consenting minors); Whalen v. Roe, 429
U.S. 589 (1977) (although privacy interests include avoidance of disclosure of personal
matters and the making of certain important decisions, patients do not have a right to
privacy protecting physician-patient confidentiality); Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney,
425 U.S. 901 (1976) (no right to privacy regarding homosexual lifestyle); Kelley v. Johnson, 425 U.S. 238 (1976) (no right to privacy protecting a policeman's personal appearance); Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 683, 713 (1976) (no fundamental right to privacy protecting
public dissemination of one's name in a negative context). See generally L. TRIBE, supra note
15, at 887-957.
21. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
22. Id. at 162-64.
23. See Note, Roe v. Wade and Doe v. Bolton: The Compelling State Interest Test in Substantive Due Process, 30 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 628 (1973).
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sions on personal security is limited by various legitimate societal
interests which are given effect through application of Justice Harlan's
24
Poe v. Ullman balancing test.
The landmark decision of Rennie v. Klein (Rennie 1)25 extended the
application of the right of personal security from bodily restraint to the
mentally ill.26 Rennie was a 40-year-old mental patient forcibly treated
with antipsychotic drugs. The Third Circuit Court of Appeals found
that forced medication was an intrusion "rising to the level of a liberty
interest warranting the protection of the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment."' 2 7 This right was not treated as absolute. Rather,
the protection from bodily intrusions was balanced against the state's
interest in preventing Rennie from endangering himself and others. 28
Additionally, in Rennie I the Third Circuit applied, as the appropriate
standard of review, the "less intrusive means test." '29 Under this test
"[tihe means chosen to promote the state's substantial concerns must be
be carefully tailored to effectuate those objectives with minimal infringe'30
ment of protected interests."
Subsequent to Rennie I, in Youngberg v. Romeo, 3 1 the Supreme Court
considered for the first time the substantive rights of involuntarily committed mentally retarded persons restrained against their will. 3 2 Citing

Vitek v. Jones,3 3 the Court found that committed mentally retarded patients retain certain liberty interests under the fourteenth amendment.
In addition to the undisputed rights to food, shelter, clothing and medical care, the Court concluded that the patients possess rights of safety,
freedom of movement, and liberty from bodily restraint. The Court
stated that these patients retain the right to freedom from bodily restraint because this interest "survives criminal conviction and incarceration . . . it must also survive involuntary commitment." '3 4 Again, the
24. See supra text accompanying note 16; see also Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651,
673 (1977) (school's corporal punishment policy upheld as a valid disciplinary method in
the face of children's assertions of right to freedom from excessive punishment); Cf
Greenholtz v. Nebraska Penal Inmates, 442 U.S. 1, 18 (1979) (Powell, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part) (action brought by inmates of a state prison alleging violation
of due process rights: "liberty from bodily restraint always has been protected by the Due
Process Clause from arbitrary governmental action").
25. Rennie I, 653 F.2d 836 (3d Cir. 1981) (en banc), vacated and remanded, 458 U.S. 119
(1982) (in light of Supreme Court decision in Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307 (1982)),
reinstatedand modified on remand, 720 F.2d 266 (3d Cir. 1983) (Rennie II).
26. The right to be free from bodily intrusions is treated by the court precisely the
same as the right to be free from bodily restraint. Rennie 1, 653 F.2d at 843-45.
27. Id. at 844.
28. This power flows from a state's police power and the parens patriae theory. Id. at
845 (citing Colls v. Hyland, 411 F. Supp. 905 (D.N.J. 1976)).
29. 653 F.2d at 845.
30. Id. at 846.
31. 457 U.S. 307 (1982).
32. Youngberg is factually distinguishable from Rennie and Bee in that the state action in
Youngberg did not involve medication. Id. at 315.
33. 445 U.S. 480 (1980). In Vitek, a convicted felon was transferred from a state
prison to a mental health hospital under the authority of a state statute. The Court recognized that a prisoner is entitled to the procedural due process protection of a hearing prior
to being transferred to a mental hospital.
34. Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 316.

DENVER UNIVERSITY L4 W REVIEW

[Vol. 63:2

Court reiterated that these liberty interests are "not absolute."' 35 The
state is entitled to balance against these individual interests the competing interests of operating mental health institutions in a manner which
36
protects the patients from themselves and others.
Turning to a discussion of the appropriate level of judicial review,
the Court, refusing to follow Rennie I,37 declined to adopt the "less intrusive means" standard. Instead, the Court adopted the modem governing standard of review for the conduct of states when dealing with
the mentally infirm: "Liability may be imposed only when the decision
by the professional is such a substantial departure from the accepted
professional judgment, practice, or standards as to demonstrate that the
person responsible did not base the decision on such a judgment. 3 8
At least one court has noted that this right of freedom from bodily
restraint extends to protection from mental restraint as well. In Project
Release v. Prevost,3 9 a state mental patient challenged the constitutionality
of statutorily authorized commitment and treatment procedures. In
holding that the specific commitment procedures did not violate due
process, the court stated that "[f]orcible medication can alter mental
processes and limit physical movement, and therefore is analogous to
40
bodily restraint."
Thus, the Supreme Court has developed a constitutional right,
under the due process clause, of freedom from bodily restraint. This
right does not exist in a vacuum; it is circumscribed by competing state
interests. In reviewing these decisions, the appropriate level of review
employed by courts in light of Youngberg is the "professional judgment"
4
standard. 1
3.

First Amendment Protections

Justice Cardozo, writing in Palco v. Connecticut,4 2 a case primarily involving the fourteenth amendment, paused in dicta to comment on the
freedom of thought and speech described most prominently in the first
amendment: "Of that freedom [of thought and speech] one may say it is
the matrix, the indispensable condition, of nearly every other form of
35. Id. at 321.
36. Id. at 320-21. The Court once again, by balancing the liberty interest of the individual against the demands of organized society, relied on Justice Harlan's dissent in Poe
v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 542 (1961). See supra text accompanying note 16.
37. See Rennie 1, 653 F.2d 836 (3d Cir. 1981), supra notes 25-29 and accompanying
text. As a result of the Supreme Court's holding in Younberg v. Romeo, the Third Circuit in

Rennie II adopted the "professional judgment" standard; however, this greater level of
deference to the state interests failed to warrant a reversal. Rennie v. Klein, 720 F.2d 266
(3d Cir. 1983) (Rennie I1).
38. Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 323.
39. 551 F. Supp. 1298 (E.D.N.Y. 1982), af'd, 722 F.2d 960 (2d Cir. 1983).
40. 551 F. Supp. at 1309.
41. See supra text accompanying note 38; see also Comment, ConstitutionalRights of the
Involuntarily Committed Mentally Retarded After Youngberg v. Romeo, 14 ST. MARY's L.J. 1113
(1983).
42. 302 U.S. 316 (1937).
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freedom." 4 3
Freedom of thought and speech was first applied to the forced medication of a mental patient in Scott v. Plante.44 As well as addressing the
protections available under the fourteenth amendment, the Third Circuit held that forced treatment amounts to a violation of a mental patient's first amendment rights. 4 5 The federal district court's opinion in
Rogers v. 0kin 46 similarly recognized the applicability of the first amendment to forced medication cases. Rogers involved a class action attacking
the policies of non-emergency forced medication and involuntary seclusion at a state mental health facility. Finding that the first amendment
provided a basis for the right to privacy, the district court held that the
"protected right of communication presupposes a capacity to produce
ideas." '4 7 Moreover, the court acknowledged that psychotropic medication interferes with an individual's capacity for thought, and, as such,
infringes upon this fundamental right: "The right to produce a thought
- or refuse to do so - is as important as the right protected in Roe v.
Wade to give birth or abort. .

.

. Realistically, the capacity to think and

decide is a fundamental element of freedom." '48 Thus, the scope of the
first amendment protections has been held by lower courts to include
freedom of thought as well as speech.
To summarize, there is a group of constitutional protections available to an individual who has been medicated against his or her will.
Whether labeled "liberty interest," "right to privacy," "freedom from
bodily and mental restraint" or "freedom from thought-control," this
constitutional protection provides a shield for all persons - free, involuntarily committed, or incarcerated - from unjustified state infringements. However, this shield is often legitimately pierced by compelling
state interests. Courts have sought to balance these competing interests
in an effort to serve the needs of both society and the individual.
43. Id. at 327. See also Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 565 (1969) ("Our whole
constitutional heritage rebels at the thought of giving government the power to control
men's minds.").
44. 532 F.2d 939 (3d Cir. 1976).
45. Id. at 946. See also Mackey v. Procunier, 477 F.2d 877 (9th Cir. 1973) (prisoners'
alleged receipt of "fright drug" without consent raised possibility of cruel and unusual
punishment or impermissible tinkering with mental processes); Kaimowitz v. Department
of Mental Health, No. 73-19434-AW (Mich. Cir. Ct., Wayne County, July 10, 1973), excerpted in 2 PRIsoN L. REP. 433 (1973) (adult, or his legal guardian if the adult is involuntarily detained at a state mental facility, cannot give truly informed consent to experimental
psychosurgery).
46. 478 F. Supp. 1342 (D. Mass. 1979), aff'd in part and revd in part, 634 F.2d 650 (1st
Cir. 1980), vacated and remanded on other grounds sub nom. Mills v. Rogers, 457 U.S. 291
(1982), on remand, 738 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1984).
47. 478 F. Supp. at 1367.
48. Id. See also Davis v. Hubbard, 506 F. Supp. 915 (N.D. Ohio 1980) (although rejecting the first amendment as a basis for protection, the court acknowledged the ability of
antipsychotic drugs to impede an individual's thought processes). See generally L. TRIBE,
supra note 15, at §§ 15-7, 15-8; Comment, The First Amendment Right to Freedom of Thought as
Applied to Involuntarily Committed Patient's Right to Refuse Drugs, 26 ST. Louis U.L.J. 973
(1982).
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Development of the ConstitutionalProtections of PretrialDetainees
1. The Rights Retained by Prisoners and Pretrial Detainees

In Bell v. Wolfish, 49 the Supreme Court stated that pretrial detainees
-retain at least those constitutional rights that we have held are enjoyed
by convicted prisoners." ' 50 However, this is not to say that a pretrial
detainee possesses "the full range of freedoms of an unincarcerated individual."' 5 1 In Bell, several inmates of a New York pretrial detention
center brought a class action suit alleging that the overcrowded and un52
derstaffed conditions of the center violated their constitutional rights.
The Court found that because no fundamental rights were involved in
the detainee's allegations, the only issue was whether the facility conditions amounted to "punishment" of the detainees. 53 In order to resolve
this issue, the Court first investigated the extent to which the restrictions
or conditions were imposed for purposes other than those stated and,
then, whether such restrictions were excessive in relation to their purposes. 54 Further, the Court outlined the standard of judicial review to
be implemented: whether or not the condition or restriction at issue is
"reasonably related to a legitimate governmental objective." '5 5 If such a
condition is "arbitrary or purposeless." courts should infer that the
measure is punitive, thereby surpassing legitimate government objectives. 5 6 "Wide ranging deference" was accorded the prison officials and
their policies in the absence of evidence that a particular restriction was
an "exaggerated" response to the problem. 57 The Court concluded
that all of the alleged violations were reasonably related to valid govern58
mental objectives.
Thus, the Court has fashioned a "reasonable relation" standard to
be employed in evaluating possible breaches of the non-fundamental con49. 441 U.S. 520 (1979).
50. Id. at 545. In Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480 (1980), the Supreme Court held that
prisoners retain certain liberty interests, under the due process clause, in freedom from
involuntary transfer from prison to a state mental hospital. In Wolf v. McDonnell, 418
U.S. 539 (1974), the Court held that prisoners retain certain limited procedural due process protections in prison administrative procedures affecting them such as loss of "good
time" credits due to misconduct. See also Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215 (1976); Pell v.
Procunier, 417 U.S. 817 (1974).
51. Bell, 441 U.S. at 546.
52. Violations of rights under the first, fourth, fifth and eighth amendments were alleged by the pretrial detainees. Other alleged constitutional violations included: "'undue
length of confinement, improper searches, inadequate recreational, educational, and employment opportunities,. . . and objectionable restrictions on the purchase and receipt of
personal items and books." Id. at 527.
53. Id. at 535-36. Justice Rehnquist stated that under the due process clause of both
the fourteenth and fifth amendments, "a detainee may not be punished prior to adjudication of guilt." Id. (citing Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 672 n.40, 674 (1977)).
54. Bell, 441 U.S. at 538.
55. Id. at 539.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 547-48.
58. The most important governmental interest is detention center security:
'[Clentral to all other corrections goals is the institutional consideration of internal security within the corrections facilities themselves.' " Id. at 546-47 (quoting Pell v.
Procunier, 417 U.S. at 823).
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stitutional rights of pretrial detainees. Courts are instructed to focus
their inquiry upon the punitive intent, or lack of punitive intent, behind
prison actions and restrictions when dealing with pretrial detainees.
C.

The ConstitutionalRights of Mental Health Patients

The constitutional rights of mental health patients stem mainly
from the interaction of the fourteenth and the first amendments. 59
Courts have recognized a right to refuse treatment grounded in the
right to privacy, which is derived from the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment. 60 The fourteenth amendment has also been
held to protect a mental health patient's right to freedom from bodily
restraint. 6 1 Further, in Rennie v. Klien, 62 this freedom was held to be
applicable to mental patients who are medicated against their will. The
second basis for a mental patient's constitutional right to be free from
forced treatment is the first amendment right to freedom of expression.
Both Scott v. Plante63 and Rogers v. Okin 6 recognized the first amendment violations inherent in forced medication.
Thus, courts have allowed mental health patients the constitutional
right to be free from both unwanted treatment and bodily intrusions. As
set forth in the discussion of Rennie v. Klein, 65 these rights are limited by
the legitimate state interests of controlling the mentally ill and of protecting the mentally ill from violence to themselves and others. Additionally, courts will balance the patient's interests with those of the state
when inquiring into possible violations of constitutional protections.6 6
59. These amendments encompass the right to privacy and the right to freedom of
thought and mental processes, respectively.
60. See Wyatt v. Strickney, 344 F. Supp. 387 (M.D. Ala. 1972) (mental patients have
constitutional rights not to receive treatments such as lobotomy, electro convulsive treatment, or "adverse reinforcement conditioning"), afd sub nom. Wyatt v. Aderbolt, 503 F.2d
1305 (5th Cir. 1974); Kaimowitz v. Michigan Dept. of Mental Health, No. 73-19434-AW
(Mich. Cir. Ct., Wayne County, July 10, 1973), excerpted in 2 PRISON L. REP. 433 (1973)
(right to free choice in deciding whether to undergo experimental medical procedures).
61. See discussion of Youngberg, 457 U.S. 307 (1982), supra notes 31-38 and accompanying text.
62. 653 F.2d 836 (3d Cir. 1981) (Rennie 1). See supra notes 25-29 and accompanying
text.
63. 532 F.2d 939 (3d Cir. 1976). See supra notes 44-45 and accompanying text.
64. 478 F. Supp. 1342 (D. Mass. 1979). See supra notes 46-48 and accompanying text.
65. 653 F.2d 836 (3d Cir. 1981) (Rennie I). See supra notes 25-29, 37 and accompanying text.
66. See Rennie 11, 720 F.2d 266 (3d Cir. 1983), discussed supra note 37. Interestingly,
many of these constitutional issues were brought together in a federal district court case
involving mental patients and compulsory use of psychotropic drugs. In Davis v. Hubbard, 506 F. Supp. 915 (N.D. Ohio 1980), the court stated that, although some courts had
derived the right to refuse treatment from "the First Amendment, the Eighth Amendment,
as well as the 'penumbras' and 'shadows' of these and the Third, Fourth, and Fifth Amendments," it believed that "the source of the right can be best understood as substantive due
process, or phrased differently, as an aspect of 'liberty' guaranteed by the due process
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." Id. at 929. Three interests were found to be involved in forced use of psychotropic drugs: the interest in "bodily integrity," the interest
in making independent decisions, and the interest in being able to think and communicate
freely. Id. at 930. After an extensive analysis, the court concluded that the legitimate state
interests of protecting a patient from harming himself or others did not outweigh the indi-
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Any constitutional infringement must meet the "least intrusive means"
standard.
III.

THE CASE

The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, finding issues of material fact,
reversed the district court's summary judgment for the defendants and
remanded Bee for further proceedings. 6 7 The court employed a twotiered analysis, focusing on the issue of whether pretrial detainees have
68
a constitutional right to refuse treatment with antipsychotic drugs.
The first task before the court was to determine the sources, if any, of
Bee's constitutional protections. The second consideration by the court
protections against legitiinvolved weighing these alleged6constitutional
9
interests.
state
competing
mate
Judge Seymour, writing for a unanimous three-judge panel, began
by analyzing Bee's claimed rights under Roe v. Wade.70 The court determined that an individual possesses a constitutionally protected "privacy
interest" in deciding whether or not to accept treatment by potentially
dangerous drugs. 7 1 The court based its determination on the traditional rights analysis, finding that an individual's right to refuse treatment is important enough to fall within the zone of interests protected
72
by the right to privacy.
The Tenth Circuit reinforced this finding by uncovering a separate
liberty interest protection within the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. 73 Relying on Youngberg v. Romeo 74 and Project Release
v. Prevost,75 the court reasoned that if incarcerated individuals retain a
liberty interest in freedom from bodily restraint, then the same individuals, afortiori, have a liberty interest in freedom from mental restraint of
the kind imposed upon them by antipsychotic drugs. 76 The court continued its due process analysis by drawing an analogy between Bee's situation and Vitek v. Jones, 77 in which the Supreme Court held that even a
convicted prisoner retains due process rights, both substantive and pro78
cedural, prior to being subjected to involuntary psychiatric treatment.
vidual's fundamental interests. Thus, procedural measures safeguarding the right and
ability to consent were enforced. Id. at 937-38.
67. 744 F.2d at 1397.
68. Id. at 1391.
69. Id. at 1392.
70. 410 U.S. 113 (1972). See supra notes 21-23 and accompanying text. Judge Seymour also relied extensively on Davis v. Hubbard, 506 F. Supp. 915 (N.D. Ohio 1980),
discussed supra note 66.
71. 744 F.2d at 1393.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. 457 U.S. 307 (1982). See supra notes 31-38 and accompanying text.
75. 551 F. Supp. 1298 (E.D.N.Y. 1982), affd, 722 F.2d 960 (2d Cir. 1983). See supra
notes 39-40 and accompanying text.
76. 744 F.2d at 1393.
77. 445 U.S. 480 (1980). See supra note 33.
78. 744 F.2d at 1393. The Tenth Circuit further stated that the medical nature of
using antipsychotic drugs was not reason enough to dispose of procedural due process
requirements. Id. (citing Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418,430 (1979)). While the Court
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Bee also contended that a third source of constitutional protection
stems from the first amendment. 79 The court, agreeing with Bee, reasoned that antipsychotic drugs, because of their ability to severely impair an individual's thought processes and abilities to communicate,
infringe upon the right to free speech and free thought. According to
the court, this infringement implicates first amendment interests.80
The combination of these privacy, liberty and freedom of thought
interests lead the court to hold that Bee retained a constitutional interest in refusing Thorazine treatments. However, the court qualified this
interest as "not absolute," 8' stating that such interests are subject to
"'the demands of an organized society.' "82 The court then weighed
Bee's liberty interests against the legitimate interests of the state.
Following Bell v. Wolfish, 8 3 the court stated that pretrial detainees, as
lawfully incarcerated individuals, lose certain rights otherwise enjoyed
by free people. 84 The court expressly adopted the Bell professional
judgment standard8 5 - even relating to the first amendment protections afforded Bee - as the level of review the courts must use when
86
examining the policies and actions of prison officials.
The court then examined each of the defendant-appellees' alleged
overriding governmental interests.8 7 The defendants first claimed a
constitutional duty to medically treat pretrial detainees. This argument
was dismissed outright as perverting the holding of Bell; 8 8 the duty is
only applicable when the treatment not provided is desired and requested by the pretrial detainee. 89 Second, the defendants asserted
their duty to maintain a pretrial detainee's competency to stand trial.
This defense was also summarily dismissed by the court on the basis that
the state court had found Bee competent to stand trial prior to the episode of forced medication. 90
defers to reasonably related professional judgment when addressing substantive due process requirements, it is much more demanding when procedural due process requirements
are involved. See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, supra notes 49-58 and accompanying text.
79. 744 F.2d at 1393-94.
80. Id. See also Davis v. Hubbard, 506 F. Supp. at 927-29.
81. 744 F.2d at 1394.
82. Id. (quoting Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. at 320).
83. 441 U.S. 520 (1979). See supra notes 50-58 and accompanying text.
84. 744 F.2d at 1394.
85. Id. This standard involves a substantial amount of deference to prison administrators. See supra text accompanying note 57.
86. 744 F.2d at 1394-95.
87. Id. at 1395.
88. Id. See Bell, 441 U.S. at 535. The court distinguished two cases which held that,
because detainees were entitled to medical treatment, the state has a duty to provide such
care. Jones v. Diamond, 636 F.2d 1364 (5th Cir.), cert. granted sub noma.
Ledbetter v.Jones,
452 U.S. 959 (1981); Bowring v. Godwin, 551 F.2d 44 (4th Cir. 1977). According to the
Tenth Circuit, this obligation is conditioned upon the request of the inmate himself. 744
F.2d at 1395.
89. Id.
90. Id. The Tenth Circuit did not have to go further on this point, yet it chose to
develop the issue in detail, in dicta. The court doubted that there ever could exist a "sufficiently compelling" state interest in bringing an individual to trial strong enough to outweigh an accused's interest in not being forcibly medicated with antipsychotic drugs. Id.
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The third and final state interest asserted by the defendants was the
interest involved in protecting the inmates and staff from the actions of a
violent detainee. Adopting the Bell "reasonable relation" standard, the
court held that absent an emergency situation, forced medication is unconstitutional. 9 ' What, precisely, constitutes an "emergency situation"
turns on the relevant circumstances present in each case. 92 As a final
consideration for the district court on remand, the Tenth Circuit stated
that even if an emergency existed at the time Bee was forcibly injected,
such medication might still be unconstitutional. 9 3 The court held that
the prison also had a duty to seek less restrictive means for controlling
94
Bee.
IV.
A.

ANALYSIS

Legitimacy of the Court's Bases For ConstitutionalProtection
1.

Bee's Liberty Interest Under the Fourteenth Amendment

Traditionally, areas which call for substantive due process protections are marriage, education, free travel and procreation. 9 5 However,
as Justice Harlan pointed out in his Poe v. Ullman dissent, due process
cannot be "reduced to any formula."'9 6 The soundness of a court's decision regarding liberty interests will be evaluated through the test of
time, contended Harlan. 9 7 Certainly, the Supreme Court has made a
highly subjective practice of determining the specific areas deserving of
substantive due process protection.
Against this background, the Tenth Circuit validly held that Bee was
entitled to due process protection. In other words, Bee possessed a liberty interest under the fourteenth amendment. The first type of protection afforded Bee is his right to informed consent. This right extends to
persons within a state's custody who are deprived of certain rights enjoyed by free persons. 98 In light of the recent opinions in Rennie I and
Rogers,9 9 Bee, under the circumstances of this case, possessed a clear
constitutional right to refuse treatment. The second type of liberty protection recognized by the court was liberty from bodily restraint. There
is little doubt following the Supreme Court's ruling in Youngberg v. Ro91. Id. (quoting Bell, 441 U.S. at 539).
92. 744 F.2d at 1396. Whether or not the circumstances in Bee made it an "emergency" situation was a material factual issue in dispute, for determination on remand. Another issue of fact to be determined on remand was whether or not forcible medication for
an indefinite period constituted an exaggerated response. d. at 1396-97.
93. Id. at 1395-96.
94. Id. The court suggested that "tranquilizers or sedatives" might have been tried
first instead of the more powerful antipsychotic medication. In a footnote, the court acknowledged some dispute regarding the use of the less intrusive means analysis in cases
involving the involuntary treatment of the mentally infirm. Id. at 1396 n.7. See infra notes
135-41 and accompanying text.
95. See supra notes 19-20 and accompanying text.
96. 367 U.S. at 542 (Harlan, J., dissenting). See supra text accompanying note 16.
97. 367 U.S. at 542 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
98. See Davis v.Hubbard, 506 F. Supp. at 929.
99. See Rennie 1, 653 F.2d 836, supra notes 25-29 and accompanying text; Rogers v.
Okin, 478 F. Supp. 1342, supra notes 46-48 and accompanying text.
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meo, 0 0 that even convicted prisoners retain certain freedoms from bodily restraint.' 0 ' In Youngberg, however, the Court did not address the
possibility of mental restraints, as only physical bondage was at issue.
The court in Bee relied on an analogy initially drawn in Project Release v.
Prevost 102 to locate a liberty interest within the freedom from mental
restraint. "Forcible medication can alter mental processes and limit
10 3
physical movement and therefore is analogous to bodily restraint."'
Thus, the Tenth Circuit stood on firm ground when it found that Bee
possessed liberty interests under the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. The holding is less solid, however, regarding the
court's ruling that Bee possessed a special liberty interest protection
based upon the right to privacy.
2.

Bee's Right to Privacy

Relying on Roe v. Wade, 104 the Tenth Circuit found that Bee possessed a "fundamental" right to privacy. 10 5 As noted previously, the
concept of protection embodied in the phrase "right to privacy" only
appears in Supreme Court decisions relating to specific factual situations. 10 6 Further, the Supreme Court has been reluctant to find a right
of privacy outside the traditional right-to-privacy contexts of marriage,
education, travel and procreation.' 0 7 Thus, it is unclear whether the
Tenth Circuit's extension of the right-to-privacy beyond the prescribed
boundaries will be adopted by the Supreme Court in the future, as a part
of some general personal right to privacy.
3.

The Use of the First Amendment

First amendment protections have long held a position of special
importance with the Supreme Court. Justices writing on behalf of the
Court have often called for the highest level of judicial scrutiny when
reviewing first amendment issues. 10 8 In Rogers v. Okin, 10 9 the First Cir100. 457 U.S. 307 (1982).
101. See Greenholtz v. Nebraska Penal Inmates, 442 U.S. 1 (1979).
102. 551 F. Supp. 1298 (E.D.N.Y. 1982), affd, 722 F.2d 960 (2d Cir. 1983).
103. Id. at 1309.
104. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
105. See supra text accompanying notes 71-72.
106. See supra notes 19-20 and accompanying text.
107. See supra note 20. The Tenth Circuit found support for Bee's right to privacy in
the -important decisions" interest outlined in Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589 (1977), supra
note 20. While Whalen appears to recognize a right to privacy which is general in nature
and not dependent upon specific contexts for its existence, it is unclear from the holding
whether the Court extended the right to privacy beyond the traditional zones of protection. In fact, the Court held that the specific relationship in question was not protected by
the right to privacy and that "important decisions" are characterized as dealing with "matters relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships and child rearing and education." 429 U.S. at 600 n.26 (quoting Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 713
(1976)).
108. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
109. 634 F.2d 650 (1st Cir. 1980), vacated and remanded on other grounds sub nom. Mills v.
Rogers, 457 U.S. 291 (1982), on remand, 738 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1984). See supra notes 46-48
and accompanying text; see also Davis v. Hubbard, 506 F. Supp. 915 (N.D. Ohio 1980).
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cuit upheld the portion of the trial court's opinion which grounded the
right to refuse treatment on the first amendment. The court thus gave
tacit approval to using first amendment protection for mental patients
forcibly medicated with antipsychotic drugs."10 Therefore, assuming
Bee is entitled to the same level of constitutional protection as mental
health. patients, the Tenth Circuit had at least one source of authority for
finding first amendment protection for Bee."I ' However, although the
first amendment provides a high level of protection, it is not absolute.
Compelling state interests such as attempts to rehabilitate mental patients may override this protection, allowing involuntary treatment of
1 2
mental health patients in certain situations.
B.

The Level of Protection Afforded Bee as a PretrialDetainee and Mental
Patient

None of these liberty interests, including those derived from the
first amendment, is afforded absolute protection. Any liberty interest to
which pretrial detainees are entitled must be weighed against compelling, possibly subordinating state interests. Before this "balancing" of
competing interest occurs, it is necessary to determine the level of protection pretrial detainees in Bee's position are due. The Tenth Circuit
looked to Bell v. Wofish "i for guidance as to the level of protection applicable to pretrial detainees. Under Bell, while not permitted the protections of a free person, Bee, as a pretrial detainee, retained
fundamental fights at least as extensive as those of convicted prisoners." 14 Although the Tenth Circuit concluded under the Bell test that,
absent an emergency, the governmental activities in Bee were not reasonably related to legitimate state interests, the court never recognized
the fact that in Bell no fundamental rights were involved.'1 5 It is unclear
whether the Tenth Circuit merely overlooked this distinction or whether
the court determined that the presence of a fundamental right would
not change the "reasonable relationship" standard.
Another distinguishing trait of pretrial detainees is their presumption of innocence, a factor which might cause a court to treat them in a
manner similar to free persons. However, the Court in Bell gave no
weight to this consideration when determining the rights of pretrial detainees. 1 16 Nor did the Tenth Circuit mention the issue in Bee.
110. "The First Amendment protects the communication of ideas. That protected
right of communication presupposes a capacity to produce ideas. . . .Whatever powers
the Constitution has granted our government, involuntary mind control is not one of
them, absent extraordinary circumstances." Rogers, 478 F. Supp. at 1367.
111. But see infra text accompanying notes 117-119.
112. As long as a mental patient is given due process procedures, he may also bejudicially submitted to treatment. See Comment, The First Amendment Right to Freedom of
Thought as Applied to Involuntarily Committed Mental Patient's Right to Refuse Drugs, 26 ST.
Louis U.LJ. 973 (1982).
113. 441 U.S. 520 (1979).
114. Id. at 545. See supra text accompanying note 50.
115. 441 U.S. at 539.
116. "Without question, the presumption of innocence plays an important role in our
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Further, in determining the appropriate level of protection, the
Tenth Circuit declined to view Bee as a mental patient. In light of Bee's
mental health history, the court might have viewed him as a mental patient, in addition to a pretrial detainee. As set forth in Youngberg v. Rome'o,11 7 although an involuntarily committed individual necessarily loses
certain rights, a mental health patient also retains certain fundamental
protections.1 8 The Bee court could have strengthened its analysis regarding the level of Bee's constitutional protection by defining Bee as a
mental health patient in addition to a pretrial detainee. 1 9 The court in
Bee reached the correct level of protection for Bee, but overlooked an
important consideration.
C.

State Interests and Levels of Review
1.

Duty to Treat Medical Needs of Patients

The defendants in Bee initially argued that the jail is under a constitutional duty to "treat the medical needs of pretrial detainees."12 0 The
Tenth Circuit disposed of this assertion as a misstatement of law. Contrary to the interpretation offered by the defendants, a jail's duty to
medically or psychologically treat its inmates is purely conditional upon
the request and desire of the inmates themselves. 12 1 Further, to hold
that the state has a right to forcibly treat detainees at will, regardless of
any standard as to legitimacy in the government's objectives, is to completely disregard all that Bell stands for. 122 Thus, the court in Bee rightfully rejected this attempt by the defendants to allege a legitimate state
concern which simply does not exist. However, the other two state interests set forth were legally 'sound, whether or not applicable to the
context of Bee.
2.

Maintaining Bee's Competency to Stand Trial

Based upon Jackson v. Indiana,123 there is a legitimate state interest,
validly identified by the court in Bee, to bring the accused to trial in a
criminal justice system. . . . But it has no application to a determination of the rights of a
pretrial detainee during confinement before his trial has even begun." Id. at 533.
117. 457 U.S. 307 (1982).
118. See supra notes 31-36 and accompanying text.
119. Bee spent a substantial amount of time in the Salt Lake mental health facility.
Moreover, he was treated by two state employed psychiatrists. Arguably, Bee could have
been considered a mental health patient. See supra notes 4-13 and accompanying text.
120. 744 F.2d at 1395.
121. See supra notes 88-89 and accompanying text.
122. See supra notes 55-58 and accompanying text.
123. 406 U.S. 715 (1972). In Jackson, the Supreme Court found that a state has a limited right to commit incompetent criminally accused persons for a period of time, without
a due process hearing. The detainee may be held "only for a 'reasonable period of time'
necessary to determine whether there is a substantial chance of his attaining the capacity to
stand trial in the foreseeable future." Id. at 733. See also Cook v. Ciccone, 312 F. Supp.
822 (W.D. Mo. 1970) (where an unconvicted person is confined in federal custody and
where it is clear that lack of competency to stand trial is permanent or has existed for an
unreasonable period of time and there is not likely to be an immediate change, such person should be ultimately transferred to state authorities for adequate control and
treatment).
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state of mental competency. However, nothing in Jackson defines this
state interest as "compelling." On the contrary, the Supreme Court in
Jackson severely restrained a state's attempts to detain a criminal defendant for an indeterminate time or "until sane." 124 The court in Bee
reached the appropriate conclusion underJackson, but did not mention
the case, nor call upon the above standards. The court chose instead to
question whether a state interest in bringing a competent defendant to
trial is ever "sufficiently compelling" to outweigh all of the aforementioned liberty interests. 125 Thus, while failing to cite any helpful authority to justify its position, the court in Bee was accurate in doubting that
the interest in bringing a competent defendant to trial could ever be
defendant's numerous liberty intercompelling enough to outweigh that 126
ests against involuntary medication.
However, this discussion is mere speculation on dicta, as the Tenth
Circuit, relying on the lower court's finding that Bee was competent to
stand trial, stated that the issue of Bee's competency is "not implicated
in this case." 127 There is a strong inference in the record that when the
Utah court found Bee competent to stand trial, Bee was under the influence of Thorazine.' 2 8 In fact, the state psychiatrists who treated Bee
were of the opinion that Bee would require continued Thorazine treatment to maintain his competency to stand trial. 129 A constant dosage of
Thorazine would have a tremendous impact, not only on Bee's compe30
tency to stand trial, but also on his general demeanor as a witness.
Thus, there is at least a strong implication within the facts of Bee that
Bee's competency was artificially controlled, and that his competency to
stand trial was a direct product of the effects of an extremely potent
tranquilizer. Apparently this was completely overlooked by the Tenth
upon
Circuit judges who relied upon the federal district court's reliance
13
the state court's finding that Bee was competent to stand trial. '
124. If the defendant does not attain a status of competency in a reasonable period of
time, the state must either release the defendant or "institute the customary civil commitment proceeding that would be required to commit indefinitely any other citizen." Jackson,
406 U.S. at 738. See also Gobert, Competency to Stand Trial: A Pre- and Post-Jackson Analysis,
40 TENN. L. REV. 659 (1973).

125. Bee, 744 F.2d at 1395. The court might have strengthened its position by drawing
an analogy toJackson. If a state is prevented from retaining in its custody a legally incompetent defendant beyond a reasonable amount of time, then it follows that a state may not
attempt to keep a person competent through the harsher liberty violation of forced
medication.
126. This is particularly true since first amendment protections are implicated. Only
"sufficiently compelling" state interests may override first amendment protections. See
supra notes 43-48 and accompanying text.
127. 744 F.2d at 1395.
128. See supra notes 7-10 and accompanying text.
129. See supra note 8.
130. See supra notes I and 10 and accompanying text; see also Davis v. Hubbard, 506 F.
Supp. at 927 ("Though there appears to be no generally accepted theory that explains the
biochemical manner in which the drugs work, the beneficial effects of antipsychotic drugs
are on thought processes and the brain's ability to sort out and integrate perceptions and
memory. That is, they stabilize and blunt thought processes.").
131. While not an issue in Bee, the possibility of conviction while under the influence of
Thorazine would involve the question of a criminal defendant's right to a fair trial. See
Pledger v. United States, 272 F.2d 69 (4th Cir. 1959) (motion to vacate sentence of con-
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3.

Jail Security and the "Emergency" Standard

Both Bee and the defendants agreed that forced medication with
psychotropic drugs may be required in an "emergency." 13 2 The Tenth
Circuit, in remanding the issue to the trial court for a ruling on whether
an emergency existed, outlined the "reasonable relation" test of
Youngberg v. Romeo. '33 The court provided that the decision of what constitutes an emergency is to be decided on a case by case basis with defer134
ence to the "professional judgment" of medical authorities.
However, in listing the considerations to be analyzed in determining on
remand whether an emergency existed,' 3 5 the court in Bee departed
from the Youngberg standard and seems to authorize the much higher
level of judicial review inferred in the "less intrusive means" standard.' 3 6 The court attempted to justify its deviance from the traditional
standard by arguing that Youngberg is distinguishable as it does not contemplate the "severe effects" of antipsychotic drugs.' 3 7 Although it is
well-established that the side-effects of Thorazine and other psychotropic medications are severe and more permanent than other forms of
restraint, 138 the Supreme Court, in Rennie J,139 had the opportunity to
change the level of review pertaining to cases specifically involving
forced medication with antipsychotic drugs. Yet, the Court elected to
maintain the Youngberg "professional judgment" standard. As set forth
in the Third Circuit's opinion on remand, 140 the
Supreme Court thus declined to adopt a "least intrusive
means" analysis, and remanded both Rennie, [citations omitted]
and Rogers v. Okin [citations omitted] to their respective courts.
Mills involved the same issue as Rennie, namely, the constitutionality of the forcible administration of antipsychotic drugs to
involuntarily committed mental patients. Rennie was remanded
specifically for reconsideration in light of the Supreme Court's
opinion in Youngberg.14
Thus, the Tenth Circuit sidestepped the Supreme Court's tacit rulvicted felon remanded for further consideration where defendant was incapacitated at time
of trial due to the influence of narcotics); State v. Hancock, 426 P.2d 872 (Or. 1967) (criminal conviction affirmed because tranquilizers given to defendant did not deprive him of
the ability to comprehend the nature of the proceedings and to assist in his own defense);
State v. Murphy, 355 P.2d 323 (Wash. 1960) (new trial granted for defendant convicted of
murder; defendant's attitude, appearance, and demeanor may have been influenced by
tranquilizers during trial). For an in-depth treatment of this issue as it applies to psychotropic drugs, see Winick, Psychotropic Medication and Competence to Stand Trial, 1977 Asx. BAR
FOUND. RES. J. 769.

132. 744 F.2d at 1395.
133. 457 U.S. 307 (1982). See supra notes 31-38 and accompanying text.
134. 744 F.2d at 1396.
135. The considerations included the "nature and gravity of the safety threat, the characteristics of the individual involved, and the likely effects of particular drugs." Id.
136. Id.
137. Id. n.7.
138. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
139. 458 U.S. 119 (1982).
140. Rennie 11, 720 F.2d 266 (3d Cir. 1983).
141. Id. at 268.
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ing that cases involving psychotropic medications should be evaluated
according to the Youngberg "professional judgment" standard. In its efforts to provide a high degree of protection for Bee and others subjected to similar treatment, the Tenth Circuit appears to have exceeded
the limitations on individual liberty interests, necessarily imposed by
competing legitimate state objectives, as proscribed by the Supreme
Court.
CONCLUSION

Bee v. Greaves straddles the law of several Supreme Court decisions.
Bee was a pretrial detainee who was subjected to forced medication with
a potentially dangerous drug. While the holding reached by the Tenth
Circuit is accurate, several important points were overlooked by the
court. The court ignored the possibility that without Thorazine, Bee
may not have been competent to stand trial, a factor which would have
been evident to the state court at his competency hearing. At that point,
Bee would have undergone civil commitment. Similarly, the court
should have considered Bee to be a mental patient as well as a pretrial
detainee. Finally, in its "less intrusive means" language, the court appears to stray from the traditional standard of review attributed to cases
of this nature. The holding in Bee is otherwise reasonable, affording persons like Bee numerous constitutional protections, while allowing room
for subordinating state interests. Absent a clear showing of an emergency situation, Bee, and those like him in future decisions, will be adequately shielded by the Constitution from incidents of forced
medication with antipsychotic drugs.
Solomon L. Leftin

CRIMINAL LAW
OVERVIEW

During the survey period, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals addressed several issues significant to the criminal sentencing process and
considered the adequacy ofjury instructions on the good faith defense
to mail fraud charges.
In each of the sentencing cases, the Tenth Circuit upheld criminal
sentences notwithstanding strong arguments favoring reversal. In the
lead case on sentencing, the court permitted sentencing under the federal kidnapping statute to a term of years greater than life imprisonment, and ruled that the federal parole statute authorizes a minimum
parole eligibility date to be set at any time up to one-third of that term of
years. In another case, the Tenth Circuit allowed a general statute to be
applied in sentencing for an offense covered under a more specific statute, even though the general statute prescribed a greater punishment.
In a third sentencing case, the court held that there is no right to a jury
in a restitution determination proceeding.
In the sole mail fraud case discussed in this survey, the Tenth Circuit ruled that a specific instruction on the "good faith" defense must be
given where evidence supports that defense and the instruction is
requested.
I.

A.

SENTENCING

Defining Statutory Limits: United States v. O'Driscoll
1.

Background

In United States v. O'Driscoll,I the defendant, Michael James
O'Driscoll, was convicted of armed bank robbery2 and kidnapping,3 and
4
sentenced to consecutive prison terms of 25 and 300 years respectively.
The trial court further held that O'Driscoll would be eligible for parole
only after serving 99 years of the latter sentence. 5
The charges arose out of a two-month series of grisly criminal acts
1. 586 F. Supp. 1486 (D. Colo. 1984), afd, 761 F.2d 589 (10th Cir. 1985).
2. 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a), (d) (1982). The sentence rendered in connection with the
bank robbery was not an issue on appeal.
3. The charge of kidnapping was brought under 18 U.S.C. § 1201 (1982) which provides in pertinent part:
(a) Whoever unlawfully seizes, confines, inveigles, decoys, kidnaps, abducts, or
carries away and holds for ransom or reward or otherwise any person, except in
the case of a minor by the parent thereof, when:
(1) the person is willfully transported in interstate or foreign commerce;
(2) any such act against the person is done within the special maritime and
territorial jurisdiction of the United States;
shall be punished by imprisonment for any term of years or for life.
4. O'Driscoll, 761 F.2d at 595.
5. Id. The district court purported to derive its authority for the 99-year no-parole
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committed by the defendant. The trial record disclosed that O'Driscoll
had robbed and "pistol whipped" a Denver merchant. He then drove to
a suburban shopping center where he and a girlfriend took a hostage
and departed for Kansas. Leaving his girlfriend at a hotel in Salina,
Kansas, O'Driscoll drove the hostage several miles to a wooded area
where he shot the hostage several times, killing him. 6 Thereafter,
O'Driscoll traveled to Massachusetts where he perpetrated a bank robbery. 7 Following his eventual arrest in Puyallup, Washington,
O'Driscoll plead guilty to the bank robbery charge and was convicted by
8
a jury on the kidnapping charge.
Recognizing its authority to consider extraneous information concerning the background, character and conduct of the defendant in arriving at a sentencing decision, 9 the trial court noted additional facts
aggravating O'Driscoll's culpability. During the sentencing hearing,
O'Driscoll admitted to the commission of seven bank robberies and to
the heavy consumption of alcohol, cocaine, and other drugs. He had
been previously convicted of at least eight misdemeanor offenses, six
serious traffic violations, and three or four felonies, two of which were
prior acts of bank robbery and kidnapping. At the time of his sentencing, O'Driscoll had sevcnty-one charges pending against him in seven
different courts. ' 0
On appeal, O'Driscoll argued that the 300-year sentence, 99 years
to be served without possibility of parole, was outside applicable statutory limits, an abuse of the trial court's discretion, and cruel and unusual
punishment in violation of the eighth amendment."
2.

The Tenth Circuit Opinion

The Tenth Circuit, Judge Barrett writing for a unanimous threejudge panel, found both the sentence and the parole eligibility rulings to
be within statutory limits for the crime of kidnapping, within the proper
period from 18 U.S.C. § 4205(b)(1) (1982) (repealed Oct. 12, 1984; effective Nov. 1, 1986)
which provides:
(b) Upon entering a judgment of conviction, the court having jurisdiction to
impose sentence, when in its opinion the ends ofjustice and best interest of the
public require that the defendant be sentenced to imprisonment for a term exceeding one year, may (1) designate in the sentence of imprisonment imposed a
minimum term at the expiration of which the prisoner shall become eligible for
parole, which term may be less than but shall not be more than one-third of the
maximum sentence of imprisonment by the court.
6. 761 F.2d at 591-92. A post mortem examination established that the hostage had
been shot ten times. One shot had been fired while O'Driscoll pressed the gun against the
hostage's chest.
7. Id. at 592.
8. Id. at 592-93.
9. 18 U.S.C. § 3577 (1982) states that -[no] limitation shall be placed on the information concerning the background, character, and conduct of a person convicted of an
offense which a court ... may receive and consider for the purpose of imposing an appropriate sentence."
10. O'Driscoll, 761 F.2d at 593.
11. Id. at 595, 598-99.
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discretion of the trial court, and not in violation of the eighth amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment.
Initially, the court addressed O'Driscoll's interpretation of the penalty provision of the federal kidnapping statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1201, which
permits "imprisonment for any term of years or for life."' 12 O'Driscoll
pointed to the Revisor's Note accompanying the 1948 consolidation of
the federal kidnapping laws to support his contention that life imprisonment is the maximum sentence allowed under section 1201.13
O'Driscoll's argument that Congress intended to alert sentencing judges
that life imprisonment was available as a maximum sentence was rejected
by the court without discussion. 14 The court was also unpersuaded that
bringing a 300-year sentence within the meaning of "any term of years"
rendered the specially added "or for life" clause superfluous. Rather,
the court preferred the government's explanation that setting "life" as
the maximum term of imprisonment would make "any term of years"
superfluous.1 5 In addition, the court emphasized that the disjunctive effect of "or for life" implied that sentencing a defendant to a term of
16
years greater than life was permissible.
Turning its attention to the federal parole law, 18 U.S.C. § 4205,17
the court cited legislative history behind the predecessor parole statute 18 indicating that the judicial and executive branches share the responsibility for determining how long a prisoner should serve. 19
Acknowledging that section 4205(a) permits a prisoner who is serving a
life sentence to become eligible for parole ten years after incarceration,
the court held that subsection (b)(1) stands independently from subsection (a), permitting a judge to prohibit parole eligibility for a period up
to one-third of any sentence when "the ends ofjustice and the best interest of the public" so require. 20 Under such circumstances, the court
ruled, section 4205(b)(1) allows the trial judge to "bypass the Parole
Commission," setting parole eligibility at any point during the first onethird of the sentence imposed. 2 1 The court advised that the kidnapping
12. Id. at 595-96.
13. Section 1201 consolidates former 18 U.S.C. §§ 408a, 408c (repealed 1948). H. R.
REP. No. 304, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (1947). The Revisor's Note suggested that "for any
term of years or for life" was substituted for the penalty provision of the predecessor
statute, 18 U.S.C. § 408a, "for such term of years as the court in it discretion shall determine," in order to remove all doubt as to whether "term of years" included life
imprisonment.
14. 761 F.2d at 596 (emphasis added).
15. Id. (emphasis in original).
16. Id. at 597-98 (emphasis in original).
17. 18 U.S.C. § 4205 (1982) (repealed Oct. 12, 1984; effective Nov. 1, 1986).
Subsection (a) provides:
(a) Whenever confined and serving a definite term or terms of more than one
year, a prisoner shall be eligible for release on parole after serving one-third of
such term or terms or after serving ten years of a life sentence or of a sentence
over thirty years, except to the extent otherwise provided by law.
18. 18 U.S.C. § 4208 (1958) (repealed 1976).
19. 761 F.2d at 596 (citing S. REP. No. 2013, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 2, repinted in 1958
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 3891, 3892).
20. 761 F.2d at 596.
21. Id. at 596-97 (citing United States v. Addonizio, 442 U.S. 178, 189 n.15 (1979);
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statute sentencing provision should be read in connection with the parole law, but in the case of a conflict, the former, being more specific,
22
governs.
In an amicus curiae brief, it was further argued that the sentence imposed upon O'Driscoll was in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 4206(d)2 3 "which
authorizes the Parole Commission to release a prisoner sentenced to
more than 45 years, including a life term, when he has served 30 years,
unless 'there is reasonable probability that he will commit any Federal,
state, or local crime.' "24 The court responded that the sentence did not
interfere with application of parole guidelines, but merely fixed the date
25
when the parole mechanism is to become operative.
On the eighth amendment issue, the court ruled that setting parole
eligibility beyond the life expectancy of the defendant did not constitute
cruel and unusual punishment. 26 O'Driscoll contended that the parole
statute, contrary to judicial customs, was used in his case to increase,
rather than decrease, the punishment prescribed by the substantive
crime statute. 27 The Tenth Circuit rejected this argument based on its
previous finding that the sentence did not exceed statutory limits. 2 8

Fi-

nally, abiding by widely accepted principle, the court stated that its review of a sentence generally ends with the determination that statutory

limits have not been exceeded. 2 9 While not articulating a specific standard of review for abuse of discretion, the court found the extreme sentence rendered by the trial court easily justified given O'Driscoll's
"callous, vicious propensities."13 0
3.

Analysis
a.

The Kidnapping Sentence

Section 1201 provides that a defendant convicted thereunder "shall
be punished by imprisonment for any term of years or for life."'3 ' The
statute's predecessor directed that imprisonment be required "for such
term of years as the court in its discretion shall determine." '3 2 There is,
as the Tenth Circuit observed, a dearth of legislative history explaining
the addition of "or for life" to the discretionary term of years provision.
United States v. Pry, 625 F.2d 689 (5th Cir. 1980); Wilden v. Fields, 510 F. Supp. 1295,
1306-07 (W.D. Wis. 1981); United States v. Whitley, 473 F. Supp. 23, 24 (E.D. Mich.
1979)).
22. Id. at 598 (citing N. SINGER, 2A SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 51.05
(4th ed. 1984)).

23. 18 U.S.C. § 4206(d) (1982) (repealed Oct. 12, 1984; effective Nov. 1, 1986).
24.

761 F.2d at 598 (citing Brief for Amicus Curiae at 4).

25. Id. at 598.
26. Id. at 599 (citing Bailey v. United States, 74 F.2d 451, 452 (10th Cir. 1934) and
United States ex rel. Bongiorno v. Ragen, 146 F.2d 349 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 325 U.S. 865
(1945)).
27. Id. at 599.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 597.
30. Id. at 600.
31. 18 U.S.C. § 1201 (1982).
32. 18 U.S.C. § 408a (1946) (repealed 1948).
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As mentioned above, the Revisor's Note to the predecessor statute suggests that the change was made in order to remove all doubt as to
whether a life sentence could be imposed. 33 If the "term of years"
clause in the earlier statute was meant to include 300-year sentences, it
is odd that Congress subsequently authorized courts to impose the life
sentence. A more reasonable inference is that "any terms of years" refers to terms of imprisonment between zero years and life and that life
imprisonment is therefore the maximum possible sentence.
The Tenth Circuit's reasoning appears particularly strained when
viewed in the context of statutory punishment provisions identical to
those found in section 1201. The federal murder statute, 18 U.S.C.
§ 11 11,3 4 employs the same "any term of years or for life" language

used in section 1201. That section requires imposition of the death sentence upon conviction of first degree murder unless the jury qualifies its
verdict, "without capital punishment," in which event the defendant
"shall be sentenced to imprisonment for life." For a second degree
murder conviction, the statute mandates that the guilty party be "im'35
prisoned for any term of years or for life."
In United States v. Black Elk, 3 6 the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals
applied the sentencing language of section 111 1 in a second degree
murder case. The court held that Black Elk's fifteen year sentence was
"well below the maximum penalty for second degree murder of life imprisonment."'3 7 This language indicates the Eigth Circuit's belief that
life imprisonment is a ceiling above which "any term of years" may not
extend. The Tenth Circuit, in O'Driscoll, thus finds itself in conflict with
the Eighth Circuit in its interpretation of "any term of years." Further,
the O'Driscollcourt's reasoning, applied to section 11 11, would allow a
longer term of imprisonment for second degree murder than for first
degree murder, a result unlikely to have been intended by Congress.
b. Parole Eligibility
In practical terms, the court's construction of 18 U.S.C. § 4205, the
federal parole statute, was the most consequential aspect of the opinion. 38 Section 4205, governing time of eligibility for parole release,
consolidates two previous sections3 9 and is set forth, accordingly, in two
33. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
34. 18 U.S.C. § 1111 (1982), amended by 18 U.S.C. § 111t(a) (Supp. 11 1984). Two
other federal criminal statutes, 18 U.S.C. § 2031 (1982) (governing rape) and 18 U.S.C.
§ 241 (1982) (governing conspiracy), share the punishment language of section 1201.
Neither legislative history nor judicial interpretation related to those laws, however, are
enlightening.

35. 18 U.S.C. § 1111 (1982), amended by 18 U.S.C. § 1111(a) (Supp. 11 1984).
36. 579 F.2d 49 (8th Cir. 1978).

37. Id. at 51. See also United States v. Martell, 572 F. Supp. 110, 113 (D. Mont. 1983),
afd without opinion, 742 F.2d 1463 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 1772 (1985).
38. The difference between life and 300 years imprisonment is surely less interesting
to the convicted felon than whether he will be entitled to parole review during his natural
life expectancy.
39. 18 U.S.C. § 4205(a) is based upon former 18 U.S.C. § 4202 (1948) (repealed

1976); 18 U.S.C. § 4205(b) is based on former 18 U.S.C. § 4208 (1958) (repealed 1976).
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parts.
Subsection (a) provides that a prisoner serving more than one year
shall be eligible for release on parole after serving one-third of his sentence "or after serving ten years of a life sentence or of a sentence over
thirty years." ' 40 While the Tenth Circuit acknowledged that a prisoner
serving a life sentence becomes eligible for parole no later than ten
years after incarceration, 4 1 it is especially noteworthy here that the tenyear ceiling applies equally to sentences over thirty years. The House
Conference Report on section 4205 explains that subsection (a) mandates eligibility for parole consideration "in the case of a prisoner sentenced to life or more than 30 years, after serving 10 years of his
42
sentence."
The Tenth Circuit did not deny the plain meaning of subsection (a).
Instead, the court held that section 4205(b)(1) authorizes the trial judge
to prohibit parole eligibility for a period up to one-third of any determined sentence and thus to "bypass" subsection (a). 43 This holding was
predicated on the court's position that subsection (b)(1) was designed to
enable the sentencing judge to set parole eligibility at a date later than
4
4
would be allowed under subsection (a).

Legislative history of section 4205(b) is unenlightening. Former 18
U.S.C. § 4208, enacted in 1958, is the predecessor statute to section
4205(b). Its legislative history, relied upon by the Tenth Circuit, provides clear statements of congressional intent underpinning the statute.
Prior to enactment of section 4208, eligibility of federal adult prisoners
for parole was governed solely by former 18 U.S.C. § 4202, predecessor
to the present section 4205(a). 4 5 Under section 4202, prisoners sentenced to a term over one year were entitled to parole consideration
after serving one-third of their total sentence or, in the case of a life
46
sentence or sentence of more than forty-five years, after fifteen years.
Testifying before a House Judiciary Subcommittee, a representative of
the Judicial Conference of the United States explained that section 4208
was designed "to authorize the court in sentencing a prisoner to fix an
earlier date when a prisoner shall become eligible for parole .... -47
Moreover, in the Report of the Subcommittee to Consider the Problem
of Disparities in Sentences, the subcommittee chairman recommended
approval of legislation, which later became section 4208, "to authorize
the court, in sentencing a prisoner, to fix an earlier date when the pris'48
oner shall become eligible for parole."
40. 18 U.S.C. § 4205(a) (repealed Oct. 12, 1984; effective Nov. 1, 1986).
41. O'Driscoll, 761 F.2d at 596.
42. H. CONF. REP. No. 94-838, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 2, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 335, 357 (emphasis added).
43. O'Driscoll, 761 F.2d at 596.
44. Id.
45. Grasso v. Norton, 520 F.2d 27, 32 (2d Cir. 1975).
46. 18 U.S.C. § 4202 (1948) (repealed 1976).
47. S.REP. No. 2013, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 2, reprintedin 1958 U.S. CODE CONG.& AD.
NEWS 3891, 3896 (emphasis added).
48. Id. at 3900 (emphasis added). Additional statements in the Senate Report on sec-
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Further legislative history cited by the Tenth Circuit advises that
section 4208 permitted the trial court to share with the executive branch
49
the responsibility for determining how long a prisoner should serve.
The court relied upon this legislative history to affirm, implicitly, the
trial judge's statement that O'Driscoll's release should be a matter of
executive clemency and not of legal entitlement. Read in context, the
statement clearly refers to judicial cooperation with the attorney general
and the parole board in determining parole eligibility based upon the
individual prisoner's progress. 50 Nowhere in the legislative history is
the shared responsibility statement associated with an extreme sentence
in which the prisoner's only hope of release rests in executive clemency.
Other federal appellate decisions interpreting section 4205 and its
predecessors support the position that a court's power to fix a parole
eligibility date is conferred to allow parole at a date earlier than would
result under the automatic parole eligibility provision. In Grasso v. Norton, 5 1 the Second Circuit reviewed committee hearing testimony of the
author of section 4208. Arguing that section 4202 created a purely arbitrary limitation on parole eligibility, the author, Congressman Emmanuel Cellar, testified that section 4208 would "permit the release under
supervision at an earlierdate, should a prisoner's response to the rehabili''5
tation justify it. 2
The Seventh Circuit, in Garafola v. Bensen, 53 also examined the history of parole eligibility authority. The court noted that prior to the
adoption of section 4208, the statutory scheme did not include any grant
of authority to the sentencing court or the Board of Parole that would
permit release of a prisoner earlier than the one-third point established by section 4202. 54 The Seventh Circuit found that section 4208
"supplied the omission by permitting the judge either to shorten the
mandatory minimum imprisonment period ((a)(1)) or to eliminate the
tion 4208 similarly indicate that the legislative intent behind the section was to empower
judges to fix parole eligibility at a time less than the period required for automatic eligibility. See id. at 3902 ("[T]he court may designate in the sentence imposed a time when the
prisoner may become eligible for parole, which time may be less than, but shall not be more than,
one-third limitation now provided in section 4202." (emphasis in original)); id. at 3905 ("The
court will be authorized to . . . fix the maximum term of the sentence and (1) direct that
the prisoner shall be eligible for parole at any time up to one-third this maximum, as now
provided by law." (emphasis added)).
49. O'DriscoUt, 761 F.2d at 596 (citing S. REP. No. 2013, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 2, reprinted in 1958 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWs 3891, 3892).

50. S. REP. No. 2013, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 2, reprintedin 1958 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS at 3892 ("The purpose of this section is to provide the court with optional procedures which will enable it to impose sentences which may be indeterminate in nature. This
would permit the court, at its discretion, to share with the executive branch the responsibility for determining how long a prisoner should actually serve. The court could . . . fix
the maximum term of the sentence and . . . specify that the Board of Parole shall decide
when the prisoner will be considered for parole.").
51. 520 F.2d 27 (2d Cir. 1975).
52. Id. at 32 (quoting Hearings on H. J Res. 424, H. J Res. 425, and HR 8923 Before
Subcomm. No. 3, House Comm. on theJudiciary, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 2, at 5, 6 (1958)) (emphasis added).
53. 505 F.2d 1212 (7th Cir. 1974).
54. Id. at 1216.
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minimum entirely and permit the Board to parole the prisoner at any
time ((a)(2)). '' 55 Applying these same statutes, the Eighth Circuit, in
Jones v. United States, 5 6 reached the same conclusion.
Most recently, the Seventh Circuit, in United States v. Fountain,5 7 directly addressed the relationship between subsection 4205(a) and subsection 4205(b)(1). The defendant, convicted of first degree murder,
was sentenced by the trial court to not less than 50 nor more than 150
years in prison. 58 Reviewing the record, the circuit court noted that the
district judge was "troubled" by the fact that someone sentenced to life
in prison can be paroled after serving only ten years under 18 U.S.C.
§ 4205(a). 59 The circuit court concluded that was why the sentencing
judge imposed a term of years instead of life. 60 The court continued:
But we are not clear how the judge thought this form of
sentence would affect the defendant's parole eligibility dates,
when as we have said section 4205(a) requires that every sentence of more than 30 years be treated, for purposes of computing that date, as if it were a sentence of 30 years. . . . True,
the next subsection [section 4205(b)(1)] allows the judge to
"designate in the sentence of imprisonment imposed a minimum term at the expiration of which the prisoner shall become
eligible for parole, which term may be less than but shall not be
more than one-third of the maximum sentence imposed by the
court." [citation ommitted]. But the apparent purpose is to allow release
on parole before the earliest date allowed by subsec61
tion (a).
Thus, the Second, Seventh, and Eighth Circuit Courts of Appeals
have concluded that the power vested in sentencing courts to fix a parole eligibility date was intended to allow parole review at a date earlier
than would result under the automatic eligibility provision. The Tenth
Circuit's decision in O'Driscoll obviously works a contrary result. In addition, a brief review of the cases cited by the Tenth Circuit in support of
its holding indicates that the court misconstrued relevant language in
those decisions.
The Tenth Circuit in O'Driscoll correctly cited the United States
Supreme Court, in United States v. Addonizio, 6 2 for the proposition that
the trial court may set parole at any point up to one-third of the maxi55. Id. (emphasis added). See also United States v. Hundley, 430 F. Supp. 500 (E.D.
Pa. 1977) ("The purpose of [section 4208(a)(1)] is only to reduce below one-third of the
total sentence the period within which the prisoner may be considered for parole.") (emphasis in original).
56. 419 F.2d 593, 595 (8th Cir. 1969) (Blackmun, J.) ("The reference in § 4208(a)(1)
to one-third of the maximum sentence is geared to the general parole eligibility provisions
of 18 U.S.C. § 4202.").
57. 768 F.2d 790 (7th Cir. 1985).
58. Id. at 793.
59. Id. at 799.
60. Id.
61. Id. (emphasis in original) (citing United States v. Smith, 703 F.2d 627, 628 (D.C.
Cir. 1983) and United States v. Pry, 625 F.2d 689, 692 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S.
925 (1981)).
62. 442 U.S. 178 (1979).
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mum sentence imposed. 63 More specifically, however, the Supreme
Court recognized, albeit in dicta, that the authority of sentencing judges
under section 4205(b)(1) is limited to selecting an "early" parole eligi64
bility date.
65
Two other cases cited by the O'Driscoll court, United States v. Pry,
6
6
and Wilden v. Fields, each state in dicta that the sentencing court may
set parole eligibility at any time up to one-third of the total sentence
imposed. 6 7 The Fifth Circuit in Py, however, pointed out that where
the trial court fails to set a parole review date during the first third of a
prisoner's sentence, section 4205(a) would kick in automatically to entitle the prisoner to review at the end of that one-third period. 68 In
Wilden, a Wisconsin federal district court stated that sentencing judges
have three alternatives in setting the parole eligibility date: (1) the onethird point, not to exceed ten years (section 4205(a)), (2) a "minimum
period" up to the one-third point (section 4205(b)(1)), or (3) immediate
parole eligibility. 6 9 Again, the terms of section 4205(a) are represented,
as they were in Pry, as a limit beyond which a sentencing judge cannot
prohibit parole eligibility, contrary to the Tenth Circuit's holding in
o 'Driscoll.
The most obvious misinterpretation of case law in the O'Driscoll
opinion occurs in the court's reliance on United States v. Whitley. 70 The
O'Driscoll court cited Whitley for the proposition that section 4205(b)(1)
allows the sentencing court to "bypass" section 4205(a) by setting a parole review date later than the ten-year limit imposed by subsection
(a). 7 1 In Whitley, the defendant moved the federal district court for sentence modification, seeking a reduction in his thirty-five year sentence. 72
The district court in Whitley stated in dicta that section 4205(b)(1) empowered the sentencing judge to "bypass" section 4205(a) by setting a
parole review date earlierthan would be effected under subsection (a). 73
Nothing in the opinion lends itself to the proposition that section
4205(b)(1) allows the judge to bypass subsection (a) by exceeding the
limits stated therein.
c.

Cruel and Unusual Punishment and Abuse of Discretion

The Tenth Circuit also rejected O'Driscoll's argument that his punishment, because of its length, violated the eighth amendment. 74
Adopting the "proportionality principle," the court sided with firmly es63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.

O'Driscoll, 761 F.2d at 597 (citing Addonizio, 442 U.S. 178, 189 n.15).
442 U.S. at 189.
625 F.2d 689 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 925 (1981).
510 F. Supp. 1295 (W.D. Wis. 1981).
Pry, 625 F.2d at 692; IVilden, 510 F. Supp. at 1306.
625 F.2d at 692.
510 F. Supp. at 1306.
473 F. Supp. 23 (E.D. Mich. 1979).
O'Driscoll, 761 F.2d at 596-97.
473 F. Supp. at 23-24.
Id. at 24.
O'Driscoll, 761 F.2d at 599-600.
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tablished precedent. The United States Supreme Court has held that
the duration of punishment will not constitute cruel and unusual punishment unless it is determined that the length of the sentence is "grossly
disproportionate" to the severity of the crime. 75 Further, the Court has
noted frankly that "[olutside the context of capital punishment, successful challenges to the proportionality of particular sentences have been
76
exceedingly rare."
Reviewing the trial court's exercise of discretion, the Tenth Circuit
correctly noted that sentences within statutory guidelines are rarely disturbed. 7 7 Because the Tenth Circuit improperly defined the statutory
guidelines set forth in sections 1201 and 4205, however, the court erred
in approving the trial court's exercise of discretion.
4.

Conclusion

The heinous nature of O'Driscoll's conduct is well documented in
78
If
the respective opinions of the Tenth Circuit and the district court.
any facts justify the imposition of the maximum sentence under law,
these do. But the sentence must be rendered within statutory guidelines. The Tenth Circuit in O'Driscoll misconstrued legislative history
and judicial authority to permit a sentence and parole eligibility date
which, though perhaps deserved, exceeded statutory limits.
B.

Application of Overlapping Specific and General Sentencing Statutes:
United States v. Affierbach
1.

Background

In United States v. Afflerbach, 79 Joseph Afflerbach and four other defendants were convicted in the United States District Court for the District of Wyoming of forcibly interfering with federal officers in violation
of 18 U.S.C. § 111.80 Specifically, the charges were based upon a confrontation between the defendants and agents of the Internal Revenue
75. Hutto v. Davis, 454 U.S. 370, 377 (1982) (Powell, J.,concurring); see Rummel v.
Estelle, 445 U.S. 263 (1980); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977); Weems v. United
States, 217 U.S. 349 (1910).
76. Hutto, 454 U.S. at 374; Rummel, 445 U.S. at 272. The Court in Rummel conceded,
however, that life imprisonment for overtime parking might be considered "cruel and
unusual."
77. 761 F.2d at 597 (citing Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263 (1980); Schick v. Reed,
419 U.S. 256 (1974); Dorszynski v. United States, 418 U.S. 424 (1974); Gore v. United
States, 357 U.S. 386 (1958)). See also Townsend v. Burke, 334 U.S. 736, 741 (1948).
78. 761 F.2d at 591-95; 586 F. Supp. at 1487-92.
79. 754 F.2d 866 (10th Cir.), ceri. denied, 105 S. Ct. 3506 (1985).
80. 18 U.S.C. § 111 (1982) provides:
Whoever forcibly assaults, resists, opposes, impedes, intimidates, or interferes
with any person designated in section 1114 of this title while engaged in or on
account of the performance of his official duties, shall be fined not more than
$5,000 or imprisoned not more than three years, or both.
Whoever, in the commission of any such acts uses a deadly or dangerous
weapon, shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than ten
years, or both.
Three of the defendants were found guilty of using a deadly weapon in the commission of their crime. Under a separate count, the same three defendants were further con-
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Service. Pursuant to a district court order, IRS special agents entered
the farm property of Afflerbach's co-defendant, Harvey Annis, to seize
machinery and equipment in satisfaction of a deficiency in Annis's federal tax payment. Before the machinery could be removed, Afflerbach
and other neighbors of Annis approached and threatened the agents
with pistols, shotguns, and a semi-automatic rifle. The agents agreed to
8
leave and abandoned the seizure effort. '
Following their convictions, the defendants were sentenced to various terms of imprisonment and probation. 8 2 All of the defendants appealed, advancing numerous grounds for vacation of their respective
sentences. 8 3 The defendants claimed that the sentences imposed were
based upon a statute under which they should not have been charged.8 4
Particularly, it was urged that the specific statute prohibiting interference with IRS officers in the performance of their duties8 5 should have
been applied instead of section 11 which prohibits interference with
federal officers generally. 8 6 Because the more specific statute, 26 U.S.C.
§ 7212, prescribes a lesser punishment, the defendants argued that their
sentences were outside statutory limits and therefore constituted cruel
and unusual punishment in violation of the eighth amendment. 8 7
2.

The Majority Opinion

The Tenth Circuit, Judge Doyle writing for the majority, 88 rejected
the defendants' "general versus specific" statutory application argument, scarcely discussing the issue. The court merely cited United States
victed of using a firearm in the commission of a felony in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)
which provides for an enhanced sentence when a firearm is used. 754 F.2d at 868-69.
81. Id. at 868.
82. Id. at 869. The sentences for the section I 1I violations ranged from seven years
imprisonment to three years probation (with three months of the probation to be served in
prison). The sentences were further enhanced pursuant to section 924(c) for periods
ranging from five years probation to four years probation.
83. Id. The first six grounds, unsuccessfully argued by the defendants, were failure to
grant a motion to transfer within district, improper jury composition, illegal seizure attempted by the IRS agents, denial of effective assistance of counsel, improper instructions
to the jury, and lack of jurisdiction due to improper notice of the IRS levy.
84. Id. at 871.
85. 26 U.S.C. § 7212 (1982) provides in pertinent part:
(a) Corrupt or forcible interference.
- Whoever corruptly or by force or threats of force. . . endeavors to intimidate

or impede any officer or employee of the United States acting in an official capacity under this title, or in any other way corruptly or by force or threats of force
(including any threatening letter or communication) obstructs or impedes, or endeavors to obstruct or impede, the due administration of this title, shall, upon
conviction thereof, be fined not more than $5,000, or imprisoned not more than
3 years, or both, except that if the offense is committed only by threats of force,
the person convicted thereof shall be fined not more than $3,000 or imprisoned
not more than I year, or both. The term "threats of force", as used in this subsection, means threats of bodily harm to the officer or employee of the United
States or to a member of his family.
86. 754 F.2d at 871.

87. Id.
88. Judge Logan joined Judge Doyle. Judge McKay filed a separate dissenting opinion. 754 F.2d at 871-73. See infra
text accompanying notes 91-104.
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v. MacClain8 9 for the proposition that sentences within statutory limits
do not constitute cruel and unusual punishment. The court did not,
however, cite any authority or set forth any argument in support of its
finding that the sentences imposed upon Afflerbach and the other defendants were within statutory guidelines. Nor did the majority address
the broad question of whether a general statute may allow sentencing in
excess of that permitted by a specific statute covering the same
offense. 90
3.

Judge McKay's Dissent 9 '

Judge McKay argued in dissent that the defendants were improperly
sentenced under the general provisions of section I 1 I when their conduct violated the specific.provisions of section 7212 of Title 26.92 Citing
Busic v. United States, 93 Judge McKay reiterated the "time-honored rule
of statutory construction," that a specific statute is given precedence
over a general statute, regardless of their temporal sequence. 94 Judge
McKay further noted that the rule has long been applied to prevent conviction under a general statute where a specific statute governs the same
95

criminal offense.
Judge McKay acknowledged that the clarity of the rule was somewhat blurred by the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Batchelder. 9 6

In Batchelder, the Court held that the United States Attorney had

the discretion to prosecute under either of two statutes prohibiting receipt of a firearm by a convicted felon, though one of the statutes prescribed a greater punishment than the other. 9 7 Judge McKay observed
that certain courts have used Batchelder to allow the government to pro89. 501 F.2d 1006, 1013 (10th Cir. 1974) (citing Page v. United States, 462 F.2d 932
(3d Cir. 1972)).
90. Although the Tenth Circuit upheld the sentences imposed under section I 11, the
court ruled that the "deadly weapon" provision contained in section 111 precluded further enhancement of the sentences under the "firearm" provisions of section 924(c). In
support of this holding the court cited Busic v. United States, 446 U.S. 398 (1980), in
which the Supreme Court ruled that the defendants could not be sentenced consecutively
under the enhancement provisions of both sections 11 and 924(c). Accordingly, the Afflerbach majority vacated the probationary sentences imposed by the trial court pursuant to
section 924(c). Afflerbach, 754 F.2d at 871.
91. Id. (McKay, J., dissenting). Judge McKay concurred in the court's opinion as it
related to the first six issues addressed therein. Id. at 873. See supra note 83.
92. 754 F.2d at 872-73
93. 446 U.S. 398 (1980).
94. Id.at 871.
95. Id. at 871-72 (citing United States v. Bates, 429 F.2d 557 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 400
U.S. 831 (1970); Enzor v. United States, 262 F.2d 172 (5th Cir. 1958) (conspiracy to sell
narcotics must be punished under statute respecting conspiracy to violate narcotics laws
rather than under the general conspiracy statute), cerl. denied, 359 U.S. 953 (1959); Robinson v. United States, 142 F.2d 431 (8th Cir. 1944) (stealing property from the post office
must be punished under the statute specifically prohibiting that act, rather than under the
general statute outlawing theft of personal property belonging to the United States)).
96. 442 U.S. 114 (1979).
97. Id. at 123-24. (The defendant in Batchelder was convicted under 18 U.S.C.
§ 922(h) which prohibits convicted felons from receiving firearms which have traveled in
interstate commerce. 18 U.S.C. § 924(a) permits the trial court to sentence a defendant to
a maximum of five years imprisonment for such offense. In contrast, 18 U.S.C. app.
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ceed under a general statute which contravenes the provisions of a specific statute covering the same offense. 98 However, Judge McKay
declined to follow the rule announced by those courts favoring government discretion, distinguishing Batchelder on the ground that two specific
statutes were involved, rather than one general and one specific. 99 In
addition, Judge McKay noted that Busic, decided after Batchelder, affirms
the contention that Batchelder did not undermine the doctrine that a specific statute governs over a general one.10 0
Judge McKay further stated that this doctrine is a "corollary" to the
rule of lenity which mandates resolving ambiguity in criminal statutes in
favor of the less onerous penalty,' 0 ' and also noted the Supreme
Court's reluctance to increase punishment absent a "clear and definite
legislative directive."' 0 2 Concluding that the defendants should have
been sentenced under 26 U.S.C. § 7212,103 Judge McKay would have
remanded the case to the district court for resentencing under that
statute.104
4.

Analysis
a.

The Legacy of Busic

In Busic, the United States Supreme Court faced an appeal by two
defendants convicted of armed assault of federal officers in violation of
18 U.S.C. § 111.105 In addition, each of the defendants' sentences was
0 6
enhanced pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 924(c).1
As the majority in Afflerbach correctly noted, the Court in Busic 107
held that section 924(c) may not be used to increase the defendants'
sentences where section 111 contained its own "deadly weapon" enhancement provision. 10 8 But unlike Affterbach, in Busic the government
sought to enhance the defendants' sentences under section 924 rather
than under the provisions of section 111. No double enhancement question was involved in Busic. The question was, instead, whether the general enhancement provisions of section 924 could be employed by the
§ 1202(a) authorizes not more than two years imprisonment for an offense with identical
elements.) Batchelder, 442 U.S. at 116-17.
98. Affierbach, 754 F.2d at 872 (citing United States v. Carpenter, 611 F.2d 113 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 922 (1980); United States v. Simon, 510 F. Supp. 232, 237 (E.D.
Pa. 1981)).
99. Afferbach. 754 F.2d at 872.

100. Id.

101. Id. (citing Simpson v. United States, 435 U.S. 6 (1978); United States v. Bass, 404
U.S. 336, 347 (1971)).
102. 754 F.2d at 872 (citing Simpson, 435 U.S. at 15).
103. Id. at 873 (Judge McKay noted that the absence of an enhancement provision in
section 7212 allowed section 924 to supplement the sentence without violating Busic.).
104. Id.
105. Busic, 446 U.S. at 401.
106. Id.
107. Justice Brennan wrote for a four-justice plurality. ChiefJustice Burger joined Justice Blackmun concurring. 446 U.S. at 412. Justice Blackmun's separate opinion affirmatively supported Justice Brennan's interpretation and application of Simpson. Id.
108. Busic, 446 U.S. at 399-400.
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government where the provisions of section 111 permitted an enhanced
sentence for the specific crime committed.' 0 9 In addition to its interpretation of the rule announced in Simpson v. United States, "10 the Busic Court
found its holding supported by "two tools of statutory construction relied upon in Simpson:"' I II the rule of lenity, and the principle that "a
more specific statute will be given precedence over a more general one,
regardless of their temporal sequence."' 12 The Court concluded that
section 111, being the more specific statute, provided the exclusive
channel through which the defendants' sentences could be enhanced. "13
This line of reasoning was ignored by the Afflerbach court.
In the Courts of Appeals, Busic is most frequently cited for the
broad principle that a specific statute supercedes a general statute covering the same factual situation. At least six circuits, including the Tenth
Circuit, have cited the principle as a fundamental maxim of statutory
construction and have applied it to questions of statutory application,
14
including those arising outside the realm of criminal law."
In Otero Savings and Loan Association v. Federal Home Loan Bank
Board,' 15 the Tenth Circuit, citing Busic, held that the general language
of a federal statute prohibiting interest bearing demand deposit accounts "must give way to the specific language" of another statute au16
thorizing one such type of account.
109. Id. at 404.
110. Simpson, 435 U.S. 6 (1978).
111. 446 U.S. at 406 (citing United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 347 (1971) (quoting
Rewis v. United States, 401 U.S. 808, 812 (1971)).
112. 446 U.S. at 406 (citing Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 489-90 (1973) (habeus
corpus is the appropriate relief for state prisoners challenging the validity of their confinement and is exclusive of other general statutory remedies, such as those provided in the
Civil Rights Act)).
113. 446U.S. at411.
114. United States v. Olinger, 759 F.2d 1293, 1299 (7th Cir. 1985) (approving the two
"tools" of statutory construction enunciated in Busic, but holding that the more specific of
two statutes prohibiting conspiracy to commit vote fraud was, in the present case, too specific to be applied); Union of Concerned Scientists v. NRC, 711 F.2d 370, 380-81 (D.C.
Cir. 1983) (holding that hearing and notice requirements of the Atomic Energy Act are not
subject to the general "good cause" exception of the Administrative Procedure Act);
Water Transport Association v. I.C.C., 722 F.2d 1025, 1029 (2d Cir. 1983) (water carriers
denied standing because specific statute, 49 U.S.C. § 10713(d), contemplates challenges to
I.C.C. rules only by shippers and ports, although the general provisions of section 707 of
the Staggers Rail Act of 1980 could be construed to permit water carriers' standing); In re
Morristown & Erie R.R. Co., 677 F.2d 360, 368 (3d Cir. 1982) (holding that the precise
mandates of the Milwaukee Railroad Restructuring Act of 1979 regarding procedural requirements of an "interim" railroad operation should be followed instead of general rules
set forth in the Bankruptcy Act); Otero Say. and Loan Ass'n v. Federal Home Loan Bank
Bd., 665 F.2d 279, 282 (10th Cir. 1981); United States v. Saade, 652 F.2d 1126, 1132 (1st
Cir. 1981) (applying the more specific of two competing criminal statutes forbidding unauthorized entry into military danger zones). Each of the above cited cases relied expressly
upon Busic in support of its holding.
115. 665 F.2d 279 (10th Cir. 1981). Otero involved an appeal by savings and loan associations from an administrative finding by the Federal Home Loan Bank Board that its
customer "check-in" procedures violated the federal statutes "forbidding deposit in or
withdrawal from interest bearing accounts via negotiable or transferable instruments payable to a third party."
116. Id. at 282.
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In criminal cases, however, two other circuits have given the holding in Busic a limited reading. The Fourth Circuit, in United States v. Computer Sciences Corp.,' 7 permitted prosecution of the defendants therein
under mail and wire fraud statutes, although the defendants' conduct
was more specifically proscribed by the statute outlawing false claims
against the government. 1 8 The Fourth Circuit conceded, however, that
"[s]ince the particular statute controls and rules out the more general
•.

."

Busic reached a "sensible result."' 1 9 The court declined to apply

Busic and Simpson, reasoning that the defendants had violated more than
120
one statute by a single act or combination of acts.
The Sixth Circuit, however, in United States v. Schaffner, 12 1 went further, holding that the government, at the prosecutor's discretion, may
prosecute under any applicable statute. 12 2 The court rejected the district court's reliance on Busic and Simpson, citing Computer Sciences to support the position that those cases governed only situations involving two
123
sentencing enhancement provisions.
The rule announced in Busic, that a specific statute supercedes a
general statute covering the same offense, has been treated with great
deference. 12 4 The courts which have declined to apply Busic have done
so by distinguishing it, not by denying its applicability to criminal sentencing statutes.' 2 5 The Tenth Circuit's decision in Afflerbach appears
incongruous not only to the position of sister circuits regarding the Busic
rule, but to the Tenth Circuit's previous willingness to adopt the rule as
26
a guideline for statutory construction generally.1
b.

The Batchelder Problem

While the majority in Afflerbach did not cite United States v. Batchelder
to support its holding, Judge McKay noted the importance of distinguishing Batchelder from the rule of statutory construction set forth in
Busic. 127 In Batchelder, the Supreme Court reviewed a Seventh Circuit
decision in which the defendant's sentence was reduced to the maximum
length permitted by the more lenient of two otherwise identical statutes.1 28 The defendant, a previously convicted felon, was convicted of
receiving a firearm which had traveled in interstate commerce, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(h). The defendant was sentenced to five years
imprisonment under section 924(a) of the same title. 129 Noting that the
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.

689 F.2d 1181 (4th Cir. 1982). cert. denied. 459 U.S. 1105 (1983).
Id. at 1186-87.
Id.
Id. at 1187.
715 F.2d 1099 (6th Cir. 1983).
Id. at 1102.
Id. The applicability of Busic to sentencing statutes was not questioned.
See supra note 114.
See supra notes 117-23 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 115-16 and accompanying text.
Afflerbach, 754 F.2d at 872 (McKay, J., dissenting).
Batchelder, 442 U.S. at 116-18.
Id. at 116.
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substantive elements of section 922(h) and 18 U.S.C. app. § 1202(a) 130
are identical, and that the latter permits a maximum two-year sentence,
the court of appeals remanded for resentencing under section 1202(a).
The Supreme Court reversed, holding principally that the government
may prosecute and defendants may be sentenced under any statute violated by their conduct, "so long as it does not discriminate against any
class of defendants." 13 1 While acknowledging the partial redundancy of
sections 922(h) and 1202(a), the Court maintained that the statutes represented independent criminal laws, each enforceable on its own
terms.' 3 2 The Court further declined to apply the doctrine that ambiguity in criminal statutes should be construed in favor of lenity, stating that
33
no ambiguity was present in the statutes in question.1
As Judge McKay noted in Afflerbach, the Batchelder holding has been
relied upon by a number of lower courts to uphold convictions and sentencing under general statutes allowing greater punishment when a specific, more lenient statute covers a defendant's conduct.' 34 A
comparison of the circuits adopting Batchelderfor this purpose with those
circuits which have followed Busic,' 3 5 reveals that, with two exceptions, 136 the courts applying Batchelder have not adopted the rule announced in Busic.
130. 18 U.S.C. app. § 1202(a).
131. Batchelder, 442 U.S. at 116-17.
132. Id. at 118-19.
133. Id. at 121-22.
134. Afflerbach, 754 F.2d at 872 (McKay, J., dissenting) (citing United States v. Carpenter, 611 F.2d 113 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 922 (1980); United States v. Simon, 510 F.
Supp. 232, 237 (E.D. Pa. 1981)). See also United States v. Boggs, 739 F.2d 1376, 1378 n.2
(8th Cir. 1984) (Defendants who moved freight by truck in violation of certain Interstate
Commerce Act provisions were convicted of a felony violation of the Act under a section
generally proscribing interstate shipments of freight not complying with regulations,
though a misdemeanor section of the Act disallowed such shipments specifically by "motor
common carriers."); United States v. Davis, 707 F.2d 880, 883 n.4 (6th Cir. 1983) (government allowed to prosecute conspiracy under RICO, 18 U.S.C. § 1961, instead of more
specific state statutes); United States v. Fern, 696 F.2d 1269, 1273-74 (1 1th Cir. 1983) (A
defendant convicted of making a materially false statement to an IRS auditor was prosecuted and sentenced under 18 U.S.C. § 1001 forbidding false statements to be made to
any department or agency of the United States, though 26 U.S.C. § 7207, prescribing a
lesser punishment, applied to false statements made to officers of the IRS. The court
upheld the conviction stating that the existence of a more specific statute would never be
grounds for reversal, citing Batchelder among other cases.); United States v. Anderez, 661
F.2d 404,407 & n.9 (5th Cir. 1981) (upholding convictions under the felony provisions of
18 U.S.C. § 1001 prohibiting false statements to departments or agencies of the United
States and under the misdemeanor provisions of the more specific Currency and Foreign
Transactions Reporting Act, 31 U.S.C. §§ 1101, 1058); United States v. Abraham, 627
F.2d 205, 206 (9th Cir. 1980) (conviction for assaulting a federal officer under 18 U.S.C.
§ 111 upheld though defendant's conduct was more particularly forbidden by 18 U.S.C.
§ 1501 making it a misdemeanor to assault a federal officer serving process).
135. See supra note 98.
136. Davis, 707 F.2d 880, 883 (6th Cir. 1983) (But the Sixth Circuit's application of
Batchelder came prior to its decision in Schaffner, 715 F.2d 1099, which, though distinguishing Busic, conceded its applicability to criminal punishment statutes.); Abraham, 627 F.2d
205, 206 (9th Cir. 1980) (The Ninth Circuit found that applying the specific statute in this
instance would permit only the filing of misdemeanor charges against an individual assaulting a police officer who was making an arrest as opposed to the usual felony charges
which would apply under any other circumstances).
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Judge McKay correctly pointed out that reliance on Batchelder in opposition to Busic is misplaced. The Supreme Court in Batchelder never
considered the question of whether sentencing may proceed under a
general statute when a specific statute is available. In Batchelder, the defendant's conduct was proscribed by two specific statutes with identical
substantive elements.13 7 Moreover, the fact that Busic was decided subsequent to the Court's decision in Batchelder indicates that the Batchelder
rule allowing discretionary prosecution is limited to cases involving two
38
equally specific statutes.'
The First Circuit, in United States v. Saade, l 9 adopted reasoning similar to Judge McKay's, finding that Batchelder permits prosecutorial discretion only where the Busic principle of statutory construction does not
apply.' 40 In Saade, the defendants entered a military danger zone without authorization during a naval gunnery practice session. 14 1 The government sought to proceed under the sweeping provisions of 33 U.S.C.
§ 1142 which authorizes the Secretary of the Army to prescribe regulations for the use of navigable waters for the protection of life and property. Section 3 of the same title empowers the Secretary to promulgate
similar regulations for waters likely to be endangered by coastal artillery
fire. 143 The government argued that Batchelder permitted prosecution
under either section. 14 4 Citing Busic, the First Circuit held that the specific statute, section 3, was exclusive and that Batchelder would apply only
14 5
if section 1 specifically authorized danger zone regulations.
The soundness of Judge McKay's reasoning in Afflerbach, and the
precise balancing of Batchelder and Busic by the First Circuit in Saade,
demonstrate that Batchelder should not be used in contravention of the
statutory construction maxim articulated in Busic.
c.

The Tenth Circuit Since Afflerbach

Since the Tenth Circuit decided Afflerbach, it has considered the
question of prosecution under general versus specific statutes on two
occasions. In Timberlake v. United States,14 6 defendants were indicted for
transportation of drugs as a part of a conspiracy. 14 7 The defendants
plead guilty to two and three counts of conspiracy, respectively, including counts based upon specific and general conspiracy statutes. 14 8 Fol137. Aifferbach, 754 F.2d at 872 (McKay, J., dissenting).
138. Id.
139. 652 F.2d i126 (Ist Cir. 1981).
140. Id. at 1132.
141. Id. at 1129.
142. 33 U.S.C. § 1 (1982).
143. 652 F.2d at 1130 n.4.
144. Id. at 1132 n.5.
145. Id. at 1132 & n.7.
146. 767 F.2d 1479 (10th Cir. 1985).
147. d. at 1480.
148. One defendant plead guilty to conspiracy to import cocaine in violation of 21
U.S.C. § 963 (1982), conspiracy to distribute cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846
(1982), and conspiracy to travel in interstate and foreign commerce with intent to promote
unlawful activity in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1982) (general conspiracy statute). The

DENVER UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 63:2

lowing the imposition of sentences, the defendants retained new counsel
and moved to vacate the sentences pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255.149
The defendants asserted that sentencing under multiple conspiracy stat50
utes constituted double jeopardy in violation of the fifth amendment.
The Tenth Circuit, Judge Doyle writing, explained that a single illegal
act may be punished under several statutory provisions, and added that
the act may be punished "under the general conspiracy statute (18
U.S.C. § 371) and a more specific conspiracy statute."' 5'1 While Judge
Doyle did not cite his opinion in Afflerbach, the similarity of the holdings
is evident.
Judge McKay dissented, noting that the general rule allowing prosecution of a single conspiracy under several statutes applies only when
charges are based on two or more specific conspiracy statutes.' 52 Following reasoning similar to that expressed in his dissent in Afferbach, but
citing cases pertaining specifically to conspiracy statutes, 15 3 Judge McKay argued that the defendants in Timberlake should have been convicted
54
and sentenced only under the specific statutes.1
More recently, in United State v. Largo, 1 55 the Tenth Circuit heard an
appeal by a defendant convicted of converting to his own use money
belonging to the United States. 156 The charges stemmed from the defendant's embezzlement of federal funds provided by the Bureau of Indian Affairs to a local childhood development program. 15 7 The
defendant argued on appeal, inter alia, that he was improperly convicted
under 18 U.S.C. § 641,158 when 25 U.S.C. § 450,159 prescribing a lesser
punishment, specifically prohibited embezzlement of Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance funds.160 The Tenth Circuit found
the issue to be controlled by Afflerbach and rejected the defendant's argument. 16 1 Judge McKay, again dissenting, filed a separate opinion,
nearly identical in language, analysis, and authority to his dissent in
62
Afflerbach.1
second defendant plead guilty to the conspiracy charges under sections 963 and 371. 767
F.2d at 1481.
149. 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1982).
150. Timberlake, 767 F.2d at 1481.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 1483 (McKay, J., dissenting).
153. 767 F.2d at 1484 (McKay, J., dissenting) (citing United States v. Corral, 578 F.2d
570, 572 (5th Cir. 1978); United States v. Marotta, 518 F.2d 681, 684 (9th Cir. 1975);
United States v. Mori,444 F.2d 240, 245 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 913 (1971); Enzor
v. United States, 262 F.2d 172 (5th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 953 (1959)).
154. 767 F.2d at 1486.
155. 775 F.2d 1099 (10th Cir. 1985).
156. Id. at 1100.
157. Id.
158. 18 U.S.C. § 641 (1982).
159. 25 U.S.C. § 450 (1982).
160. Largo, 775 F.2d at 1100.
161. Id. at 1101.
162. Id. at 1102-04 (McKay, J., dissenting).
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Conclusion

The Tenth Circuit, in Afflerbach, again demonstrated its willingness
to uphold criminal sentences when sound reasoning and ample authority suggest a contrary result. In subsequent decisions, the Tenth Circuit
has found itself bound by the precedent set in Afflerbach. While the
Tenth Circuit in Afflerbach did not rely on the Supreme Court's decision
in Batchelder to support its holding, future decisions will do well to heed
Judge McKay's artful distinction of that case from cases involving specific and general criminal statutes. Finally, if the Tenth Circuit wants to
square itself with the decisions of sister circuits and with its own holding
in Otero, 16 3 it must consistently acknowledge the fundamental principle
of statutory construction that a general sentencing statute may not be
applied in derogation of a specific one covering the same conduct.
C.

Restitution and the Seventh Amendment: United States v. Watchman
1.

Background

In United States v. Watchman,' 6 4 the defendant, a Native American
man, plead guilty to an indictment for assault with intent to murder on
an Indian reservation. 16 5 The victim, a Native American woman, received serious injuries requiring extensive medical treatment. 166 In sentencing Watchman, the district court ordered him to pay the victim
restitution in the amount of $13,556.88. 1 6 7 This order was based on 18
U.S.C. § 3579,168 which authorizes an order of restitution, and 18
U.S.C. § 3580,169 which specifies procedures to be used before restitution can be ordered. Watchman's motion to reduce his sentence was
170
denied and he appealed, attacking the restitution award specifically.
He challenged the constitutionality of the statutes authorizing restitution, the amount of restitution awarded and the procedure used for determining that amount. 17 1 As to the constitutionality of the statutes
authorizing restitution, Watchman urged that the restitution award
amounted to a civil judgment in excess of twenty dollars, thereby requir72
ing a jury trial under the seventh amendment.1
2.

The Tenth Circuit Opinion

The Tenth Circuit, Judge Seth writing for the court, rejected
163. See supra notes 115-16 and accompanying text.

164. 749 F.2d 616 (10th Cir. 1984).
165. Id. at 618.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 617.
168. 18 U.S.C. § 3579 (1982), amended by 18 U.S.C. § 3579(c), (0(4) (Supp. 11 1984)
(renumbered as section 3663, Oct. 12, 1984; effective Nov. 1, 1986).
169. 18 U.S.C. § 3580 (1982) (renumbered as section 3664, Oct. 12, 1984; effective
Nov. 1, 1986).
170. 749 F.2d at 617.
171. Id.
172. U.S. CONST. amend. VII. The seventh amendment states: "In suits at common
law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury
shall be preserved."
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Watchman's claim that the restitution statute was unconstitutional. In
so doing, the court refused to recognize the restitution award as a civil
action governed by the seventh amendment. Rather, the court held that
73
restitution is a "constitutional extension of sentencing."
In a very brief analysis, the court held that the enforcement clause
in the Victim and Witness Protection Act of 1982,174 providing that a
restitution order may be enforced by the victim in the same manner as
176
civil action, 175 did not affect the nature of the sentencing hearing.
Distinguishing between civil adjudications and sentencing, the court
noted that the victim does not appear as a party in the determination of
restitution and is not entitled to appeal the order. 177 The court was
persuaded by the analysis expounded in United States v. Brown. 17 8 Noting
that the sixth amendment permits length of incarceration to be determined at a non-jury sentencing hearing, the Second Circuit in Brown
ruled that restitution determined at sentencing does not infringe upon
seventh amendment guarantees.' 79 Finally, the Tenth Circuit recognized that the concept of restitution was in place when the seventh
amendment was adopted, implying that the framers understood restitution to be a criminal sanction.' 8 0
The court then looked to the lower court's factual findings and procedures and determined that its findings of fact were deficient. 18 The
court ruled that the Act requires sentencing courts to make certain factual determinations when the victim has received physical injuries inflicted by the defendant. 18 2 These determinations include the extent of
the victim's losses,1 83 and the defendant's financial condition and ability
to pay under the Act. 184 While approving the use of presentence reports as a fact-finding tool, the court held that such reports may be too
general to suffice as the sole source of information in the determination
of restitution.' 8 5 The court found that the sentencing court record did
not, therefore, reflect sufficient development of facts regarding the victim's restitutionary needs. 186 Accordingly, the restitution order was va173. 749 F.2d at 617.
174. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1512-14, 3579-80 (1982) (hereinafter referred to as "VWPA" or
"the Act").

175.
176.
177.
178.

18 U.S.C. § 3579(h).
749 F.2d at 617.
Id.
744 F.2d 905 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 599 (1984).

179. Id. at 909-10.
180. Watchman, 749 F.2d at 617.
181. Id. at 618-19. Congress has mandated that certain factual determinations be made
and that certain procedures be followed. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3579, 3580.
182. Id. at 618 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3579(b)(2) (1982)).
183. Id. Additionally, the victim must participate in the fact finding process and the
record must reflect such participation. Id.
184. Id. In Watchman, the necessity of such fact gathering was particularly acute.
Watchman had been declared indigent for the purpose of representation at trial. Id.
185. Id. at 619. The government has the burden of developing sufficient facts on behalf of the victim and the defendant has the burden of developing facts on his own behalf.

Id.
186. The trial court had relied on a presentence report and "figures" related to the
victim's "losses" which were determined by telephone conversations with unidentified
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cated and the case remanded. 187
3.

Analysis
a.

The Seventh Amendment

The Victim and Witness Protection Act of 1982188 provides, in part,
that a judge sentencing an offender, in addition to or in lieu of any other
penalty, may order that the offender make restitution to any victim of
the offense.18 9 The Act thus allows a victim to recover damages without
bringing a separate civil action against the offender. The amount of restitution is determined at sentencing without the right to jury trial. This
attempt by Congress to expedite justice has recently met with some
criticism.
Relying on the distinction between legal and equitable proceedings,
one commentator has argued that the Act violates the seventh amendment. 190 The Act authorizes essentially three types of restitution: return of property stolen, damaged or destroyed, or its value;
compensation by the offender to the victim for medical expenses and
lost income; and, payment of funeral expenses where the offense results
in the death of the victim. 19 1 Noting the familiar principle that the seventh amendment preserves the right to jury trial as it existed at English
common law when the amendment was adopted in 1791,192 that commentator states that only the first type of restitution would be considered a remedy in equity in which the offender was required to "disgorge
ill-gotten gains"' 9 3 without the right to a jury trial.19 4 The second and
third categories represented remedies at common law for which the defendant was entitled to demand a jury. 19 5
In addition, the restitution order authorized by the Act shares a
number of characteristics with traditional civil actions. The sentencing
persons. The record failed to reflect that the victim had ever been interviewed as to her
"losses." Id.

187. 749 F.2d at 619.
188. See supra note 174.
189. 18 U.S.C. § 3579(a)(1) (1982).
190. See Raymond, The Unconstitutionalityof the Victim and Witness Protection Act Under the
Seventh Amendment, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1590 (1984).
191. Id. at 1592-93 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3579(b)(l)-(b)(3) (1982)).
192. See Baltimore & Carolina Line, Inc. v. Redman, 295 U.S. 654, 657 (1935) (a jury
trial is constitutionally mandated if a right to it existed in England in 1791 when the seventh amendment was ratified).
193. See Raymond, supra note 190, at 1597 & n.39 (citing 5J. MOORE, W. TAGGERT &J.
WICKER, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE

38.24[2] ("In equity, restitution is usually thought

of as a remedy by which defendant is made to disgorge ill-gotten gains or to restore the
status quo or to accomplish both objectives.") (footnote omitted)).
194. See Raymond, supra note 190, at 1596 & n.32 (citing Parsons v. Bedford, 28 U.S. (3
Pet.) 433, 446 (1830) ("It is well known, that in civil causes in courts of equity and admiralty, juries do not intervene, and that courts of equity use the trial by jury only in extraordinary cases, to inform the conscience of the court.").
195. Raymond, supra note 190, at 1595 & n.31 (citing S. MILSOM, HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE COMMON LAw 419 (2d ed. 1981) ("Even if a misdemeanor was brought

before the King's Bench, it was treated wholly as a crime, the injured party being left to
bring separate proceedings for compensation if he would.").
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court, pursuant to the Act, may order restitution only where there is a
19 6
only to the extent of the victim's injury, 19 7 and only to the
victim or his heirs or designees. 9 8 Further, the amount of restitution
awarded is set off against any judgment the victim may recover in a separate civil proceeding. 199 Finally, it is argued that the award of restitutionary relief puts the offender in precisely the same position as a losing
defendant in a civil suit in the sense that he is made to pay the injured
200
party damages which are determined without the benefit of a jury.
The sole case finding the Act unconstitutional is United States v. Welden.2 0 1 This decision of the United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama was reversed on the seventh amendment issue
by the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals in United States v. Satterfield.20 2
Nevertheless, the district court's reasoning in Welden is worthy of inspection since several United States circuit courts have examined the arguments set forth by the district court in Welden prior to and since
20 3
modification of the decision on appeal.
In an analysis which has been described as "far from rigorous, 2 0 4
the district court in Welden found that the portions of the Act pertaining
to restitution violate the seventh amendment.2 0 5 The Welden court
stated initially that 18 U.S.C. § 3579(h), by allowing enforcement of the
restitution order by the victim in the same manner as a civil action, turns
the order into a civil judgment. 20 6 The court noted that the seventh
amendment requires that "the right of jury trial shall be preserved" in
'20 7
civil cases "where the value in controversy exceeds twenty dollars."
The court was further persuaded that the res judicata effect of proceedvictim,

196. 18 U.S.C. § 3579(a)(1) (1982) ("The court... may order. . . that the defendant
make restitution to any victim of the offense.").
197. See S. REP. No. 532, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 30, reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEws 2515, 2536 ("The premise of [the section governing restitution] is that the court
• . . should insure that the wrongdoer make goods [sic], to the degree possible, the harm
he has caused to his victim.").
198. 18 U.S.C. § 3579(b)(4) (1982) permits the victim to designate a person or organization to receive the restitution.
199. 18 U.S.C. § 3579(e)(2) (1982) ("Any amount paid to a victim under an order of
restitution shall be set off against any amount later recovered as compensatory damages by
such victim ..
").
200. Raymond, supra note 190, at 1598.
201. 568 F. Supp. 526 (1983), rev'd in part sub nom. United States v. Satterfield, 743 F.2d
827 (11th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 2362 (1985).
202. 743 F.2d 827, 831.
203. See United States v. Palma, 760 F.2d 475, 479-80 (3d Cir. 1985); United States v.
Brown, 744 F.2d 905, 909-11 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 599 (1984); United States v.
Florence, 741 F.2d 1066, 1067-68 (8th Cir. 1984).
204. Raymond, supra note 190, at 1590 n.6.
205. 568 F. Supp. at 534. Aside from the seventh amendment infirmities, the Welden
court found the Act consistent with requirements of the eighth and sixth amendments and
inconsistent with the due process and equal protection requirements of the fifth and fourteenth amendments. Id. at 533-35. The due process and equal protection questions analyzed in Welden, however, were not raised on appeal in Watchman and are therefore beyond
the scope of this survey discussion.
206. Id. at 534; See 18 U.S.C. § 3579(h) (1982) ("An order of restitution may be enforced by the United States or a victim named in the order to receive the restitution in the
same manner as a judgment in a civil action.").
207. Id. (citing U.S. CONST. amend. VII).
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ings under the Act rendered such proceedings civil "suit[s] at common
law" within the contemplation of the seventh amendment. 20 8 The disclassified
trict court also ruled that the restitution hearing could not 2be
09
as a proceeding in equity, for which a jury is not required.
Arguments advanced by the district court in Welden, and in commentary offering more developed constitutional criticism, have not persuaded courts considering the seventh amendment question. In
Watchman, the Tenth Circuit became the fourth federal appellate court
to address the constitutionality of the Act under the seventh amendment. 210 Since then, three other circuits and one district court have
faced seventh amendment attacks upon the Act's validity. 2 11 In each

case the court has held that restitution proceedings under the Act are
properly classified as criminal sentencing rather than civil judgment and
upheld the Act.
The courts have advanced four basic reasons for this characterization. First, legislative history advises that the Act should be construed to
create a criminal sanction. Second, a restitution hearing focuses on appropriate punishment of the offender rather than the precise compensation of the victim sought in a civil action. Third, an award of restitution
advances traditional goals of the criminal system. Fourth, the factors
considered by the district court in Welden do not transform the restitution hearing into a civil proceeding.
The question of whether the Act imposes a criminal or civil penalty
has been held to be, in the first instance, one of statutory construction.2 12 In attempting such construction, two courts have relied, in part,
2 13
upon legislative history. The Third Circuit, in United States v. Palma,
pointed generally to the Senate Report highlighting the objective underlying the Act. The Report refers to restitution as "victim-oriented sentencing" and notes that "[t]his kind of sentencing" was not specially
authorized prior to the Act. 2 14 In United States v. Ciambrone,2 15 the
United States District Court for the Southern District of New York cited
208. Id. See 18 U.S.C. § 3580(e) (1982) (directing that the restitution order shall "estop" the defendant from denying the essential allegations in a subsequent civil
proceeding).
209. Id.
210. The first three federal circuit cases addressing the question were: Satterfield, 743
F.2d at 836-39; Brown, 744 F.2d at 908-11; and, Florence, 741 F.2d at 1067-68.
211. Palma, 760 F.2d at 479-80; United States v. Durham, 755 F.2d 511, 514 (6th Cir.
1985); United States v. Keith, 754 F.2d 1388, i391-92 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 93
(1985); United States v. Ciambrone, 602 F. Supp. 563, 567-68 (S.D. N.Y. 1984).
212. Florence, 741 F.2d at 1068; Keith, 754 F.2d at 1391. See generally United States v.
Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 248 (1980). In Ward, the United States Supreme Court suggested a
two-level inquiry to determine whether a particular statutorily defined penalty is civil or
criminal. First, it must be determined "whether Congress, in establishing the penalizing
mechanism, indicated either expressly or impliedly a preference for one label or another."
Second, if Congress intended to establish a civil penalty, is the statutory scheme "so punitive in purpose or effect as to negate that intention?" 448 U.S. at 248-49.
213. 760 F.2d at 479.
214. S. REP. No. 532, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 30, reprintedin 1982 U.S. ConE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 2515, 2537.
215. 602 F. Supp. 563 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
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the floor statement of one House member that restitution would be "a
sentence that could, in and of itself, be imposed" and that the legislation
"does not intend that restitution become a substitute for civil
."216
damages ..
Courts have also focused on the characteristics of a restitution hearing and the factors considered in the determination of restitution which
distinguish the proceeding from civil suits at common law. The Second
Circuit, in United States v. Brown, 2 17 pointed out that the victim is not a
party to a sentencing hearing and therefore has only a limited ability to
influence the outcome. He cannot control the presentation of evidence
in either the criminal trial or the sentencing hearing and is not even
guaranteed the right to testify as to his losses. Neither can he appeal if
the award appears inadequate. 2 18 The Brown court further noted that a
court imposing an order of restitution is required to consider the defendant's ability to pay, information generally inadmissible in a civil
2 19
The victim may therefore be awarded less than full compensasuit.
220
tion solely because of the offender's financial circumstances.
One writer has noted additional features of the restitution process
which are distinct from features characterizing civil actions. The restitution order considers the defendant's background and is balanced with
other forms of sentencing to achieve the maximum rehabilitative effect. 22 1 Moreover, a victim may not recover speculative damages such
as "pain and suffering" 2 22 and the sentencing court may, at its discretion, refuse to award restitution altogether, 2 23 an option clearly unavailable at common law.
The Second Circuit's opinion in Brown also illustrates the argument
that the Act advances the traditional objectives of criminal sentencing.
The prospect of having to pay restitution adds to the deterrent effect of
fines and imprisonment and the defendant may feel less likely to be excused from such a sentence. 224 Moreover, restoration of the victim to
his condition prior to the offense satisfies society's interest in peaceful
retribution. 2 25 Restitution also contributes to rehabilitation in several
ways: the offender is forced to acknowledge the harm done to his victim
and assume personal responsibility for righting his wrong; the offender
can develop a sense of accomplishment; and the option of imposing a
216. Id. (citing 128 CONG. REC. H8467 (daily ed. Oct. 1, 1982) (statement of Rep.
McCollum)).
217. 744 F.2d 905 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 599 (1984).
218. Id. The Tenth Circuit adopted this analysis in Watchman. See supra note 177 and
accompanying text.
219. Id. (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3580(a)); see also Brown, 760 F.2d at 479; Ciambrone, 602 F.
Supp. at 568.
220. Id.
221. Project, Congress Opens a Pandora'sBox - The Restitution Provisions of the Victim and
Witness Protection Act of 1982, 52 FORDHAM L. REV. 507, 541 (1984).
222. Id. at 542 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3579(b) (1982) (providing the types of damages for
which the court may require a defendant to make restitution)).
223. Id. (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3579(d)).
224. Brown, 744 F.2d at 909.
225. Id.
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restitution order represents a useful rehabilitative compromise between
22 6
imprisonment and probation.
Finally, courts deciding the issue subsequent to Welden have persuasively found that the factors relied on by the Welden court do not change
the restitution hearing into a civil proceeding. The Eighth Circuit, in
United States v. Florence,2 27 disagreed with the district court's contention
in Welden that the Act's enforcement provision renders the restitution
proceeding a civil action. The court argued that section 3580(e) specifically contemplates the possibility of civil actions subsequent to the restitution order at sentencing. 2 28 In Brown, the Second Circuit
acknowledged that the enforcement provision authorized procedures
similar to those for enforcing a civil judgment, but held that such similarities do not transform the nature of the restitution award so long as
restitution is a permissible form of punishment. 22 9 Furthermore, the
court cited legislative history specifying that the victim's right to enforce
the restitution order was enacted only to supplement the government's
normal enforcement procedures, thus "increas[ing] the victim's chances
of collecting restitution. ' 23 0 Therefore, a restitution order is to be primarily enforced by normal governmental procedures for enforcing any
criminal sanction.
The second argument advanced by the district court in Welden, that
the res judicata effect of a restitution order in subsequent civil actions
renders the restitution hearing civil in nature, has also met with effective
opposition. The Third Circuit, in Palma, pointed out that the collateral
estoppel provision merely codifies the general rule that a criminal conviction may be accorded collateral estoppel effect as to some issues
raised in a subsequent civil suit. 23 ' Furthermore, the defendant is estopped to deny only the essential allegations underlying the criminal
conviction, established by a plea of guilty or by a jury at the time of
trial. 23 2 Facts regarding the extent and nature of the victim's injury are
2 33
not given the same effect.
In United States v. Satterfield,2 34 the Eleventh Circuit heard an appeal
brought in the name of one of Welden's co-defendants. The court upheld the convictions and sentence to imprisonment of each defendant, 23 5 but reversed the district court's holding in Welden that the VWPA
was unconstitutional under the seventh amendment. 2 3 6 Relying upon
226. Note. Victim Restitution in the Criminal Process: A ProceduralAnalysis,97 HARV. L REv.

931, 938 (1984).
227. 741 F.2d 1066 (8th Cir. 1984).
228. Id. at 1068. See supra note 208.
229. 744 F.2d at 910.
230. Id. The court noted that the enforcement provisions of the Act "'parallel" en-

forcement procedures for the collection of fines under 18 U.S.C. § 3565 (1982). Id.
231. Palma, 760 F.2d at 475.
232. Id.
233. Id.
234. 743 F.2d 827 (11th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 2362 (1985).
235. Id. at 851.
236. Id. at 836-39.
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analysis similar to that set forth in Brown, the Eleventh Circuit rejected
the district court's argument that the right to "civil" enforcement renders the restitution hearing a civil proceeding 2 3 7 and, using analysis
similar to that articulated in Palma, rejected the district court's finding
that the resjudicata effect of a restitution order in later civil actions also
serves to transform the restitution hearing into a civil proceeding. 23 8 In
addition, the court examined legislative history and traditional goals of
criminal sentencing to support its holding that the restitution proceed23 9
ing is criminal, rather than civil in nature.
b.

Fact Finding Requirements

Most of the Victim and Witness Protection Act is dedicated to
amendments of the Crimes and Criminal Procedure sections of title
18.240 In addition, however, the Act amends Rule 32(c) of the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure. Rule 32(c) governs "Presentence Investigation." 2 4 1 Subsection (c)(1) of Rule 32 instructs the probation service

of the court to make a presentence investigation and report to the court
before any sentence is imposed or probation is granted. 2 4 2 Subsection
(c)(2) of the rule sets forth the required elements of the presentence
report. 2 4 3 Prior to the Act, information relevant to a restitution order
was not an element of the report. Rather, the report was designed to

focus primarily on the behavorial background of the defendant. However, the Act amended subsection (c)(2) to require a "victim impact
237. Id. at 838-39. See supra notes 229-30 and accompanying text.
238. Id. at 838 (citing S. REP. No. 532, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 30, reprinted in 1982 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2515, 2536). See supra notes 231-32 and accompanying text.
239. Id. at 837 (citing S. REP. No. 532, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 30, reprinted in 1982 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2515, 2536 ("[R]estitution ... lost its priority status in the
sentencing procedures of our federal courts long ago."); id. at 2538 ("permitting its use in
conjunction with imprisonment, fine, suspended sentence, or other sentence imposed by
the court"); 128 CONG. REC. H8467 (daily ed. Oct. 1, 1982) (statement of Representative
McCollum) ("Restitution would become a sentence that could in and of itself be imposed ....
This legislation does not intend that restitution become a substitute for civil
damages."); [further citation omitted]).
240. See Victim and Witness Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 97-291, 96 Stat. 1248 (1982).
241. FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(c).
242. FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(c)(1) remains unchanged by the Act. It provides in part:
(c) Presentence Investigation.
(1) When Made. The probation service of the court shall make a
presentence investigation and report to the court before the imposition of sentence or the granting of probation unless, with the permission of the court, the
defendant waives a presentence investigation and report, or the court finds that
there is in the record information sufficient to enable the meaningful exercise of
sentencing discretion, and the court explains this finding on the record.
243. FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(c)(2) provides:
(2) Report. - The presentence report shall contain (A) any prior criminal record of the defendant;
(B) a statement of the circumstances of the commission of the offense and
circumstances affecting the defendant's behavior;
(C) information concerning any harm, including financial, social, psychological. and physical harm, done to or loss suffered by any victim of the
offense; and
(D) any other information that may aid the court in sentencing, including
the restitution needs of any victim of the offense.
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statement" containing information concerning specific losses suffered
by the victim of the offense.

244

The Tenth Circuit's holding in Watchman, that the trial court should
not have relied solely upon the presentence report in determining the
amount of restitution, reflects a judicial effort to pay even closer attention to the victim's damages. Other federal courts have reached a variety of conclusions as to the adequacy of methods used to determine a
restitution award.
Two federal courts have upheld findings of fact based exclusively on
the presentence reports, 24 5 but neither of those decisions necessarily
conflicts with the Tenth Circuit's ruling in Watchman. As noted in Watchman, the Eighth Circuit in Florence implicitly approved a restitution award
determined by reference to the presentence report alone. 24 6 The Tenth
Circuit in Watchman took issue with the Florence court's exclusive reliance
on the presentence report, apparently understanding Florence to stand
for the proposition that the presentence report is the only fact finding
resource necessary in cases involving restitution awards.2 4 7 But the
Eighth Circuit did not raise the adequacy of fact finding as a specific
issue and did not suggest that presentence reports provided sufficient
information in all cases. In Palma, the Third Circuit upheld the exclusive
use of a presentence report which detailed losses sustained by the victim
and specifically analyzed the defendant's financial circumstances. 248
The Palma court's approval of fact finding absent testimony by the victim
is distinguishable from Watchman inasmuch as the victim in Palma, a
2 49
bank, was incapable of personal allocution.
Other federal courts have recognized the value of resources other
than the presentence report in determining a victim's restitutionary
needs. In Brown, the Second Circuit found that facts gleaned from the
trial court record, in addition to conclusions set forth in the probation
officer's presentence report, provided the sentencing judge with ample
evidence to allow proper determination of the restitution amount. 2 50 In
Ciambrone, the federal district court ordered a hearing to resolve
factual
25
questions concerning the damages claimed by the victim.
244.

' The court

See supra note 243. The Senate Report accompanying the Act's amendments to

Rule 32(c)(2) discloses that the victim impact statement is intended "as a first step to ensure that the victim's side is heard and considered by adjudicative officials." S. REP. No.
532, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 30, reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2515, 2519.
The Senate Report further advise- that courts are encouraged to take advantage of additional victim assistance techniques such as "allocution by the victim at the sentencing. . .. ." Id. The victim impact statement was proposed to "lend balance to the present
information available to the court .... ." Id. at 2520.
245. United States v. Palma, 760 F.2d at 476; United States v. Florence, 741 F.2d at
1067.
246. Florence, 741 F.2d at 1067.
247. Watchman, 749 F.2d at 617.
248. Palma, 760 F.2d at 476. Apparently no factual testimony was heard regarding the
defendant's financial condition or the extent of the victim's losses.
249. See supra note 248.
250. 744 F.2d at 908 n.l.
251. 602 F. Supp. at 570-71.
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ordered the hearing after consideration of documents and memoranda
provided by the parties, as opposed to the presentence report.25 2 The
court found that the risk of error in arriving at a restitution amount without a hearing would be greater than the burden imposed by such a
253
hearing.
While such investigative techniques may be useful in determining
the restitution award, it is clear that Rule 32 does not necessarily compel
2 54
fact finding procedures beyond review of the presentence report.
The Ninth Circuit in United States v. Keith, 2 55 for example, rejected the
defendant's argument that failure to provide an evidentiary hearing on
the amount of restitution constituted an abuse of discretion. 2 6 The
court noted that Rule 32 provides that a trial court may, in its discretion,
entertain testimony relating to alleged factual inaccuracy of the
presentence report, 2 5 7 but added that no form of hearing is sanctioned
by Rule 32 or the Act unless a factual dispute exists regarding the
presentence report. 25 8 The Act clearly does not prescribe fact-finding
procedures beyond consideration of the presentence report. 2 59
The presentence report is intended to satisfy the need for accurate
assessment of a victim's restitutionary needs. Legislative history indicates that the report should include the detailed infornation necessary
to reach an informed conclusion as to the appropriate amount of restitution. 260 The legislative history makes it equally clear that additional efforts to ascertain relevant facts are not precluded. 26 1 The Tenth Circuit
in Watchman was faced with a presentence report that was inadequate for
factual determinations associated with the restitution order. Accordingly, the court demanded a record reflecting more active participation
by the victim in the fact-finding process. 26 2 Likewise, other courts have
required supplemental procedures where additional facts were necessary. The essential concern expressed by Congress and the courts is not
the adequacy of victim impact statement per se, but the sufficiency of facts
ultimately relied upon. The presentence report containing the victim
impact statement may or may not accomplish this purpose. When it
does not, additional requirements are warranted.
5.

Conclusion

The Victim and Witness Protection Act empowers the sentencing
252. Id. at 571.
253. Id. at 570.
254. 18 U.S.C. § 3580(b) (1982) empowers the court to order the probation service to
issue a presentence report. Section 3580(a) deliniates information to be considered by the
sentencing judge in determining restitution. The Act does not specify other means by
which the court may acquire necessary information.
255. 754 F.2d 1388 (9th Cir. 1985).
256. Id. at 1392.
257. Id.
258. Id. at 1393.
259. See supra note 254.
260. S. REP. No. 532, supra note 198, at 2519.
261. Id.
262. 749 F.2d at 618-19.
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judge to address more adequately the needs of criminal victims. Critics
of the Act fail to acknowledge the multi-dimensional nature of the criminal system. Penalties imposed upon criminal offenders may serve traditional penal objectives and simultaneously satisfy compensatory needs
of criminal victims. Indeed, it is persuasively argued that restitution advances such objectives. There is simply no rigid dichotomy between
civil and criminal actions such that the seventh amendment precludes a
sentencing court from attending to some of the losses suffered by victims of criminal acts. Procedurally, Congress has authorized the formulation and consideration of presentence reports to facilitate accurate
determination of restitution amounts. Where the reports do not satisfy
the need for specific factual determination, Congress has allowed sentencing courts flexibility in ordering further fact-finding procedures.
II.

MAIL FRAUD AND THE GOOD FAITH DEFENSE:
UNITED STATES V. HOPKINS

A.

Facts

The Tenth Circuit, in United States v. Hopkins,2 6 3 reconsidered the
sufficiency of instructions pertaining to the "good faith" defense to mail
fraud charges. 2 64 The defendant, Hopkins, was charged with devising a
scheme to defraud and obtain money by inducing people, generally of
Native American descent, to pay for his assistance in filing a claim for an
Indian land allotment in Nevada. 26 5 Hopkins told claimants that by submitting a claim form and nominal recording fee to the Clark County,
Nevada, Record's Office, an individual, by virtue of Indian ancestry,
could obtain up to 160 acres of public domain land in Nevada for various purposes. 2 66 Hopkins also represented that claimants would have
some rights in the land when the claim was filed. For his assistance,
Hopkins charged between $100 and $125 per claim. 2 67 Contrary to
Hopkins' representations, the land was either unavailable for Indian land
allotments until it was "reclassified" by the Secretary of the Interior, or
2 68
was already patented to other persons.
At trial, Hopkins submitted that the claim procedure was suggested
in good faith, and that he believed claimants would eventually obtain the
263. 744 F.2d 716 (10th Cir. 1984).
264. 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1982) provides in pertinent part:
Whoever, having devised or intending to devise any scheme or artifice to defraud,
or for obtaining money or property by means of false or fraudulent pretenses,
representations, or promises . . . for the purpose of executing such scheme or
artifice or attempting so to do, places in any post office or authorized depository
for mail matter, any matter or thing whatever to be sent or delivered by the Postal
Service, or takes or receives therefrom, any such matter or thing, or knowingly
causes to be delivered by mail according to the direction thereon . . . any such
matter or thing, shall be fined not more than $1,000 or imprisoned not more than
five years, or both.
265. United States v. Hopkins, 716 F.2d 739, 742-43 & n.2 (10th Cir. 1982) (Hopkins 1),
rev'd and vacated on reh'g, 744 F.2d 716 (10th Cir. 1984) (en banc) (Hopkins II).
266. Hopkins I, 716 F.2d at 743.
267. Id.
268. Id. at 742 n.2.
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lands for which the papers were filed. 2 6 9 Accordingly, Hopkins requested specific instructions on his defense of good faith. 270 This request was denied and Hopkins was subsequently convicted on eleven
counts of mail fraud and one count of conspiracy to commit mail fraud.
The Tenth Circuit initially upheld the substantive mail fraud conviction, 27 1 ruling, inter alia, that while no specific instruction was given by
the trial court on Hopkins' good faith theory of defense, the instructions
viewed as a whole were sufficient to advise the jury on the defense of
good faith. 27 2 The Tenth Circuit subsequently granted the defendant's
request for rehearing.
B.

The Tenth Circuit Opinion On Rehearing

On rehearing, the Tenth Circuit consolidated Hopkins with United
States v. Peterman 2 73 for en banc consideration of the adequacy of instructions on the good faith defense. 2 74 Judge Seth, writing for the majority, 27 5 ruled that a good faith instruction is required to be given as a
separate subject where "sufficient evidence" supports the defense of
2 76
good faith.
Initially, the court reiterated the well-established rule that "good
faith" is a complete defense to mail fraud charges under section
1341.277 In addition, the court gleaned from previous Tenth Circuit decisions that a defendant is entitled to proper instructions on the good
269. Id. at 746. Hopkins testified at trial that he believed that filing the claim form
served as notice of an Indian allotment selection, that it was a proper method of establishing constructive settlement on the land, and that federal laws restricting availability of the
land did not diminish or impair tribal "vested rights" in the land. Id. at 744 (citing Record
vol. XI at 1227, 1238).
270. The requested instructions provided, in pertinent part:
Bad faith is an essential element of fraudulent intent. Good faith constitutes a
complete defense to one charged with an offense of which fraudulent intent is an
essential element. One who acts with honest intention is not chargeable with
fraudulent intent . . . . [T]o establish fraudulent intent on the part of a person,
it must be established that such persons knowingly and intentionally attempted to
deceive another ...
A man may be visionary in his plans and believe they will succeed, and yet, in
spite of their ultimate failure, be incapable of committing concious fraud.
Id. at 750 n.13 (quoting Record vol. I at 50-51). Relevant portions of the charge given
stated:
To act with intent to defraud means to act knowingly and with specific intent to
deceive. . . .[The acts charged were] alleged to have been done knowingly and
willfully by the defendants. . . .An act is knowingly done if done voluntarily and
intentionally and not because of mistake or accident or other innocent reason.
Id. at 751 n.14 (quoting Record vol. XI at 1369, 1376, 1377).
271. Id. at 752. The court reversed the conspiracy conviction on grounds of insufficient evidence. Id. at 749.
272. Id. at 751-52.
273. No. 82-1100 (10th Cir. 1984). The case was originally submitted to a Tenth Circuit panel but no opinion was filed. The facts of Peterman were not reviewed by the court in
Hopkins I.
274. United States v. Hopkins, 744 F.2d 716 (10th Cir. 1984).
275. The sole separate opinion was Judge McWilliams' dissent which stated simply that
he remained in agreement with the views expressed by the panel in the initial Hopkins I
decision.
276. Hopkins 11, 744 F.2d at 718.
277. Id.
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faith theory where there is evidence to support that defense and such an
instruction is requested.2 78 Evidence is sufficient to support the defense, the court said, when the jury could reasonably find from such evidence that the defendant, in good faith, believed that the plan would
succeed, however visionary in retrospect it may seem to be, and that the
promises made would be kept and that the representations would be
carried out. 2 79 Most significantly, the court required that the "good
faith" instruction be given as a separate subject and that instructions on
various elements of the mail fraud offense were held insufficient for that
28 1
purpose. 280 Both Hopkins and Peterman were remanded for new trials.
C.

Analysis
1. The Good Faith Defense

Federal courts have long recognized the good faith theory as a complete defense to mail fraud charges. 28 2 While section 1341 does not
specifically mention a requisite statutory intent, courts have read the
mail fraud statute to include among its essential elements, specific intent
to defraud. 28 3 Good faith has been described as the "obverse" of bad
motive or intent to defraud. 28 4 Proof of good faith negates and there2 85
fore operates as a defense to the element of fraudulent intent.
The meaning of "good faith" was, for a time, somewhat obscured.
Language used to describe the concept in the Tenth Circuit and elsewhere was not consistent. 2 86 The first federal case to determine in what
278.

Id. at 717 (citing United States v. Roylance, 690 F.2d 164 (10th Cir. 1982); United

States v. Westbo, 576 F.2d 285 (10th Cir. 1978); Sparrow v. United States 402 F.2d 826
(10th Cir. 1968); Steiger v. United States, 373 F.2d 133 (10th Cir. 1967)).
279. Hopkins 11, 744 F.2d at 717.
280. Id. at 718. The court further specified that the rule articulated is intended to apply equally to substantive and conspiracy counts for mail and wire fraud. Id.
281. Id.
282. Durland v. United States, 161 U.S. 306 (1896). In Durland, the defendant was
charged under a predecessor statute to section 1341 with using the mails to further a
fraudulent investment scheme. The Court therein stated:
If the testimony had shown that. . . the defendant. . . had entered in good faith
upon that business, believing that out of the moneys received they could by investment or otherwise make enough to justify the promised returns, no conviction would be sustained, no matter how visionary might seem the scheme.
Id. at 314-15.
283. See, e.g., United States v. Williams, 728 F.2d 1402, 1404 (11th Cir. 1984); United
States v. Goss, 650 F.2d 1336, 1341 (5th Cir. 1981); Sparrow, 402 F.2d at 829.
284. United States v. Gatewood, 733 F.2d 1390, 1395 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct.
200 (1984); United States v. Westbo, 576 F.2d 285, 289 (10th Cir. 1978).
285. Williams, 728 F.2d at 1404; United States v. Lewis, 592 F.2d 1282, 1286 (5th Cir.
1979). See also W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTr, HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAw 356 (1972) (noting
that ignorance and mistake, close cousins of good faith, serve as defenses where they negate a required mental state).
286. Although some courts have treated fraudulent intent and good faith as synonymous issues (see, e.g., United States v. Foshee, 569 F.2d 401, 404 n. 3, 405 (5th Cir.), modified on rehk'g, 578 F.2d 629 (5th Cir. 1978)), they are in fact distinct. The former "is an
element of the offense to be proven beyond a reasonable doubt, and the latter is developed as a defense to be asserted by the defendant as part of his theory of the case and
becomes an issue upon which he is entitled to adequate instructions if the evidence warrants." Sparrow, 402 F.2d at 829. Failure by the defendant to prove his own good faith

DENVER UNIVERSITY IA W REVIEW

[Vol. 63:2

the defendant must have "good faith" was a Tenth Circuit case, Hawley
v. United States. 2 87 Approving the trial court's defense theory instruction, the Hawley court suggested that a defendant acted in good faith
where he "earnestly and sincerely believed the truth of the representations made." 28 8 Some years later, in Steiger v. United States, 28 9 the Tenth
Circuit ordered the trial court to grant a new trial and instruct the jury
that the good faith defense must prevail if the defendant "actually be'2 90
lieved that the plan was practical and would succeed."
There is an apparent consensus among other circuits rejecting the
standard enunciated in Steiger. Four circuits have stated specifically, for
example, that an honest belief that the venture or enterprise will ulti29 1
mately be successful is not in itself a defense to mail fraud charges.
Two of those circuits accept the principle that the defendant's belief in
his plan, however sincere, will not justify "baseless, false, or reckless
representations or promises. ' 29 2 When the Tenth Circuit, in Sparrow v.
United States, 293 combined the "successful plan" language set forth in
Steiger, with the reckless representation caveat elucidated in prior Tenth
Circuit opinions, 2 94 the court announced a new concept of good
faith. 2 9 5 "Thus the good faith of the defendant in the plan or scheme
and good faith intention to carry out the promises and representations
constitutes a defense . . .in a prosecution . . .under the Mail Fraud
Statute .... .296 Hopkins II modified that language only slightly, pointing out that good faith is present when the defendant "believed the plan
would succeed, that the representations would be carried out and [that]
the promises were true." 2 9 7 The notion of good faith articulated in Hopkins II is consistent with The Tenth Circuit's leadership role in refining
the concept.
does not relieve the prosecution of its burden on the element of intent. If the defendant
succeeds in proving good faith, however, the element of intent is necessarily defeated.
287. 133 F.2d 966 (10th Cir. 1943).
288. Id. at 970.
289. 373 F.2d 133 (10th Cir. 1967).
290. Id. at 136.
291. United States v. Stull, 743 F.2d 439, 446 (6th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct.
1779 (1985); United States v. Beecroft, 608 F.2d 753, 757 (9th Cir. 1979); United States v.
Amrep Corp. 560 F.2d 539, 547 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1015 (1978); United
States v. Diamond, 430 F.2d 688, 691 (5th Cir. 1970).
292. Stull, 743 F.2d at 446 (quoting Sparrow v. United States, 402 F.2d 826, 828 (10th
Cir. 1968)); Diamond, 430 F.2d at 692 (quoting Sparrow, 402 F.2d at 828)).
293. 402 F.2d 826, 828-29 (10th Cir. 1968).
294. Id. (citing Hawley, 133 F.2d 966; Elbel v. United States, 364 F.2d 127 (10th Cir.
1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1014 (1967)). See also Note, Survey of the Law of Mail Fraud, 1975
U. ILL. L.F. 237, 242.
295. See, e.g., United States v. Preston, 634 F.2d 1285, 1294 (10th Cir. 1980), cert. denied,
455 U.S. 1002 (1982) ("Good faith is employed to mean a genuine belief that the information being sent or given is true. Good faith does not mean an ultimate hope or even faith
that eventually the project will come out even. Nor does it mean a hope or belief that
money which is being obtained will eventually be put back.").
296. Sparrow, 402 F.2d at 828-29 (emphasis added).
297. Hopkins II, 744 F.2d at 718.
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Adequacy of Instructions

In federal criminal law, it is axiomatic that a defendant is entitled to
proper instructions on his theory of defense if evidence introduced supports the theory. 298 The federal courts commonly apply this maxim to
the good faith defense in mail fraud prosecutions. 29 9 The more difficult
question concerns the adequacy of instructions given on the defense
theory. The Hopkins II court, overruling precedent, contributed to
Tenth Circuit law most significantly in this area. Prior to Hopkins II, the
Tenth Circuit did not require a separate instruction on good faith,
though the defense had been raised and supported by evidence. The
Tenth Circuit standard frequently used to evaluate the adequacy of
30 0
good faith instructions was set forth originally in Beck v. United States.
Reviewing instructions concerning false representation, intent to defraud, knowledge and willfullness, the Tenth Circuit in Beck found that
the jurors were adequately apprised of the defendant's good faith theory. In so finding, the court ruled that "the sufficiency of the instructions may not be determined by the giving or the failure to give, any one
or more instructions. To make this determination, all of the instructions
30 1
given must be viewed as a whole."
Steiger represents the single deviation from the standard articulated
in Beck. In Steiger, the Tenth Circuit held that general instructions on
willfullness, unlawful intent, specific intent, untruth of a representation,
fraudulent statements, and acting on advice of counsel were insufficient
to "fairly, clearly and fully" submit the defense of good faith interposed
30 2
by each defendant.
The holding in Steiger, however, had been largely ignored in other
cases addressing the issue. In United States v. Westbo, 30 3 for example, the
court adopted the Beck principle and, maintaining that good faith is the
obverse of intent to defraud, ruled that a specific intent instruction "adequately and sufficiently advised the jury about defendant's good-faith30°4
principle theory of defense."
The relationship between fraudulent intent and good faith3 0 5 has
also convinced other circuit courts to dispense with the specific instruction requirement. The First Circuit, in New England Enterprises, Inc. v.
United States,3 0 6 said that instructions on knowledge and specific intent
298. Beck v. United States, 305 F.2d 595, 599 (10th Cir.) (citing Bird v. United States.
180 U.S. 356 (1901), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 890, 895 (1962)).
299. See, e.g., United States v. McGuire, 744 F.2d 1197, 1201 (6th Cir. 1984), cert. denied,
105 S. Ct. 1866 (1985); United States v. Williams, 728 F.2d 1402, 1404 (11th Cir. 1984);
United States v. Seymour, 576 F.2d 1345, 1348 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 857 (1978);
Kroll v. United States, 433 F.2d 1282, 1290 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 944
(1971); Steiger v. United States, 373 F.2d 133 (10th Cir. 1967).
300. 305 F.2d 595 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 890 (1962).
301. Beck, 305 F.2d at 599.
302. Steiger, 373 F.2d at 599.
303. 576 F.2d 285 (10th Cir. 1978).
304. Id. at 289.
305. See supra note 286 and accompanying text.
306. 400 F.2d 58 (1st Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1036 (1969).
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to defraud were "necessarily inconsistent with good faith and forced the
jury to consider good faith and honest belief....-307 The addition of
"other synonyms," the court concluded, was not required.30 8 In United
States v. Wilkinson,3 0 9 the Fifth Circuit held that an instruction on specific
intent was sufficient, effectively equating the concepts of specific intent
and good faith. 310 Specifically relying on language in Westbo, the Ninth
Circuit, in United States v. Cusino,3 11 held that an instruction on specific
312
intent to defraud "can be deemed an instruction on good faith."
Several courts have examined the trial record to determine whether
the jury was adequately apprised of the defendant's good faith defense
or whether a specific instruction should have been given. The Fifth Circuit, in Kroll v. United States,3 13 found that instructions on knowledge,
willfullness and intent, combined with clear statements of the good faith
defense in defendant's testimony, placed the defense adequately before
the jury. 3 14 In New England Enterprises, Inc., the First Circuit, facing the
same issue, stated the determinative question to be "...
whether the
record evidences a substantive presentation of the defense of good faith
to the jury."'3 15 The court found such a presentation in defense counsel's opening statement which emphasized the good faith defense.3 1 6 In
United States v. Diggs, 3 17 the United States District Court for the District
of Columbia noted the similarity between good faith and intent concepts
in the defendant's case and reasoned that the specific intent instruction
given the jury posed the question of good faith "exactly as the defendant
'3 18
himself had presented the issue at trial."
D.

Conclusion

The achilles heel of the Tenth Circuit's first opinion in Hopkins was
its reliance on the erroneous rule announced in Beck. The court permitted the charge on fraudulent intent and other "fundamental issues" to
suffice in communicating the good faith defense because the trial court's
instructions were "viewed as a whole." 3 19 On rehearing, the Tenth Circuit permanently retired that approach. Hopkins II is not the first case
among the various circuits to hold that intent instructions do not direct
the jury's attention to the defense of good faith with sufficient specificity
to avoid reversible error.3 20 Arguably, the rule was announced within
307.
308.
309.
310.
311.
312.
313.
314.

Id. at 71.
Id. (citing Beck, 305 F.2d at 599-600).
460 F.2d 725 (5th Cir. 1972).
Id. at 729 (citing New England Enterprises, Inc., 400 F.2d 58 (1st Cir. 1968)).
694 F.2d 185 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 932 (1983)
Id. at 188.
433 F.2d 1282 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 944 (1971).
Id. at 1290-91.

315.

Aew England Enterprises, Inc., 400 F.2d at 71.

316. Id.
317. 613 F.2d 988 (D.C. Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 982 (1980).
318. Id. at 1000.
319. Hopkins 1,716 F.2d at 750.

320. See, e.g., United States v. Goss, 650 F.2d 1336, 1345 (5th Cir. 1981) (The Fifth
Circuit distinguished Wilkinson on grounds that the instruction therein actually addressed
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the Tenth Circuit, if not subsequently followed, in Steiger. But Hopkins II
resolved any ambiguity by stating expressly that "[t]he 'good faith' instruction is required to be given as a separate subject."3 2 1 While the
22
court specifically overruled only l'estbo as to contrary points of law,'
the Hopkins opinion clearly represents the abrogation of the standard
originally stated in Beck.
John AL .torrison

,.good faith" specifically. The court then ruled: "Charging the jury that a finding of specific intent to defraud is required for conviction . . .does not direct thejury's attention to
the defense of good faith with sufficient specificity to avoid reversible error.").
321. Hopkins II. 744 F.2d at 718.
322. id.

THE FAILURE OF THE DUE PROCESS DEFENSE IN UNITED
STATES V. GAMBLE
INTRODUCTION

In United States v. GambleI the defendant was randomly targeted in
an undercover scheme conceived and contrived by United States postal
inspectors. 2 Upon appeal of his conviction, the defendant raised the defense of outrageous governmental conduct: the due process defense.
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the government's conduct
was not so outrageous as to shock the conscience of the court.3 The
case is unremarkable insofar as Dr. Gamble's defense failed; the defense
has been successful only once in the federal courts - in the Third Circuit Court of Appeals' 1978 decision in United States v. Twigg. 4 Gamble is,
however, an excellent example of police undercover work which focuses
on anticipating rather than investigating crime and of the federal courts'
failure to adjust due process analysis when faced with such tactics.
I.
A.

LEGAL BACKGROUND

Entrapment and the Development of the Due Process Defense
In Sorrells v. United States, 5 the Supreme Court for the first time rec-

ognized entrapment 6 as a valid defense to criminal charges. 7 ChiefJustice Hughes, writing for the majority, based the Court's finding for the
defendant on three factors: (1) the conduct of the government in insti-

gating the crime;8 (2) the purpose of the statute? and (3) the predisposition of the defendant.'

0

The Court reasoned that a nonpredisposed

defendant cannot be guilty of committing an offense which was created
1. 737 F.2d 853 (10th Cir. 1984).
2. The undercover operation was dubbed "MAIL-Fraud" for Medical and Insurance
Fraud, discussed infra, notes 63-72 and accompanying text.
3. The 'shocks-the-conscience' standard, as it has come to be called, is that announced in United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423 (1973), discussed infra, text accompanying notes 25-35.
4. 588 F.2d 373 (3d Cir. 1978), discussed infra, text accompanying notes 49-56.
5. 287 U.S. 435 (1932).
6. The lower federal courts had already recognized the entrapment defense. See, e.g.,
Woo Wai v. United States, 223 F. 412 (9th Cir. 1915).
7. In Sorrells, the defendant was twice approached by a prohibition agent to purchase
whiskey for him. Sorrells finally capitulated after repeated appeals to sympathy and friendship. Sorrells, 287 U.S. at 439. At trial, no evidence was produced showing that the defendant had ever bought, sold, or possessed alcoholic beverages prior to the event in
question. Id. at 441.
8. Although acknowledging that the government may use "[a]rtifice and stratagem"
to ferret out crime, "[a] different question is presented when the criminal design
originates with the officials of the Government, and they implant in the mind of an innocent person the disposition to commit the alleged offense and induce its commission in
order that they may prosecute." Id. at 441-42.
9. The majority found that Congress could not have intended that enforcement of its
laws was to be achieved by inducing innocent victims to commit the offense. Id. at 448.
10. ld. at 451.
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and instigated by the government for its subsequent prosecution. The
controlling question in any court's inquiry, the majority stated, is
whether an "otherwise innocent" individual was entrapped solely because of the government's "creative activity."'I 1
Finding the Court's reasoning fallacious, Justice Roberts, concurring in the result, contended that the sole issue was the government's
conduct, regardless of the statutory construction1 2 and regardless of the
defendant's predisposition.13 The reason for the defense, argued Justice Roberts, lies in "the public policy which protects the purity of government and its processes."14
The majority and concurring opinions thus respectively expressed
the "subjective" and "objective" theories of entrapment. Both agreed
that a defendant ensnared by improper governmental conduct could not
be prosecuted and convicted for the offense. But while the proponents
of the subjective theory would examine the government's conduct in
light of the defendant's predisposition and dismiss the prosecution only
upon a finding that the defendant would not have committed the act but
for the government's enticement, those adhering to the objective theory
would view the defendant's predisposition as irrelevant and would dismiss the case whenever the government employed illegal, improper, or
impermissible strategies in order to prosecute and convict a defendant.
Further developing the subjective standard espoused in Sorrells, the
Court in Sherman v. United States 15 stated that the entrapment issue turns
on whether the trap ensnares the "unwary innocent" or the "unwary
criminal"1 6 - that is, the individual predisposed to commit the crime.
In Sherman, a government informant who, along with the defendant
Sherman, was undergoing treatment for heroin addiction, repeatedly
pressed Sherman to supply him with narcotics because he was in pain
and not responding to treatment. The defendant succumbed to these
appeals and was subsequently indicted and convicted. The Supreme
Court reversed the conviction, finding that the defendant had estab7
lished entrapment as a matter of law.'
The Court thus rejected the government's argument that the del1.Id.
12. Joined by justices Brandeis and Stone, Justice Roberts castigated the majority for
its finding of an "unspoken and implied mandate" in any given statute that a person can be
found not guilty because of the government's conduct. Id. at 456 (Roberts,J., concurring).
The statutory construction theory has been abandoned by the courts. Abramson &
Lindeman, Entrapment and Due Process in the Federal Courts, 8 AM. J. CRIM. L. 139, 158 n.67.

(1980).
13. "To say that such conduct by an official of government is condoned and rendered
innocuous by the fact that the defendant had a bad reputation or had previously transgressed is wholly to disregard the reason for refusing the processes of the court to consummate an abhorent transaction." Sorrells, 287 U.S. at 459 (Roberts, J., concurring).

14. Id. at 455.
15. 356 U.S. 369 (1958). Chief Justice Warren wrote the majority opinion. Justices
Frankfurter, Douglas, Harlan and Brennan concurred in the result, but would have based
the opinion on the objective theory of entrapment as expressed by Justice Roberts in

Sorrells.
16. Sherman, 356 U.S. at 372.
17.

Id. at 370-72.
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fendant was predisposed' s and found the government's actions,
through its informant, highly improper because they "play[ed] on the
weaknesses of an innocent party and beguile[d] him into committing
crimes which he otherwise would not have attempted. Law enforcement
19
The concurring Justices 20
does not require methods such as this."'
expressed their concern for the majority's lack of forthright analysis.
They argued that, although ostensibly adhering to the subjective theory
of entrapment, the Court's holding was nonetheless based on "the conduct of the informer ... and not [on the fact that] the Government has
'
failed to draw a convincing picture of petitioner's [predisposition]."' 2
When the Court again considered the entrapment defense in United
States v. Russell 2 2 and Hampton v. United States, 23 the tension between the
subjective and objective theories of entrapment was apparent in the creation of the new, constitutionally-based due process defense. 24 Russell
presented the Supreme Court with its first case on the due process defense. The defendant had been convicted of manufacturing, possessing,
and selling methamphetamine (speed). 2 5 Because he was predisposed,
Russell was foreclosed from basing his defense on entrapment. 26 He
argued instead that the informant had supplied the defendants with an
essential component of the drug, 2 7 and that without the government's
intervention, the component could not have been obtained nor the drug
manufactured. Thus, although predisposed, his conviction could not
stand because of the level of governmental involvement in the crime for
which he was prosecuted. He therefore requested that the Court base
the entrapment defense on constitutional grounds. 28 He analogized his
30
29
case to the Court's holdings in Mapp v. Ohio and Miranda v. Arizona
18. The government attempted to prove Sherman's predisposition on the basis of several drug sales, id. at 374; his acquiesence to the scheme, id. at 375; and on the basis of
prior narcotics convictions, id. The Court rejected this evidence as "insufficient ... particularly when we must assume from the record he was trying to overcome the narcotics habit
at the time." Id. at 375-76.
19. Id. at 376.
20. Justice Frankfurter, joined by Justices Douglas, Harlan and Brennan.
21. Sherman, 356 U.S. at 383 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). Justice Frankfurter defended the objective theory and called for clear analytical standards defining the defense
and the boundaries of permissible law enforcement practices. Id. at 380-85 (Frankfurter,
J., concurring). For an indepth discussion of the subjective and objective theories of entrapment, see Park, The Entrapment Controversy, 60 MINN. L. REV. 163 (1976) and Note,

Entrapment as a Due Process Defense. Developments After Hampton v. United States, 57 IND. L.J.
89, 89-101 (1982).
22. 411 U.S. 423 (1973).
23. 425 U.S. 484 (1976).
24. Entrapment is "not of a constitutional dimension." Russell, 411 U.S. at 433.
25. Id. at 424.
26. The informant had infiltrated the existing drug manufacturing ring of Russell and
two other defendants. Id. at 425.
27. Id. at 425-26. The ingredient supplied was phenyl-2-propanone (P-2-P).
28. Id. at 430. Russell also argued for the objective theory of entrapment to be
adopted by the Court. Id. at 432-33. The Court declined to do so and reaffirmed its holdings in Sorrells and Sherman. Id. at 433-34.
29. 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (illegal search and seizure, fourth amendment).
30. 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (self-incrimination clause, fifth amendment).
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in which the Court developed the exclusionary rule as the remedial measure for illegal searches and seizures and coerced confessions.
Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority, declined to raise the entrapment defense to constitutional status. He found the analogy to
Mapp and Miranda inapposite because the exclusionary rule was developed in those cases as the result of the government's illegal conduct
which violated the defendants' fourth and fifth amendment rights. Russell's case was different, he stated, because "the Government's conduct
here violated no independent constitutional right of the [defendant]."'3
Furthermore, in Russell, the informant had broken no laws, breached no
rules, nor committed any crimes in its infiltration of the drug manufacturing ring. 32 Justice Rehnquist then delivered the celebrated dictum
that has become the standard for due process analysis:
While we may some day be presented with a situation in which
the conduct of law enforcement agents is so outrageous that
due process principles would absolutely bar the government
from invoking judicial processes to obtain a conviction, cf.
Rochin v. California [citation omitted], the instant case is distinctly not of that breed... . The law enforcement conduct here
stops far short of violating that "fundamental fairness, shocking
to the universal sense ofjustice," mandated
by the Due Process
33
Clause of the Fifth Amendment.
The Russell opinion thus failed to set guidelines for impermissible
law enforcement practices, merely stating that they must rise to the level
of "outrageous" or "shocking" to the conscience.
Because Russell concerned a drug manufacturing ring, "a continuing, .

.

. illegal, business enterprise, ' ' 34 the government was allowed

some participation in the enterprise in order to secure convictions. The
Court further cautioned that "the defense of entrapment ... was not
intended to give the federal judiciary a 'chancellor's foot' veto over law
enforcement practices of which it [does] not approve." '3 5 Thus, to attain
the status of a due process violation warranting dismissal, law enforcement techniques must be demonstrably egregious. The circumstances
considered by the Court in deciding this issue were the means available
31.

Russell, 411 U.S. at 430. See Tribe, The Supreme Court 1972 Term, 87 HARV. L. REV.

55, 248 n.45 (1973) ("In using the expression 'independent constitutional right,' Justice
Rehnquist was apparently referring to any constitutional right not derived from the due
process clause.").
32. Russell, 411 U.S. at 430-31. The Court also stated that the drug was not impossible to obtain. Id. at 431.
33. Id. at 431-32 (quoting Kinsella v. United States ex rel. Singleton, 361 U.S. 234, 246
(1960)). The use of Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952), as the touchstone for due
process violations has caused confusion in determining the boundaries of the defense. See
infra note 59 and accompanying text. In Rochin, the police illegally entered the defendant's
house and, when he swallowed two capsules lying on his nightstand, forcibly attempted to
remove them from his mouth. Unable to remove the capsules, the police handcuffed him,
took him to the hospital and, without consent, forcibly pumped his stomach to examine
the contents for contraband. The vomited material was the evidence used to secure his
conviction. Rochin, 342 U.S. at 166.
34. Russell, 411 U.S. at 432.
35. Id. at 435.
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to the authorities to combat the crime and the government's level of
involvement in that crime. Three years later, the focus of analysis
shifted.
Relying on the dictum in Russell, the defendant in Hampton v. United
States3 6 claimed a violation of due process principles of fundamental
fairness through governmental involvement in a crime instigated and directed by the government. He argued that his conviction for narcotics
sales should be overturned because the government both supplied him
37
with the drug and then purchased it from him.
The Court split into factions when the plurality 38 attempted to establish a per se rule that the remedy for a predisposed defendant "lies
solely in the defense of entrapment" 39 and that due process is violated
"only when the Government activity in question violates some protected
right of the defendant."' The plurality thus determined that predisposition is always the crucial issue whether the defense rests on entrapment
or due process grounds: a predisposed defendant can have no claim
against the government for its practices short of violence against the
person, in the manner of Rochin.
Justice Powell rejected the plurality's per se rule because he did not
find that the subjective theory of entrapment had encroached upon due
process principles to the point of making predisposition the sole, determinative issue.4 1 Although emphasizing that cases in which "proof of
predisposition is not dispositive will be rare,"' 42 he did not foreclose reliance on either due process or the Court's supervisory powers to warrant
43
dismissal of the prosecution.
Justice Powell further recognized that the due process defense as
thus far developed had only dealt with contraband cases and that the
Court had not considered criteria for impermissible governmental conduct outside that particular realm. 44 And even within the realm of contraband offenses, he noted that the plurality's focus on predisposition
and concomitant per se rule left many unanswered questions. For exam36. 425 U.S. 484 (1976).
37. Hampton, 425 U.S. at 488. The dissent characterized the case as one in which
"[tihe Government is doing nothing less than buying contraband from itself through an
intermediary and jailing the intermediary." Id. at 498 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
38. Justice Rehnquist delivered the plurality opinion, joined by ChiefJustice Burger
and Justice White. Justice Powell concurred in the judgment, joined by Justice Blackmun.
Justices Brennan, Stewart, and Marshall dissented. Justice Stevens did not participate.
39. Hampton, 425 U.S. at 490 (emphasis added). This means, of course, that a predisposed defendant has no defense because a finding of predisposition precludes the entrapment defense.
40. Id. (emphasis by the Court). The basis forJustice Rehnquist's unnecessarily crabbed interpretation of the due process clause apparently lies in his distaste for the remedy
engendered by that defense: "If the police engage in illegal activity in concert with a defendant beyond the scope of their duties the remedy lies, not in freeing the equally culpable defendant, but in prosecuting the police under the applicable provisions of state or
federal laws." Id.
41. Id. at 492-93 & n.2 (Powell, J., concurring).
42. Id.at 495 n.7.
43. Id. at 494 nn. 5 & 6, 495.
44. Id. at 493.
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pie, "varying degrees of criminal involvement" engender varying types
of investigative procedures, "and under the flat rule enunciated .

.

. by

the plurality the differences between the circumstances would be irrelevant despite the most outrageous conduct conceivable by the Government agents relative to the circumstances."

45

In Hampton, five justices indicated that some investigative practices
may warrant dismissal on either supervisory power or constitutional
grounds. At present, at least five members of the Court 46 may be willing
to assess due process claims in light of all circumstances involved.
B.

Assessment of the Supreme Court's Holdings

Sorrells, Sherman, Russell, and Hampton make up the Supreme Court's
effort to articulate standards for the entrapment and due process defenses. Although the entrapment defense clearly is based upon the subjective theory of the defendant's predisposition, the basis for the due
process defense remains blurred. The Hampton plurality made a strong
attempt to separate the defense from the objective theory of entrapment
by its retreat from the Russell dictum and by use of the "independent
right" language in its Hampton opinion. Moreoever, because in both
Russell and Hampton the defendants were predisposed, the Court never
examined governmental conduct absent predisposition. Thus, the following issues were never evaluated by the Court: (1) what factors are to
be used to determine governmental overreaching or overinvolvement in
crime; (2) what weight is to be given any factor; and (3) what level must
these factors attain before a deprivation of due process occurs sufficient
to dismiss the prosecution. One may infer from the Court's subsequent
analyses of Sorrells and Sherman in the due process context that while the
government may not instigate the crime, the mere affording of an opportunity is not impermissible government conduct. 4 7 The line between
instigation and affording an opportunity is tenuous at best, and the
48
Court has made no effort to define it.

45. Id. at 494 n.5. He offered as an example the difference between a "high-school
youth whose 'pushing' is limited to a few ... classmates" and the "hardcore professional,
in the 'business' on a large scale." Id.
46. In Hampton, the dissenters charged that law enforcement interests were not promoted when the government supplied the defendant with contraband and then provided
him with a buyer: "plainly [such conduct] is not designed to discover ongoing drug traffic." Hampton, 425 U.S. at 498 (Brennanj., dissenting). One of the dissenters, Justice
Stewart, has since been replaced by Justice O'Connor. As one commentator points out,
the views of neither Justice O'Connor nor Justice Stevens (who did not participate in
Hampton) are known regarding the due process defense. Mascolo, Due Process, Fundamental
Fairness, and Conduct That Shocks the Conscience: The Right Not to be Enticed or Induced to Crime by
Government and its Agents, 7 W. NEw ENG. L. REV. 1, 42 (1984).
47. See Hampton, 425 U.S. at 489. Although noting the differences between the defendant's and the government's testimony as to who initiated the scheme, the Hampton
Court never addressed the issue of instigation as it applied to the due process defense.
48. Compare Russell, 411 U.S. at 436 (entrapment) (the defendant "was an active participant in an illegal drug manufacturing enterprise which began before the Government
agent appeared on the scene, and continued after the Government agent had left the
scene") with Hampton, 425 U.S. at 489-90 (due process) (where defendant was drawn into
scheme by the government, supplied with the contraband and the buyer, the plurality
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The Due Process Defense in the Federal Courts of Appeals
1. The Twigg Decision

United States v. Twigg 4 9 represents the only successful due process
defense in the federal courts. 50 The case involved a drug manufacturing
operation set up by a government informant. Defendant Neville was in
charge of raising funds and the informant was in charge of manufacturing. Defendant Twigg was brought into the scheme by Neville. The
planning stages took approximately six months and the drug manufacturing ring operated for only one week, under the guidance and expertise of the informant. The defendants were arrested at the end of their
51
week's labor.
The Third Circuit Court of Appeals found the level of governmental involvement sufficient to bar prosecution as a violation of due process. 52 The court distinguished Hampton from Twigg by finding that
drug sales (as in Hampton) might "require more extreme methods of investigation" 5 3 than infiltration of a drug manufacturing ring. More important, however, the court found that in Twigg the entire scheme was
"conceived and contrived by the government agents." 54 The court determined that the rule left by Hampton is that predisposition is not determinative and that fundamental fairness precludes conviction when
police conduct is "outrageous." ' 55 Although noting that defining outrageous conduct is difficult at best, the Twigg court concluded that when
the government designs the scheme, provides the expertise, and the defendants do not encourage the scheme but are merely receptive to it,
56
due process demands dismissal.
2.

Federal Court Decisions Since Twigg

Since the 1978 Twigg decision, the due process defense has not
been successful in the federal appellate courts, due, in part, to the questions surrounding the nature of the defense itself. That is, does the destated that "petitioner's case is different from Russell's but the difference is one of degree,
not of kind .... [11n each case the Government agents were acting in concert with the
defendant .... ).
49. 588 F.2d 373 (3d Cir. 1978).
50. Greene v. United States, 454 F.2d 783 (9th Cir. 1971) is sometimes cited as a
successful due process defense case, but the Greene court did not analyze it as such. Greene
was cited by the defendant in Russell as an example of extreme governmental overinvolvement. See Russell, 411 U.S. at 428. It is apparent from the Greene opinion that the defend-

ants were small-time operators who were goaded into a large-scale operation by the
government, which also created the only market for the contraband. Greene, 454 F.2d at
784-86.
51. Twigg, 588 F.2d at 375-76. For a thorough analysis of Twigg, see Comment, Due
Process Defense When Government Agents Instigate and Abet Crime, 67 GEo. L.J. 1455 (1979).
52. Twigg, 588 F.2d at 377.
53. Id. at 378.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 379.
56. Id. at 380-81. In a sharp dissent, Judge Adams criticized the majority for resurrecting the objective theory of entrapment "under a new name." Id. at 383 (Adams, J.,
dissenting).

DENVER UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 63:2

fense apply only when enforcement practices have encroached upon
some protected, "independent" right of the defendant and thus violated
due process? 57 Or is it a limitation on government investigations,
grounded in due process principles of fundamental fairness? 58 Because
of the dictum in Russell and the lack of a majority view in Hampton, the
answer to these questions is by no means clear. The federal courts have
therefore fashioned various tests to examine claims of due process
59
violations.
Although both the Fifth and Seventh Circuit Courts of Appeals still
consider Twigg an example of outrageous conduct, 60 the continued efficacy of that case may be in question. 6 ' Still, some courts are expressing
concern about overzealous and questionable tactics used by various governmental agencies, 62 although the case has not yet arisen which is sufficient to shock a court's conscience.
57. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
58. One commentator, posing the question similarly, concludes that "the protection
of due process, with its comprehensive guarantee of fairness in the relations between government and citizen, is not dependent upon any violation, by police misconduct, of a separate right of the defendant." Mascolo, supra note 46, at 36.
Many commentators have urged the Court to establish a constitutional basis for controlling undercover investigations. See Dix, Undercover Investigations and Police Rulemaking,
53 TEX. L. REV. 203 (1975) (calling for uniform standards in undercover work based upon
protections inherent in the fourth amendment); Gershman, Entrapment, Shocked Consciences,
and the Staged Arrest, 66 MINN. L. REV. 567, 611 (1982) (proposing a two-tiered due process
analysis focusing on ends and means which requires the government to justify procedures
used); Note, supra note 21, at 122 ("[T]he defense is clearly and most logically required as
a matter of substantive due process: the criminalization of acts which would not have occurred absent the government's solicitation and aid can serve no legitimate purpose.").
But see Park, The Entrapment Controversy, 60 MINN. L. REV. 163, 274 (1976) ("Governmental
bodies with the power to investigate [enforcement practices], subpoena witnesses, publicize abuses, recommend discipline, and institute prosecution are likely to be more effective
than attempts at control through sporadic acquittal of criminal defendants.").
59. See, e.g., United States v. Kelly, 707 F.2d 1460, 1468 n.49 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (The
D.C. Circuit, citing the dictum in Russell concerning outrageous governmental conduct, see
supra note 33 and accompanying text, stated "[tihe Second Circuit has read this citation to
indicate that due process will bar a prosecution only if the government's conduct directly
invades some personal right of the defendant."). Compare Archer v. Commissioner of Correction (Archer I/), 646 F.2d 44, 47 (2d Cir.) ("[Ilmpermissible police conduct [must be]
inflicted directly upon the defendant."), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 851 (1981) with United States
v. Brown, 635 F.2d 1207, 1213 (6th Cir. 1981) (relevant to due process inquiry are government instigation, government control of the criminal activity, and the "causal relationship
between the challenged ... conduct and the commission of the [defendant's] acts .... ").
For a thorough examination of cases prior to 1980, see generally Abramson & Lindeman,
supra note 12.
60. See United States v. Yater, 756 F.2d 1058, 1065, 1066 n.12 (5th Cir. 1985); United
States v. Thoma, 726 F.2d 1191, 1199 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 2683 (1984).
61. In United States v. Jannotti, 673 F.2d 578 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 457 U.S.1106
(1982), the court stated that three of the judges wanted to overrule Twigg: "[U]nless further guidance is given [in the area of the due process defense], district courts, in a faithful
attempt to apply Twigg .... will continue to reach results that cannot be reconciled with
the teaching of the Supreme Court in Hampton." Id. at 610 n. 17. But see supra text accompanying note 60.
62. See United States v. Beverly, 723 F.2d 11, 13 (3d Cir. 1983); United States v. Garrett, 716 F.2d 257, 275 n.10 (5th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 1910 (1984).
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Facts

In 1980, United States postal inspectors in Kansas City, Missouri,
concocted an intricate scheme to discover attorneys and physicians involved in insurance fraud.6 3 The inspectors obtained driver's licenses
using fictitious names, registered nonexistent vehicles under those
names, and then purchased automobile liability insurance for the
vehicles. 64
The postal inspectors, working with the Kansas City Police Department, had an officer prepare false accident reports, indicating that each
accident was the cited inspector's fault. The police issued traffic citations to the inspectors and they subsequently appeared in Kansas City
Municipal Court and pleaded guilty before unsuspecting prosecutors
65
and judges.
Two inspectors, posing as husband and wife, visited Dr. Gamble's
office and told him they had been passengers in a one-car accident on
May 6, 1980 and, although uninjured, wanted to obtain some money
from their insurance company. 6 6 They visited Dr. Gamble's office on
seven occasions. During each visit the defendant checked the inspectors' weights, blood pressures, and temperatures and charged them ten
to twelve dollars each. 6 7 On the fourth visit, the defendant's assistant
prepared insurance forms and, at the direction of one of the inspectors,
indicated on the form that the inspector had been unable to work for
approximately two months. On their final visit, the inspectors brought
with them a draft from the insurance company for $180, the medical
expense claimed. Dr. Gamble calculated the amount owed him which
68
the inspectors paid by money order, keeping the draft.
Two months later, another false accident report was filed and a second "husband and wife" undercover team appeared at Dr. Gamble's office claiming to have been involved in a rear-end collision. The
inspectors told Dr. Gamble they were uninjured but that the driver of
the car that hit them was insured and they wanted to obtain some money
63. The scheme is described in detail in United States v. Warren, 747 F.2d 1339 (10th
Cir. 1984), a case decided four months after United States v. Gamble, 737 F.2d 853 (10th
Cir. 1984). Both defendants, Warren and Gamble, were physicians in Kansas City and
both were targeted (apparently randomly) by United States postal inspectors as part of the
undercover operation "MAIL-Fraud") (Medical And Insurance Liability Fraud). Warren,
747 F.2d at 1340. It does not appear from either the Warren or Gamble decision that the
postal authorities suspected wholesale insurance fraud among doctors and lawyers, but
instead were on what may be termed a fishing expedition.
64. Warren, 747 F.2d at 1340; Gamble, 737 F.2d at 854.
65. Gamble, 737 F.2d at 854.
66. Id. One of the inspectors told Dr. Gamble he had broken his glasses in the accident but otherwise had suffered no injuries. Id.
67. Id.
68. Dr. Gamble calculated incorrectly. The draft was for $180. The inspectors had
paid $104 and the defendant calculated they owed him $66. The correct amount owed was
$76. Id. Apparently, the medical expenses and the notation on the form regarding leave
from work were to serve as the basis for some later action against either the "driver" of the
vehicle or a claim against the insurance company.
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through his insurance. 69 The inspectors visited the defendant on five
occasions and were given routine medical examinations on each visit.
After several weeks, the inspectors told Dr. Gamble they had contacted
the insurance company. At a later visit the inspectors gave the defendant an envelope addressed to the insurance company. Dr. Gamble wrote
out a bill, placed it in the envelope and asked the inspectors to handle
it. 70 On December 11, 1980, the inspectors gave the defendant the
$160 draft they had received from the insurance company. They were
reimbursed the $50 they had paid on the prior five visits and then signed
7
the draft over to Dr. Gamble. '
Dr. Gamble was subsequently arrested and convicted on four
72
counts of mail fraud.
B.

The Opinion

A three-judge panel 73 for the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed Dr. Gamble's conviction, rejecting the defendant's claims that (1)
the requirements of the mail fraud statute7" were not satisfied, and (2)
the Government's conduct was so outrageous as to bar his conviction as
a violation of due process of law.
1.

Mail Fraud

Dr. Gamble's appeal was predicated on the fact that he neither devised the scheme to defraud nor mailed any documents. He further contended that the use of the mails was not crucial to the scheme. 7 5 Finally,
he argued that section 1341 was not applicable to him because the gov76
ernment planned the scheme and his was a peripheral role.
The court rejected all of the defendant's claims. First, the court
stated that only two elements are required to prove mail fraud: "(1) a
scheme to defraud, and (2) the mailing or causing the mailing of a letter
69. Id. at 855. Dr. Gamble told his "patients:"
"You'll just have to play it up. You can't go out there tell that man ah, I wasn't
hurt .... " "You gotta have a back injury and you gotta have a neck injury or
something .... "We have to write it up to that effect and you'll make some money
out of the deal."
Id.
70. Id.
71. Id. As with the other inspectors' visits, Dr. Gamble's profit, if any, was minimal.
72. The federal mail fraud statute provides in pertinent part:
Whoever, having devised or intending to devise any scheme or artifice to defraud,
or for obtaining money or property by means of false or fraudulent pretenses,
representations, or promises . . . for the purpose of executing such scheme or
artifice or attempting to do so, places in any post office... or knowingly causes to
be delivered by mail ... any such matter or thing, shall be fined not more than
$1,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.
18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1982).
73. Judge Logan wrote the opinion and was joined by Judges Holloway and
Breitenstein.
74. 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1982). See supra note 72.
75. Gamble, 737 F.2d at 855. Dr. Gamble "admitted in tape recorded meetings with
the inspectors that he knew the mails would be used to execute the scheme." Id. at 856.
76. Id.
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or other item for the purpose of executing the scheme." ' 77 As long as
the defendant had the requisite intent to defraud, 78 the scheme need
not be devised by the defendant. 79 Nor is there a requirement for
agreement among the participants similar to that required in the act of
conspiracy. 8 °
2.

The Due Process Claim

The court began its analysis of the defendant's due process claim by
citing the dictum in Russell and the opinions in Hampton. The court also
discussed Twigg and Greene v. United States, 8 1 noting that in both cases the
government instigated, conceived and directed the schemes; provided
essential services and supplies; and, in the case of Greene, was the sole
82
purchaser of the contraband.
The court next asserted that the due process defense, like the defense of entrapment, is based upon the principle that " 'courts must be
closed to the trial of a crime instigated by the government's own
agents.' -83 Crucial to this determination is the extent to which the government's actions directly enticed the defendant to commit the crimes
for which he stands accused: "Thus, the more immediate the impact of
the government's conduct upon the particular defendant, the more vig84
orously would be applied Russell's test for constitutional impropriety."
The government's conduct, moreover, must be assessed in light of the
defendant's predisposition. The determination of whether governmental conduct exceeds permissible levels depends upon "the type of opportunity to become involved with crime that this conduct provides to
the unwitting defendant." '8 5 The court stated that Dr. Gamble had no
criminal record and the government had no apparent suspicion that he
was predisposed to criminal acts. However, the court stated that such
77. Id. at 855 (citing Pereira v. United States, 347 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1954)).
78. Gamble, 737 F.2d at 856. See United States v. Rasheed, 663 F.2d 843, 847 (9th Cir.
1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1157 (1982).
79. Gamble, 737 F.2d at 856. See United States v. Toney, 598 F.2d 1349, 1356 (5th Cir.
1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1033 (1980).
80. "[Miail fraud, unlike conspiracy, does not require an agreement. Thus, the fact
that only one of the participants ... had a specific intent to defraud does not bar conviction . . . ." Gamble, 737 F.2d at 856. Here, the court concluded that the evidence established that Dr. Gamble had the requisite intent to defraud. The fact that it was the
government that engendered and carried out the scheme is not fatal to the issue of the
defendant's intent. Id.
81. 454 F.2d 783 (9th Cir. 1971). See supra note 50.
82. Gamble, 737 F.2d at 857.
83. Id. (quoting Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 459 (1932) (Roberts, J., concurring)). Why entrapment was not pleaded in Gamble is unclear. The court acknowledged
the defendant's lack of predisposition and absence of a criminal record. Gamble, 737 F.2d
at 859.
84. Id. at 858 (quoting United States v. Spivey, 508 F.2d 146, 150 (10th Cir.), cert.
denied, 421 U.S. 949 (1975)). In Spivey the court found that the informant's conduct was
not outrageous because the defendant was predisposed and engaged in illegal conduct
without the government's assistance: "We cannot accept defendant's argument [that his
conduct] may be rationalized only by predicating a pervasive and creative participation by
the government in the criminal activity." Spivey, 508 F.2d at 151.
85. Gamble, 737 F.2d at 858. See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
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reasonable suspicion is not a prerequisite to undercover activities. 86
Although the government agents obtained false documents, lied to
prosecutors and judges, submitted false claims to the insurance companies, and lied to the insurance agents, 8 7 this web of deceit did not induce the defendant to commit the fraud, the court asserted. Following
the reasoning of the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in Archer H,88 the
court determined that because none of these outrageous acts of the government was perpetrated against Dr. Gamble, he could not claim a due
process violation in this area of the government's conduct. 89
The area of governmental conduct that did directly affect the defendant, although deceitful, was not sufficient to violate due process, the
court stated. Dr. Gamble is a black doctor who practiced in the Kansas
City ghetto area. The agents presented themselves as poor and needing
financial help. The court conceded that the circumstances were "appealing" to the doctor who "might [have] appear[ed] callous if he did
not cooperate." 90 Although finding that the government created and
controlled the crime in which the defendant joined, the court concluded
that insurance fraud represents a legitimate target for police undercover
activity. 9 i
Finally, the court discussed the government's conduct and Dr. Gamble's subsequent conviction in conjunction with its supervisory power.
The court concluded that it was foreclosed from exercising its power
because "we may not fashion a 'sub-constitutional' rule to permit dismissal of this case because of the government agents' conduct. "92
III.

ANALYSIS

United States v. Gamble presented the Tenth Circuit with a clear case
of government-manufactured crime entered into for the purpose of convicting offenders. The government violated at least five state statutes
and lied to prosecutors, judges and insurance companies (which were
the purported beneficiaries of the scheme) in order to secure convictions of randomly targeted individuals. 93 The government conceived,
86. Id. at 859-60.
87. Id. at 858-59. The court was clearly outraged at this conduct: "The government
agents in the case before us displayed shocking disregard for the legal system." Id. at 859.
88. 646 F.2d 44 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 851 (1981).
89. Gamble, 737 F.2d at 859.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 860.
92. Id., citing United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727 (1980) for the proposition that
even when an investigation is "tainted with gross illegalities," a court may not dismiss a
prosecution of its own accord when the defendant does not have standing to object to the
agents' conduct. See supra text accompanying notes 87-89.
93. In the Appellant's Brief for Warren, 747 F.2d 1339 (10th Cir. 1984), which concerned the same scheme as that in Gamble, the defendant listed five Missouri state statutes
violated in the undercover operation: Mo. Ann. Stat. §§ 302.220 (prohibited uses of
licenses); 570.090 (forgery; class C felony); 575.060 (false declarations; class B misdemeanor); 575.080 (false reports; class B misdemeanor); 575.00 (tampering with physical
evidence; class A misdemeanor); 575.110 (tampering with public record; class A misdemeanor) (Vernon 1979). Appellant's Brief at 7-13.
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created and directed the operation from start to finish. Gamble is thus
indistinguishable from Twigg. 94 And, like Twigg, the defendant in Gamble
was merely an auxiliary, the last element needed to complete the contrived crime. Yet, unlike Twigg, the due process defense in Gamble was
unsuccessful.
The court cited extensively from Twigg and Greene, apparently with
approval, noting that those cases stand for the proposition that the government may not instigate, manufacture, nor become enmeshed in
crime from beginning to end for the purpose of securing convictions of
individuals who were " 'minding [their] own affairs.' -95 The court also

noted that the due process defense survives because of the Hampton concurring and dissenting opinions which deemed fundamental fairness
would prevent conviction of a predisposed defendant (and, a fortiori, a
nonpredisposed defendant) under certain circumstances. 9 6
Despite these references, the Tenth Circuit failed to draw the obvious parallel. 9 7 It reiterated its holding in United States v. Spivey 9 8 which
formulated the test used by the Tenth Circuit to determine due process
violations:
[T]o be relevant at all, the government's conduct must be postured as connected in some way to the commission of the acts
for which the defendant stands convicted. In cases decided
since Russell . . .this connection has been implicitly acknowl-

edged by reference to the extent to which the government instigated, participated in, or was involved or enmeshed in, the
criminal activity itself. Thus, the more immediate the impact of
the government's conduct upon the particular defendant, the
more vigorously would be applied Russell's test for constitutional impropriety. 9 9
Spivey's defense failed because of his own independent illegal conduct
and the fact that in that case the government neither initiated contact
94. In Twigg, the court stated that "[ilt
is unclear whether the parties had the means or
the money to obtain the chemical [which the government supplied] on their own." Twigg,
588 F.2d at 380. The court also determined that the defendants lacked the expertise to
manufacture the drug. Id. at 381. In Gamble, no such "expertise" was required due to the
nature of the crime but, like Twigg, "[t]he assistance . . .provided [by the defendant] was
minimal and then at the specific direction of [the government]." Id.
95. Gamble, 737 F.2d at 858 (quoting United States v. Twigg, 588 F.2d 373, 381 (3d
Cir. 1978)).
96. Gamble, 737 F.2d at 856-57 (citing Hampton, 425 U.S. at 492 (Powell, J., concurring), 497 (Brennan, j., dissenting)). See supra notes 41-46 and accompanying text.
97. In United States v. Warren, 747 F.2d 1339 (10th Cir. 1984), the court stated that
Greene and Twigg "involved facts readily distinguishable from the present case."

Warren,

747 F.2d at 1343. The court did not make this claim in Gamble, and it is difficult to see how
Gamble and Warren differ from Twigg. The difference between Gamble and Warren is that in
Warren the defendant was an active, profiting participant in the scheme. See Warren, 747
F.2d at 1341 n.3 (four agents, over a period of months, visited defendant's office 34 times;
the insurance company was billed for 100 visits at a total charge (calculated by the defendant) of $3,625).
98. 508 F.2d 146 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 949 (1975). See supra note 84.
99. Gamble, 737 F.2d at 858 (quoting Spivey, 508 F.2d at 149-50). The Russell test is
that expressed by Justice Rehnquist which referred to Rochin. See supra text accompanying

note 33.
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nor instigated the drug sales.' 00 In Gamble, the government both initiated contact and instigated the scheme. By the court's own characterization, "[t]he government . . . enmeshed in criminal schemes fabricated
entirely by government agents a black doctor who had no criminal record and with respect to whom the agents had no apparent hint of a predisposition to criminal activity."' 0 '
The court avoided the consequences of its own determination that
the due process defense is properly invoked when " 'the government's
conduct [is] ...

connected in some way to the commission of the acts for

which the defendant stands convicted' "o102 by dividing its analysis into
discrete parts: the crime of mail fraud, the government's unlawful activities prior to inducement, and the government's actions as they directly
affected Dr. Gamble. These elements should not be separated because
to do so prevents a complete examination of the government's creation
and instigation of the scheme and its level of involvement therein. This
examination is the very heart of the due process defense. Nor can the
causal connection between the government's inducement and the defendant's commission of the crime be fairly examined if these factors are
viewed in isolation. The Gamble court did not view the government's
conduct as a whole and did not consider justice Powell's comments in
Hampton that noncontraband offenses may engender different criteria
for due process analysis, with the focus on the tactics used in light of the
circumstances involved.' 0 3 The Gamble court merely concluded that it
did not find insurance fraud so "commonplace that it is improper for the
1
government to try to catch and convict citizens who engage in it."i 04
Drug-related crimes and corruption in public offices involve issues and
societal effects which are demonstrably different from those of smallscale insurance fraud. This is not to say that the latter should be condoned. It should not. But when that crime, which by its very nature
necessitates random targeting, becomes the subject of an intricate and
intrusive undercover operation, such as that in Gamble, the issue turns
not merely on whether the crime is a proper target for undercover operations but also on whether greater societal interests are at stake.
Because the Gamble court apparently determined that the defendant
was not predisposed and that the government instigated the crime, 10 5
100. Spivey, 508 F.2d at 150, 151. See supra note 84; see also United States v. Szycher,
585 F.2d 443, 446-49 (10th Cir. 1978) (defendant attended party given by informant and
DEA agents, invited them to his home for some cocaine, and agents subsequently expressed their desire to purchase the drug in quantity; court adopted trial court's determination that this constituted mere opportunity for commission of crime because of the
defendant's predisposition).
101. Gamble, 737 F.2d at 859. In both Russell and Hampton the defendants were predisposed. See supra section I(B).
102. Gamble, 737 F.2d at 858 (quoting Spivey, 508 F.2d at 149).
103. Hampton, 425 U.S. at 493 (Powell,J., concurring). See also supra text accompanying
notes 44-45.
104. Gamble, 737 F.2d at 860 (emphasis added). "[T]o catch" implies a defendant already engaged in the activity. Given the facts of Gamble, the proper phrasing would be "to
induce."
105. See supra text accompanying notes 86-87, 91.
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the court should have examined the following interdependent factors for
its due process analysis: (1) whether the government manufactured
crime for the sole purpose of obtaining a conviction;' 0 6 (2) the nature of
the crime involved;' 0 7 and (3) whether the defendant acted "in concert"
with the government in committing the crime for which he was
convicted. ' 08
By failing to evaluate Dr. Gamble's due process claim in this manner, the Tenth Circuit ignores the anomoly of convicting a defendant
who had far less participation in a crime than did the government.' 0 9 It
also ignores the implications of police undercover work which focuses
on anticipating rather than investigating crime; that is, undercover work
which amounts to random integrity testing.' 10 If the issue is outrageous
police conduct, then that conduct must be assessed in light of all circumstances involved - including the detection practices employed to induce the defendant's commission of the crime. I1 ' The Gamble court
only found "outrageous" the government's "shocking disregard for the
106. See supra text accompanying note 83; see also supra text accompanying notes 54-56
for the Twigg court's assessment of government-created crimes.
107. See supra text accompanying notes 44-45. Relevant to this inquiry is the difficulty
of detection, see Hampton, 425 U.S. at 495 n.7 (Powell, J., concurring) and United States v.
Brown, 635 F.2d 1207, 1213 (6th Cir. 1980), society's need to deter and detect such crime,
and a balancing of the interests involved. See supra text accompanying notes 103-04; see also
United States v. Archer (Archer 1) 486 F.2d 670, 677 (2d Cir. 1973) (noting the danger in
assigning "too little [weight] to the rights of citizens to be free from government-induced
criminality") (dictum); Gershman, Entrapment, Shocked Consciences, and the Staged Arrest, 66
MINN. L. REV. 567, 613 (1982) (arguing that random targeting amounts to "intrusive and
deceptive undercover weaponry to test the integrity or criminal propensities of citizens at
large").
108. See supra note 48. Related to this analysis, and a factor not addressed by the Gamble court, is an evaluation of the elements of the crime itself, see supra text accompanying
note 77. In Gamble, the government provided both of the elements required. Although
this fact does not prevent conviction, see supra notes 75-80 and accompanying text, the
court's separation of this issue from the due process claim is myopic. The court states that
"[tihe government's actions in formulating the scheme and drawing defendant into it are
not to be condemned as failing to satisfy the 'scheme' element." Gamble, 737 F.2d at 856.
Yet such conduct must be evaluated in view of the "in concert" requirement of Hampton.
Hampton, 425 U.S. at 489-90. If "in concert" means anything, it must require that the
defendant be "an active participant in an illegal .. .enterprise." Russell, 411 U.S. at 436
(emphasis added). See United States v. Tobias, 662 F.2d 381, 387 (5th Cir. 1981), cert.
denied, 457 U.S. 1108 (1982) (no due process violation when defendant initiated contact
with DEA agent and was thus found to be "a predisposed active participant [inthe scheme],
motivated solely by a desire to make money") (emphasis by the court); cf. supra note 97.
109. See supra notes 93 and 107 and accompanying text.
110. See generally Marx, Who Really Gets Stung? Some Issues Raised by the New Police Undercover Work, 28 CRIME & DELINQ. 165, 175 (1982) (noting "[t]he government's unregulated
power to carry out integrity tests at will ...");
Comment, supra note 51, at 1471 ("[It] is
difficult to square arbitrary and unrestrained solicitation of crime with the requirement of
fundamental fairness inherent in due process.").
111. See supra notes 44-45 and accompanying text; Marx, supra note 110, at 167 ("At a
very general level, there appears [in law enforcement practices] to be a decline in the
acceptance of coercive means to control people, with a concomitant rise in deceptive
means."); Rotenberg, The Police Detection Practice of Encouragement: Lewis v. United States
and Beyond, 4 Hous. L. REV. 609, 611 (1967) ("To the extent that the propriety of a practice is raised by a defendant on appeal .. .the inquiry islimited to the specific detection
practice in question.... Without 'total' thinking about detection, however, society fails to
identify and articulate detection 'values' for its detection system.").
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legal system.'
,12 But the government's quiet invasion into the homes
and offices of its citizens to test their propensity for crime manifests a
more insidious, although less dramatic, encroachment on personal liberties than did Rochin.' i These tactics are outrageous.
Jill BurIram

112. Gamble, 737 F.2d at 859.
113. See also Mascolo, snpra note 46, at 29 ("The degree of [policel misconduct
which will warrant the barring of prosecution, should not be restricted to situations involving police brutality that rivals 'the rack and the screw' in its assault upon human dignity.")
(quoting Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952)); Comment, Entrapment, Do Lorean
and the Undercover Operation: .4 ConstitutionalConnection, 18 J. MAR. L. REV. 365. 397 (1985)
(arguing that "the individual's privacy interests, ["the citizen's 'right to be let alone' ",
become a necessary consideration in cases of entrapment and outrageous government
misconduct") (quoting Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis,].,
dissenting)).
In another context, in Poe v. Ullman, but expressing similar sentiments, Justice
Harlan declared:
The secular state is not an examiner of consciences: it must operate in the realm
of behavior, of overt actions, and where it does so operate. not only the underlying, moral purpose of its operations, but also the choice of means becomes relevant
to anv Constitutional judgment on what is done.
367 U.S. 497, 547 (1960) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
OVERVIEW

Because of the numerous issues encompassed under the topic of
criminal procedure, this article will discuss only a few subjects within
that broad topic, subjects that are in a developmental stage in the Tenth
Circuit. Many areas have been addressed by the court during this survey
period that will not be considered in this discussion, not because they
are not noteworthy or because changes or new precedent in these areas
have not been developed, but rather because they are not considered to
be among the major issues relevant to criminal procedure law.
This article will discuss the fine line distinguishing a Terry stop from
a full-fledged arrest, primarily in the context of a car search. The many
inroads to fourth amendment protections such as the exceptions of exigency, independent source and attenuation will be considered, along
with the Tenth Circuit's strict compliance with a valid and knowing consent to search. Next, this article will discuss the fifth amendment rights
of the accused, namely, what constitutes a waiver of those rights and the
consequences of counsel's comment on the defendant's invocation of
those rights as well as how privileges and immunities can operate to vitiate fifth amendment protections. Finally, issues arising out of the sixth
amendment protections will be discussed; for example: when a defendant has the right to counsel; if the defendant has the right to counsel of
his choice; the sufficiency of a waiver of counsel; the collateral use of an
uncounseled conviction; and the right to effective assistance of counsel
in various contexts. There is also some commentary on the Tenth Circuit's treatment of the defendant's sixth amendment right to confront
his witnesses and the use of an absent witness's deposition at trial.

I.
A.

FOURTH AMENDMENT

Car Searches: A Terry Stop Followed by Consent
1. United States v. Recalde

In United States v. Recalde,' an Argentinian citizen was stopped in
New Mexico for speeding. The officer testified at trial that because he
had a "gut instinct" that Recalde was transporting narcotics, 2 he asked
Recalde if he could look into the trunk of the car. Recalde immediately
obliged the officer. Upon inspecting the trunk, the officer spotted a
briefcase and asked if he could search its contents. Without hesitation,
Recalde consented to the search. 3 The officer found nothing suspicious
in Recalde's trunk or brief-case, but did notice that a number of screws
in the automobile's interior had been tampered with. At this point, Re1. 761 F.2d 1448 (10th Cir. 1985).
2. Recatde, 761 F.2d at 1451.

3. Id. at 1452.
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calde was either asked or directed to accompany the officers to the police station for further investigation. 4 When they arrived at the station,
the officer gave Recalde his Miranda warnings and began to interrogate
him. Recalde indicated that he did not want to answer any questions,
but he agreed to sign a consent-to-search form and allowed the officers
to search his car. Upon searching the car, the officers discovered ten
kilograms of cocaine stashed inside the interior quarter panels, and, as a
result, the officer placed Recalde under arrest.5 Recalde was convicted
on one count of possession with intent to distribute cocaine. On appeal
to the Tenth Circuit, he argued that the district court erred in denying
6
his motion to suppress the evidence seized during the search of his car.
In its response to the defendant's motion to suppress, which alleged
that the evidence seized from Recalde's car was based on an illegal
search, the prosecution did not rely on any of the exceptions to the warrant requirement, 7 such as a car search incident to an arrest, 8 a personal
search incident to an arrest 9 or exigent circumstances. 10 Instead, the
prosecution asserted the search was valid because Recalde had voluntarily signed a consent form at the police station. The prosecution alternatively argued that even if the court concluded that Recalde's consent
to accompany the police officers to the police station and his later consent at the station to have his car searched was not entirely voluntary,
any intrusive invasions of privacy were justified as lawful measures taken
following a Teriy stop. " I
Judge Seymour, writing for a unanimous three judge panel, first determined that the government had failed to establish that there was an
4. At trial, Recalde testified that he was ordered to accompany the officers to the
police station; conversely, the officers testified that they had merely asked Recalde to go
with them to the station. Recalde, 761 F.2d at 1452. Recalde was never told that he was
either free to go or free to refuse to accompany the officers to the police station. Neither
officer denied this. Furthermore, Recalde's undisputed testimony revealed that because
the officer had retained his driver's license and vehicle registration, he did not feel free to
leave at any time. The trial record also disclosed that when Recalde drove from the roadside stop to the police station, his car was protectively sandwiched between the two officers' squad cars. Id.
5. Recalde, 761 F.2d at 1452.
6. Id. at 1451.
7. The seminal case requiring the issuance of a warrant before any search may be
conducted is Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
8. When the police make a lawful arrest of the occupants of an automobile, they may
also search the car's passenger compartment without obtaining a warrant. See New York v.
Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981).
9. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969). In Chimel, the Court held that "[w]hen
an arrest is made, it is reasonable for the arresting officer to search the person arrested...
[without obtaining a warrant]." Id. at 762-63.
10. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925) (contraband hidden in the seats of a
car was validly seized by an arresting officer without a warrant because it was in the control
of one who was legally arrested).
11. Recalde, 761 F.2d at 1454. In Terry v. Ohio, 342 U.S. 1 (1968), the United States
Supreme Court permitted police officers to conduct a limited search of an individual based
on less than probable cause, provided the police officer has an articulable basis for suspecting criminal activity. See also Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692 (1981) (extending
the Terry search to allow a search for weapons in an automobile's passenger compartment
based on less than probable cause).
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absence of duress or coercion when the officers obtained Recalde's consent. Judge Seymour gleaned from the testimony that Recalde perceived himself to be in a coercive custodial situation in which he had no
other option but to comply with the officers' requests.' 2 Following
United States v. Mendenhall,13 Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 14 and United States
v. Prichard,15 the Tenth Circuit held that "consent" is a question of fact
to be determined from the totality of the circumstances.' 6 The trial
court must determine whether the consent is in fact voluntary, or the
product of some form of duress or coercion. The burden is on the government to prove an absence of duress or coercion, and, if the "consent" is given after an illegal stop, the government has an even heavier
burden of proof to carry than it would if the consent had been given
after a permissible stop.'

7

The Tenth Circuit found that the government in Recalde was unable
to meet its weighty burden to refute duress or coercion; therefore, the
transport of the defendant to the station exceeded the scope and reasonableness of a Terry stop. The record divulged not only that the officer
retained Recalde's driver's license and vehicle registration at all times
prior to the car search, but also that Recalde had signed the consent
form only moments after being placed in a small interrogation room
with two police officers.' 8 These facts substantiated the court's conclusion that Recalde had perceived himself to be in a coercive custodial
situation.
Because the Tenth Circuit concluded that the government was unable to sustain its burden to refute the existence of duress or coercion, it
turned to the prosecution's alternative contention that these actions
were permissible and reasonable because they were proper precautionary measures following a Terry stop. In analyzing the validity of the investigative roadside stop, the Tenth Circuit looked to see if the officer's
actions were justified at the inception of the stop and whether the extent
of the officer's actions were reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the initial interference. 19 Judge Seymour stated
that the court's assessment is essentially a balancing test which weighs
12. Id. But cf. United States v. Obregon, 748 F.2d 1371, 1376 (10th Cir. 1984) (The
defendant testified that he told the officer he could search his car "because that way I felt
he would let me go or something." The Tenth Circuit in Obregon found that the record
amply supported the district court's decision that the defendant had voluntary consented
to the car search despite the defendant's perception of a coercive situation.). See infra
notes 55-57 and accompanying text.
13. 446 U.S. 544 (1980).
14. 412 U.S. 218 (1973).
15. 645 F.2d 854 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 832 (1981).
16. See also United States v. Obregon, 748 F.2d 1371, 1376 (1984) (Given the totality
of the circumstances, the defendant, who had stated he did not want to make a statement
and wanted to see a lawyer, made a knowing and intelligent waiver of his rights by signing
a consent form.).
17. Recalde, 761 F.2d at 1457 (citing United States v. Troutman, 590 F.2d 604, 606
(5th Cir. 1979) and United States v. Ballard, 573 F.2d 913, 916 (5th Cir. 1978)).
18. Recalde, 761 F.2d at 1454.
19. Id. (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. I (1968) and United States v. Sharpe, 105 S. Ct.
1568 (1985)); see also United States v. Obregon, 748 F.2d 1371 (10th Cir. 1984).
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the nature and quality of the intrusion on the individual's fourth amendment interests against the importance of the governmental interests alleged to justify the intrusion. 20 The court conceded that the initial stop
and the subsequent demand for Recalde to display his driver's license
and vehicle registration were reasonable and minimally intrusive because he was driving in excess of the maximum speed limits. It further
found that Recalde's consent to search the trunk of his car and his briefcase was entirely voluntary under the circumstances. On the other hand,
when Recalde was "persuaded" to accompany the police officers to the
station, the court concluded that the officers had crossed over the line of
reasonableness and converted their investigative Terry stop into an
arrest, requiring a threshold of probable cause which the court deter21
mined had not been met.
Judge Seymour relied on Dunaway v. New York 2 2 and Hayes v. Flor23
ida.
Hayes describes the line separating a brief detention and a full
fledged arrest to be "[w]hen the police ...forcibly remove a person
from his home [or other place in which he is entitled to be] and transport him to [a police] station, where he is detained, although briefly, for
investigative purposes .....
-24 Accordingly, in moving and subsequently detaining Recalde, involuntarily and without probable cause,
the policemen had exceeded the limits of a Terry stop and violated Recalde's fourth amendment rights. Therefore, the evidence, ten kilo25
grams of cocaine found in the search, was properly suppressed.
2.

United States v. Gonzalez

Two weeks after the Tenth Circuit handed down the Recalde opinion, it considered United States v. Gonzalez, 26 a case involving an almost
identical factual situation as that in Recalde. Gonzalez was driving down
a New Mexico highway and was pulled over for speeding. Here again,
the officer testified to having a "gut feeling" or intuition that the defendant was transporting narcotics; this was partly because the officer had
smelled deodorizer in the car, a tactic often used to mask the scent of
narcotics. 2 7 Nevertheless, the officer could not articulate with any degree of specificity what facts could give rise to justify a search, the minimum requirement laid down in Terry.
Once stopped, Gonzalez was asked to produce his driver's license
and vehicle registration. When the officer saw that Gonzalez's driver's
20. " 'When the nature and extent of the detention are minimally intrusive of the
individual's Fourth Amendment interests, the opposing law enforcement interests can support a seizure on less than probable cause.' " Recalde, 761 F.2d at 1454 (quoting United
States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 703 (1983)) (emphasis omitted).
21. Recalde, 761 F.2d at 1455.
22. 442 U.S. 200 (1979).
23. 105 S. Ct. 1643 (1985).
24. Id. at 1644. See generally Y. KAMISAR, W. LA FAVE, J. ISRAEL, MODERN CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE 256-415 (4th ed. 1974).

25. Recalde, 761 at 1459.
26. 763 F.2d 1127 (10th Cir. 1985).
27. Id. at 1128.
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license was from New York but the car was registered in California, he
became suspicious that the vehicle was stolen. The officer returned to
his own vehicle and conducted a computer check to verify the propriety
of the registration and license. Although the computer check disclosed
that no problems existed, the officer's suspicions of criminal activity still
remained. At this point, the officer requested that the defendant accompany him to the police station for further interrogation. 2 8 Once at the
station, the officer promptly prepared a speeding citation along with a
consent-to-search form, both of which the defendant signed. The car
search uncovered eighty pounds of cocaine underneath the back seat
and within the side door panels. The defendant was immediately placed
29
under arrest.
The Tenth Circuit's rationale and conclusion in Gonzalez was similar
to that in Recalde: the court explained that the officer, once he transported Gonzalez from the side of the highway to the police station, had
stepped over the line separating the minimally intrusive actions permitted in a Terry stop into the realm of a full-fledged arrest necessitating
probable cause. Because there was no probable cause to arrest the defendant, the officer had clearly invaded Gonzalez's constitutionally protected right against unlawful searches and seizures. The government
had, as in Recalde, failed to overcome its burden to prove that, under the
circumstances, Gonzalez had been free from coercion or duress when he
signed the consent-to-search form.
An interesting point made by Judge Logan in his analysis of the
illegal roadside seizure was that the length of time that Gonzalez was
detained, twenty minutes, was only minimally intrusive and that this, if
standing alone, was reasonable.3 0 He acknowledged that if United States
v. Sharpe3 l was relied upon to determine whether this was an illegal
seizure, the twenty minute stop would pass constitutional muster. It was
not, however, the brevity of the detention that the court was concerned
with; rather, it was the conduct of the officer during the detention that
became the decisive factor in the constitutional assessment. The court
therefore looked to Hayes v. Florida3 2 where the focus was on the police
conduct during the stop, not the duration of the stop itself. The Hayes
Court announced that the proper inquiry is whether the defendant has
perceived, either implicitly or explicitly, a loss of freedom when taken
from his house to a police station and detained against his will.3 3 The
Tenth Circuit accepted the district court's finding that Gonzalez had
perceived that there was no option other than to accompany the officer,
no matter how polite the officer was in phrasing his request. Just as in
28. Gonzalez, 763 F.2d at 1129-30.
29. Id. at 1129.
30. Id. at 1131.
31. 105 S. Ct. 1568, 1575 (1985) ("In assessing whether a detention is too long in
duration to be justified as an investigative stop ....
it [is] appropriate to examine whether
the police diligently pursued a means of investigation that was likely to confirm or dispel
their suspicions quickly ....
).
32. 105 S. Ct. 1643 (1985).
33. Id. at 1647.
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Recalde, the officer had retained the defendant's driver's license and vehicle registration. Because the officers lacked sufficient probable cause
to justify a full-fledged arrest, the court concluded that Gonzalez' trip to
34
the station was a clear violation of his fourth amendment rights.
Judge Logan noted that the officer detaining Gonzalez had reasonable alternatives to a forced trip to the police station. The officer could
have requested a backup officer,3 5 or he could have attempted to obtain
a consent to search the vehicle on the spot. 3 6 Additionally, as the
Supreme Court noted in Michigan v. Long, 3 7 if there are reasonable and
articulable grounds for a belief that the suspect is dangerous and that he
may gain immediate control of any weapons, the officer may conduct a
brief search of the automobile, limited to those areas in which a weapon
may be placed or hidden. 38 The Long holding is similar to the Tenth
Circuit opinion of United States v. Romero, 39 decided prior to Long. The
Romero decision held that just as an officer may search a car for weapons
during a lawful arrest,40 an officer who has lawfully stopped a suspect
whom he reasonably believes is armed and dangerous may conduct a
41
limited search of the suspect's car.
Romero also was important because it followed the Tenth Circuit
precedent 4 2 that adopted the "independent source" exception to the
exclusionary rule. This exception, carved out in Silverthorne Lumber Co. v.
United States,4 3 recognized that the "fruits of the poisonous tree ''4 4 doctrine would not apply where the evidence obtained could have come
from two sources, one of which was legitimate. The Silverthorne Court
stated that evidence obtained through illegal searches does not automatically become sacred and insulated from the judicial process; if the government can prove that the evidence was obtainable from an
independent and constitutionally permissible source, it will be
45
admissible.
34. Gonzalez, 763 F.2d at 1133.
35. The atmosphere of the detention appeared threatening to the officer. It was dark
outside; the stop occurred on an isolated stretch of highway; and, furthermore, there were
two occupants inside the vehicle and only one officer at the scene. Id. at 1132.
36. Id. at 1133.
37. 463 U.S. 1032 (1983); see supra note 11.
38. Long, 463 U.S. at 1049.
39. 692 F.2d 699 (10th Cir. 1982).
40. Id. at 703; see infra notes 61-69 and accompanying text.
41. Romero, 692 F.2d at 703; see also United States v. Pappas, 735 F.2d 1232 (10th Cir.
1984) (limited car search for weapons conducted immediately after defendant's arrest for
protective measures was not a violation of the fourth amendment).
42. See Aiuppa v. United States, 393 F.2d 597 (10th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 404 U.S.
871 (1971).
43. 251 U.S. 395 (1920).
44. In Wong Sung v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963), the Supreme Court held that
any evidence obtained directly or indirectly
as a result of illegal police conduct will be
suppressed.
45. Silverthornes holding did not explicitly go quite this far, but later decisions have
confirmed its broad application. In Segura v. United States, 104 S. Ct. 3380 (1984), the
police entered the defendant's apartment without first obtaining a search warrant. The
Court permitted this unlawful entry because at the time of the entry, the officers already
had the requisite probable cause they would have needed to obtain a search warrant. Ex-
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The court in Gonzalez excluded the evidence found in the car search
labeling it "tainted fruit" from an illegal seizure.4 6 If the government
had argued that a limited Romero search of the car's passenger compartment based upon articulable facts would have unearthed the cocaine
hidden beneath the back seat, and alleged that this limited search was a
legal and "independent" source of discovery of the evidence, 4 7 the
eighty pounds may have withstood the motion to suppress. The government, however, instead alleged that when Gonzalez voluntarily consented to have his car searched, he "purged the taint" 4 8 of the illegal
stop, cleansing the otherwise defective subsequent seizure of evidence
of any constitutional violations.
The Supreme Court has recognized several situations where a victim of illegal police conduct cannot use the exclusionary rule to suppress evidence. One such situation is when there is sufficient
attenuation between the illegal stop and a consent to search. This "attenuation" doctrine was recently adopted by the Tenth Circuit in United
States v. Carson.49 In Carson, the court held that the evidence found in a
second search was admissible because the defendant's voluntary consent
to the second search was an independent act sufficient to break the
causal connection between the illegal first search and the second
search. 50 Notwithstanding the Carson opinion, the Gonzalez court, based
on the facts, could not find sufficient attenuation to justify the admission
of evidence found in a search preceded by an illegal detention. 5 '
In Gonzalez, ChiefJudge Holloway dissented in a lengthy opinion in
which he admonished the majority for failing to adequately protect the
clusion of the evidence as "fruit of the poisonous tree," explained the Court, is not warranted due to that independent source. In Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980), the
officers were not entitled to enter Payton's home without a warrant in the absence of exigent circumstances. However, the officers did have probable cause to obtain an arrest
warrant for Payton, and this probable cause furnished an "independent source" permitting the warrantless search and seizure of the narcotics that were in plain view in Payton's
apartment.
46. Gonzalez, 763 F.2d at 1133.
47. Had the officer been alert enough to conduct a limited Romero search for weapons
and chanced to stumble upon the narcotics during this search, he could have seized the
cocaine under the "plain view" doctrine, an independent and legitimate source of discovery. The Tenth Circuit adopted the United States Supreme Court's "plain view" doctrine,
announced in Harris v. United States, 390 U.S. 234 (1968), in United States v. Merryman,
630 F.2d 780, 782 (10th Cir. 1980). Merryman discusses the "plain view" doctrine in terms
of not requiring the officers to "close their eyes" if they run across evidence of other
crimes while conducting a limited Tery search. See also United States v. Obregon, 748 F.2d
1371, 1376 (10th Cir. 1984) ("If, in the process of so doing, the officers saw evidence of
other crimes, they had the right to take reasonable investigative steps and were not required to close their eyes." (quoting Merryman, 630 F.2d at 782-85)) (emphasis omitted).
48. The principle of the "purged taint" doctrine is that if enough additional factors
intervene between the original illegality of the search and the final discovery of evidence,
then neither the "deterrence" nor the "judicial fairness" rationale behind the exclusionary
rule apply. Therefore, the evidence may be admissible despite the fact that it would not
have been discovered "but for" the illegality. See Wong Sung v. United States, 371 U.S.
471, 484-88 (1963).
49. 762 F.2d 833 (10th Cir. 1985).
50. Carson, 762 F.2d at 836 (citing United States v. Fike, 449 F.2d 191, 193 (5th Cir.
1971)).
51. Gonzalez, 763 F.2d at 1133.
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governmental interests of crime prevention and police protection.
Judge Holloway advocated the use of a balancing test that would weigh a
limited violation of an individual's privacy interests against the governmental interests in protecting the police officer's safety and preventing
and detecting crime. 52 He distinguished the facts in Hayes, the decision
most heavily relied upon by the majority, and noted that even this decision recognized that exigent circumstances may justify a trip to the police station. He additionally emphasized the importance of a court's
consideration of "the totality of the circumstances," rejecting a reading
of Hayes that would cause any move to a police station for investigative
purposes, unless justified by probable cause, to be in violation of an
individual's fourth amendment rights. 53 Judge Holloway's argument for
compassion towards police officers in their attempts to combat crime
and his attempt to give them more discretion and power to effectuate
their "gut feelings" or "intuitions" does not seem to have gained much
acceptance in view of the majority opinions in the cases decided in the
Tenth Circuit during this survey period.
It appears that the Tenth Circuit is becoming increasingly sympathetic to individual rights where no probable cause exists to search the
defendant or his car and a consent to search is not voluntarily given.
The evidence was suppressed in three of the cases discussed, 54 Recalde,
55
Gonzalez, and Carson, but not in one case, United States v. Obregon.
Obregon can be distinguished from the other three because the initial
stop and subsequent detention were lawful, and, in addition, Obregon
56
gave his consent to search his car within minutes of the initial stop.
After looking at the "totality of the circumstances," the court found that
the trial court's record amply supported a finding that Obregon's consent was devoid of any coercion or duress and accordingly held that no
57
constitutional rights had been breached.
Despite an apparent censure of police power in the area of fourth
amendment rights, the Tenth Circuit has left a few doors open for police
officers suspicious of criminal activity. The law enforcement officer can
first attempt to gain the suspect's voluntary consent to a roadside search
of his vehicle. He may also lawfully conduct a limited search of the
passenger compartment of the vehicle under Romero5 8 if he has a reasonably articulable suspicion of criminal activity. At this point, he may
seize any evidence of another crime he may happen to "stumble upon"
during his limited weapons search. 59 This limited search could likely
unearth evidence that could be used to form the basis of probable cause,
thus enabling the officer to proceed with a full-fledged Belton search. 60
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.

Id. at 1135 (Holloway, C.J., dissenting)
Id. at 1135-37 (Holloway, C.J., dissenting).
See infra notes 70-74 and accompanying text.
748 F.2d 1371 (10th Cir. 1984).
Id. at 1376.
Id.
692 F.2d 699 (10th Cir. 1982).
See supra note 47.
See infra notes 61-74 and accompanying text.
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Car Search Incident to Arrest: The Belton Rule
1.

United States v. Cotton

In United States v. Cotton,6 1 the Tenth Circuit adopted the United
States Supreme Court's holding in New York v. Belton, 62 which declared
that when the police make a lawful "custodial arrest" 6 3 of the occupant
of an automobile, they may, incident to that arrest, conduct a search of
the entire passenger compartment of the vehicle, including any interior
compartments or contents of any containers. 64 The rationale for the
Belton decision was to protect and ensure the safety of the officers and to
prevent the destruction of evidence - the very reasons the Supreme
Court in Chimel v. California65 allowed a warrantless search of an arrestee
and the area within his immediate control. The defendant in Cotton argued that the Belton opinion should not apply because he was handcuffed outside his car, thereby eliminating the danger that he could have
reached into his car and grabbed a weapon. 66 The court was not persuaded by this argument and instead adopted a per se permissible "car
search incident to arrest" that does not require the arresting officer to
undergo any analysis whatsoever to determine whether the arrestee
could or could not reach into the car and grab a weapon or destroy some
evidence. 6 7 This "bright line" rule, contended the court, does not operate to promote police misconduct that may result in violations of the
fourth amendment. The court reasoned that an individual has a diminished expectation of privacy in an automobile and that relaxation of the
exclusionary rule is therefore appropriate in this context. 6 8 The court
seemed to sympathize with the police officers' need for some concrete
guidelines in their efforts to protect themselves and to prevent the destruction of evidence.
61. 751 F.2d 1146 (10th Cir. 1985).
62. 453 U.S. 454 (1981).
63. This is to be distinguished from a Tery stop for non-custodial traffic violations
such as speeding, registration checks and defective vehicle stops.
64. Belton, 453 U.S. at 460. This holding limits the search to the inside of the passenger compartment only. The Belton rule does not permit a search of the trunk of the automobile incident to a custodial arrest. The theory behind this exception derives from the
fact that the trunk will be inaccessible to the suspect once he is apprehended. However, if
there is probable cause to search the car and the trunk, this may be permissible without a
warrant pursuant to the general "automobile exception." See, e.g., United States v. Ross,
456 U.S. 798 (1982) (because police had lawfully stopped automobile and had probable
cause to believe contraband was contained therein, they could conduct a thorough warrantless search). But see United States v. Sharpe, 105 S. Ct. 1568 (1985). See generally Alpert & Haas, Judicial Rulemaking and the Fourth Amendment: Cars, Containers and Exclusionary
Justice, 35 ALA. L. REV. 23 (1984) (providing an analysis of the Supreme Court's opaque
interpretation of the fourth amendment and the concomitant effect ofjudicial rulemaking
which attempts to achieve more clarity in ambiguous situations); Note, Privacy Rights v. Law
Enforcement Difficulties: The Clash of Competing Interests in New York v. Belton, 59 DEN. L.J. 793
(1982) (discussing the development of justifications for a permissible search incident to
arrest with respect to the individual's privacy interest balanced against the government's
interest in law enforcement).
65. 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
66. Cotton, 751 F.2d at 1148.
67. Id. at 1149.
68. Id.
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It is interesting to note that the Cotton court adopts a "bright line"
rule, but then qualifies its holding. The court instructs the officers to
69
always consider the "totality of circumstances" before acting.
Although it appears that this opinion was intended to create an absolute
rule, a fairer analysis may be that the Tenth Circuit is attempting to formulate a "workable" rule whereby the officer can have more discretion
when making a decision concerning his safety and the preservation of
evidence.
2.

United States v. Pappas

In United States v. Pappas,70 the Tenth Circuit upheld a limited car
search incident to arrest which uncovered a loaded hand-gun despite
conflicting testimony as to whether or not the defendant was in his car at
the time of his arrest. 7 1 After discovering the hand-gun in the initial
search of the car, the arresting officer impounded the car and conducted
a full-blown inventory search. 72 Looking to the Supreme Court's decision in South Dakota v. Oppernan73 for guidance, the court found there
was no justifiable reason for the car's impoundment and subsequent inventory search. 7 4 Because the officer exceeded the permissible scope of
a Belton search when he transported the suspect's vehicle to the police
station, the illegal sawed-off shotgun found underneath the seat of the
defendant's car during the inventory search was suppressed. This case
is significant in that it acknowledged that a Belton search incident to
arrest was permissible, but once the officer impounded the vehicle and
looked in the trunk, he violated the defendant's fourth amendment
rights.
C.

Warrantless Car Searches: United States v. Swingler

The issue of whether a car search incident to an arrest based on
probable cause requires a warrant was addressed in United States v. Swingler.75 In Swingler, arrests of four defendants were made based upon
69. "The act of the officer in seizing the bank bag under the totality of circumstances
presented here was therefore reasonable." Cotton, 751 F.2d at 1149 (emphasis added).
"Upon an examination of the facts of each case, the court need do no more than examine the
reasonableness of the officer's actions under the totality of the circumstances and in view of the
above-stated concerns." Id. at 1150 (emphasis added).
70. 735 F.2d 1232 (10th Cir. 1984).
71. Under a Belton search, only the passenger compartment may be searched if a defendant is placed under arrest while in the vehicle. See supra note 64 and accompanying
text.
72. Pappas, 735 F.2d at 1233.
73. 428 U.S. 364 (1976).
74. Pappas, 735 F.2d at 1234. Opperman set forth three situations in which an impoundment and a subsequent inventory search of a car is constitutionally permissible: 1)
to protect the owner's property in police custody; 2) to protect the police against claims of
lost or stolen property; or 3) to protect police from potential danger. Opperman, 428 U.S.
at 369.
75. 758 F.2d 477 (10th Cir. 1985). This case also addressed the amount and quality
of information necessary for probable cause to make a warrantless search. In Wyoming,
the state in which the crimes in Swingler took place, the courts and legislature have adopted
the "totality of the circumstances" test established in Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983)
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probable cause and in three of those instances, warrantless searches
were conducted of the cars being driven by the defendants. Those
searches revealed controlled substances and various paraphenalia used
in the production of those substances. 7 6 After holding that there was
sufficient probable cause to make the arrests, the Tenth Circuit, Judge
Bohanon writing, 7 7 decided whether the searches and seizures of these
suspects and vehicles could take place without a warrant. The Tenth
Circuit cited to Carrollv. United States 78 and United States v. Ross, 7 9 the two
landmark cases that carved out the "automobile exception" to the general rule requiring a warrant before any search is conducted. 80 The
Supreme Court in Carrollannounced that the police may search a vehicle
without a warrant if such search is necessary to preserve evidence, as will
be the case when the car can be quickly driven out of the jurisdiction. 8 1
This exception is known as "exigent circumstances." The Ross decision
later clarified the extent of such a search. In this case, the Court sanctioned a warrantless search of the vehicle, and stated that the scope of
such a search could be "no broader and no narrower" than one approved by a magistrate. Thus, every part of the vehicle or its contents,
where contraband might be stored, could be inspected. 82 The Court
explained that "t]he scope of a warrantless search of an automobile
thus is not defined by the nature of the container in which the contraband is secreted. Rather, it is defined by the object of the search and the
places in which there is probable cause to believe that it may be
found."' 83 Thus, if the officers have probable cause to search a vehicle,
they may do so without a warrant.
The defendants in Swingler argued that this Carroll/Ross automobile
exception applies only when there are exigent circumstances. They asserted that in their case, the officers should have obtained a warrant
prior to searching their automobiles because the officers knew the description and make of the suspected vehicles far enough in advance to
obtain a warrant. Judge Bohanon rejected this contention noting that
the Supreme Court has never endorsed the view that the automobile
to evaluate the adequacy of information received and used to constitute probable cause for
a warrantless search. See Bonsness v. Wyoming, 672 P.2d 1291, 1293 (Wyo. 1983); Wvo.
STAT. § 7-2-103 (1977). In Swingler, the informant's information was mainly hearsay acquired through her husband. Independently, however, the informant was found to be
trustworthy, and her testimony was corroborated and uncontradicted by further police
investigations. The court thus concluded that by looking at the "totality of the circumstances," the information was not disqualified as a valid source of probable cause, and the
subsequent warrantless search of the car was proper. Swingler, 758 F.2d at 487.
76. Swingler, 758 F.2d at 484-86.
77. Judge Bohanon of the United States District Court for the Northern, Eastern and
Western Districts of Oklahoma sat by designation.
78. 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
79. 456 U.S. 798 (1982).
80. The case requiring a warrant before a search is Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347
(1967).
81. Carroll, 267 U.S. at 162.

82. Ross, 456 U.S. at 825.
83.

Id. at 824.
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exception applies only in situations involving exigent circumstances. 8 4
Thus, the Tenth Circuit abandoned any exigency requirement for warrantless car searches and will not require the issuance of a warrant for an
inventory search when a car is seized under the newly expanded Carroll/Ross exception.
Looking to the Supreme Court case law defining the elements required under a Carroll/Ross car exception, the holding in Swingler appears to be unjustified because of the Tenth Circuit's failure to require
exigent circumstances. An argument can be made that in future cases,
the Tenth Circuit's abandonment of the exigency requirement should
not be applied to the Carroll/Ross exception. On the other hand, it
would not be unreasonable to assume that the Swingler opinion has drastically broadened the scope of the Carroll/Ross exception by throwing
out exigency as a requirement. If future decisions accept this interpretation, it will significantly contribute to the erosion of individuals' fourth
amendment protections.
II.
A.

FiFrH AMENDMENT

Waiver

The Supreme Court has ruled that after being advised of his Miranda rights, an accused may validly waive his right against self incrimination and respond to police interrogation. 8 5 The Court has stressed,
however, that the prosecution bears a heavy burden to demonstrate a
knowing and intelligent waiver which cannot be presumed merely from
the fact that the defendant was advised of his rights.86 On the other
hand, the accused need not expressly state that he wishes to waive his
rights; a waiver can be inferred from the fact that he voluntarily answered questions after receiving the Miranda warnings, provided the
court is satisfied that the defendant was fully aware of the relevant circumstances and likely
consequences
when he volunteered
87
information.
1. Fernandez v. Rodriguez
In Fernandez v. Rodriguez88 the defendant, Fernandez, was initially
charged with voluntary manslaughter, and entered into a stipulation
with the state wherein he agreed to submit to a polygraph examination.
This agreement provided that the results of the test would be admissible
in court. Fernandez was unable to speak and understand the English
language fluently, and testified that he did not understand the stipula84. Swingler, 758 F.2d at 489-90 (citing Michigan v. Thomas, 458 U.S. 259, 261
(1982)). The Carroll/Ross automobile exception is not dependent on the mobility or immobility of the vehicle and does not depend on the likelihood that the evidence within the
automobile would be tampered with during the period of time that it would take for the
police to secure a search warrant.
85. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
86. Tague v. Louisiana, 440 U.S. 469 (1980).
87. North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369 (1979).
88. 761 F.2d 558 (10th Cir. 1985).
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tion he signed, or the polygraph test itself. In addition, he testified that
his attorney never warned him that the results of the polygraph could be
used against him; to the contrary, he alleged that his attorney led him to
believe that it was a routine and mandatory test.8 9 Following the polygraph examination, the prosecution filed a more serious.charge of murder with firearm enhancement. Fernandez's attorney then withdrew
from the case and public defenders were appointed, who immediately
filed a motion to suppress the results of the polygraph examination.
Following a hearing, the trial court found that the defendant adequately
understood the polygraph stipulation and concluded that a valid waiver
of his right to remain silent was given.9 0
The Tenth Circuit, Judge Doyle writing, remarked on the overwhelming amount of evidence in Fernandez's favor and did not hesitate
to reverse the trial court's holding. "Unquestionably the defendant
made his decision to sign the polygraph stipulation without knowing
that he was thereby convicting himself; with the advice of his then counsel." 9 1 The primary reason the court decided that Fernandez had not
given a knowing and intelligent waiver was due to his meager grasp of
the English language. Had he understood the significance of the polygraph test, the court explained, he would not have agreed to participate.
Judge Doyle stated that under such circumstances, "it was imperative
that his attorney explain to him the possible consequences . . ." and he
did not.9 2 As a result, the court stated that the totality of the circumstances indicated that Fernandez did not comprehend the consequences
of the stipulation, and found the district court's conclusion to be clearly
erroneous.
B.

Courtroom Comment on the Right of Silence
1.

Velarde v. Shulsen

Just as the right to remain silent has been given a high degree of
protection by the judiciary, the courts have also safeguarded a defendant's right to be free from any comment to the jury or judge about his
invocation of his fifth amendment privilege to remain silent. 9 3 Although
there have been several cases in this survey period that have not found
such a violation to be reversible error,9 4 the latest such decision, Velarde
v. Shulsen,9 5 reversed the lower court's decision and found that comments made regarding the defendant's silence resulted in harmful constitutional error.
In Velarde, the prosecutor engaged in questioning designed to call
attention to the fact that the defendant, Velarde, did not make any ex89. Id. at 560.
90. Id. at 560-61.
91. d. at 561.
92. Id.
93. For a textual discussion of the right of the accused not to testify, seeJ. SCARBORO
&J. WHITE, CONsTrruTIONAL CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 464-613 (1977), 97-123 (Supp. 1980).
94. See infra notes 103-08 and accompanying text.
95. 757 F.2d 1093 (10th Cir. 1985).
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culpatory statements at the time of his arrest. This was, in effect, an
inquiry into the defendant's post-arrest, post-Miranda warning silence.
There were repeated defense counsel objections to this line of questioning, but the magistrate overruled those objections. Later, the magistrate
acknowledged that certain portions of the prosecutor's examination
were constitutional error, but concluded that this error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

96

The Tenth Circuit, in a per curiam opinion, agreed that there was
constitutional error specifically prohibited by the fifth and fourteenth
amendments, and relied on Doyle v. Ohio 9 7 in determining that the prosecutor's comments violated Velarde's right to remain silent. The
Supreme Court in Doyle held:
[W]hile it is true that the Miranda warnings contain no express
assurance that silence will carry no penalty, such assurance is
implicit to any person who receives the warnings. In such circumstances, it would be fundamentally unfair and a deprivation
of due process to allow the arrested person's silence to be used
to impeach an explanation subsequently offered at trial. 9 8
Once the Tenth Circuit decided that the comments violated Velarde's due process rights, it turned to the next issue: Did the prosecutor's questions and remarks constitute harmless error beyond a
reasonable doubt? 99 In 1984, the Tenth Circuit, in United States v. Barton,' 0 0 ruled that once a court finds a constitutional error of this nature,
the government has the burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt
that the comments made with regard to the defendant's silence were
harmless'10 1 In Velarde the prosecution's case was entirely circumstantial, and much turned on the jury's evaluation of Velarde's credibility.
Citing United States v. Polsinelli,10 2 the court decided that because the defendant's credibility was a pivitol issue in the case, the government had
not met the required burden of proof.
2.

United States v. Cotton

The Tenth Circuit, though watchful and protective of the criminal
defendant's constitutional rights, will not uphold those interests without
justification. In United States v. Cotton, 103 Judge Finesilver, writing for a
unanimous three judge panel, held that an attempt by the prosecutor to
comment on the defendant's right to remain silent was not reversible
error because defense counsel was quick to interpose an objection to
96. Id. at 1095.

97. 426 U.S. 610 (1976).
98. Id. at 618.
99. Velarde, 757 F.2d at 1095.
100. 731 F.2d 669 (10th Cir. 1984).
101. Id. at 675.
102. 649 F.2d 793, 798 (10th Cir. 1981). See also United States v. Johnson, 495 F.2d
242, 246 n.5 (10th Cir. 1974) (If the very essence of the case is the jurors' assessement of
the witness' credibility, the admission of tainted evidence cannot be considered harmless.).
103. 751 F.2d 1146 (10th Cir. 1985). Judge Finesilver of the United States District
Court for the District of Colorado sat by designation.
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the unconstitutional line of questioning. 10 4 The court also pointed out
that the defense counsel requested, and the court gave, an immediate
0 5
admonition to the jury, thus curing any potential problem raised.
3.

United States v. Swingler

Reluctance to find reversible error without reasonable basis is also
evident in United States v. Swingler. 10 6 In this case, the defense counsel
inadvertently elicited testimony from a government witness regarding the
defendant's silence upon arrest. Although he did not object or move to
strike the testimony, defense counsel immediately minimized its effect
by more artfully rephrasing his question. The Tenth Circuit, Judge
Bohanon writing, 10 7 concluded that because the witness had not intended to comment improperly on defendant's right to remain silent
and any prejudice was "ameliorated by the succeeding questions and
answers," any error was harmless.' 0 8
C.

Privilege, Immunity, and the Fifth Amendment
1. The Marital Privilege

The confidentiality of spousal communications has been safeguarded in the courtroom because the judiciary is in favor of fostering
family peace and promoting marital harmony. This privilege, however,
is not absolute. The Tenth Circuit has recognized at least two exceptions and discussed them in two opinions handed down during the survey period and authored by Judge Barrett.
In United States v. Kapnison,10 9 the defendant's wife was granted immunity1 1 0 from prosecution by the government and was willing to testify
against her husband. Kapnison, the defendant-husband, alleged that his
wife's voluntary cooperation with the government and her testimonial
104. Cotton, 751 F.2d at 1150.
105. Id.
106. 758 F.2d 477 (10th Cir. 1985).
107. Judge Bohanon of the United States District Court for the Eastern and Western
Districts of Oklahoma sat by designation.
108. Swingler, 758 F.2d at 500.
109. 743 F.2d 1450 (10th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 2017 (1985).
110. Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 6002 (1982), the privilege against self-incrimination does
not provide total immunity for a witness who does not want to testify. The statute provides in pertinent part:
Immunity Generally
Whenever a witness refuses, on the basis of his privilege against self-incrimination, to testify or provide other information in a proceeding before or ancillary
to 1) a court or grand jury of the United States ...
and the person presiding over the proceeding communicates to the witness an
order issued under this part, the witness may not refuse to comply with the order on the
basis of his privilege against setf-incrimination; but no testimony or other information
compelled under the order (or any information directly or indirectly derived from
such testimony or other information) may be used against the witness in any criminal case, except a prosecution for perjury, giving a false statement, or otherwise
failing to comply with the order.
Id. (emphasis added).
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appearances before the grand jury and the trial jury were in violation of
his fifth and sixth amendment rights. Quoting extensively from Trammell
v. United States,'
the Tenth Circuit held that the marital privilege
should be circumscribed so that only the witness-spouse has the privilege to refuse or agree to testify adversely concerning his or her
spouse's affairs; the witness-spouse may not be compelled or foreclosed
from testifying by the other spouse. 1 2 This modification of the marital
privilege does not promote a deterioration of the family unit because if
one spouse is willing to testify against the other in a criminal proceeding, their relationship is almost certainly in a state of disrepair. In addition, a two-sided marital privilege could actually operate to undermine
the marital relationship. The state would be reluctant to grant immunity
to a spouse if it knew her spouse could prevent her from giving adverse
testimony; thus the privilege could have the unfortunate effect of permitting one spouse to escape prosecution at the expense of the other.
The Supreme Court thus concluded in Trammell, and the Tenth Circuit
agreed in Kapnison, that the newly defined marital privilege continues to
further the important public interest of the spousal relationship without
13
unduly burdening legitimate state interests.'
The Kapnison opinion is unclear in desribng the precise nature and
extent of the testimony that one spouse can volunteer in court against
the other uncooperative spouse based on this "modified" privilege
alone. When Mr. Kapnison objected to testimony relating to information Mrs. Kapnison obtained directly from him during the course of
their marriage," l 4 Judge Barrett accepted the admissibility of the testimony relying not on the "modified" unilateral marital privilege, but
rather because Mrs. Kapnison qualified as a participant under the
"crime-fraud" exception to the marital privilege. The "crime-fraud" exception operates to negate the marital privilege when a husband and
5
wife conspire or otherwise actively participate in an unlawful activity. "1
The theory behind this exception is that marital communications having
to do with the commission of a crime do not concern the marriage itself
and therefore do not fall within the protections of the marital privilege.
Because Mrs. Kapnison acknowledged that she was an active participant
in an unlawful scheme, 1 6 Mr. Kapnison's allegation that his wife's testimony was in violation of confidential marital communications was without merit." 17
111. 445 U.S. 40 (1980).
112. Kapnison, 743 F.2d at 1454 (citing Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 53

(1980)).
113. Kapnison, 743 F.2d at 1454.
114. Judge Barrett noted that there must be strict enforcement of the lower court's
ruling that Mrs. Kapnison's testimony be limited to those statements made by Mr.
Kapnison to Mrs. Kapnison in the presence of other persons, or testimony relating to acts
committed by Mr. Kapnison. Such testimony is not protectd by the fifth amendment. Id.
at 1455.

115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 1454.
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In another opinion, United States v. Neal," 8 handed down on the
same day as Kapnison, the Tenth Circuit attempted to more clearly define
the application of a "modified" marital privilege to a case that also involved the "crime-fraud" exception. Mrs. Neal was an accessory after
the fact to a robbery and murder allegedly committed by her husband.
Similar to the facts in Kapnison, Mrs. Neal was granted immunity from
prosecution in exchange for truthful testimony pertaining to her husband's suspected criminal activity. Mr. Neal appealed the district court's
decision and contended that the court erred in allowing Mrs. Neal to
testify about communicative acts in contravention of the marital
privilege. 1"9
Judge Barrett first pointed out that because Mrs. Neal was an accessory after the fact to a robbery committed by her husband, Mr. Neal
could not cling to the cloak of marital immunity when his wife, who enjoyed the fruits of the crime, gave incriminating testimony under a grant
of immunity. Second, Judge Barrett described the now applicable
"modified" marital immunity that permits the witness-spouse to testify
against his or her spouse without that spouse's approval. "[W]e conclude that the existing rule should be modified so that the witnessspouse alone has a privilege to refuse to testify adversely; the witness
120
may be neither compelled to testify nor foreclosed from testifying."'
In the Neal decision, Judge Barrett defined the applicability of this
"modified" privilege rule, and cleared up obscurities that were not addressed in the Kapnison decision. This modified rule, he explained, operates to exclude the testimony of one spouse against another only when
the "sole knowledge and information and/or participation involves a conversation wherein the spouse who committed the crime discloses thatfact to the other
spouse.' 12 1 In the Neal case, however, Mrs. Neal actively participated in
the cover-up of her husband's crime and enjoyed the fruits of his criminal activity; thus, the "crime-fraud" exception to the marital communications privilege was applied rather than the "modified" privilege rule.
Because Mrs. Neal was an accessory after the fact in her husband's
crime, the Tenth Circuit upheld the lower court's admission of her testimony concerning the crime.
2.

Immunity and Waiver of the Right to Remain Silent

When immunity is granted to a witness, the witness waives his or
her right to invoke the fifth amendment right to silence. The grant of
"transactional" immunity has two limitations on it not present in a general grant of immunity. First, transactional immunity does not preclude
a subsequent prosecution for perjury based on the immunized testimony. Second, transactional immunity does not extend to matters not
related to the elicited testimony. Thus, a witness cannot gain immunity
118. 743 F.2d 1441 (10th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 1848 (1985).

119. Neal, 743 F.2d at 1444.
120. Id. at 1445 (emphasis omitted).
121. Id. at 1446 (emphasis by the court).
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from all prosecution for all previous criminal acts by simply including a
reference to those acts in his testimony without regard to the subject on
which he was asked to testify.122
In Wolffv. United States, 123 a witness accepted an offer of immunity in
exchange for giving incriminating testimony against the defendant,
Wolff. In a later habeus corpus proceeding, Wolff alleged that the immunized witness committed perjury while on the stand and that the government knowingly used this perjured testimony against him.
Furthermore, he claimed that his confrontational and due process rights
were violated when this critical witness was granted immunity. 124 The
government took the position that the immunity granted to the witness
was "transactional" and therefore the witness was subject to prosecution
for perjury for his proferred testimony. Wolff, however, contended that
the immunity was much broader and that the witness was exempt from
prosecution for perjury. Therefore, Wolff argued, the oath the witness
had to take before testifying was destroyed, and his due process and
25
confrontational rights were violated.1
Without addressing the distinctions between "transactional" and
"non-transactional" immunity, the court, Judge McWilliams writing,
simply stated that the immunity granted the witness did not specifically
include or exclude the witness' immunity from perjury. Because counsel
for the defense knew the underlying basis of immunity and had failed to
either make an appropriate objection at trial or determine the exact extent and effect of the immunity granted, the court held that the defendant was barred from raising the immunity issue on appeal. 12 6 The court
mentioned that if the defendant could have shown good cause for not
having raised this issue at the trial level and have further shown that
there was actual prejudice resulting from this error, appellate relief
might have been available. The defense counsel was unable to demonstrate either, and the defendant was left without means for relief.
In United States v. Hembree, 12 7 the issue of perjury with respect to
immunized testimony arose again. The Tenth Circuit again did not address "transactional" or "non-transactional" immunity; rather, it described the grant of immunity to be one that was given in exchange for
truthful testimony. The immunized witness, Hembree, testified at trial
that she had lied to the grand jury. Based on this testimony, Hembree's
probation for an unrelated offense was revoked. She later recanted the
testimony she gave at trial which had implicated the defendant and, as a
result, she was charged and convicted for perjury. On appeal from the
122.

See Note, The Federal Witness Immunity Acts In Theory And In Practice: Treading The

Constitutional Tightrope, 72 YALE L.J. 1568, 1578-80 (1963).
123. 737 F.2d 877 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 575 (1984).
124. Id. at 878.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 880. The trial was actually a military proceeding for court martial. The military courts have adopted the general rule that appellate courts can only review issues or
errors presented at the lower court level. Id. (citing United States v. Anderson, 10 M.J.
743, 746 (N.C.M.R. 1981) and United States v. Dupuis, 10 M.J. 650, 652 (N.C.M.R. 1980)).
127. 754 F.2d 314 (10th Cir. 1985).
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perjury conviction, Hembree claimed that her immunity rights were violated or, alternatively, that her fifth amendment rights had been violated. It was her contention that because the court did not honor her
immunity agreement with the United States Attorney, which had included a promise not to participate in probation revocation proceedings, she had given up her right against self-incrimination and received
28

nothing in return. 1

The Tenth Circuit has described the federal immunity statute to be
one that represents an accommodation between the right of the government to compel testimony on the one hand, and the constitutional right
to remain silent, on the other.129 The purpose of immunizing a witness
is to reach the truth, and when the testimony cannot be used against the
testifying witness, the fear of incrimination is removed. "The Congressional intent, then, is that the statutory claim of immunity be as broad as,
but no broader than, the privilege against self-incrimination."' 30 The
agreement made between the United States Attorney and the witness
was to exchange the witness' trustworthy testimony for immunity. Because the witness gave inconsistent testimony and therefore failed to uphold her side of the bargain, the Tenth Circuit held that the grant of
immunity was void ab initio.131
It appears that the Tenth Circuit is not concerned with the semantics of "transactional" or "non-transactional" immunity. If a witness is
granted immunity and does not tell the truth when giving testimony, he
or she will be subject to a charge for perjury, and a subsequent claim
that his or her fifth amendment rights or immunity rights have been violated will not be recognized.
The Hembree court upheld the perjury conviction because the iminunity granted was informal, meaning that no court order, as required by
15 U.S.C. § 6002, was obtained. 13 2 Therefore, the court explained, the
immunity agreement was merely a contract with the United States Attorney that did not bind the district court.' 3 3 Finally, it pointed out that
the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination applies only in
criminal cases, and the law is settled that probation revocation proceed13 4
ings are not criminal in nature.
128. Id. at 316.
129. United States v. Trammel, 583 F.2d 1166, 1168 (10th Cir. 1978) (citing United
States v. Tramunti, 500 F.2d 1334 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1079 (1974)).
130. Tramnmei, 583 F.2d at i168 (citing Childs v. McCord, 420 F. Supp. 428 (D. Md.
1976), afd sub nom. Childs v. Schlitz, 556 F.2d 1178 (4th Cir. 1977)).
131. Hembree, 754 F.2d at 317.
132. See supra note 110.
133. Hembree, 754 F.2d at 317.
134. Id. (citing Minnesota v. Murphy, 104 S. Ct. 1136, 1147 n.7 (1984); Gagnon .
Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 782 (1973); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 480 (1972)).
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SIXTH AMENDMENT

Right to Counsel
1.

Custodial Interrogation: United States v. Leach

In United States v. Leach,13 5 the defendant, who was convicted on five
counts of passing forged and counterfeited bills, had originally volunteered to be interrogated in response to a telephone call from a Secret
Service agent. On appeal, Leach claimed that he was not properly advised of his Miranda rights informing him of his right to have an attorney
present when being interrogated by police officers. Judge Barrett, writing for the court, held that because Leach was not in custody and because he volunteered to be interrogated at the time and place of his
choice, the law enforcement agents were not under a legal duty to advise
him of his Miranda rights. The landmark Miranda case declared that an
individual has a right to be informed of his fifth and sixth amendment
rights once the individual becomes subject to a custodial interrogation.
The Supreme Court, in Rhode Island v. Innis,136 defined "custodial interrogation" to be whenever law enforcement officers deprive an individual
of his freedom and begin to question him. The Court described this
"deprivation of freedom" to include a situation wherein the individual is
placed in an environment where he perceives himself to be subjugated
to the will of the interrogator.' 3 7 Other Supreme Court decisions have
maintained that the constitutional right to an attorney exists only at or
after the time adversary judicial proceedings have been initiated against
the defendant, or even as late as when the proceedings are in a "critical
38
stage."1
The Tenth Circuit considered when the right to counsel attaches in
United States v. Bridwell.139 The Bidwell court, keeping in mind the prerequisite of "custody" or "deprivation of freedom," held that when a
physician was questioned in his office and no indicia of coercion is alleged, the Miranda warnings were not required. A few years later, in
United States v. Miller, 140 the court found no violation of the right to an
advisement of Miranda warnings when a suspect was questioned in his
home prior to his arrest. This finding was based upon the fact that the
defendant was not deprived of his freedom, nor was the questioning coercive in nature.
135. 749 F.2d 592 (10th Cir. 1984).
136. 446 U.S. 291 (1980).
137. Id. at 298-99. See generally S. KADISH & M. PAULSEN, CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS PROCESS 780-832 (3d ed. 1975), 188-202 (Supp. 1979) (discussion and case support for the
right to counsel and when it may be invoked).
138. See, e.g., Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 688 (1972) (adversarial judicial proceedings are when the defendant is formally charged at his preliminary hearing, when he is
indicted, or when he is arraigned); accord United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300 (1973) (The
sixth amendment does not guarantee a defendant the right to counsel at a post-indictment
photographic display because this does not constitute a "critical stage" in the judicial proceedings. A "critical stage" is when the accused requires aid in coping with legal problems
or confronting his adversary.); see also infra note 149 and accompanying text.
139. 583 F.2d 1135 (10th Cir. 1978).
140. 643 F.2d 713 (10th Cir. 1981).
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Following the precedent set down in these decisions, Judge Barrett
explained in Leach that because the defendant voluntarily spoke to the
two law enforcement agents about his suspected criminal activity, he was
neither coerced nor in any way deprived of his freedom. Consequently,
the court concluded that Leach's sixth amendment rights were not
violated. 14'
2.

A Right to the Attorney of Your Choice?
McConnell

-

United States v.

Criminal defendants have frequently asserted that they are constitutionally entitled to a particular attorney despite the potentially disruptive effect this request may have upon judicial proceedings. In United
States v. McConnell,14 2 the defendant, McConnell, wanted to be represented by his co-defendant's attorney. 14 3 Because the attorney's dual
representation would have created a conflict of interest, McConnell asserted that he was entitled to a severance of his claims. Insisting that
this particular attorney was the only attorney who could effectively represent him, he contended that his sixth amendment rights would be violated unless the court granted a trial separate from that of his codefendant. The Tenth Circuit, Judge Bohanon writing for the court,
somewhat aghast at this preposterous request, held that the sixth
amendment right to counsel did not extend so far as to entitle a criminal
defendant to a severance merely because he expressed a preference for
an ineligible attorney. 14 4 The court, relying on several earlier Tenth
Circuit cases, 1 4 5 concluded that the sixth amendment does not include
an absolute right to counsel of one's choice. The court stated that
"[t]he right to retain counsel of one's choice 'may not be insisted upon
in a manner that will obstruct an orderly procedure in courts ofjustice,
and deprive such courts of the exercise of their inherent powers to control the same.' "146
141. The court rejected Leach's argument that because he was a "target of investigation," he was "in custody" for Miranda purposes. See Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492,
495 (1977) (Police officers are not required to administer Miranda warnings to everyone
whom they question; nor are the warnings required simply because the questioning takes
place at the station house or because the questioned person is one whom the police
suspect.).
142. 749 F.2d 1441 (10th Cir. 1984).
143. The McConnell case also discussed the economic requirement necessary in order
for a defendant to be entitled to appointed counsel. Although McConnell contended that
the court did not make the proper inquiry into his financial standing, or advise him that he
need not be indigent to qualify for court-appointed counsel, the court found that it was
incapable of determining such eligibility because McConnell had flatly refused to disclose
his assets and had repeatedly told the trial court that he could afford to hire an attorney.
Id. at 1450.
144. Id. at 1450.
145. United States v. Gipson, 693 F.2d 109 (10th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1216
(1983); United States v. Peister, 631 F.2d 658 (10th Cir. 1980), cerl. denied, 449 U.S. 1126
(1981); United States v. Weninger, 624 F.2d 163 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1012
(1980).
146. McConnell, 749 F.2d at 1450 (citing Gipson, 693 F.2d at I I (quoting United States
v. Burton, 584 F.2d 485, 489 (D.C. Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1069 (1979)).
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No Right to Counsel at Post Line-up Interview:
Hallmark v. Cartwright

On appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern
District of Oklahoma, the defendant in Hallmark v. Cartwright147 cited
Richardson v. State, 148 an Oklahoma decision he considered to be controlling, and argued that the right to counsel at a line-up should be extended to include the right to have counsel present at a post line-up
interview between the witnesses and the police. 14 9 The Tenth Circuit
was not persuaded by Richardson and remarked that while a few states
have extended a right to counsel to post line-up interviews,1 5 0 the trend
within the federal courts is not to require the presence of counsel under
such circumstances. 15 1 Accordingly, the per curiam decision stated that
the appellant's sixth amendment rights were not violated when he was
not permitted the presence of counsel at his post line-up interview.
B.

Waiver of the Right to Counsel

In order to effectively waive the right to counsel, the Supreme
Court has held that the sixth amendment requires an "intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege."' 1 52 In 1980,
the Tenth Circuit, in United States v. Weninger,' 53 adopted a test which
requires that before a defendant can relinquish his sixth amendment
right to counsel, the judge must personally address the defendant and
inform him of the nature of the charges made against him, the statutory
offenses included within them, and the range of punishments to which
he may be subjected. The court must also apprise the defendant of the
possible defenses or mitigating factors that might be available to him.154
In United States v. McConnell, 155 another case decided during this survey period, the Tenth Circuit decided that there was an effective waiver
147. 742 F.2d 584 (10th Cir. 1984).
148. 600 P.2d 361 (Okla. Crim. App. 1979).
149. A suspect has an absolute right to counsel at any pretrial confrontation. Such
confrontations include, but are not limited to line-ups and one-man show-ups. See United
States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967); Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263 (1967).
150. See People v. Williams, 3 Cal. 3d 853, 478 P.2d 942, 92 Cal. Rptr. 6 (1971) (defendant was entitled to the presence of counsel in a post line-up indentification).
151. The court cited several federal circuit court opinions refusing to extend the right
to counsel to post line-up interviews: United States v. White, 617 F.2d 1131, 1135 (5th
Cir. 1980); United States v. Bierey, 588 F.2d 620, 624 (8th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S.
927 (1979); United States v. Tolliver, 569 F.2d 724, 727 (2d Cir. 1978) (recording of interview should be made available to defense counsel); United States v. Parker, 549 F.2d 1217,
1223 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 971 (1977); United States v. Wilcox, 507 F.2d 364,
370 (4th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 979 (1975).
152. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938). See also Brewer v.Williams, 430 U.S.
387 (1977) (There is a heavy burden on the state to prove that an effective waiver had been
given. To determine this, the courts must look to the circumstances of each case, including the defendant's background and the setting in which the alleged waiver took place.).
153. 624 F.2d 163 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1012 (1980). This test was also
reasserted in United States v.Gipson, 693 F.2d 109 (10th Cir. 1982), cert.
denied, 459 U.S.
1216 (1983).
154. 11eninger, 624 F.2d at 164.
155. 749 F.2d 1441 (10th Cir. 1984).
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of counsel despite the trial court's failure to apply the Weninger test. The
court instead looked to the "total circumstances of [the] ... case, including background, experience and the conduct of the accused person."1 56
In McConnell the facts revealed that the defendant had attended two and
one half years of law school, that he had read his entire indictment and
asserted that he understood it, that he had already begun to prepare his
defense, and that he was fully aware of the seriousness of the penalty he
faced. 15 7 Furthermore, the trial judge repeatedly attempted to persuade
McConnell to retain an attorney, but the defendant disregarded his advice. Despite the fact that strict compliance with the Weninger test was
not required to recognize a waiver of an individual's right to counsel in
McConnell, this decision, in view of the particular facts of the case, has
not significantly diminished the importance of a knowing waiver and has
not set the stage for a mere hollow compliance with this revered constitutional mandate in the future. 15 8 The apparent abandonment of the
Weninger requirements in McConnell should not be attributed to a decline
or deterioration of an individual's right to an intelligent and knowing
waiver of his sixth amendment right to counsel.
During the previous survey period, in United States v. Dressel,15 9 the
Tenth Circuit outlined the minimum requirements to find an effective
waiver of counsel in a situation of joint representation. The court declared that the defendant must be made aware of his right to separate
representation if he so desires and he must also understand the hazards
inherent in a case where one attorney is representing two defendants.
Turning to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 44(c), 160 the court further noted that the presiding judge should elicit a narrative response
from each defendant stating that he has been advised of his right to an
effective assistance of counsel and that he fully understands the perils of
joint representation and voluntarily and intelligently waives his right to
counsel. 161
156. Id. at 1451 (citing lWeninger, 624 F.2d at 164 (quoting United States v. Warledo,
557 F.2d 721, 727 (10th Cir. 1977)); see also infra note 171 and accompanying text.
157. McConnell, 749 F.2d at 1451.
158. In another case decided during this survey period, United States v. Dressel, 742
F.2d 1256 (10th Cir. 1984), the court stated: "Notwithstanding the trial court's compliance with all of the suggested procedures to ensure that any waiver is fully informed and
voluntary, under some circumstances 'even full disclosure and consent . . . may not be
adequate protection.' " Id. at 1258 (quoting the advisory committee notes to FED. R.
CRIM. P. 44(c)).

159. 742 F.2d 1256 (10th Cir. 1984).
160. This rule states in relevant part:
Whenever two or more defendants have been jointly charged . . . or have been
joined for trial .... and are represented by the same retained or assigned counsel
or by retained or assigned counsel who are associated in the practice of law, the
court shall promptly inquire with respect to such joint representation and shall
personally advise each defendant of his right to the effective assistance of counsel,
including separate representation ....
FED. R. CRaM. P. 44(c).

161. Dressel, 742 F.2d at 1258 (quoting United States v. Garcia, 517 F.2d 272, 278 (5th
Cir. 1975)).
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Collateral Use of an Uncounseled Conviction

The sixth amendment prohibits collateral use of an invalid uncounseled conviction in order to enhance a subsequent conviction or sentence. This principle has been espoused by the Supreme Court on
numerous occasions, 162 and the Tenth Circuit recently adopted it in
Santillanes v. United States Parole Commission. 163 In Santillanes, the trial
court upheld the parole commission's order that Santillanes forfeit his
street time in a revocation of parole hearing due to a state court conviction for driving while intoxicated. Santillanes contended on appeal to
the Tenth Circuit that the forfeiture was constitutionally improper because the conviction was obtained without the assistance of counsel and
without a waiver of his right to counsel. Judge McKay, writing for the
Tenth Circuit, explained that the proper use of a prior constitutionally
infirm conviction depends on its reliability rather than the mere fact of
conviction; ergo the use of such an invalid prior conviction on one charge
to support a subsequent guilty conviction on another charge, or to enhance a later punishment for an unrelated offense, erodes the safeguard
established in Gideon v. Wainright.164 Accordingly, the court could not
accept the use of Santillanes' prior conviction for driving while intoxicated while on parole as a basis for ordering a forfeiture of his "street
time" because the driving while intoxicated conviction had been obtained without the assistance or effective waiver of counsel. 16 5 Under
Santillanes, an uncounseled and therefore constitutionally infirm conviction is per se unreliable.
D.

Effective Assistance of Counsel
1. The Requisite Elements of Proof: McGee v. Crist

In McMann v. Richardson,166 the Supreme Court declared "the right
to counsel is the right to effective assistance of counsel" in criminal
prosecutions. 167 Last year, in Strickland v. Washington, 16 8 the Court set
forth elements that a convicted criminal must prove in order to establish
a denial of the sixth amendment right to counsel. The convicted defendant must persuade the court that his counsel's assistance was so defective as to require a reversal. In order to do so, the defendant must
establish that his counsel's performance was deficient; that is, that the
attorney was not functioning in a manner minimally guaranteed by the
sixth amendment, that standard being guided by reasonableness under
current professional norms. Additionally, the defendant must establish
that the deficient performance actually prejudiced his defense to such a
162.
(1979);
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.

E.g., Baldasar v. Illinois, 446 U.S. 222 (1980); Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367
Burgett v. Texas, 389 U.S. 109 (1967).
754 F.2d 887 (10th Cir. 1985).
372 U.S. 335 (1963).
Santillanes, 754 F.2d at 890.
397 U.S. 759 (1970).
Id. at 771 n.14.
104 S. Ct. 2052 (1984).
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degree that he was not afforded a fair trial. Unless the 69defendant can
make both of these showings, the conviction will stand.'
In the 1980 decision of Dyer v. Crisp, 170 the Tenth Circuit found the
right to effective assistance of counsel to be one that "demands that defense counsel exercise the skill, judgment and diligence of a reasonably
competent defense attorney." 7' Until the Strickland decision came
down in 1984, the Tenth Circuit had only the opaque and highly subjective standard of Dyer to wrangle with. When the "fair trial doctrine"
approach, with its tangible and more objectively defined elements, was
handed down in Strickland, the Tenth Circuit was given an opportunity
to pull together its somewhat unpredictable and often irreconcilable
holdings. 172 During the current survey period, the Tenth Circuit
adopted the Strickland holding by applying its two-prong test in McGee v.
Crist.17 3 In McGee, the defendant claimed that his sixth amendment right

to effective assistance of counsel was breached, and attempted to establish both a deficient representation by his attorney and actual prejudice
to his case as required by Strickland. McGee claimed that due to inadequate research by his attorney, a key witness who could have testified at
trial and supported his defense did not testify for fear of incriminating
74
himself. This, alleged McGee, resulted in actual prejudice to his case. 1
The Tenth Circuit noted that notwithstanding his attorney's failure
to discover New Mexico's immunity statute, McGee's attorney actually
could not have secured any immunity for the defendant's absent "key"
witness. Under New Mexico law, only the prosecuting attorney may apply to the court and request a grant of immunity for a witness. 17 5 Because this request was only available to the state and not to the defense
attorney, McGee was unable to establish the prejudice necessary to find
a denial of effective assistance of counsel as required under Strickland.
2.

Multiple Representation: United States v. Burney

In situations where counsel is burdened by a conflict of interest, the
Strickland Court found that a presumption of prejudice arises. 176 The
Supreme Court in Cuyler v. Sullivan 177 qualified this presumption by stating that it materializes only if the "defendant shows that his counsel actively represented conflicting interests

. . .

[and] . . . that an actual

169. Id. at 2064.
170. 613 F.2d 275 (10th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 945 (1980).
171. Id. at 278.
172. See, e.g., Valdez v. Winans, 738 F.2d 1087 (10th Cir. 1984); United States v. Winkle, 722 F.2d 605 (10th Cir. 1983).
173. 739 F.2d 505 (10th Cir. 1984).
174. Id. at 506.
175. Id. at 508. "If a person has been or may be called to testify ... the district court
...may, upon application of the prosecuting attorney, issue an order requiring the person to
testify... notwithstanding his privilege against self-incrimination." N.M.R. CRIM. P. 58(a)
(emphasis added).
176. Strickland, 104 S. Ct. at 2067. But cf. Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 482
(1978) (multiple representation of co-defendants is not per se a violation of the sixth
amendment).
177. 446 U.S. 335 (1980).
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conflict of interest adversely affected his lawyer's performance." 178
In a recent Tenth Circuit opinion, United States v. Burney, 17 9 the
court was faced with the issue of whether the sixth amendment imposes
a burden upon the court to initiate an inquiry concerning the potentially
prejudicial effects of multiple representation upon the co-defendant. In
Burney, one attorney represented four defendants and the trial judge did
not make any inquiry into the effect this had on the adequacy of representation afforded to each defendant. It is noteworthy, however, that
the attorney did not bring this potential conflict to the attention of the
trial judge.' 8 0 This fact was critical in the protection of the defendants'
right to effective assistance of counsel. The Burney court, Judge Seymour writing, cited Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 44(c), 18 1
although it appeared to pay the rule no regard. Judge Seymour acknowledged that an attorney conflict of interest implicates the sixth
amendment; nevertheless, she cited three circuit opinions and one
United States Supreme Court opinion 18 2 as authority for the principle
that the sixth amendment "does not require a court to initiate an inquiry
when no party either objects to multiple representation or raises a conflict issue."1 83 Because the Burney court decided that no violation of the
sixth amendment occurs when neither the court nor any party raises an
objection at trial to multiple representation, the defendant must demonstrate to the court that an actual conflict of interest adversely affected his
lawyer's performance as required by Strickland.184 Burney failed to
demonstrate any such conflict. A trial court's failure to comply with
Rule 44(c) will not ipsofactojustify a reversal of a conviction; a defendant
85
must show that his counsel actively represented conflicting interests.1
E.

Police Interrogation Following a Defendant's Invocation of His Right to
Counsel

In 1981, the United States Supreme Court announced that all police
interrogation must stop once the accused has expressed his desire to
deal with the police only in the presence of his attorney. 186 It is not
until the accused is furnished with an attorney or until the accused initiates further communications, exchanges or conversations with the of178. Id.at 350.
179. 756 F.2d 787 (10th Cir. 1985).
180. Id.at 791.
181. See supra note 157.
182. Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 346 (1980); United States v. Unger, 700 F.2d
445,453 n.17 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S.Ct. 339 (1983); United States v. Benavidez, 664
F.2d 1255, 1258 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 457 U.S. 1135 (1982). Cf. United States v. Foster,
469 F.2d 1, 4-5 (1st Cir. 1972).
183. Burney, 756 F.2d at 791.
184. Id.(citing Cuyler, 446 U.S. at 349-50).
185. Id.The court also cited United States v. Alvarez, 696 F.2d 1307, 1309 (11 th Cir.),
cert.
denied, 461 U.S. 907 (1983); United States v. Arias, 678 F.2d 1202, 1205 (4th Cir.), cert.
deniedsub nom. Faircloth v. United States, 459 U.S. 910 (1982); and Benavid, 664 F.2d at
1258-59, for its authority in this decision.
186. Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981); see also
Oregon v. Bradshaw, 462 U.S.
1039 (1983).
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ficers that the officers may begin to question the criminal suspect. 18 7 In
United States v. De La Luz Gallegos," 8 the Tenth Circuit recognized this
limitation on police communications, but refused to find any sixth
amendment violation. In De La Luz Gallegos, the defendant was advised
of his Miranda rights when he was approached by an agent of the Bureau
of Indian Affairs concerning a gunshot incident the previous day. He
indicated that he understood his rights and requested an attorney.
Then De La Luz Gallegos made some statements tending to show that
he was in possession of the shotgun involved. Judge Cook,' 8 9 writing
for the Tenth Circuit, explained that although De La Luz Gallegos had
invoked his right to counsel, he subsequently made spontaneous declarations; his statements were plainly volunteered and unprovoked. The
law enforcement officer had scrupulously honored the defendant's request for an attorney, and even went so far as to advise him to keep
silent until his attorney arrived. Because the defendant ignored this advice and initiated further conversation with the police officers, the court
could find no violation of the defendant's sixth amendment rights.' 9 0
De La Luz Gallegos additionally asserted that the prosecution acted
improperly when it commented to the jury in its opening statement that
the defendant had requested an attorney upon his arrest. Though comment to a jury on an individual's invocation of his right to keep silent
under the fifth amendment may constitute error,' 9 ' the Tenth Circuit
held that any reference to a defendant's request for an attorney is
proper and relevant for the purpose of laying a foundation for the admission of any subsequent statements made by the defendant. 19 2 This is
so the jury can determine whether or not the defendant's subsequent
93
statements were voluntary and what weight they should be accorded. 1
F.

The Confrontation Clause

In conducting a criminal trial, the court must protect the rights of
the defendant under the sixth amendment, including the defendant's
right to confront the witnesses who provide evidence or testimony
against him.19 4 During this survey period, the Tenth Circuit considered
several cases that illustrate the nature and scope of this clause in various
contexts. 195
187. Edwards, 451 U.S. at 484-85.

188. 738 F.2d 378 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 574 (1984).
189. Judge Cook, Chief United States District Judge for the Northern District of
Oklahoma, sat by designation.
190. De La Luz Galegos, 738 F.2d at 381. See also United States v. Obregon, 748 F.2d
1371, 1380-81 (10th Cir. 1984) (Because the defendant initiated further dialogue with the
police officer after he had requested to see an attorney, the court held the defendant's
sixth amendment right to counsel was not violated when the police continued further discussion with him.).
191. See supra notes 94-108 and accompanying text.
192. De La Luz Galtegos, 738 F.2d at 381 (citing United States v. Wycoff, 545 F.2d 679,
681 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1105 (1977)).
193. Id. at 381-82.
194. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
195. For a general discussion of the right to confront witnesses, see F. MILLER, R. DAW-

DENVER UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 63:2

1. A Limited Examination: United States v. Morgan
United States v. Morgan 196 is helpful in that it sets forth the rights
implicit in the sixth amendment's confrontation clause. In Morgan, the
defendant claimed that his rights under the confrontation clause were
violated because the trial court granted a motion limiting the defense
counsel's examination of a government's witness. The court had directed defense counsel to refrain from asking questions about the witness's pending murder charges and those to which the witness could
invoke the fifth amendment.
Before addressing the relevant requirements to Morgan, the Tenth
Circuit, Judge Saffels 19 7 writing, listed the rights implicitly contained in
the confrontation clause. First, the confrontation clause limits the prosecution's use of hearsay evidence. Before any hearsay can be raised in
court against the accused, there must be sufficient "indicia of reliability
as to the statement."' 98 The prosecution must demonstrate the unavailability of the declarant and establish that it has made a good faith effort
to obtain the declarant at trial.' 9 9 If at all possible, the defendant must
20 0
be given an opportunity to cross examine the government's witness.
Second, the confrontation clause does not provide the accused with a
guarantee that the government must call each and every witness it has to
testify against him. 20 1 The accused generally does not have the right to
20 2
confront an informant who does not provide any evidence at trial.
Finally, the court spoke to the relevant issue in Morgan and recognized a
third element of the confrontation clause: the accused has a right to use
cross-examination as a way to present a defense to the charges brought
against him.
SON,

G. Dix, R.

20 3

PARTNAS,
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1253, 1288 (4th ed. 1976),

244 (Supp. 1979).
196. 757 F.2d 1074 (10th Cir. 1985).
197. Judge Saffels, United States District Judge for the District of Kansas, sat by
designation.
198. Morgan, 757 F.2d at 1076 (citing Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 89 (1970)).
199. Id. (citing Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 724-25 (1968)); see also Mancusi v. Stubbs,
408 U.S. 204 (1972) (A showing that the witness is outside of the the country is sufficient
per se to establish "unavailability" and avoid the requirement that the prosecution make a
good faith effort.).
200. Morgan, 757 F.2d at 1076 (citing California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149 (1970)); see,
e.g., United States v. Kapnison, 743 F.2d 1450, 1458-59 (10th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S.
Ct. 2017 (1985). In Kapnison, the defendant attempted to admit a deposition of a declarant
that was taken in a previous civil action, claiming that it had an adequate indicia of reliability because the deponent was cross-examined by other parties during the deposition. The
Tenth Circuit refused to allow the admission of this testimony in view of the fact that the
government did not have the opportunity to cross examine the deponent during this civil
action.
201. Morgan, 757 F.2d at 1076 (citing Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58, 62 n.2 (1967)).
202. Id. (citing United States v. Francesco, 725 F.2d 817, 822 (1st Cir. 1984); United
States v. Kabbaby, 672 F.2d 857, 864 (11th Cir. 1982); United States ex rel. Meadows v.
New York, 426 F.2d 1176, 1184 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 941 (1971)).
203. Id. (citing Younger, Confrontation, 24 WASHBURN L.J. 1, 28 (1984)); see also United
States v. Swingler, 758 F.2d 477, 497 (10th Cir. 1985) ("[T]he sixth amendment confrontation clause ... [gives the defendant] the right [to an] 'effective' cross examination when
attempting to show the existence of possible bias or prejudice on the part of a government
witness.").
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In most instances, the prosecution calls its informant to the stand to
testify against the accused, but in Morgan it did not. Because the defense
wanted to prove that the informant coerced the defendant into selling
cocaine, it called the informant to the stand as a hostile witness. 20 4 The
Tenth Circuit cited language in the Supreme Court case of Chambers v.

Mississippi20 5 which stated that "[t]he right of confrontation does not de-

pend upon whether the witness was put on the stand by the accused or
by the prosecution." ' 20 6 However, when Morgan's counsel asked the informant about his own involvement in criminal activity, the informant
invoked the fifth amendment. In allowing a limitation on questions
asked by the defense to which the informant could invoke this privilege,
the court stated that the trial court had adequately balanced all competing interests and did not abuse its discretion in limiting the informant's
testimony. 20 7 Thus Morgan was not denied his right of con20 8
frontation.
2.

Unavailable Witness and Reliable Information:
Ewing v. Winans

In Ewing v. Winans, 20 9 the accused, Ewing, appealed the trial court's
decision to allow the prosecution to read portions of Ewing's girlfriend's
deposition to the jury and further allowing the prosecution to read the
entire deposition into the record. Under the New Mexico Rules of Evidence, any part or all of a deposition may be used as evidence if the
declarant is unavailable. 2 10 The statute further states that a witness is
unavailable if the proponent of the statement is unable to procure the
declarant's attendance by process or other reasonable means. 2 1 1 When
deciding whether reasonable means were taken to secure the attendance
of the witness at trial, the courts look to the totality of the circumstances. 2 12 Under the New Mexico rules, the Tenth Circuit, Judge Barrett writing, found that the trial court did not err in allowing the
deposition to be read into the record and to be read to thejury.2 13 The
record clearly showed that she was an uncooperative witness. 2 14
204. Morgan, 757 F.2d at 1075. The prosecution apparently did not object to an element of the confrontation clause as discussed by the Tenth Circuit in this case: "[T]he
accused generally may not confront an informant who provides no evidence at trial." See
supra note 202 and accompanying text.
205. 410 U.S. 284 (1973).
206. Morgan, 757 F.2d at 1077 (citing Chambers, 410 U.S. at 298).
207. Id. The court noted that the questions which the defense wished to ask the informant involved matters collateral to the issues at trial and, additionally, other evidence
was introduced to accomplish the same purpose as such testimony would have accomplished. Id.
208. Accord United States v. Ramirez, 622 F.2d 898 (5th Cir. 1980).
209. 749 F.2d 607 (10th Cir. 1984).
210. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 8 04(a) (1983).
211. Id. at § 804(a)(5) (1983). See also State v. Vialpando, 93 N.M. 289, 599 P.2d 1086
(state has burden to prove the unavailability of its witnesses), cert. denied, 93 N.M. 172, 598
P.2d 215 (1979).
212. Vialpando, 599 P.2d at 1092.
213. Ewing, 749 F.2d at 611.
214. Id. at 610-11. The facts clearly established that the investigator had considerable
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In addition to satisfying the procedural rules of evidence, the trial
court must ensure that the defendant's constitutional right to confront
the witness is protected. To determine whether this was done, the
2 15
If
Tenth Circuit relied on the guidelines set forth in Ohio v. Roberts.
the prosecution wishes to admit a deposition into the record or read
passages of it to the jury, first it must either produce the declarant at
trial, or sufficiently demonstrate to the court that the declarant is unavailable. 2 16 Second, it must establish that the deposition is trustworthy
and reliable. 21 7 The Tenth Circuit found that the prosecution had sufficiently established the unavailability of the declarant when it satisfied
the requirements under the New Mexico Rules of Evidence.
The defendant, however, contended that the deposition was inadmissible because it lacked the trustworthiness required by the confrontation clause of the sixth amendment. The court was not persuaded.
When the witness appeared at the grand jury and at her deposition, she
was represented by counsel. She was examined and cross-examined
under oath. In addition, there were no significant or material inconsistencies among her statements, her testimony at the grand jury, and her
testimony at her deposition. The Ewing court accordingly held that the
reliability requirement was satisfied and concluded that the defendant
was not deprived of his right to confront his witness. The right to confront a witness, in short, cannot be equated to a right to cross
2 18
examine.
3.

The Co-conspirator Hearsay Exception
a.

United States v. Shepherd

When a hearsay declarant is not available for trial, the confrontation
clause requires, as stated above, a sufficient showing of unavailability of
the witness, and reliability of the statements. In United States v. Shepherd,2 19 the defendant appealed from his convictions for conspiracy to
transport explosives in interstate commerce. The government had
based its case on testimony of a federally protected witness who had
conspired with the defendant. The Tenth Circuit allowed admission of
the protected witness's testimony as to out-of-court statements. Judge
Logan found the statements were not hearsay in that they were not offered for the truth of the matter asserted, rather they were offered to
prove that the statements were in fact made, thereby showing the existence of a conspiracy. Because the court found, based on the record, that
difficulty in serving the witness for her grand jury appearance and for her deposition;
moreover, she had refused to come to the district attorney's office to discuss the case and
had moved from her previous address without notifying the officials.
215. 448 U.S. 56 (1980). See also United States v. Rothbart, 653 F.2d 462, 465-66 (10th
Cir. 1981).
216. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 65 (citing Mancusi v. Stubbs, 408 U.S. 204, 216 (1972); Barber
v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 724-25 (1968)).
217. Ewing, 749 F.2d at 612 (citing Synder v Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 107 (1934)).
218. Id. at 613.
219. 739 F.2d 510 (10th Cir. 1984).
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the jury had ample opportunity to evaluate the credibility of the defendant, it held there was no violation of the confrontation clause. 2 20 The
court did not engage in a discussion of the trustworthiness of the absent
declarant's statements; rather, it seemed satisfied that because one of
the co-conspirators, the defendant, was present at trial, there was an opportunity to test the reliability of the statement through cross-examination of the present co-defendant.
b.

United States v. Alfonso

The court was more articulate in discussing the confrontational
rights with respect to the co-conspirator exception to the hearsay rule in
United States v. Alfonso. 22 1 In Alfonso, the court, in a per curiam opinion,
stated "[i]t is true that 'testimony which . . .hurdle[s] the hearsay rule

via an exception can still run afoul of the Sixth Amendement.' ,,222
Here, the confrontation clause violation had been objected to at trial,
unlike Shepherd, and the Tenth Circuit was willing to specifically address
the issue. Because there was a substantial showing of truthfulness in
addition to compliance with the hearsay rule, the court held that the
22 3
defendant's sixth amendment rights had not been breached.
In Alfonso, the defendant objected at trial to the admission of statements made by a co-conspirator outside the defendant's presence. Included was the co-conspirator's statement to an undercover officer that
the defendant, Alfonso, was his partner in a cocaine distribution conspiracy. Relying on guidelines set forth in several Supreme Court cases,
the Tenth Circuit found an adequate "indicia of reliability" which justified the admission of the co-conspirator's statements although he was
not confronted by Alfonso at trial. 2 24 First, the prosecution established

that the out-of-court declarant knew the identity and role of the other
conspirator. Second, the court was persuaded that the declarant's statements were not based on faulty recollections, or that such a possibility
was extremely remote. Third, the court found that the declarant's statements tended to incriminate himself; that is, they tended to be statements made against his own interest. Fourth, the statements were not
ambiguous. Finally, these hearsay statements were not critical to the
government's case. 2 25 Because the prosecution was able to establish
these five things, the Tenth Circuit was convinced that there was in fact a
sufficient "indicia of reliability" to justify the admission of the hearsay
22 6
statements by the co-conspirator.
Elizabeth Kohnen
220. Shepherd, 739 F.2d at 514.
221. 738 F.2d 369 (10th Cir. 1984).
222. Atfonso, 738 F.2d at 372 (quoting United States v. Roberts, 583 F.2d 1173, 1177
(10th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1080 (1979)).
223. Atfonso, 738 F.2d at 372.
224. See Green, 399 U.S. at 161-62; Dutton, 400 U.S. at 88-89; see also Roberts, 583 F.2d at
1176.
225. Afonso, 738 F.2d at 372.
226. id.

FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE

OVERVIEW

The Tenth Circuit handed down several important decisions in the
area of federal practice and procedure during the survey period. In particular, the court, in a group of en banc opinions, clarified the approach
to be taken when a court is considering imposing pretrial sanctions
against parties and their attorneys. The court also considered when
counsel should be disqualified in cases of successive representation and
determined that the similarity between the factual contexts of the two
representations is the crucial factor. In the troublesome area of in personam jurisdiction, the Tenth Circuit held that the traditional "minimum
contacts" test is satisfied when only the effect of an alleged tort takes
place in the forum state. And, finally, the court considered whether documents subpoenaed as evidence by a state grand jury are entitled to protection from discovery in a federal civil proceeding. As a whole, these
decisions perhaps represent the Tenth Circuit's primary contribution to
federal case law during this survey period.
I.

SANCTIONS

In the current survey period, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals
decided several cases dealing with sanctions imposed on parties or their
attorneys at the pretrial stage. In the case of In Re Baker,' the Tenth
Circuit upheld the imposition of small monetary sanctions, relying on a
broad interpretation of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16(f). Hollis v.
United States, 2 reemphasized the Baker consensus that monetary sanctions
should be imposed whenever unnecessary delays occur and reinforced
the Tenth Circuit's current policy that preventive sanctions may be used
only when extreme circumstances exist. Finally, in D & H Marketers, Inc.
v. Freedom Oil & Gas, Inc.,3 the Tenth Circuit emphasized its conviction to
sanction those who abuse the pretrial process by holding that a default
judgment imposed as a discovery sanction may not be challenged
through an interlocutory appeal. Considered together, these cases
demonstrate the Tenth Circuit's resolve to breath life into the federal
court's power to impose sanctions to help control court dockets.
A.

Background

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure should be construed "to se'4
cure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action."
1.
2.
3.
4.

744 F.2d 1438 (10th Cir. 1984) (en banc), cert.
denied, 105 S. Ct. 2016 (1985).
744 F.2d 1430 (10th Cir. 1984).
744 F.2d 1443 (lOth Cir. 1984) (en banc).
FED. R. Civ. P. 1.
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The pretrial process is the primary tool to achieve this goal. 5 In recent
years, however, the civil pretrial process has been used far too often to
postpone resolution of suits and drive up litigation expenses. 6 Thejudicial imposition of sanctions is one method used to curb pretrial abuse
and delay. Although the federal courts have always had the power to
impose sanctions for pretrial abuses, 7 this power has not been fully utilized by trial judges to control their expanding dockets. 8 To encourage
the judiciary's vigorous employment of sanctions to punish recusant
parties who abuse the litigation process, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were amended in 1983. 9 The amendments sought to remedy the
5. See generally Yankwich, Crystallizationof Issues by Pretrial: A Judge's View, 58 COLUM. L.
REV. 470 (1958) (discussing the importance of the pretrial process).

6. Many judges and commentators feel pretrial abuses are so pervasive that they undermine justice in the federal courts. See Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedures, 446 U.S. 995, 998-1001 (1980) (Powell, J., dissenting); Rosenberg & King, Curbing
Discovery Abuse in Civil Litigation: Enough is Enough, 1981 B.Y.U. L. REV. 579. For more
comprehensive documentation of the problems of pretrial abuse, see generally Levy, Discovery - Use and Abuse, Myth and Reality, 17 FORuM 465, 465-73 (1981); Sofaer, Sanctioning
Attorneys for Discovery Abuse Under the New Federal Rules: On the Limited Utility of Punishment, 57
ST. JOHN's L. REV. 680, 680-83 (1983).
7. The sources of pretrial sanctioning authority include FED. R. Civ. P. 37 (failure to
make or cooperate in discovery) and FED. R. Civ. P. 41 (b) (voluntary and involuntary dismissal of actions). See generally R. Rodes Jr., K. Ripple & C. Mooney, Sanctions Imposable
for Violation of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Federal Judicial Center (1981) (discussing the federal rules under which sanctions may be imposed). The courts may also
impose sanctions for pretrial abuse under their contempt power. See Ager v. Jane C.
Stromont Hosp., 622 F.2d 496 (10th Cir. 1980) (The primary beneficiaries of civil contempt are individual litigants, not thejudicial system.); 19 U.S.C. § 401 (1982). Courts are
reluctant to administer contempt sanctions since the pervasive judicial attitude is that the
contempt powers are measures of last resort. See Comment, FinancialPenalties Imposed Directly Against Attorneys in Litigation Without Resort to the Contempt Power, 26 U.C.L.A. L. REV.
855, 861-63 (1979). Counsel may also be liable for excessive costs under 28 U.S.C. § 1927
(1982). See Dreiling v. Peugeot Motors of Amer., Inc., 768 F.2d 1159 (10th Cir. 1985)
(strictly construing section 1927 and requiring serious and standard disregard for the orderly process ofjustice). Finally, it is well established that courts have the inherent power
to impose a variety of sanctions on both litigants and attorneys to regulate their dockets.
See, e.g., Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752 (1980) (A court has the inherent
power to award costs and attorney's fees against counsel when the court finds the attorney
acted in bad faith.); Link v. Wabash R.R. Co., 370 U.S. 626, 630 (1962) (A court has the
inherent power to dismiss a client's case for an attorney's pretrial misconduct.); Betz v.
United States, 753 F.2d 834 (10th Cir. 1985) (A court has the inherent power to impose a
variety of sanctions on litigants and counsel to regulate dockets and promote judicial efficiency.); see also Comment, supra, at 875-82.
8. See Rosenberg & King, supra note 6, at 494-95 (judges often feel that punishment
for noncompliance with discovery guidelines should be invoked only when a deliberate or
flagrant attitude is demonstrated); Sofaer, supra note 6, at 703-04; Comment, Recent
Changes in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Prescriptions to Ease the Pain? 15 TEx. TECH. L.
REV. 887, 898-99 (1984).
9. Of particular note are the amendments to FED. R. Ctv. P. 7, 11, 16, and 26.
"These amendments not only enhance and clarify the duties of attorneys and parties, but
substantially revise and expand the court's control over pending litigation, including the
re-emphasis of the court's inherent power to impose sanctions where necessary." D & H
Marketers, 744 F.2d at 1444 n. 1; see also Marcus, Reducing Court Costs and Delay: The Potential
Impact of the ProposedAmendments to the FederalRules of Civil Procedure,66JUDICATURE 363, 364
(1983) (tenor of the amendments seek to stimulate judges to use their existing power to
the utmost). See generally Burbank, Sanctions in the Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure: Some Questions About Power, 1 HOFSTRA L. REV. 997 (1983) (discussing the
1983 amendments and an analysis of the authority io change the courts' sanction powers);
Long, The New Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure- The First Fonr .llonths, 31
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problem of delay and to encourage the use of sanctions to shift the cost
of litigation delay onto the attorneys or parties who abuse the litigation
process.10

B.

In re Baker

In re Baker" is the Tenth Circuit's first in-depth interpretation of
the new sanction sections of the 1983 amendments. In Baker, four days
before a scheduled jury trial, the third party defendant moved the
United States District Court for the Northern District of Oklahoma for a
continuance based on the failure to depose a critical witness.' 2 At the
hearing on this motion on the first day of trial, the plaintiffs counsel
indicated that he might be partly responsible for opposing counsel's inability to take the deposition in question. After the parties failed to
agree on a time for the deposition, the district court granted the requested continuance. After finding no bad faith, the district court imposed a $175 sanction on both attorneys for the serious inconvenience
13
created for the court and the subsequent burden on the taxpayers.
The Tenth Circuit upheld the imposition of the monetary sanctions
examining the case not only in light of the court's historic sanction powers, but also in light of the 1983 amendment to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 16.14 Although all pre-1983 sanction provisions may still be
used to control dockets, the focus of the new Rule 16 sanctioning power
is quite different.1 5 The trial courts now have broad discretion to assess
monetary sanctions under Rule 16(). Offenders may be punished not
only when contumacious behavior exists, but also when a trial court's
"high duty to insure the expeditious and sound management of the
preparation of cases for trial" is inhibited. ' 6 No orders need be violated
or bad faith exhibited. Concern over litigation management is sufficient
to place sanctions on those who delay the pretrial process.
Even though the monetary sanctions in Baker were imposed before
the adoption of the 1983 amendments, the Tenth Circuit analyzed this
case under the newly formulated Rule 16 powers stating that "the spirit
FED. B. NEWS &J. 36 (1984) (A survey of cases decided under the amendments and their
significance in fulfilling the amendments' purpose of curtailing abuse.).
10. Marcus, supra note 9, at 364.
11. 744 F.2d 1438 (10th Cir. 1984) (en banc), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 2016 (1985).
12. Id.
13. Id. at 1440. The trial court made no finding of bad faith by either attorney, but
was prompted by concern that "delays caused by negligent counsel burden the taxpayers
and the court system." Id.
14. Rule 16 concerns pretrial conferences, scheduling and management. The 1983
amendments to Rule 16 require the courts to set deadlines for various pretrial matters and
gives the courts power to require litigants' attendance at pretrial and settlement conferences. FED. R. Civ. P. 16(a)-(e). Section 16(f) added specific sanctioning authority to the
rule: "In lieu of or in addition to any other sanction, the judge shall require the party or the
attorney representing him or both to pay the reasonable expenses incurred because of any
noncompliance with this rule .... " FED. R. Civ. P. 16(f) (emphasis added). Before this
addition, an abuse of Rule 16 was punishable only under Rule 37 which required a showing of bad faith.
15. Baker, 744 F.2d at 1440.
16. Id.
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and purpose of those amendments have always been within the inherent
power of the courts to manage their affairs."' 7 To support their use of
inherent and Rule 16 powers, the Tenth Circuit relied on Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper1 8 where the Supreme Court used its inherent sanction
powers when bad faith existed. The Tenth Circuit justified the use of
inherent power in Baker, where no bad faith was present, by stating that
the Piper case dealt with the sanction of dismissal, making bad faith a
proper requirement.' 9 With the small fine imposed in Baker, however,
the sanction was not as harsh as dismissal; therefore, the new Rule 16
powers could be considered. This reliance on Piper is misguided because Piper actually dealt with the award of costs and attorney's fees, not
the sanction of dismissal. 20 Thus, the Tenth Circuit's logic for dropping
the bad faith requirement for costs and fees loses some of its credibility.
But, despite this misapplication of Piper, the Tenth Circuit's use of the
court's inherent power to sanction was justified; inherent power to sanction has traditionally been viewed as broad enough to cover pretrial
21
abuses without a showing of bad faith.
In reviewing the district court's imposition of sanctions for abuse of
discretion, 22 the Tenth Circuit stated that the totality of circumstances
should be considered. 2 3 Because these sanctions were imposed for interference with court management of the case, the Tenth Circuit heavily
emphasized congestion of court calendars as a factor. 24 The attorney's
failure to depose a witness constituted a pattern of negligence which
disrupted the trial court's schedule. The Tenth Circuit observed that
the sanctions were imposed to manage the district court dockets and
avoid unnecessary burdens on the courts, not to deal with the refusal to
comply with court orders. The primary purpose for the monetary sanctions was to insure reasonable management requirements for case preparation. The secondary purpose was to compensate opposing parties
for their inconvenience and expenses caused by the unwarranted delays. 2 5 Consequently, as a message to the lawyers involved, and the bar
generally, the $175 sanction imposed on each lawyer was not an abuse
17. Id. at 1441.
18. 447 U.S. 752 (1980).
19. Baker, 744 F.2d at 1441.
20.

Compare Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 764-68 with Baker, 744 F.2d at 1441.

21. Callip v. Harris Country Child Welfare Dept., 757 F.2d 1513, 1518-19 (5th Cir.
1985) ("[Tlhe 1983 amendments were not intended to alter ... the district court's inherent power to dismiss or impose lesser sanctions for violations of court orders and rules
and for dilatory conduct in general."); Eash v. Riggins Trucking, Inc., 757 F.2d 557, 561
(3rd Cir. 1985).
22. See National Hockey League v. Metropolitan Hockey Club, Inc., 427 U.S. 639
(1976) (per curiam) (sanctions under Rule 37 are reviewable under the abuse of discretion
standard).
23. Baker, 744 F.2d at 1440. In addition, the court enumerated the following factors
which should be considered in the totality of circumstances: the specific case under review; the total management problems for courts; and, access and cost problems for
litigants.
24. d. The court noted that the expense and delay problems have been well documented and that Rule 16 was amended to alleviate these pretrial management problems.
25. Baker, 744 F.2d at 1441.
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of discretion considering the broad parameters of Rule 16(f). 26 In fact,
the Tenth Circuit stated that it is the district court's duty to impose sanctions upon anyone, attorneys or parties, who causes unnecessary
27
delays.
The Tenth Circuit clearly encouraged trial judges to use Rule 16.
Appropriate monetary sanctions should be imposed under Rule 16 on
any attorney acting negilgently or causing court delays. Although
neither a contumacious attitude nor consistent failure to obey court orders is essential for sanctions under Rule 16, the Tenth Circuit warned
that justification for such sanctions must be set forth in the trial court
28
record.
C.

Hollis v. United States

In Hollis v. United States, 2 9 the Tenth Circuit restated its position on
the type of misconduct warranting harsh preclusive sanctions. The issue
presented in Hollis was whether the dismissal of an action was too severe
a sanction for a party's failure to file an amended complaint when there
was no serious inconvenience to the opposing party and where the suit
had been pending for a comparatively short time. In this case, the district court ordered the plaintiff to file an amended complaint within
thirty days. When this thirty-day period had expired, without any communication from the plaintiff's counsel, the district court dismissed the
plaintiff's original complaint for failure to state a claim and for failure to
file an amended complaint as ordered by the court. 30 The plaintiff appealed the dismissal and the Tenth Circuit held that dismissal under
those circumstances was too severe a sanction and constituted an abuse
3 1
of the district court's discretion.
In analyzing the sanction, the Tenth Circuit stated that dismissal is a
drastic measure 32 to be ordered only when a party intentionally or repeatedly fails to adhere to ongoing court orders and when the opposing
party is prejudiced or seriously inconvenienced. When these circumstances do not exist the interests of justice are better served by action
26. Id. The Tenth Circuit declined to determine whose "reasonable expenses" were
recoverable under Rule 16(f) in the Baker case. Since the statutory language did not limit
recovery solely to an opposing party's expenses, the court did say the awareness of court
costs should not be irrelevant. Id. at 1441-42.
27. "If the fault lies with the attorneys, that is where the impact of sanction should be
lodged. If the fault lies with the clients, that is where the impact of the sanction should be

lodged." Id. at 1442.
28. Id. The need for such justification led to the case's only dissent. Circuit Judge
McWilliams felt that the trial court record was too sketchy to warrant the sanctions imposed. Id. at 1442. Subsequent decisions have shown that the court of appeals will insist
on justification in the trial court record before sanctions under Rule 16 will be imposed.
See In re Russel, 746 F.2d 1419 (10th Cir. 1984); Hollis v. United States, 744 F.2d 1430
(10th Cir. 1984); Sterling Energy, Ltd. v. Friendly Nat'l Bank, 744 F.2d 1433 (10th Cir.
1984).
29. 744 F.2d 1430 (10th Cir. 1984).
30. Id. at 1431-32.
31. Id. at 1433.
32. Id. at 1432 (citing Davis v. Operation Amigo, Inc., 378 F.2d 101 (10th Cir. 1967)).
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against the offending attorney. 33 The Tenth Circuit stated that the attorney's actions in Hollis did not warrant dismissal but are of the type
that warrant sanctions, like those imposed in Baker. However, any delays
more severe than the ones in Hollis would warrant a dismissal. The case
was reversed and remanded and the Tenth Circuit encouraged the district court to consider substantial monetary sanctions against the plaintiff's counsel.3 4 This decision reinforced the Tenth Circuit's new
resolve to punish parties or attorneys for pretrial abuses with monetary
sanctions but emphasized that preclusive sanctions may be imposed only
when more severe misconduct exists.
D.

D & H Marketers, Inc. v. Freedom Oil & Gas, Inc.

Although not dealing directly with sanctions, the Tenth Circuit did
decide the important issue of when sanction orders are appealable in D
& H Marketers, Inc. v. Freedom Oil & Gas, Inc. 35 This case considered
whether appellate jurisdiction exists to review sanction orders having a
substantially preclusive effect on the claims of one party but not terminating the entire action. The Tenth Circuit held that such sanction orders are not appealable since the orders in question were neither a final
judgment 3 6 nor collateral orders, which constitute an exception to the
final judgment rule. 3 7 This decision significantly narrowed the Tenth
Circuit's previous view that monetary and preclusive sanctions under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(b)(2) were directly reviewable even
when all claims have not been adjudicated. 3 8 Additionally, the Tenth
Circuit stated that district court sanctions would have the greatest impact if appellate review of sanctions is not possible until final adjudica39
tion on the merits.
D & H Marketers, filed in the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Oklahoma, involved multiple parties in a complicated proceeding alleging federal securities violations and common law
33. Hollis, 744 F.2d at 1433 (citingJackson v. Washington Monthly Co., 569 F.2d 119
(D.C. Cir. 1977)).
34. Hollis, 744 F.2d at 1433.
35. 744 F.2d 1443 (10th Cir. 1984) (en banc).
36. The appellate jurisdiction of the court of appeals is limited by the concept of finality. 28 U.S.C. § 1291 states in part that "[tlhe courts of appeals ... shall have jurisdiction
of appeals from all final decisions of the district courts of the United States . . . except
where a direct review may be had in the Supreme Court." For cases interpreting the finality rule, see Catlin v. United States, 324 U.S. 229, 233 (1945); B.F. Goodrich Co. v.Grand
River Dam Authority, 712 F.2d 453 (10th Cir. 1983); see also 15 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E.
COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3907 (1976) (discussion of the purpose of

the final judgment rule).
37. D & H Alorketers, 744 F.2d at 1446 (citing Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp.,
337 U.S. 541 (1940) (The collateral order exception, or Cohen exception, to the finality rule
was judicially created by giving 28 U.S.C. § 1291 a practical rather than technical construction, balancing judicial efficiency and justice.)).
38. Ohio v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 570 F.2d 1370, 1372 (10th Cir.) (preclusionarv
and monetary sanctions under FED. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2) for noncompliance with a discovery order are immediately appealable under the Coh-n exception), cerl. denied, 439 U.S. 833
(1978).
39. D & H Marketers, 744 F.2d at 1446.
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fraud. Eight defendants were initially sanctioned for failure to comply
with discovery orders. 40 When these defendants continued to improperly respond to the plaintiffs discovery requests, the judge sanctioned
the defendants by entering a default judgment against them pursuant to
Rule 37(b)(2). 4 1 The default judgment was not a final adjudication because it did not adjudicate all the claims of the parties. Furthermore, the
trial court did not utilize Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b) to authorize an immediate appeal. 42 The eight defendants filed a notice of
43
appeal from the default judgment orders.
The Tenth Circuit prefaced its analysis by acknowledging the
widening judicial concern about the district court's effective management of burgeoning dockets, increased use of sanctions to control pretrial abuses, and the respect accorded these attempts by parties and
attorneys. 44 The Tenth Circuit considered the above factors to determine whether a trial court's sanctioning effort is best supported by allowing interlocutory review.
The Tenth Circuit examined the relevant law pertaining to appellate review. The district court's sanction orders were not appealable as
final judgments, 4 5 necessitating the consideration of whether they were
reviewable under the exception to the general finality rule enunciated in
Cohen v. Benenficial Industrial Loan Corp.4 6 This exception to 28 U.S.C. §
1291, the finality rule, 4 7 requires the existence of three elements before
one claim may be reviewed prior to the total adjudication of all case
claims: -[T]he order must conclusively determine the disputed question, resolve an important issue completely separate from the merits of
40. Id. at 1444.
41. Id. FED. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2) states in pertinent part:
If a party. . . fails to obey an order to provide or permit discovery. . . the court
in which the action is pending may make such orders in regard to the failure as
are just, and among others the following:
(c) An order . . . dismissing the action or proceeding or any part thereof, or
rendering a judgment by default against the disobedient party ....
42. FED. R. Civ. P. 54(b) states in pertinent part: "[Tihe court may direct the entry of
a final judgment as to one or more but fewer than all of the claims or parties only upon an
express determination that there is no just reason for delay and upon an express direction
for the entry ofjudgment." See generallv Note, Federal Civil Procedure- Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b)
- A Proposed Two-Part Analysis for the Exercise of a TrialJudge's Discretionary Certification of a
Claim as Final Under Rule 54(b) When a Counterclaim Remains Pending, 25 VILL. L. REV., 179
(1979-80) (a review of 54(b) policies and the application of the rule).
43. D & H Marketers, 744 F.2d at 1444.
44. Id. at 1441 n.1. Referring to the 1983 amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, the court noted the heightened duties of attorneys and parties to help the
court control litigation.
45. Only an entry of final judgment pursuant to Rule 54(b) would be a final default
order. See supra note 42.
46. 337 U.S. 541 (1949) (whether security need be posted in a shareholder's derivative action is appealable without awaiting final judgment).
47. Id. at 546. The Court in Cohen determined that if an issue is separate from and
collateral to the rest of the claims asserted in the action, an interlocutory appeal is allowed
when the claim is too important to be denied review and too independent of the cause
itself to require that appellate consideration be deferred until the whole case is adjudicated. Id. See also 15 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACrICE AND PROCEDURE § 3911 (1976) (general discussion of collateral order exception).
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the action, and be effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment."'4 8 In D & H Marketers, the Tenth Circuit found the first two factors of the Cohen exception: (1) the eight defendants were effectively
terminated from the case by the trial court order; and, (2) the orders
appealed from conclusively resolved an issue separate from the merits of
the action. However, the Tenth Circuit failed to find the third element
49
because the orders were reviewable on appeal from final judgment.
Thus, the default judgment orders were not immediately reviewable on
appeal since the Cohen collateral order exception was inapplicable.
The Tenth Circuit observed that strict adherence to the finality rule
would enhance the trial courts' broad discretionary power in managing
their dockets, including the imposition of sanctions. "Attorneys and
parties will be fully aware that they must bear the burden of sanctions to
the conclusion of the case and appeal on the merits of the fully adjudicated case with no more hope of reversing the sanction order on appeal
than normally attends an appeal asserting abuse of a broad trial court
50
discretion."
The decision in D & H Marketers brings the Tenth Circuit in line
with the intent of the Cohen exception and the other circuits which have
considered the issue. Prior to D & H Marketers, the Tenth Circuit had
found that preclusive and monetary sanctions fall within the Cohen exception. In Ohio v. Arthur Andersen & Co. ,51 the Tenth Circuit permitted
direct appeal of Rule 37(b)(2) sanctions before the final adjudication on
the merits. The Anderson court failed, however, to explain why it was
allowing direct appeal of sanctions; therefore, other circuits have been
reluctant to follow the Tenth Circuit's example. 5 2 The court in D & H
Marketers specifically distinguished Arthur Andersen, narrowing the holding to its facts. 5 3 D & H Marketers is more in accord with the intent of
the Cohen decision and is an effective way of insuring that sanction orders will be taken seriously.
E.

Conclusion

Considered together, Baker, Hollis, and D & H Marketers demonstrate the Tenth Circuit's resolve to help district court judges manage
their dockets in an expeditious manner and also encouragejudges to use
48. D & H Marketers, 744 F.2d at 1445 (quoting Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437
U.S. 463, 468 (1978)).
49. D & H Marketers, 744 F.2d at 1445-46.
50. Id. at 1446.
51. 570 F.2d 1370 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 833 (1978).
52. See, e.g., Coleman v. Sherwood Medical Indus., 746 F.2d 445, 447 (8th Cir. 1984);
Mulay Plastics, Inc. v. Grand Trunk Western R.R. Co., 742 F.2d 369, 370 (7th Cir. 1984),
cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 1409 (1985); Eastern Maico Distributors, Inc. v. MaicoFahrzeugfabrik, 658 F.2d 944,947 (3d Cir. 1981);Johnny Pflocks, Inc. v. Firestone Tire &
Rubber Co., 634 F.2d 1215, 1216 (9th Cir. 1980).
53. D & H Marketers, 744 F.2d at 1446. In Arthur Andersen, the Tenth Circuit was concerned with an order which, if complied with, could have put the complaining party in
violation of foreign law. Therefore, immediate appeal was necessary since effective appeal
would posssibly have been denied later. Id.
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the sanction powers available to them to insist that parties and attorneys
fulfill their duties. The effect of these decisions remains to be seen. Despite the Tenth Circuit's attempt to give trial judges an effective weapon
to combat pretrial abuse, many of the factors which cause delay are still
outside the trial court's reach. Small monetary sanctions are no more
than a nuisance compared to the advantages which can be derived from
tactical delays. Although the Tenth Circuit sent a clear message to trial
court judges concerning the imposition of sanctions for pretrial abuses,
it is ultimately up to the trial judges to impose these sanctions consistently. Their actions will determine if these Tenth Circuit decisions will
help to curb pretrial dilatory behavior.
II.

DISQUALIFICATION OF COUNSEL: SMITH V

WHATCOTT

During the current survey period, the Tenth Circuit clarified the analytical process to be used when considering disqualification of counsel
for conflicts of interest in cases of successive representation. 54 In Smith
v. Whatcott, 55 the Tenth Circuit vicariously disqualified an entire law firm
from representing defendants due to one attorney's prior representation of the plaintiff in a related criminal action. 5 6 The one attorney's
knowledge of the prior criminal action was imputed to the entire firm,
even though no information was actually disclosed or access to the attorney's files permitted. Unfortunately, the Tenth Circuit declined to decide whether vicarious firm disqualification may be avoided by setting up
an internal screening procedure, a "Chinese wall," which would prevent
the flow of information from an attorney with potentially. confidential
information regarding an adverse party, to other members of his law
firm.
The first lawsuit Leon Smith was involved in was filed by Provo City,
Utah, against him for violations of apartment house zoning ordinances. 5 7 Mark Anderson, a Boyden Kennedy & Romney (Boyden) attorney, handled Smith's case and negotiated a settlement with the city.
After the settlement, Smith consulted Anderson about filing a civil action against the former owners of the apartment house. Smith decided
to hire other counsel and terminated Anderson's employment in 1980.58
The second suit involving Smith was filed by Smith in early 1984
against the former apartment owners for allegedly fraudulent misrepresentation of occupancy limits during the sale of the building to Smith.
54. In disqualification cases, successive representation exists when an attorney accepts
employment in a suit against aformer client while concurrent representation occurs when
employment is accepted in a suit against an existing client. Note, The Chinese Wall Defense to
Law Firm Disqualification, 128 U. PA. L. REV. 667, 680-81 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Note,
The Chinese Wall Defense].

55. 757 F.2d 1098 (10th Cir. 1985).
56. Vicarious disqualification is "[t]he principle that a lawyer can be disqualified from
representing a client in a matter adverse to the interests of a present or former client of
one of his present or former partners or associates." Liebman, The Changing Law of Disqualification: The Role of Presumption and Policy, 73 Nw. U. L. REV. 996, 1000 (1979).
57. Whatcott, 757 F.2d at 1099.
58. Id.
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In this action, Smith was awarded $210,000 in damages. The defendants retained the law firm of Nielsen & Senior to appeal this adverse
judgment to the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals. Shortly before Nielsen
& Senior was retained, however, most of the Boyden attorneys, including Anderson, joined the Nielsen & Senior firm. 59 Clark Neilsen discovered Anderson's former representation of Smith, and the resulting
potential conflict, when reviewing the Smith criminal trial transcript.
60
Smith's present attorney was not notified of the potential conflict.
Later, Smith recognized Anderson's name on the Nielsen & Senior letterhead and informed his attorney of the conflict. Smith's attorney contacted Nielsen & Senior about the situation but no solution was
negotiated and briefs were filed as scheduled. Smith then filed a motion
to disqualify Nielsen & Senior as defendants' counsel. 6 1 After a full evidentiary hearing, 6 2 the Tenth Circuit granted the motion and struck the
Nielsen & Senior brief and docketing statement from the appellate
record.
In ruling on the motion to disqualify Nielsen & Senior, the Tenth
Circuit first determined that the motion was diligently filed and should
be heard. The defendants had argued that the motion should not be
considered since it was made after briefs were filed. 6 3 Responding to
this contention, the Tenth Circuit recognized that motions to disqualify
counsel must be diligently pursued to avoid waiver and may not be filed
merely as a litigation tactic. 6 4 The Tenth Circuit, however, did not find
59. Id. The precaution taken against conflicts of interest between these firms was a
comparison of current client lists, not former client lists. Anderson was unaware that Nielsen & Senior had been retained to represent the defendants on appeal.
60. Id. Work on the appellate brief continued and all files were kept in Arthur and
Clark Nielsen's offices. Anderson never discussed his representation of Smith with anyone
at his new firm and no one was allowed access to the previous lawsuit files.
61. Conflict of interest cases are generally decided under the ethical rules of the particular jurisdiction in order to protect the interests of clients, the public and the integrity
of the bar. Greene, Everybody's Doing It - But Who Should Be? Vhen to Make a Disqualification
Motion Based on an Attorney's Representation of a Client with Interests Adverse to those of a Former
Client, 6 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 205, 206 (1983); see also Trane v. Smith, 621 F.2d 994,
999 (9th Cir. 1980) (the disqualification rule is necessary to implement many of the canons
of professional ethics). Rule 1(g) of the Rules of Practice of the Utah federal district court
incorporates both the state and national codes of professional responsibility. E.E.O.C. v.
Gygi Co., Inc., 749 F.2d 620, 621 n.l (10th Cir. 1984).
Because attorney disqualification cases involve the disclosure of confidential information normally prohibited from disclosure by the attorney-client privilege, Canons 4 and 5
are used to protect the interests of clients, while Canon 9 is often referred to as the means
of protecting the public's interests and the integrity of the bar. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL REsPoNsIBILrrY Canons 4, 5, and 9 (1986). Generally, Canon 4 is applicable in the

successive representation context while Canon 5 applies more often to concurrent representation cases. Note, The Chinese Wall Defense, supra note 54, at 68 1.
62. See Fullmer v. Harper, 517 F.2d 20, 21-22 (10th Cir. 1975) (a written response, a
full evidentiary hearing, and specific conclusions recorded on a reviewable record required
on motions to disqualify counsel).
63. Vhatcott, 757 F.2d at 1100.
64. See Redd v. Shell Oil Co., 518 F.2d 311, 315 (10th Cir. 1975) (rejection of motion
to disqualify counsel filed on the eve of trial, based on information known long before the
filing); see also United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Bolding, 447 F.2d 462 (10th Cir. 1971)
(right to object to own attorney's conflict of interest waived where client knew of conflict
and allowed attorney to conduct the trial).
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any such unacceptable behavior on the part of Smith's attorney; Smith's
attorney immediately notified Nielsen & Senior after the conflict was discovered and pursued a solution. Furthermore, the Tenth Circuit criticized Nielsen & Senior for not thoroughly inquiring about the Boyden
firm's past clients and chastened Clark Nielsen specifically for not deal65
ing with the problem before the briefs were filed.

The Tenth Circuit next focused on the merits of the motion to disqualify counsel, clarifying the analytical process to be used in cases of
alleged attorney-client conflicts created by successive representation. A
66
two-step analysis is to be employed in vicarious disqualification cases.
First, the court must examine if the attorney who previously represented
the moving party should be disqualified from working for the moving
party's opponent because of a conflict of interest. To disqualify an attorney for conflict of interest, a "substantial relationship [should] exist
between the pending suit and the matter in which the challenged attorney previously represented the client.''67 Whalcott is the first Tenth Circuit case specifically stating what criteria should be considered in finding
a "substantial relationship."'6 8 "Substantiality is present if the factual
contexts of the two representations are similar or related."'6 9 The Ninth
Circuit uses the same standard and will disqualify an attorney for even
70
the slightest hint of impropriety.
Applying these standards to the facts of Whalcolt, the court found a
65. Whatcott, 757 F.2d at 1100.
66. Id. at 1100-01. The court structured its opinion in two-step form. This is also the
form of inquiry which is used in other circuits. See, e.g., Note, Rebuttable Presumptions In
Vicarious Disqualification Cases: Can The Appearance of Impropriety Be Rebutted? - Novo Terapeutisk Laboratorium A/S v. Baxter Travenol Laboratories, Inc., 29 DE PAUL L. REV.
1077, 1079 (1980).
67. Whatcott, 757 F.2d at 1100. This test was originally enunciated in T.C. Theatre
Corp. v. Warner Bros. Pictures, 113 F. Supp. 265 (S.D.N.Y. 1953), and adopted by the
Tenth Circuit in Redd v. Shell Oil, 518 F.2d 311, 315 (10th Cir. 1975).
68. Other circuits differ on how to determine if a substantial relationship exists between an attorney's present case and the interests of a former client. The opinions range,
even within circuits, from requiring disqualification on even the appearance of impropriety
to demanding clearer proof of an actual conflict. See LaSalle Nat'l Bank v. County of Lake,
703 F.2d 252 (7th Cir. 1983) (A judge determines: (1)the scope of the representation; (2)
whether it is reasonable to infer that confidential information from the former client would
be given to a lawyer representing the present client; and (3) whether this information is
relevant to the issues raised in the litigation pending against the former client.); General
Elec. Co. v. Valeron Corp., 608 F.2d 265, 267 (6th Cir. 1979) (the Sixth Circuit does not
consider the issues of the two cases but requires that a substantial relationship exist between matters.), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 930 (1980); Government of India v. Cook Indus.. Inc..
569 F.2d 737, 740 (2d Cir. 1978) (the issues involved in the two representations must be
"identical or essentially the same."). See generally Riger, Disqualifying Counsel in Corporate
Representation - Eroding Standards in Changing Times, 34 U. MIAMI L. REV. 995, 998-99
(1980).
69. Whatcott, 757 F.2d at 1100 (citing Trust Corp. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 701 F.2d 85,
87 (9th Cir. 1982) (quoting Trone v. Smith, 621 F.2d 994, 998 (9th Cir. 1980)). This
broad interpretation of "substantial relationship" emphasizes avoiding even the smallest
possibility of impropriety even when there is only the slight probability that confidences
were or will be disclosed.
70. Trone, 621 F.2d at 998; see also Comment, Disqualificationof Counsel: Adverse Interests
and Revolving Doors, 81 CoLUM. L. REV. 199, 207-09 (1981) (criticizing Trones unusually
expansive reading of the "substantial relationship" test).
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substantial relationship between the alleged misrepresentations at the
time of the sale (the civil fraud suit) and the resulting action brought for
zoning ordinance violations (the criminal suit). The Tenth Circuit concluded that Anderson did have a conflict of interest and was prohibited
from participation in the appeal. Since the factual situation in the
Whatcott case presented a clear cut instance of a conflict of interest resulting from successive representation, it is difficult to determine if the
Tenth Circuit is actually showing a preference for the Ninth Circuit's
concept of the substantial relationship analysis or if it was simply a convenient phrase to cite. If the Tenth Circuit is showing a preference for
this approach then attorneys will be disqualified for even the slightest
hint of impropriety. If the Tenth Circuit is not showing a preference for
the Ninth Circuit standard, a more substantial nexus should be shown
between the present litigation, in which the attorney is representing an
opponent in prior litigation, and the party represented in the prior
litigation.
After finding a substantial relationship between the two successive
cases, the Tenth Circuit presumed that confidential information was actually given by the client in the first case to the attorney. 7' The Tenth
Circuit, discounting a previous Tenth Circuit decision, 72 aligned itself
with the majority of other circuits by holding that this presumption is
irrebuttable. 73 Making the presumption irrebuttable protects former
clients from having to reveal confidential information in order to prove
that the attorney whose disqualification is sought actually received confi74
dential information.
In the second step of the analysis, the Tenth Circuit examined if
Anderson's disqualification disqualified his entire firm. In resolving that
question, the Tenth Circuit recognized a second presumption; that the
attorney possessing confidential information shares this information
with his partners thereby requiring the vicarious disqualification of the
71. The Trone court indicated that this rule of disqualification perhaps serves to preserve the secrets and confidences communicated by clients. If there is even a reasonable
probability that confidences were disclosed which could be used by an attorney in adverse
representation, a substantial relationship is presumed. "Both the fact and appearance of
total professional commitment are endangered by adverse representation in related
cases." Trone, 621 F.2d at 998-99.
72. Waters v. Western Co. of N. America, 436 F.2d 1072 (10th Cir. 1971) (citing Cord
v. Smith, 338 F.2d 516, 524 (9th Cir. 1964)). Previously in the Tenth Circuit, when there
was a change of professional employment during litigation giving rise to an apparent conflict of interest, the trial judge was not required to go into the question of whether there
was an actual conveyance of privileged information from the former client. The trial judge
was, however, allowed to ignore the appearance of impropriety if there were actual facts
present to show that no conflict of interest existed.
73. Whatcott, 757 F.2d at 1100. See, e.g., In re Corrugated Containers Antitrust Litigation, 659 F.2d 1341, 1347 (5th Cir. 1981), overruled on other grounds, Gibbs v. Paluk, 742
F.2d 181, 185 (5th Cir. 1984); Trone v. Smith, 621 F.2d 994, 998-99 (9th Cir. 1980);
Arkansas v. Dean Food Products Co., 605 F.2d 380, 384 (8th Cir. 1979), overruled on other
grounds, In re Multipiece Rim Products Liability Litigation, 612 F.2d 377, 378 (8th Cir.
1980), vacated sub nom. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord, 449 U.S. 368 (1981); Silver
Chrysler Plymouth, Inc. v. Chrysler Motor Corp., 518 F.2d 751, 754 (2d Cir. 1975).
74. Id.
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entire firm. 75 However, the Tenth Circuit did not state if this presumption is irrebuttable. The defendants urged the Tenth Circuit to allow a
limited exception to firmwide disqualification where a particular firm can
prove that the firm attorney with the conflict of interest has been effectively excluded by a "Chinese wall" from participation in the second
case. 7 6 After discussing this exception and the factors which must exist
to prove that specific institutional mechanisms exist to block the flow of
confidential information, the Tenth Circuit declined to decide whether
to adopt the exception. 77 The Whatcott case was considered an inappropriate vehicle for this decision since no such effective prior screening
procedures were used by Nielsen & Senior.
Judicial resolution of attorney disqualification cases involves the
balancing of several competing policy interests; the integrity of the legal
system and the protection of client confidences versus the availability of
legal services and the right of a client to choose counsel. Although
Whatcott has helped define and clarify how the Tenth Circuit will analyze
motions to disqualify attorneys and firms for conflicts of interest, it is
unfortunate that the Tenth Circuit refused to specifically state how the
"substantial relationship" test will be applied, or rule on the Chinese
wall exception to the imputed knowledge presumption. The result
leaves law firms in the circuit in a quandry, not knowing if the screening
procedures described in this case will benefit them or simply be a waste
of firm funds. Law firms must continue to face the choice: should they
accept a client who has a potential conflict of interest with one firm attorney and set up a "Chinese wall" system, or should they flatly turn
clients away who would subject them to vicarious disqualification?
III.

IN PERSONAM JURISDICTION

Before a court may adjudicate an action seeking to impose duties or
obligations upon a defendant, it must obtain jurisdiction over the defendant. 78 In the current survey period, the Tenth Circuit, in the case of
Burt v. Board of Regents of the University of Nebraska,79 determined the reach
of Colorado's long arm statute, haling an out-of-state defendant into a
Colorado federal district court when only the "effect" of the alleged tort
took place in Colorado. This variation from the traditional "minimum
contacts" standard is one more interpretation of the Supreme Court's
75. Id. at 1101.
76. Id. A "Chinese Wall" is an internal screening procedure set up by a lawfirm to
isolate an attorney with a conflict of interest from the rest of the firm so that any confidential information is not transmitted to other firm attorneys. Several circuits allow the existence of such procedures to rebut the presumption that an attorney possessing confidential
information shares this information with his partners. See, e.g., Schiessle v. Stephens, 714
F.2d 417,421 (7th Cir. 1983); Armstrong v. McAlpin, 625 F.2d 433, 445-46 (2d Cir. 1980),
vacated on other grounds, 449 U.S. 1106 (1981); Kesselhaut v. United States, 555 F.2d 791,
793-94 (Ct. CI. 1977). Whatcott, 757 F.2d at 1101-02; Note, The Chinese Wall Defense, supra

note 54.
77. Whatcott, 757 F.2d at 1101-02.
78.

R. CASAD, JURISDICTION IN CIVIL ACTIONS

1.01(2) (1983).

79. 757 F.2d 242 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 521 (1985).
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multiple applications of the due process clause. 8 0 To assert personal jurisdiction over a nonresident a court must: first, exercise the state's
long-arm statute allowing for substituted service of process; and second,
analyze whether the nonresident defendant has sufficient minimum contacts with the forum state to employ this long-arm jurisdiction without
violating the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. 8 ' The
Supreme Court's most recent decisions in this area refine the character
of contacts a nonresident must have with a forum state to allow the exer82
cise of long-arm jurisdiction without violating the due process clause.
In Burt, the Tenth Circuit determined the reach of Colorado's long-arm
statue 8 3 by using the due process guidelines set forth in the Supreme
84
Court mass media defamation cases of Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc.
85
and Calder v. Jones.
In Burt, the Tenth Circuit examined whether one allegedly defamatory letter mailed from Nebraska to Colorado conferred personal jurisdiction upon the Colorado Federal District Court over a nonresident
defendant.8 6 The plaintiff, Dr. Burt, was a medical doctor who completed an orthopedic residency under Dr. Connolly at the University of
Nebraska. 8 7 After the residency, Dr. Burt applied for but was denied
staff privileges at several Colorado hospitals because of a "very unfavorable" letter sent by Dr. Connolly.8 8 Burt filed suit against Dr. Connolly
and the University of Nebraska Board of Regents seeking damages for
80. See Lewis, The Three Deaths of "State Sovereignty" and the Curse of Abstraction in the
Jurisprudence of PersonalJurisdiction, 58 NOTRE DAME LAW. 699, 699 (1983) ("Few fields of
legal thought have been as plagued by a penchant for abstraction as has personal jurisdiction."). Several commentators have divided the Supreme Court decisions along two distinct lines: those which follow "minimum contacts" analysis and consider all of the factors
which go into such a determination; and those which follow a single factor or "satellite
basis" analysis and consider factors outside the traditional minimum contacts standards.
The cases in the latter category tend to focus on one theme such as the "fairness" of
asserting jurisdiction over the defendant. See Lewis, A Brave New Wforld for PersonalJurisdiction: Flexible Tests Under Uniform Standards, 37 VAND. L. REV. 1 (1984); McDougal, Judicial
Jurisdiction:From a Contacts to an Interest Analysis, 35 VAND. L. REV. 1 (1982).
81. World Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980); C. WRIGHT,
LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 64 (4th ed. 1983). See also Note, PersonalJurisdictionOver Publishers in Defamation Actions: A Current Assessment, 30 VILL. L. REV. 193, 197 (1985).
82. C. WRIGHT, supra note 81, at § 64.
83. In diversity cases, the rules governing a federal district court's jurisdiction are
equivalent to the rules governing state court jurisdiction in the state where the federal
district court is located. R. CASAD, supra note 78, at 5.02(3). Many long-arm statutes are
intended to extend jurisdiction to the fullest extent permitted by the federal due process
clause. Therefore, these statutes are construed to be coextensive with the due process
clause and a court need only determine if the United States Constitution has been violated.
Since Colorado is one such state, see Behagen v. Amateur Basketball Ass'n, 744 F.2d 731,
733 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 1879 (1985), the court need only examine the constitutional issue, not the statutory one, to determine ifjurisdiction exists. Burt, 757 F.2d at
243.
84. 465 U.S. 770 (1984).
85. 465 U.S. 783 (1984). For a discussion of the guidelines set forth in Keeton and
Calder, see infra notes 90-92 and accompanying text.
86. Burt, 757 F.2d at 243.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 246. The allegedly defamatory letter was a required response to the hospitals' inquiries regarding Dr. Burt's orthopedic residency and general medical competence.
In fact, Dr. Connolly had a duty to reply to the hospitals' solicitations.
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defamation and numerous other causes of action. The district court
granted the defendants' motion to dismiss, stating that the Board of Regents was immune from prosecution under the eleventh amendment
and that the district court lacked personal jurisdiction over Dr. Connolly. Burt appealed the jurisdictional issue. The Tenth Circuit reversed and remanded the case stating that the Keeton and Calder cases,
decided after the district court ruling, required reversal. 89
In Keeton and Calder, the Supreme Court set forth the proper due
process analysis for exercising long-arm jurisdiction over mass media
defendants in a defamation action. 90 Both Supreme Court cases involved libel actions against publishers or employees of large magazines
with nationwide circulations. The defendants had no contact with the
forum states other than the circulation of their magazines. 9 1 The Court
upheld the exercise of personal jurisdiction in both cases on the ground
that publishers must anticipate defending suits in states where regular
monthly sales occur. 9 2 The Tenth Circuit found these cases dispositive
of the jurisdictional issue in Burt.
The Tenth Circuit in Burt was divided on the interpretation of Keeton and Calder. The majority, consisting of Circuit Judge Seymour and
District Court Judge Anderson, sitting by designation, found the commercial mass media case analysis applicable, even though the alleged
defamation resulted from a single letter. Relying on the emphasis
placed in Calder on the intentional nature of the defendant's conduct and
the calculated injurious effect in the forum state, the majority pointed
out that an individual injured in one state need not go to another state
93
to seek redress and that this was not a case of untargeted negligence.
If Burt's allegation was true, "no due process notions of fairness are
violated by requiring one who intentionally libels another to answer for
the truth of his statements in any state where the libel causes harm to the
victim." ' 9 4 The Tenth Circuit majority emphasized that the state has a

strong interest in exercising jurisdiction over those who commit torts
within its boundaries; therefore, it was "fair" to hale Dr. Connolly into
89. Id. at 244.
90. For an in-depth analysis of the Calder and Keeton cases, see Levine, PreliminaryProcedural Protectionfor the Press from Jurisdiction in Distant Forums after Calder and Keeton, 1984
ARIZ. ST. L.J. 459; Note, Constitutional Law - Consistency in the Due Process Requirement?, 18
CREIGHTON L. REV. 125 (1985); Note, PersonalJurisdiction Over Publishers in Defamation Actions: A Current Assessment. 30 VILL. L. REV. 193 (1985); Comment, Minimum Contacts and the
First Amendment: When Should They Meet?, 35 BAYLOR L. REV. 467 (1983) (written prior to the
Supreme Court decisions).
91. Keeton, 465 U.S. at 772; Calder, 465 U.S. at 784-85.
92. Both cases also rejected the theory of some federal circuits that a greater showing
of contacts is necessary for media defendants in defamation actions because of first
amendment considerations surrounding the law of libel. Keeton, 465 U.S. at 780-8 1; Calder,
465 U.S. at 790-91. This aspect of the Supreme Court cases is irrelevant in the cases'
application to Burt, especially since this media exception was rejected by the Tenth Circuit
in Anselmi v. Denver Post, Inc., 552 F.2d 316, 325 (10th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 432 U.S.
911 (1977). See also American Land Program, Inc. v. Bonaventura Uitgevers Maatschappij,
N.V., 710 F.2d 1449, 1452 (10th Cir. 1983).
93. Burt, 757 F.2d at 244.
94. Id. at 245.

390

DENVER UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 63:2

Colorado federal district court. 9 5 The majority paid lip service to the
traditional minimum contacts standards, but focused on the effect of the
tortious action in the forum state. 9 6
In the dissent, however, Circuit Judge Seth outlined a different application of the Calder effects test.9 7 He stated that Calder contains "a
mixture of the minimum contacts facts, minimum contact cases, and the
'effects' theory." 98 Consequently, Judge Seth believed that the court
should apply the "effects" test within the context of the minimum contacts doctrine. This more confined view of what contacts are necessary
to fulfill due process requirements requires a closer relationship between the defendant's conduct and the forum state. Judge Seth stated
that the Calder effects test requires that both the "focal point of the story
and the harm" be within the forum state. 99 According to Judge Seth,
the focal point of the story in Burt was the residency program in Nebraska, not the alleged injury in Colorado.
Finally, the dissent noted that the circumstaces of this case were far
removed from the environment found in the Supreme Court mass media
cases. Publishers of nationwide magazines must reasonably anticipate
being haled into court in many states because of the impact of their
magazines' circulation. Individuals such as Dr. Connolly do not have
these expectations and the impact of their alleged libel must still be analyzed within the context of their minimum contacts with the forum
state.100
Despite the persuasive dissent, the Burt case demonstrates that the
Tenth Circuit will find personal jurisdiction over an alleged libellist
whenever the effect of the allegedly tortious conduct is directed into the
forum state, regardless of whether the defendant is a part of the commercial mass media or if the defendant is an individual. According to
the Tenth Circuit, both types of defendants have a reasonable expectation of being haled into court in the forum state even with no other
contacts with the forum state than the effect of their allegedly tortious
conduct.
IV.

CIVIL DISCOVERY

OF

STATE

GRAND JURY DOCUMENTS

In two separate opinions, the Tenth Circuit determined whether
documents subpoenaed as evidence by a state grand jury are materials
that are entitled to protection from discovery in a federal civil proceeding. The case of United States ex rel. Woodward v. Tynan 101 was before the
Tenth Circuit twice to determine this issue. Although some guidance
was given concerning Rule 6(e)'s relationship to subpoenaed docu95. Id. at 244.
96. Id. at 243-45.
97. Id. at 245-47 (Seth, J.,
dissenting).
98. Id. at 245.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 246.
101. 757 F.2d 1085 (10th Cir. 1985) (Tynan I), decided on other grounds, 776 F.2d 250
(10th Cir. 1985) (rehearing en banc) (Tynan II).
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ments, the Tynan decisions still left some confusion over what procedure
should be used by a federal court when a party wants grand jury information released from another court.
A.

Tynan I

In Tynan I, a civil suit was filed in the United States District Court
for the District of Colorado by the Colorado Attorney General against
Tynan and seven corporate entities involved in the operation of nursing
homes in Colorado. The complaint alleged that defendants had filed
fraudulent claims with the Colorado Medicaid program. 10 2 Access to
the ordinary business records of the corporate defendants was essential
to the state's case. These records 'had already been seized from the defendants and were the basis for a criminal prosecution in a Colorado
state court.' 0 3 In the criminal proceeding, use of the records was suppressed and the judge ordered the records sealed because the search
warrant used to obtain the-records.was improperly based on grand jury
testimony.' 0 4 In the federal district court action, the Attorney General
was unsuccessful in obtaining an order from the state court freeing the
records and subsequently filed a motion in the federal district court to
compel the defendants to consent to the documents' release. This motion was denied. Because the state could not proceed with the federal
case without the records, the suit was eventually dismissed with prejudice. The state appealed the denial of the motion to compel and the
order of dismissal.' 0 5 The Tenth Circuit, Judge Logan writing for the
panel majority, reversed the order of dismissal and instructed the federal district court to order the state court to release the records.
The secrecy of grand jury proceedings, codified in Federal Rule of
Criminal Procedure 6(e)(2), is not absolute. 10 6 Where, as in Tynan I,
information is sought from a grand jury for a civil proceeding, Rule
6(e)(3)(C)(i) allows disclosure "when so directed by a court preliminarily to or in connection with ajudicial proceeding."' 0 7 Anyone needing
disclosure of testimony transcripts under this clause must demonstrate a
102. Tynan 1, 757 F.2d at 1086.
103. People v. Tynan, 701 P.2d80 (Colo. Ct. App. 1984).
104. Id. Such records would normally be discoverable in a civil case under FED. R. Civ.
P. 34.
105. Tynan 1, 757 F.2d at 1086-87.
106. FED. R. CRAM. P. 6(e)(2) states:
(2) General Rule of Secrecy. - A grand juror, an interpreter, a stenographer, an
operator of a recording device, a typist who transcribes recorded testimony, an
attorney for the government, or any person to whom disclosure is made under
paragraph (3)(A)(ii) of this subdivision shall not disclose matters occurring before
the grand jury, except as otherwise provided for in these rules. No obligation of
secrecy may be imposed on any person except in accordance with this rule. A
knowing violation of Rule 6 may be punished as a contempt of court.
See C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE §§ 106-09 (2d ed. 1982 & Supp. 1985).
See generally Note, Lifting the Bridled Veil: Disclosure of GrandJupy Proceedings Under Rule 6(e) of
the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 3 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 459 (1980) (discussing standards under which documents and trial transcripts may be disclosed in criminal and civil
cases) [hereinafter cited as Note, Lifting the Bridled Veil].
107. FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(3)(C)(i).
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"particularized need" for the materials. 108 Unfortunately, the courts do
not agree on the application of Rule 6(e), and the "particularized need"
standard, to documents subpoenaed by a grand jury as evidence. 10 9 If
the documents are sought only for their intrinsic value and not to discover what happened at the grand jury proceeding, some courts do not
subject such documents to the strict "particularized need" standard.
Documents requested under those circumstances do not fall within the
scope of "matters occuring before the grand jury.""I1 0 Other courts,
however, refuse to make a distinction between documents and transcripts of testimony insofar as Rule 6(e) is concerned."'
In Tynan I, the Tenth Circuit first decided whether documents kept
in the ordinary course of business are privileged grand jury material
under Rule 6(e). The Tenth Circuit sided with those circuits which hold
that documents sought for their intrinsic value do not disclose "matters
occurring before the grand jury." Relying on the Second Circuit's reasoning enunciated in United States v. Interstate Dress Carriers, Inc.," l2 that
data sought in furtherance of a lawful investigation rather than to learn
what took place before a grand jury has no valid disclosure defense, the
1 13
Tenth Circuit stated that the records should be made available.
The Tenth Circuit then pointed out that even if the documents were
entitled to secrecy, the proper procedure for determining if they were
exempt under Rule 6(e) was not followed. Using what a Supreme Court
case, Douglas Oil Co. v. Petrol Stops Northwest, 1 14 described as the "better
practice" for making this decision, the Tenth Circuit stated that the following three part procedure should be followed. First, application to
the state court holding the documents should be made; second, the state
court should make a written evaluation of the need for continued secrecy using the limited evidence it has of the federal civil case; third, the
108. United States v. Procter & Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677 (1958); Dennis v. United
States, 302 F.2d 5 (10th Cir. 1962). The standard for "particular need" requires that
[p]arties seeking grand jury transcripts under Rule 6(e) must show that the material they seek is needed to avoid a possible injustice in another judicial proceeding, that the need for disclosure is greater than the need for continued secrecy,
and that their request is structured to cover only material so needed.
Douglas Oil Co. v. Petrol Stops Northwest, 441 U.S. 211, 222 (1979) (footnotes omitted).
109. See M. RHODES, ORFIELD'S CRIMINAL PROCEDURE UNDER THE FEDERAL RULES
36:121 (2d ed. 1985); Note, Civil Discove, of Documents Held by a GrandJuy, 47 U. CHI. L.
REV. 604 (1980) (an analysis of the current law on the secrecy of documents subpoenaed

by a grand jury); Note, Lifting the
Bridled Veil,
supra note 106, at 480-83 (discussion of a twopronged test for disclosure of documents).
110. United States v. Stanford, 589 F.2d 285 (7th Cir.) (federal and local employment
records are documents outside the scope of Rule 6(e)), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 983 (1979);
United States v. Interstate Dress Carriers, Inc., 280 F.2d 52 (2d Cir. 1960) (trucking company's financial accounts and business records not subject to Rule 6(e) secrecy rule); see
also In re Grand Jury Investigation of Ven-Fuel, 441 F. Supp. 1299, 1303-04 (M.D. Fla.

1977); Capital Indem. Corp. v.First Minn. Constr. Co., 405 F. Supp. 929, 930-31 (D. Mass.
1975); Davis v. Romney, 55 F.R.D. 337, 341-42 (E.D. Pa. 1972); In re Hearing Before the
Senate Comm. on Banking & Currency, 19 F.R.D. 410 (N.D. Ill.), rev'd, 245 F.2d 667 (7th

Cir. 1957).
11I.See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Proceeding, 309 F.2d 440 (3d Cir. 1962).
112. 280 F.2d 52 (2d Cir. 1960).
113. Tynan 1, 757 F.2d at 1087-88.
114. Douglas Oil, 441 U.S. 211.
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state court should send the material to the federal district court where
the civil case is pending. The federal district court, with its special
knowledge of the civil action before it and the conclusions of the state
court having control over the grand jury, should make the final
determination. 115
The Tenth Circuit then stated that the same result was required
even though the records at issue were in the custody of a state court.' 16
Even assuming that Colorado law requires nondisclosure of these documents, the Tenth Circuit majority felt that federal law should determine
the discolsure issue. Relying on a Seventh Circuit case, Socialist Workers
Party v. Grubisic,' 17 the court stated that comity requires that disclosure
should first be sought through the state court. If disclosure is not permitted, however, the federal district court should order the state court
to transmit the materials for an in camera examination according to Douglas Oil and Rule 6(e) principles.' 18 Since the federal district court judge
in Tynan I did not follow this procedure, the judge did not exercise informed discretion and the case was remanded.' 19
Circuit Judge McWilliams, in a strong dissent, opposed the Tynan I
majority's recommended procedure for resolving the disclosure issue
and declared it to be an "unwarranted intrusion by the federal judiciary
into a state court proceeding."' 2 0 Judge McWilliams believed that the
abuse of discretion standard was improperly applied, 121 that Douglas Oil
did not mandate the procedures outlined by the majority, 12 2 and that a
state court protective order is entitled to the respect of the federal
courts. 123

B.

Tynan II

To avoid the potential supremacy clause and full faith and credit
clause problems created by Tynan I, the Tenth Circuit, in a rehearing en
banc, handed down Tynan H. This case redefined the procedure for releasing the records, requiring the defendants to request the documents
from the state court so that they could abide with the federal court's
discovery order. 12 4 The revised procedure avoided ordering the state
court to relinquish the documents to the federal court in the hope that
the documents could now be released by the state court under Colorado
115. Tynan 1, 757 F.2d at 1088.
116. Id.
117. 619 F.2d 641 (7th Cir. 1980).
118. Tynan 1, 757 F.2d at 1089-90.
119. Id. at 1091.
120. Tynan 1, 757 F.2d at 1093 (McWilliams, J., dissenting).
121. Circuit Judge McWilliams stated that the federal district court's refusal to grant
the motion to comply was not "arbitrary and capricious" since the records were subject to
a protective order by a court and not in the defendant's custody or control. Id. at 1091-92.
122. According to Judge McWilliams, the Douglas Oil "better procedure" need not be
used in this case since the state judge had adequate knowledge of the federal civil case to
make an intelligent decision on whether disclosure was proper. Id. at 1092-93.
123. Id. at 1093.
124. United States ex rel.
Woodard v. Tvnan (Tvnan //), 776 F.2d 250, 251-52 (1985).
The Tynan I decision was neither reaffirmed nor disavowed in Tvnan II. Id. at 251.
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law. The Tenth Circuit ordered that the discovery request be channeled
through the original owners of the records.' 2 5 The Tenth Circuit supported this procedure by noting that "documents produced for a grand
jury remain the property of the person producing them."' 12 6 Normally,
these documents are returned to their owners upon completion of the
grand jury's task.' 27 The court further held that ordering the defendants to request the release of the record was within the federal court's
power, analogizing the situation to federal court requests for records in
28
possession of a third party.'
If the Colorado court agrees with this new procedure, the constitutional issue created in Tynan I will be avoided. Regardless of the Colorado court's eventual action, the Tynan cases provide insight into the
procedure used to maintain grand jury secrecy when documents are
sought for a civil proceeding in another court. After the Tynan cases, the
correct procedure to obtain documents from another court is to have
the owner of the evidence channel the request to the court with custody
of the document.
May Oldfather

125. For a commentary lavoring this method of obtaining discovery, see Comment,
Civil Discovery of Doomiens feld br. a GrandJupy. 47 U. Cni. L. RE%-. 604. 613-20 (1980).
126. Tyrian II, 776 F.2d at 252 (citing Granberv %.District Court, 187 Colo. 316, 32223. 531 P.2d 390. 394 (1975)).
127. Tyian I1, 776 F.2d at 252 (citing in re Doe. 537 F. Supp. 1038, 1040 (D.R.I. 1982));
see also In re Bendix Aviation Corp.. 58 F. Supp. 953. 954 (S.1).N.Y. 1945).
128. Tyrian I1. 776 F.2d at 252 (citing Powell %.Merrimack Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 80 F.R.D.
431, 433 (N.D. Ga. 1978): Karlsson v. Wollson, 18 F.R.D. 474, 476-77 (1). Minn. 1956);
and Paramount Film Distrib. Corp. -. Rain, 91 F. Supp. 778, 781-82 (E.D.S.C. 1950)).

LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW
OVERVIEW

During the 1984-85 survey period, the Tenth Circuit resolved appeals concerning several areas of labor and employment law. In employment law, the court considered employment-at-will arguments
based upon Colorado and New Mexico law.' In the traditional areas of
labor law, the Tenth Circuit upheld the findings and conclusions of the
National Labor Relations Board (NLRB or Board) and enforced the
Board's order in each labor case. When certain employers refused to
bargain with the certified employee representative, the court upheld the
Boards use of presumptions, hearing criteria, and discretion in the determination of an appropriate bargaining unit. 2 The court applied the
current standard for determining the existence of representation election misrepresentations, despite the Board's repeated changes of the
standard in recent years. When the court considered the issue of entitlement to disability benefits while a strike is in progress, the court found
the benefits to be an accrued obligation of the company - unlike
wages. 3 The court's decision emphasized labor law (employer retaliation for union activity) rather than contract law. When faced with an
organization that acted like a local labor organization the court did not
hesitate to call it a local labor organization, subjecting it to the rigors of
the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act. 4 The court focused on the purposes of the Act: to give union members a say in their
union's affairs and to ensure union democracy.
In each labor decision the court attempted to construe labor-management rights, conduct, and rules in light of the purposes of the relevant statute. The Labor Management Relations Act is an enabling
statute, recognizing collective bargaining and employee representation
as in the public interest. Although the NLRB has wide discretion, the
Tenth Circuit has decided in favor of employee rights and collective bargaining. The court does not seem willing to limit these objectives without a clear mandate.
The Tenth Circuit's approach to labor issues was traditional and
straightforward. The court was unlikely to be swayed by arguments of
contractual waiver, conduct beyond the agency's scope of authority, or
artful statutory construction. The court's goal was to decide each case
in conformance with the objectives of national labor policy. Each court
should strive to do the same.
1. Garcia v. Aetna Finance Co., 752 F.2d 488 (10th Cir. 1984); Ellis v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 754 F.2d 884 (10th Cir. 1985).
2. NLRB v. Foodland, 744 F.2d 735 (10th Cir. 1984); NLRB v. DPM of Kansas, Inc.,
744 F.2d 83 (10th Cir. 1984).
3. Conoco, Inc. v. NLRB, 740 F.2d 8111 (10th Cir. 1984).
4. Donovan v. National Transient Div., 736 F.2d 618 (10th Cir. 1984), cert. denied,
105 S. Ct. 781 (1985).
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EMPLOYER'S REFUSAL TO BARGAIN

The Tenth Circuit decided two cases where employers refused to
bargain with recently certified unions. In both cases the court upheld
findings of the National Labor Relations Board, holding that the employers had committed unfair labor practices, that the representation
election results were valid and ordering the employers to bargain with
the unions.
A.

Election Misconduct: NLRB v. DPM of Kansas, Inc.

In NLRB v. DPM of Kansas, Inc. ,5 the union lost an election to represent various DPM employees but filed objections to the election. The
union alleged that DPM had interfered with the election by instituting a
job attendance bonus just prior to the election, and by adjusting an employee's vacation time. After investigation, the Board adopted the regional director's recommendation that the election results be set aside
and a new election be held. The union won the second election, but the
employer objected, citing alleged union misrepresentations at the time
of ballotting. The Board overruled the objections, and certified the
union. 6 The company refused to bargain with the union, causing the
union to file an unfair labor practice (ULP) charge. The Board found
the employer in violation of sections 8(a)(1) and (5) of the National Labor Relations Act, 7 and sought enforcement in the Tenth Circuit.
With respect to the initial action, the Tenth Circuit stated that when
an employer provides an economic benefit to its employees, as DPM
had, just before a representation election is held, such an action is "suspect" as an intentional attempt to influence the election's outcome. 8
The United States Supreme Court has termed well-timed benefits or inducements offered by an employer prior to an election "the suggestion
of a fist inside the velvet glove." 9 Noting that the instant dispute concerned the Board's inferences and legal conclusions drawn from DPM's
election time bonuses, rather than a factual dispute over what actually
occurred, the Tenth Circuit found no abuse of discretion by the Board,
and upheld its ruling.' 0
5.
6.

744 F.2d 83 (10th Cir. 1984).
Id. at 85.

7. 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(a)(1), (a)(5) (1982).
8.

744 F.2d at 85.

9. NLRB v. Exchange Parts Co., 375 U.S. 405,409 (1964) ("Employees are not likel'
to miss the inference that the source of benefits now conferred is also the source from

which future benefits must flow and which may dry up if it is not obliged.").
10. 744 F.2d at 85. For similar Tenth Circuit holdings, see Crown Cork & Seal Co.,
Inc. v. NLRB, 659 F.2d 127, 130 (10th Cir. 1981) (The union made pre-election promises

of benefits should it be elected, which the court refused to analogize to similar employer
conduct - for if the union is defeated the union will be unable to retaliate. "When an
employer promises to improve working conditions if [its] employees reject an organizing
union, the employees' freedom of choice in the election is interfered with and the election
will be set aside."), cert.
denied, 454 U.S. 1150 (1982); NLRB v. Montgomery Ward & Co.,

554 F.2d 996, 1000-01 (10th Cir. 1977) (pre-planned wage increases announced after
union organizational effort underway violates section 8(a)(1)): NLRB v. Tonkawa Ref. Co..
434 F.2d 1041 (10th Cir. 1970) (the employer violated section 8(a)(l) "'by announcing and
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DPM's objections to the second election regarding alleged union
pre-election misrepresentations of fact involved an unclear area of the
law in which the Board has vacillated between differing standards for
election conduct. During implementation of the Wagner ActII and the
early years of the Taft-Hartley amendments, the NLRB did not attempt
to regulate campaign propaganda. The NLRB concentrated its efforts
on coercive conduct, believing that employee-voters would recognize
propaganda for what it was, and discount it.1 2 Gradually, the Board developed the position that elections should be held as close to "laboratory conditions" as possible. 1 3 Later, the Board set aside elections on a
case-by-case basis, such as when employees were deceived 14 or when
15
there was a severe impairment of free and informed choice.
In 1962, the election standard governing the truth or falsity of campaign propaganda was refined in Hollywood Ceramics Co. ,16 No longer did
a party need to show an intent to mislead. Instead, the alleged misrepresentation need only have been a "substantial departure from the
truth" preventing other parties from "making an effective reply," which
could "reasonably be expected to have a significant impact on the
7
election." 1
The Board reversed this position in 1977, in Shopping Karl Food Margranting wage increases in order to induce employees to reject the designation of a union
as a bargaining agent in a pending representation election."); J.C. Penney Co. v. NLRB,
384 F.2d 479, 484-85 (10th Cir. 1967) (pre-election promise of wage increases if employees withdrew from union); American Sanitary Prods. Co. v. NLRB, 382 F.2d 53, 57-58
(10th Cir. 1967) (the employer changed pay periods, instituted an incentive pay program
for efficient performance, and granted a paid holiday on employees' birthdays); Betts Baking Co. v. NLRB, 380 F.2d 199, 203 (10th Cir. 1967) (employer granted a wage increase
and retirement benefits following the start of a union drive), modified on other grounds, 428
F.2d 156 (10th Cir. 1970); NLRB v. Albuquerque Phoenix Express, 368 F.2d 451, 454
(10th Cir. 1966) (employer unilaterally granted wage increases during a union organizational effort); Crown Tar and Chem. Works, Inc. v. NLRB, 365 F.2d 588, 589-90 (10th Cir.
1966) (Pre-planned pay raises were announced at the same time the union drive was underway. "The granting of economic benefits by the unilateral action of an employer while
union organizational efforts are underway, or while a representation election is pending, is
a violation of Sections 8(a)(l) and 8(a)(5) of the Act . . . .It follows that the employer
must bargain with the union."); NLRB v. Brown-Dunkin Co., 287 F.2d 17, 18-19 (10th Cir.
1961) (promise of pay raises and other benefits if unit employees rejected the union).
11. National Labor Relations Act of 1935, Pub. L. No. 74-198, 49 Stat. 449 (codified
as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1982)).
12. See also Midland Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 263 N.L.R.B. 127 (1982); N.P. Nelson Iron
Works, Inc., 78 N.L.R.B. 1270, 1271 (1948); Carrollton Furniture Mfg. Co., 75 N.L.R.B.
710, 712 (1948); Corn Products Ref. Co., 58 N.L.R.B. 1441, 1442 (1944).
13. General Shoe Corp., 77 N.L.R.B. 124, 127 (1948).
14. See, e.g., United Aircraft Corp., 103 N.L.R.B. 102, 103-05 (One union, in a run-off
representation election, distributed a "telegram" accusing the other union of "smearing"
its reputation. "This conduct lowered the standards of campaigning to a level which impaired the free and informed atmosphere requisite to an untrammeled expression of
choice by the employees.").
15. The Gummed Products Co., 112 N.L.R.B. 1092, 1094 (1955) (The employer distributed a handbill to employees asking them to compare their wages to other companies'
wages, but misquoted wage rates. "Petitioner's conduct exceeded the limits of legitimate
propaganda and lowered the standards of campaigning to a level which impaired the free
and untrammeled expression of choice by the employees herein.").
16. 140 N.L.R.B. 221 (1962).
17. Id. at 224.
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ket, Inc. 18 Based on the Board's experience of fifteen years under the
Hollywood Ceramics rule, and relying on the sophistication of voters, the
Board refused to consider the truth or falsity of campaign propaganda.
The Board said it would intervene only if there were "deceptive campaign practices . . . involving the Board or its processes, or the use of
forged documents which render the voters unable to recognize the
propaganda for what it is."' 9
Twenty months after Shopping Kart, the Board returned to the
Hollywood Ceramics rule in General Knit of California, Inc. 20 In order to
carry out its responsibility of ensuring fair and free union elections, the
Board believed that it should intervene where misrepresentations might
2 1
have a material effect on the election outcome.
Finally, four years later, the Board again reversed itself in Midland
National Life Insurance Co. ,22 and returned to the Shopping Kart standard.
The Board cited the need for speedy, final and uniform election results
as well as the need to minimize dilatory objections to elections. 23 It believed that the Hollywood Ceramics rule confused parties, provoked needless litigation, 24 and eluded consistent and equitable adjudications. 2 5
After weighing the interests involved, the Board stated its belief that
voters are able to recognize propaganda, and found that the protectionist Hollywood Ceramics rule was no longer warranted. 2 6 The new Midland
27
rule was to be applied in future as well as pending cases.
18. 228 N.L.R.B. 1311 (1977).
19. Id. at 1313.
20. 239 N.L.R.B. 619 (1978).
21. Id. at 620.
22. 263 N.L.R.B. 127 (1982).
23. Id. at 131.
24. Id. (quoting Bok, The Regulation of Campaign Tactics in Representation Elections under
the National Labor Relations Act, 78 HARV. L. REv. 38, 85 (1964)).
25. 263 N.L.R.B. at 132.
26. Id.
[The Shopping Kart rule] is a clear, realistic rule of easy application which lends
itself to definite, predictable election results. It removes impediments to free
speech by permitting parties to speak without fear that inadvertent errors will
provide the basis for endless delay or overturned elections, and promotes uniformity in national labor law by minimizing the basis for disagreement between
the Board and the courts of appeals.
Id. Noting its frequent changes in election standards, the Board stated: "[A]dministrative
flexibility is . . . one of the principal reasons for the establishment of the regulatory agencies [because it] permits valuable experimentation and allows administrative policies to
reflect changing policy views." Id. at 132 (citing Leedom v. International Bhd. of Elec.
Workers, Local 108, 278 F.2d 237, 243 (D.C. Cir. 1960)). Further, the Board perceives its
function as involving statutory responsibilities and actions based on its "cumulative experience" of trial and error. It repeatedly emphasized that, regarding election misrepresentations, reasonable minds can differ. Id. at 130, 132.
Board Members Jenkins and Fanning dissented. They criticized the Board for its
many reversals, and denounced the abandonment of the flexible and balanced Hollywood
Ceramics rule in favor of"an ultra-permissive standard that place[s] a premium on the welltimed use of deception, trickery, and fraud." Id. at 133. They further castigated the
Board's emphasis on speed and a decreased workload, saying that the Board was "abandoning one of the most effective means. . . yet devised for assuring" a fair and free choice
of bargaining representative. Id. at 134-35.
27. 263 N.L.R.B. at 133 n.24.
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The Tenth Circuit had no difficulty in applying the Midland rule to
DPM, finding no abuse of discretion.2 8 The court noted that most other
29
circuits have also applied Midland to pending cases.
DPM's last objection was that it should have been granted an evidentiary hearing on its election objections, rather than simply an administrative investigation and decision by the regional director.30 The
Tenth Circuit stated that in order to be granted an evidentiary hearing
concerning representation elections, the objecting party must make out
a prima facie case with evidence showing substantial and material factual
disputes which would merit setting the election aside if resolved in the
objector's favor. 3 ' DPM did not make out such a prima facie case. This
requirement is consistent with prior Tenth Circuit decisions, 3 2 as well as
holdings by other circuits. 3 3 A hearing on representation objections is
not a procedure mandated by statute, but instead was created by the
Board. 3 4 The NLRB regional director is given discretion regarding
whether to grant a hearing,3 5 and in a consent election the Board also
36
has discretion to direct that a hearing be held.
B. Appropriate Bargaining Units: NLRB v. Foodland, Inc.
The companion refusal-to-bargain case decided by the Tenth Circuit was NLRB v. Foodland, Inc.3 7 Foodland operated six retail grocery
stores in northeastern Oklahoma. The United Food and Commercial
Workers Retail Clerks union filed a representation petition with the
Board seeking to represent all employees at Foodland's Owasso store,
except the meat department employees. The United Food and Commercial Workers Meatcutters union filed a petition to represent the meat
department employees of the Owasso store. Foodland argued that the
28. 744 F.2d at 86.
29. Id. at 86 n.2 (citing NLRB v. Milwaukee Brush Mfg. Co., 705 F.2d 257 (7th Cir.
1983)).
30. 744 F.2d at 85.
31. Id at 85-86.
32. See, e.g., Crown Cork & Seal Co., Inc. v. NLRB, 659 F.2d at 129 (citing NLRB v.
Whitney Museum of Am. Art, 636 F.2d 19, 23 (2d Cir. 1980)); NLRB v. Gold Spot Dairy,
Inc., 432 F.2d 125, 128 (10th Cir. 1970)).
33. See, e.g., NLRB v. Newly Weds Foods, Inc., 758 F.2d 4, 12 (1st Cir. 1985); L.C.
Cassidy & Son, Inc. v. NLRB, 745 F.2d 1059, 1064 (7th Cir. 1984); NLRB v. ARA Serv.,
Inc., 717 F.2d 57, 63-64 (3d Cir. 1983); Certainteed Corp. v. NLRB, 714 F.2d 1042, 104748 (11th Cir. 1983); NLRB v. Yellow Transp. Co., 709 F.2d 1342, 1343 (9th Cir. 1983);
EDS-IDAB, Inc. v. NLRB, 666 F.2d 917, 974 (5th Cir. 1982); NLRB v. Pinkerton's, Inc.,
621 F.2d 1322, 1325 (6th Cir. 1980); NLRB v. Cambridge Wire Cloth Co., Inc., 622 F.2d
1195, 1199 (4th Cir. 1980).
34. "In issuing a report on objections or challenged ballots, or both.., the regional
director may act on the basis of an administrative investigation or upon the record of a
hearing before a hearing officer." 29 C.F.R. § 102.69(d) (1985) (emphasis added).
35. Id.
36. "In a case involving a consent election .
if exceptions are filed . . . and it
appears to the Board that such exceptions . . . raise issues, the Board may direct the regional director . . . to issue . . . a notice of hearing on said exceptions before a hearing

officer." 29 C.F.R. § 102.69(f) (1985) (emphasis added).
37. 744 F.2d 735 (10th Cir. 1984).
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only appropriate bargaining unit would include all of its employees at all
six stores.
The Board's regional director found that the single store units for
both meat department employees and all other employees to be the appropriate bargaining unit. The Board declined to review the regional
director's decision. Both unions won their respective elections, but
Foodland objected on the basis of union electioneering (election interference). The objection was overruled by the regional director, and the
Board did not review the decision. The unions were certified, but Foodland refused to bargain with them. At the unfair labor practice (ULP)
hearing concerning the refusal to bargain, Foodland had no new evidence to present so the administrative law judge refused to relitigate
Foodland's representation objections, a decision which the Board upheld. 38 The Tenth Circuit, Judge McWilliams writing, enforced the
Board's order that Foodland must bargain with the unions.
Section 9(b) of the Labor Management Relations Act 39 (LMRA)
confers wide discretion on the NLRB in deciding the appropriate unit of
employees for collective bargaining purposes. 40 This discretion can be
delegated to regional directors, and the unit need only be an appropriate unit, rather than the most appropriate unit. 4 1 Even if division-wide
collective bargaining is desirable for the employer, the Board is empowered to decide that a lesser unit is appropriate. 42 Further, the NLRB
may rely on presumptions it draws from its past experience in determin43
ing that a particular unit is appropriate.
One of the presumptions utilized in the Foodland case was that a
single store is an appropriate bargaining unit. 4 4 The court found that
38. Id. at 739.
39. Section 9(b) of the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA) states:
The Board shall decide in each case whether, in order to assure to employees the
fullest freedom in exercising the rights guaranteed by this subchapter, the unit
appropriate for the purposes of collective bargaining shall be the employer unit,
craft unit, or subdivision thereof ....
29 U.S.C. § 159(b) (1982).
40. See, e.g., Friendly Ice Cream Corp. v. NLRB, 705 F.2d 570, 574 (1st Cir. 1983);
Presbyterian/St. Luke's Medical Center v. NLRB, 653 F.2d 450, 454 (10th Cir. 1981);
NLRB v. Gold Spot Dairy, Inc., 432 F.2d 125, 127 (10th Cir. 1970); Presbyterian/St.
Luke's Medical Center v. NLRB, 653 F.2d 127 (10th Cir. 1970); NLRB v. Groendyke
Transp., 372 F.2d 137, 140 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 387 U.S. 932 (1967); NLRB v. Dewey
Portland Cement Co., 336 F.2d 117, 119 (10th Cir. 1964); Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co.
v. NLRB, 310 F.2d 478, 479-80 (10th Cir. 1962). These decisions are consistent with
Packard Motor Car Co. v. NLRB, 330 U.S. 485, 491 (1947) ("Section 9(b) of the Act confers upon the Board a broad discretion to determine appropriate units . . . [slo we have
power only to determine whether there is substantial evidence to support the Board."); see
also NLRB v. Hudson Oxygen Therapy Sales Co., 764 F.2d 729, 733 (9th Cir. 1985).
41. See, e.g., Beth Israel Hosp. & Geriatric Center v. NLRB, 688 F.2d 697, 699-700
(10th Cir. 1982).
42. See, e.g., NLRB v. Pan Am. Petroleum Corp, 444 F.2d 328, 331 (10th Cir. 1971);
NLRB v. Groendyke Transp., Inc., 417 F.2d 33, 35 (10th Cir. 1969).
43. Beth Israel Hospital, 688 F.2d at 699-700. Presumptions may be used in all industries, excluding health care. The court found that other circuits either approve of the
NLRB's use of presumptions, or at least do not disapprove.
44. Foodland, 744 F.2d at 737. In Haag Drug Co.. Inc., 169 N.L.R.B. 877 (1968), the
Board reiterated a policy it announced in Say-On Drugs, Inc., 138 N.L.R.B. 103.2 (1962),
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the Owasso store manager had a significant amount of supervisory authority, that there was a minimum of employee interchange between
Foodland stores, there was no multi-store bargaining history, and that
the union did not want to represent a larger bargaining unit. These facprovided subtors, in addition to the Board's single-store presumption,
45
stantial evidence justifying the Board's decision.
The second presumption involved was that meat department emThis presumption has
been established by the Board and accepted by the courts. 4 7 The Tenth
Circuit rejected an attempt to apply the Board's decision in Great Day,
Inc.,4 8 where the Board stated that there were countervailing factors
overcoming the meat department unit presumption. In Great Day, few
employees had any training, much of the beef was already pre-cut and
ployees are an appropriate bargaining unit. 4 6

refusing to find that the appropriate unit "embraces all the employees within an employer's administrative or geographic area." The Board stated: "Our experience has led
us to conclude that a single store in a retail chain, like single locations in multilocation
enterprises in other industries, is presumptively an appropriate unit for bargaining." Haag
Drug, 169 N.L.R.B. at 877. The Board went on to state:
Absent a bargaining history in a more comprehensive unit or functional integration of a sufficient degree to obliterate separate identity, the employees' "fullest
freedom" is maximized . . . by treating the employees in a single store or restaurant of a retail chain operation as normally constituting an appropriate unit for
collective bargaining purposes. The employees . . .form a homogeneous, identifiable, and distinct group, physically separated from the employees in the other
outlets of the chain; they generally perform related functions under immediate
supervision apart from employees at other locations; and their work functions,
though parallel to, are nonetheless separate from the functions of employees in
the other outlets, and thus their problems and grievances are peculiarly their own
and not necessarily shared with employees in the other outlets.
Id. at 877-78.
The presumption may be rebutted by facts showing a stable multi-store bargaining relationship, centralization of management, extensive employee interchange, and close geographic proximity of the stores. Id. at 878-89. However, the paramount factor in
determining an appropriate unit is assurance that the employees are able to exercise freedom of choice. "While an employer's interest in bargaining with the most convenient
possible unit should be accommodated when feasible, the Board is free to grant greater
weight to the employees' interest in being represented by a representative of their own
choosing." Friendly Ice Cream, 705 F.2d at 575. See also Pacific Southwest Airlines v. NLRB,
587 F.2d 1032, 1043-44 (9th Cir. 1978); NLRB v. Western and Southern Life Ins. Co., 391
F.2d 119, 123 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 978 (1968). The single store has been found
to be an inappropriate unit in a number of cases. See, e.g., Kirlin's Inc., 227 N.L.R.B. 1220,
1221 (1977) (store manager's lack of autonomy); Gray Drug Stores, Inc., 197 N.L.R.B.
924, 926 (1972) (community of interest of employees in stores in certain geographic proximity); Twenty-First Century Restaurant of Nostrand Avenue Corp., 192 N.L.R.B. 881,
882 (1971) (close proximity of locations); Waiakamilo Corp., 192 N.L.R.B. 878 (1971)
(common working conditions and lack of autonomy of single stores).
45. 744 F.2d at 738.
46. Id.
47. See Daylight Grocery Co., Inc. v. NLRB, 678 F.2d 905, 907 (11th Cir. 1982) (unit
excluding meat department employees); Big Y Foods, Inc. v. NLRB, 651 F.2d 40, 45 (1st
Cir. 1981); Amalgamated Meat Cutters, Local 576 v. NLRB, 663 F.2d 223, 225 (D.C. Cir.
1980) (employees represented by Meat Cutters and Retail Clerks, respectively); NLRB v.
Big Bear Supermarkets No. 3, 640 F.2d 924 (9th Cir.) (two unions representing employees, Meatcutters and Retail Clerks), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 919 (1980); NLRB v. Gerbes
Super Mkts., Inc., 436 F.2d 19, 22 (8th Cir. 1971); Schauffler v. Local 1357, Retail Clerks
Int'l Ass'n, 199 F. Supp. 357, 358 (E.D. Pa. 1961) (unit excluding the meat, seafood, and
delicatessen employees).
48. 248 N.L.R.B. 527 (1980).
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boxed, employees rotated among all departments, and seventy-five percent of their work did not involve traditional meatcutting skills. 4 9 In
contrast, Foodland's Owasso store manager was relatively autonomous,
the meat department employees received specialized training and higher
wages, there was little employee interchange between the meat department and other departments, and the meat department manager supervised only meat department employees. In addition, the meat
department employees spent most of their time performing tasks requir50
ing special meatcutting skills.
Foodland attempted to have the elections set aside, alleging impermissible union electioneering near the polls. 5 '

By pre-arrangement,

certain employees favoring union representation donned "Vote Yes"
buttons fifteen minutes before the polls opened. 52 In previous decisions, the Tenth Circuit has approved the section 7 right of an employee
to wear union insignia while on the employer's premises during working
hours. 53 Likewise, the Tenth Circuit found Foodland's objections of impermissible electioneering to be de minimis, and upheld the regional
54
director's dismissal of the charge.
Union insignia is a form of protected expression under section 7.55
Standing alone, the displaying or wearing of union insignia by employees does not disrupt voting procedures, nor does it impair the exercise
of free choice. 56 The Board has refused to set aside elections where the
following activities took place: 1) employees wore "Vote No" paper hats
before the election; 57 2) employees wore "Vote Yes" buttons and
"IUWA" T-shirts at the polling place; 58 and 3) employees displayed doc'5 9
uments pinned on their backs entitled "My Reason for Voting No."
49. In Great Day, the Board found it "unnecessary to pass on the employer's contention that the merger of the retail Clerks International Union with the Amalgamated Meat
Cutters and Butcher Workmen supports its position for inclusion of the meat department
in a storewide unit." Id. at 528 n.6.
50. Foodland, 744 F.2d at 737.
51. Id,
52. Id. at 739.
53. NLRB v. Montgomery Ward & Co., Inc., 554 F.2d 996, 1000 (10th Cir. 1977)
(quoting Serv-Air, Inc. v. NLRB, 395 F.2d 557, 563 (10th Cir.)) (overturning the employer's no-solicitation ban which interfered with union organizing activities), cert. denied,
393 U.S. 840 (1968)). Section 7 of the LMRA states: "Employees shall have the right...
to engage in . . . concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other
mutual aid or protection, and shall also have the right to refrain from any or all such
activities." 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1982).
54. 744 F.2d at 739.
55. Montgomery Ward, 554 F.2d at 1000.
56. In Worley Mills, Inc. v. NLRB, 685 F.2d 362, 367 (10th Cir. 1982), the court
stated that the test to be applied to employee or third party electioneering is whether there
is an " 'atmosphere necessary to the free exercise of free choice.' " (quoting EDS-IDAB,
Inc., 666 F.2d at 975).
57. Mar-Jac Poultry Co., 123 N.L.R.B. 1571, 1573 (1959).
58. Sewanee Coal Operators Ass'n, Inc., 146 N.L.R.B. 1145, 1147 (1964); R.H. Osbrin, Mfg. Co., 114 N.L.R.B. 940, 941-42 (1955), enforced, 218 F.2d 342 (9th Cir. 1954),
cert. denied, 349 U.S. 928 (1955).
59. Vegas Village Shopping Center Corp., 229 N.L.R.B. 279, 290 (1977) ("The Board
has consistently held that wearing stickers, buttons, and similar campaign insignia by participants as well as observers at an election is, without more, not prejudicial.").
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The Ninth Circuit has stated that the Board has regulated only electioneering while the polls are open, 60 while allowing electioneering prior to
6
the election. '
Foodland attempted to relitigate its election objections, and allegations of unlawful union election interference, during the hearing on its
alleged unfair labor practice. The court held that the Board was not to
reconsider previously litigated representation issues in the ULP hearing
since new or previously unavailable evidence was not presented. 6 2 The
Tenth Circuit has previously dealt with this same issue, in line with
63
United States Supreme Court guidelines.
II.

LABOR ORGANIZATIONS UNDER THE

LMRDA:

DONOVAN V.

NATIONAL TRANSIENT DIVISION

A.

The Case

In Donovan v. National Transient Division,64 Secretary of Labor Donovan brought suit against the National Transient Division (NTD) of the
International Brotherhood of Boilermakers, seeking compliance with
the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act 6 5 (LMRDA) provision which requires labor organizations to hold periodic elections of
66
union officials.
NTD is one of five divisions of the International union, 6 7 but, unlike
the other divisions, it represents workers in 41 states and has no
subordinate local organizations. NTD represents 8,000 boilermaker
craftsmen who travel across the nation in crews, erecting steel tanks and
like structures. According to the International's constitution, NTD was
established to give status to and serve employees who engage in mobile
60. NLRB v. Hudson Oxygen Therapy Sales Co., 764 F.2d 729, 732-33 (9th Cir.
1985) (finding that electioneering during an election would be a greater threat to the "sober reflection and calm deliberation" needed for free choice in a representation election
than would electioneering prior to any voting taking place).
61. Id.
62. 744 F.2d at 739.
63. In Magnesium Casting Co. v. NLRB, 401 U.S. 137, 141-42 (1971), the United
States Supreme Court held that: "Historically, the representation issue once fully litigated
in the representation proceeding could not be relitigated in an unfair labor practice proceeding." The Tenth Circuit applied this precedent in Beth Israel Hosp., 688 F.2d at 10001. It held that "unit selection remains a matter of agency discretion and expertise, unlike
factual questions that must be resolved at the unfair labor practice proceeding." Thus,
"the employer could challenge the unit selection only through judicial review in the circuit
court." Id. See also Gold Spot Dairy, Inc., 432 F.2d at 129 ('The objections to the two elections were adjudicated in the representation hearings and are not relitigable in the absence of newly discovered or previously unavailable evidence.").
Should an employer object to representation determinations and later be charged
with an unfair labor practice for refusing to bargain, then those representation challenges
are preserved. Id. at 702 (Barrett, J., dissenting). See also Leedom v. Kyne, 358 U.S. 184,
191 (1958); American Fed'n of Labor v. NLRB, 308 U.S. 401, 406 (1940); NLRB v. Ideal
Laundry and Dry Cleaning Co., 330 F.2d 712 (10th Cir. 1964).
64. 736 F.2d 618 (10th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 781 (1985).
65. 29 U.S.C. §§ 401-531 (1982).
66. 29 U.S.C. § 481 (1982).
67. The complete name of the international union is International Brotherhood of
Boilermakers, Iron Ship Builders, Blacksmiths, Forgers and Helpers, AFL-CIO.

DENVER UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 63:2

employment and cannot maintain membership or participate in a fixedlocation local.
The nine NTD officials were appointed by the International President, but there has never been an election of NTD officers. Several
NTD members complained to the International President and the International Executive Council, and finally to the Secretary of Labor, that
NTD had failed to hold elections. The Secretary brought suit in federal
68
district court in 1979 to compel an election.
The district court, finding that it had jurisdiction, 6 9 held that NTD
was a "labor organization" within the meaning of the LMRDA. 70 The
court believed that the nationwide character of NTD proved that it was a
national, as opposed to a local, which meant that elections would be
required every five years under the LMRDA. 7 1 The court ordered NTD
to comply with the provisions of the LMRDA, rejecting arguments that
such compliance would be difficult for, and have an adverse effect upon,
NTD.

72

The Tenth Circuit, in an opinion written by Judge Logan, affirmed
the district court, holding that NTD is a labor organization and subject
to coverage under the LMRDA. It also agreed that the lower court had
subject matter jurisdiction, and that the Secretary of Labor had the statutory authority to investigate and sue to compel an election when none
had previously been held. However, the circuit court found NTD to be a
local labor organization, instead of a national labor organization, which
the Act requires to hold elections once every three years. 73 The court,
in establishing NTD as a local labor organization, emphasized NTD's
functions and purposes (which are similar to those performed by a typical local) over and above its geographical form (a union without locals
that transcends state boundaries). Finding congressional intent to focus
on the relationship between a labor organization and its members, the
court dismissed NTD's claims of inability and exceptions to
74
compliance.
B.

History of the LMRDA

In the late 1950's, responding to media allegations of corrupt practices in the labor-management field, 7 5 Congress designated a special
committee to investigate racketeering and abuse in labor-management
68. 736 F.2d at 619. See Donovan v. National Transient Div., 542 F. Supp. 957, 95859 (D. Kan. 1982).
69. 542 F. Supp. at 959.
70. 29 U.S.C. §§ 402(i)-(j) (1982).
71. 29 U.S.C. § 481(b) (1982).
72. 542 F. Supp. at 960.
73. 29 U.S.C. § 408(b) (1982).
74. 736 F.2d at 622-23.
75. E.g.,R. KENNEDY, THE ENEMY WITHIN 7 (1960); Note, Clarification of Title IV of the
Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act: Toward More Democratic Elections, 2 HOFSTRA
LAB. L.J. 157, 182 (1984).
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relations. 76 The well-publicized hearings uncovered "shocking conditions." ' 7 7 The committee found that some union officers dictated the
management of union affairs. Trusteeships were unjustifiably prolonged or established over locals in order to prevent local democratic
power, to punish dissenters, to divert local funds, and to amass power
for union officials. 7 8 Many rank-and-file union members told the committee that they wanted corrected the abuses present in their labor organizations. 79 Irrational Cold War fears, as well as public response to
union corruption, spurred enactment of the LMRDA. 80 The Act was
meant to redistribute power from autocratic labor bosses to the rankand-file members. 8 1 This was because maintenance of free and demo82
cratic union elections was deemed to be in the public interest.
C.

Powers of the Secretary

The LMRDA grants individual labor organizations the first opportunity to correct violations of the LMRDA, 83 requiring members to exhaust all union remedies or to wait at least three months for union
84
corrective action before filing a complaint with the Secretary of Labor.
Once a complaint is filed, government intervention is mandatory and is
the exclusive remedy. 8 5 The Secretary of Labor and the reviewing
86
courts have broad equitable powers to remedy LMRDA violations.
The Act orders the Secretary to investigate alleged LMRDA violations
based on a member's complaint, and to file suit if probable cause of a
violation is found. 8 7 The Secretary's only explicit statutory remedies are
to "set aside the invalid election, if any, . . . and to direct the conduct of
76.

DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR-MANAGEMENT

PORTING AND DISCLOSURE ACT OF 1959 1-25 (1959).
77. W. OBERER, K. HANSLOWE &J. ANDERSEN, LABOR LAw
78. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, supra note 76, at 8.

79. U.S.

RE-

172, 174 (1979).

SENATE SELECT COMM. ON IMPROPER ACTIVITIES IN THE LABOR-MANAGEMENT

FIELD, FINAL REPORT, S. REP. No. 187, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 2328-38 (1959), reprinted in
1959 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2322-2423 [hereinafter referred to as FINAL REPORT,
S. REP. No. 187].
80. J. RAYBACK, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LABOR 437 (1966). The LMRDA is the first

law not protective of labor, and not concerned with the regulation of labor-management
relations. Id. at 436. "The passage of the act was appropriately symbolic of labor's fall

from grace." T.

BROOKS, TOIL AND TROUBLE

228 (1980). The LMRDA is also "the first

substantial effort by the Federal Government to control internal union affairs."
OBERER,

81.

K. HANSLOWE &J. ANDERSEN, LABOR
105 CONG. REC. 17,915 (1959).

LAw

W.

172 (1979).

82. See DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, supra note 76, at 24.
83. Wirtz v. Local 1622, United Bhd. of Carpenters, 285 F. Supp. 455, 462 (N.D. Cal.
1968); Goldberg v. Amalgamated Local 1355, 202 F. Supp. 844, 846 (E.D.N.Y. 1962).
84. 29 U.S.C. § 482(a) (1982); Hodgson v. Union de Empleados de los Supermercado
Pueblo, 388 F. Supp. 1026, 1028 (D.P.R. 1974).
85. Hodgson, 388 F. Supp. at 1028.
86. Id. at 1028-29 (upholding the Secretary's right to "the statutory remedy of a [Labor Department] supervised election" and disallowing an election supervised by a private
firm following a member's complaint to the Secretary). See, e.g., Brennan v. United Mine
Workers, 475 F.2d 1293, 1295-96 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (The court allowed the district court
"far-ranging relief to restore union democracy" such as an order to convene meetings and
adopt a democratic constitution. It further upheld "the court's broad equitable powers to
fashion a suitable remedy for the . . . atrophy of democratic principles and procedures.").
87. 29 U.S.C. §§ 482(a), (b) (1982).
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an election." 88
In order to guarantee free and democratic elections, it is necessary
to ensure that elections are initially held and to remedy abuses in scheduled elections. The wording of the LMRDA is directed at abuses in elections, and also reflects Congress' broad concern that elections might
never be held.89 Thus the Tenth Circuit's decision correctly read the
LMRDA as empowering the Secretary to sue to compel an election
where none has previously been held.
D.

Definition of a Labor Organization

Subsections 3(i) and 3(j) of the LMRDA define a "labor organization" for purposes of coverage under the Act. 90 The definition is to be
broadly construed, 9 1 and an organization can exist wholly or partially
for the statutory purposes of dealing with employers concerning grievances, labor disputes, wage rates, hours, and other terms and conditions
of employment. 9 2 A particular organization's constitution and by laws
will be considered along with its actual functions and practices in determining whether the Act applies. 93 The definition is meant to encompass
"any labor organization irrespective of size or formal attributes." ' 9 4 The
courts have consistently analyzed organizations by utilizing functional
criteria in order to determine whether they are included within the statu95
tory definition.
In National Transient Division, although NTD negotiated incomplete
collective bargaining agreements with employers, leaving wages and em88. National Transient Division, 736 F.2d at 620 (quoting 29 U.S.C. §§ 482(a), (b)
(1982) (emphasis added)). The court dismissed cases holding that the Secretary cannot
sue to postpone a scheduled election as inapposite. See Dunlop v. Bachowski, 421 U.S.
560, 568-70 (1975); Calhoon v. Harvey, 379 U.S. 134, 140 (1964).
89. 29 U.S.C. § 40 1(a) (1982) mandates that a national or international labor organization "shall elect its officers" at least once every five years, while section 481 (b) states that
a local labor organization "shall elect its officers" a minimum of once in three years (emphasis added). See generally Marshall v. Local 1374, Int'l Ass'n of Machinists, 558 F.2d
1354, 1358 (9th Cir. 1977) (statutory purposes include assurance of free and democratic
elections, and prompt resolution of election disputes); Goldberg v. Amalgamated Local
1355, 202 F. Supp. at 846 (the Act requires free, frequent, and periodic elections to ensure
that union officials are responsive to members' desires); Note, Union Elections and the
LMRDA; Thirteen Years of Use and Abuse, 81 YALE Lj. 407, 410-13 (1972) (the LMRDA
furthered the national labor policy of labor peace through industrial democracy).
90. 29 C.F.R. § 451.3(a)(2) (1985).
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. 29 C.F.R. § 451.3(a)(1) (1985). See also FINAL REPORT, S. REP. No. 187, supra note
79, at 2318, 2322-2323.
The definition [of labor organization] includes all forms and levels of labor organization and combinations of labor organizations which exist for or carry on
collective bargaining with employers, from internationals through locals ....
This definition. . . is intended to provide comprehensive coverage of labor organizations engaged in any degree in the representation of employees or administration of collective bargaining agreements.
Id.
94. See, e.g., National Educ. Ass'n v. Marshall, 100 L.R.R.M. 2565 (D.D.C. 1979) (organizations dealt with employers regarding terms and conditions of employment).
95. National Transient Division, 542 F. Supp. at 960.
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ployee benefits to local or international supplements, the contracts did
cover the statutory purposes. 9 6 The district court noted little resistance
to the issue of whether NTD was an LMRDA labor organization. Instead, arguments centered on whether NTD was a local or a national
labor organization - an issue of first impression.
E.

Local Versus National Labor Organization

The district court found that NTD was a national labor organization
because the typical local organization is based on geographic boundaries. 9 7 The Tenth Circuit reversed, holding that NTD is a local organization because of its functional and structural characteristics. 98 The
lower court was correct when it stated that typically local unions follow
geographic boundaries. 99 However, NTD is in essence a nationwide local, serving those employees that are unable to maintain an active membership in fixed-location locals. A local union has primary responsibility
for labor relations with employers, including contract negotiation, contract administration, and grievance handling.' 0 0 In addition to contract
negotiation, NTD representatives engage in grievance handling and
10 2
dues collection.' 0 ' In order to effectuate the purposes of the Act,
and maximize rank-and-file control and participation in union management, NTD must be a local labor organization within the meaning of the
Act.
III.

A.

DISABILITY BENEFITS DURING A STRIKE: CoNoco, INC. v.

NLRB

Background

Conoco, Inc. v. NLRB 103 involved the denial of disability benefits to
an employee while the company was being struck by the union representing its employees. Ms. Fransen, a Conoco employee and union
member, became temporarily unable to work due to medical reasons on
January 3, 1980. She began receiving disability benefits pursuant to the
Comprehensive Disability Income Plan included in the collective bargaining agreement between Conoco and the union. On January 8, 1980,
the union instituted a lawful economic strike. On the first day of the
strike, Ms. Fransen's disability benefits were terminated. The Disability
96.
97.
98.
99.
ees of a

736 F.2d at 622.
542 F. Supp. at 960.
736 F.2d at 622-23.
The "reasonably typical" union structure consists of locals representing employplant or an employer in "a defined geographic area," that are affiliated with the

international or national. D. BOK &J.

DUNLOP, LABOR INTHE AMERICAN COMMUNITY

150-

51 (1970). The "structure of the typical American labor union" involves a national or
international, which charters local unions. The locals'jurisdiction is defined on plant, employer, or geographic basis. W. OBERER, K. HANSLOWE & J. ANDERSEN, LABOR LAw 180
(1979).

100. A. SLOANE & F.

WHITNEY, LABOR RELATIONS

166-67 (1972).

101. National Transient Division, 736 F.2d at 618.
102. The purposes of the Act are to safeguard members' rights and ensure internal
union democracy. Note, supra note 75, at 157-58.
103. 740 F.2d 811 (10th Cir. 1984).
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Income Plan included a clause denying benefits during the period an
employee is on strike or lay-off. 10 4 More than a month after termination
of the benefits, Ms. Fransen began to picket for the union. She was
medically certified as able to return to work on March 25, 1980. The
strike ended on April 1, 1980. The NLRB then filed a charge alleging
that termination of Ms. Fransen's benefits was an unfair labor practice,
in violation of sections 8(a)(1) and 8(a)(3) of the Taft-Hartley Act. 10 5
The administrative law judge (ALJ) awarded Ms. Fransen disability
benefits from the date the strike began until the time she publicly participated in strike activities. The ALJ's decision relied upon the prior National Labor Relations Board decision of Emerson Electric Co. 10 6 which
denied benefits to disabled employees who participated in and publicly
supported the strike. The ALJ accepted Ms. Fransen's prima facie case
of discriminatory treatment, and rejected Conoco's defense that Ms.
Fransen was properly denied benefits under the Plan. Although the ALJ
found the clause to be legal, he decided that the clause was ambiguous,
and did not apply to disabled employees who were not actively on strike.
The Board agreed that an unfair labor practice had been committed, and ordered Conoco to pay the disability benefits for the entire period of the disability. This was consistent with the Third Circuit's
07
modification of the Emerson decision in E.L. Weigand Division v. NLRB,1
1
0
8
and with the Board's reversal of its previous position.
In Weigand, the
Third Circuit ruled that an employer committed an unfair labor practice
in terminating disability benefits during a strike, and declined to allow
the employer to discontinue benefits if the disabled employee participated in the strike prior to being medically certified to return to
work. 1 9 Agreeing that the disability benefits were accrued and based
on work already performed, the Third Circuit stated that such benefits
could not be denied by the employer during a strike under the guise of
not being required to finance a strike against itself. 10 The court found
that the employer had exhibited an anti-union motivation, III and ac104. Id. at 812. The Plan's clause stated: "If benefits are being paid prior to a strike or
layoff, such benefits will cease for the duration of such strike or layoff. No benefits will be
paid during the time you are on strike or layoff." Id.
105. 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(a)(1), (a)(3) (1982). Section 8(a) provides:
It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer (1) to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights
guaranteed in section 7 ....
(3) by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or
condition of employment to encourage or discourage membership in any labor
organization ....
106. 246 N.L.R.B. 1143 (1979), modified, 650 F.2d 463 (3d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455
U.S. 939 (1982).
107. 650 F.2d 463 (3d Cir. 1981).
108. See Southwestern Electric Power Co., 216 N.L.R.B. 522 (1975).
109. Weigand, 650 F.2d at 463. Howe 4 r, "[a]ctive participation in strike activity may
be telling, or even presumptive, evidence of cessation of disability." Id. at 473-74.
110. An employer need not pay wages to employees while the employer is being struck.
See Ace Tank and Heater Co., 167 N.L.R.B. 663, 665 (1967); General Elec. Co., 80
N.L.R.B. 510, 511 (1948).
111. 650 F.2d at 470. The Board may infer the existence of discrimination, based on
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cepted the Board's position that the denial of benefits was "inherently
destructive" of the employees' section 7 rights.' 12
B.

The Tenth Circuit Decision

The Tenth Circuit, following the Weigand analysis, agreed that Conoco was guilty of anti-union activities in denying disability benefits to
Ms. Fransen, and therefore upheld and enforced the Board's decision. 13 The Tenth Circuit's decision affirmed an employee's right to
accrued benefits which have previously been earned, and held that denial of such benefits during a strike is "inherently destructive of the employee's section 7 rights."' 14
Since 1967,15 the denial of vacation benefits during a lawful strike
has been held to be an unfair labor practice, either because the benefits
were previously earned, or because the employer had an improper motive.' 1 6 The same has been true of insurance premiums1 1 7 and severits accumulated experience and factual enquiries. NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp., 373 U.S.
221, 227-32 (1963).
In NLRB v. Great Dane Trailers, Inc., 388 U.S. 26 (1967), the Board found an unfair
labor practice (discrimination and discouragement of union membership) when an employer refused to pay strikers accrued vacation benefits due under the expired labor contract, and announced that it intended to pay such benefits to strike replacements as well as
non-striking or returning employees. The Supreme Court announced a test of unlawful
anti-union motivation to be inferred from an employer's conduct. Conduct that is " 'inherently destructive of employee interests' " needs no proof of motive (quoting NLRB v.
Brown, 380 U.S. 278, 287 (1965)), and an unfair labor practice may be found even if the
employer justifies or explains his actions. The conduct "carries with it 'unavoidable consequences which the employer not only foresaw but which he must have intended' " and thus
bears " 'its own indicia of intent' " (quoting NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp., 373 U.S. at 228,
231). However, when " 'the resulting harm to employee rights is . . . comparatively
slight, and a substantial and legitimate business end is served,' " the employer's conduct
must be proven to be improperly motivated (quoting NLRB v. Brown, 380 U.S. at 289). In
Great Dane, the employer's conduct was said to be "inherently destructive" of employee
rights.
112. The court did not describe the employer's actions as "inherently destructive" or
"comparatively slight," but did not consider the employer's business justification an acceptable rebuttal. 650 F.2d at 467-71. See supra note 53 for the text of section 7 of the
LMRA.
113. 740 F.2d at 815-16. The Tenth Circuit applied the Great Dane two-prong test for
the inference of anti-union animus. See supra note 111.
114. 740 F.2d at 813. See supra note I11.
115. NLRB v. Great Dane Trailers, Inc., 388 U.S. 26 (1967).
116. See, e.g., Allied Indus. Workers, Local 287 v. NLRB, 476 F.2d 868, 871-72, 876
(D.C. Cir. 1973) (company announcement that no vacation benefits could be scheduled or
paid during a strike); NLRB v. Jemco, Inc., 465 F.2d 1148, 1150-52 (6th Cir. 1972) (company denied vacation pay to all workers after collective bargaining agreement expired, but
"unequal treatment of different classes of employees is [not] a prerequisite" for a section
8(a)(3) violation where concerted activity is involved), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1109 (1973);
Local 186, United Packinghouse Food and Allied Workers v. Armour & Co., 446 F.2d 610,
611, 615 (6th Cir. 1971) (company refused to pay vacation benefits earned in prior year
when plant closed), cert.
denied, 405 U.S. 955 (1972); NLRB v. Frick Co., 397 F.2d 956, 95961 (3d Cir. 1968) (company removed strikers' names from payroll, making them ineligible
for vacation benefits); Indiana & Mich. Elec. Co., 236 N.L.R.B. 986 (1978) (the company
threatened not to pay previously earned accumulated leave unless employees abandoned
the strike), enforced, 89 Lab. Cas. (CCH)
12,157 (1979).
117. Viggiano v. Anchor Hocking Corp., 574 F. Supp. 861, 863-64 (W.D. Pa. 1983)
(threat to terminate insurance payments after collective bargaining agreement expired if
employees went on strike, in spite of clause continuing benefits after contract ended), va-

DENIVER UNIVERSITY L4 W REVIEW

[Vol. 63:2

ance pay.' I8 However, other courts have not consistently followed the
lead of the Board or the Supreme Court, finding that under the particular language of the collective bargaining agreement benefits were not
accrued, or by failing to find an improper motivation by the employer in
refusing to pay the benefits during a strike.' 19 One circuit could not
120
decide whether disability benefits were wages or accrued benefits.
In its Conoco decision, the Tenth Circuit has stated that disability
benefits are earned prior to the disability and therefore are accrued benefits. Further, an employer that discontinues disability benefits because
of a strike will be assumed to be acting out of anti-union animus and be
guilty of an unfair labor practice, despite an explicit collective bargaining agreement or Plan language denying benefits in the event of a strike.
The message is clear, and consistent with the holdings of the Board and
Third Circuit.
Lisolette Alitz

cated on other gsounds, 750 F.2d 276 (3d Cir. 1984); Ace Tank and Heater Co., 167 N.L.R.B.
663 (1967) (refusal to pay insurance premiums for strikers); Cone Bros. Contracting Co.,
158 N.L.R.B. 186, 188 (1966) (" lilt is true that strikers may incur certain economic losses,
such as wages whose sole aspect is monetary compensation for work performed during the
employment relationship. But strike activity does not entail acceptance after the strike of a
small quantum of vested job rights and privileges.").
118. NLRB v. Darling & Co.. 420 F.2d 63 (7th Cir. 1970).
119. See, e.g., District 29, United Mine Workers v. Royal Coal Co., 768 F,2d 588 (4th
Cir. 1985) (denial of health benefits and life insurance coverage to retired and disabled
employees after expiration of labor contract permitted, based on the intent of the parties
that such benefits only be provided during the term of the agreement); NLRB v. SherwinWilliams Co., 714 F.2d 1095 (11th Cir. 1983) (withholding disability benefits during a
strike allowed because Plan language granted benefits only to the extent that employees
could reasonably have expected to work, and it was past practice to deny such benefits
during a strike); Vesuvius Crucible Co. v. NLRB, 668 F.2d 162 (3d Cir. 1981) (company
refused to pay strikers their vacation benefits earned while working without a contract
because the company believed that without a new agreement it had no wav to compute the
benefits due); Local 358. Bakery and Confectionary Workers Union v. Nolde Bros., Inc.,
382 F. Supp. 1354 (E.D. Va. 1974) (denial of severance pay to strikers because they
breached the contract in order to avoid its no-strike clause, and finding that severance pay
is not a vested right), revdon other grounds, 530 F.2d 548 (4th Cir. 1975), afd, 430 U.S. 243
(1977) (deciding the case based on federal labor policy regarding arbitration, not accrual
of benefits).
120. Texaco, Inc. v. NLRB. 700 F.2d 1031. 1040-42, 1042 n.2 (5th Cir. 1983). In a
case involving the denial for disability benefits, which were tied to employee seniority, for
workers who were ill during a strike, the Fifth Circuit stated that the disability benefits
resembled both accrued benefits and wages but supported the Board's finding that they
were accrued benefits. None of the employees participated in the strike during the periods
of disability and the court expressed "no opinion . . . on the availability of Idisabilityl
benefits once a still-disabled employee expresses support for a strike."
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IV.

THE EMPLOYMENT-AT-WILL DOCTRINE

Two Tenth Circuit cases during the survey period dealt with the
"at-will" doctrine in employment law. In accordance with Erie v.
Tompkins, 12 1 the court applied the relevant state law in each of these diversity actions.
A.

Background

A general hiring for an indefinite period has been deemed in common law to create an at-will employment relationship in which an employer can discharge an employee for good reason, bad reason or no
reason at all. ' 2 2 The employment-at-will doctrine applies to those workers not covered by a collective bargaining agreement' 23 and not em24
ployed by the government.1
Employment-at-will has not always been the general rule. The English common law, as interpreted by Blackstone, contained a presumption
that "[i]f the hiring be general without any particular time limited, the
law construes it to be a hiring for a year."' 2 5 This presumption was
based on the status of the employment relationship and not a contract
between employer and employee.1 2 6 Under this status relationship the
12 7
master was responsible for the general welfare of the servant.
The American courts adopted and maintained this presumption of a
one-year term of employment until the late nineteenth century.' 28 At
that time, American courts shifted the emphasis to the choice inherent
in freedom of contracts, 1 29 and the employment-at-will doctrine was
born. 130 Under this doctrine, the terms of the employment contract
were to be voluntarily agreed upon and not presumed.'13 Thus, if employer and employee did not agree upon a set term of employment, the
employee could be fired at any time.
121. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
122. See Spivey v. Watkins Motor Lines, Inc., 115 L.L.R.M. (BNA) 3407 (S.D. Ga.
1984); Black v. Standard Oil Co., 115 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3076 (N.D. Ohio 1983); Maguire v.
American Family Life Ass. Co., 442 So. 2d 321 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983).
123.

See Pleck, Unjust Discharge From Employment: A Necessary Change in the Law, 40 OHIO

ST. L.J. 1, 8 (1979) (approximately 95 percent of collective bargaining agreements contain
grievance and arbitration provisions, and approximately 80 percent of the agreements require just cause for discharge).
124.

See Stieber & Murray, Protection Against Unjust Discharge: The Need for a Federal Stat-

ute, 16 U. MICH. JL REv. 319, 320-21 (1983) (government employees are either covered
by public sector collective bargaining or have access to civil service procedures).
125. W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 413 (1979 facsimile of
the 1st ed.)
126. SELZNICK, LAW, SOCIETY AND INDUSTRIAL JUSTICE 123 (1969) (An agreement might
establish certain terms but "custom and public policy, not the will of the parties, defined
the implicit framework of mutual rights or obligations.").
127. Id. at 128.
128. Summers, The Contract of Employment and the Rights of IndividualEmployees: Fair Rep-

resentation and Employment at Will, 52 FORDHAM L. REV. 1082, 1084 (1982).
129. SELZNICK, supra note 126, at 131.
130. H. G. WOOD,MASTER AND SERVANT § 134 (1877) (the first
treatise writer to challenge the presumption of hiring for a term and proclaim the at-will rule).
131. SELZNICK, supra note 126, at 131.

DENVER UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 63:2

The pendulum is now beginning to swing back toward a presumption of hiring for a term and away from employment-at-will. Within the
last two decades the common law notion of employment-at-will has been
judicially eroded by wrongful discharge exceptions which include breach
of implied employment contract, commission of a tort, and discharge in
violation of public policy.' 3 2 These exceptions have created ajust cause
requirement for the termination of an employee, giving the employee
the job security he once had under the presumption of hiring for a term.
To bring order to the state courts' varied approaches to the reemerging employment-at-will issue, commentators have advocated the
introduction of a uniform statute 133 or the use of an arbitration clause in
the employment contract covering wrongful discharge claims. 134 Until
uniform standards are established, federal courts will be forced to interpret state common law in this area, since many of these cases will be
diversity actions tried in federal courts. The federal courts' interpretation of state law will necessarily be subjective and thus the federal courts
ruling may either expand, limit, or maintain the status quo of the state
common law.' 3 5 Attorneys should be aware of how a federal court interprets state law in order to make better strategic choices as to where to
bring suit and what to arguc.
B.

Garcia v. Aetna Finance Company
1.

Facts

In Garcia v. Aetna Finance Company, 1 3 6 the plaintiff, Garcia, had been
employed from 1956 to 1975 by GAC Finance. 13 7 In 1975, the defendant acquired the branch offices of GAC and assigned Garcia to those
offices in a position that was substantially similar to his previous position
with GAC. Shortly thereafter, the defendant disseminated an employment policy manual which implemented new policies and procedures,
including a procedure for termination. 13 8 Garcia was terminated on
September 21, 1979, after performance appraisals revealed certain deficiencies in the management of his area of responsibility.
2.

The Tenth Circuit Opinion

On appeal, Garcia argued that the employment relationship be132.

Tobias, "Can You Help Ale? I've Been Fired," 70 A.B.A.J. April, 1984, at 68.

133. See Stieber & Murray, supra note 124; Summers, Individual ProtectionAgainst Lnjust
Dismissal.- Time for a Statute, 62 VA. L. REV. 48" (1976); cf. Steiber, Protection Against Unfair
Dismissal, A Comparative View, 169 ScH. LAB. INDUS. REL. RESEARCh REPRINT SERIES 231-32

(Mich. St. Univ. 1979-1980) (The following European countries have a statute requiring
just cause for discharge: Denmark, Sweden, West Germany, Great Britian, Norway,
France, Italy and Ireland.).
134.

Blumrosen, Exploring 'oluntaryArbitration of Individual Employment Disputes, 16 Micn.

J.L. REF. 249 (1983).
135. See Comment, The Role of FederalCourts in Changing State Law: The Employment At Will
Doctrine in Pennsylvania, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 277 (1984).

136. 752 F.2d 488 (10th Cir. 1984).
137. Id. at 489.
138. Garcia, 752 F.2d at 490 (10th Cir. 1984) (citing Brief for Appellant at 4-5).
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tween Aetna and himself was for a definite term.13 9 Garcia based this
argument on Aetna's employment policy manual, which required annual
appraisals, and the fact that Aetna's rehiring was based on a yearly
salary. '

40

The Tenth Circuit affirmed the lower court's grant of summary
judgment for Aetna. It agreed that the policy manual did not constitute
an employment contract for a definite term. 14 Because the plaintiff had
not negotiated the content of the policy manual, the policy manual was
only a unilateral expression of policy by Aetna. 14 2 Furthermore, the
court found that the evidence did not "establish that both parties understood that an employment contract existed between plaintiff and defendant that was for a definite term."' 143 The court also found that rehiring
44
based on an annual salary did not imply a fixed term of employment.1
The Tenth Circuit found that Colorado had decided this precise issue in
Justice v. Stanley Aviation Corporation.14 5 Because there was no fixed
term of employment, the court found that either party could terminate
their employment relationship at any time without incurring liability.' 4 6
Garcia's second argument was based on the modern view that employment contracts for an indefinite period of time are not terminable at
will by the employer. 147 The Tenth Circuit equated this implied duty of
fair dealing 14 8 with the broad and general statutory statements of public
policy which the Colorado courts had found inadequate to justify an exception to the at-will rule in Lampe v. Presbyterian Medical Center 149 and
Corbin v. Sinclair Marketing, Inc. 150 Accordingly, the Tenth Circuit found
no public-policy exception to the at-will rule. t 5 1
3.

Alternative Strategies in the Colorado At-Will Arena

In Corbin, the Colorado Court of Appeals acknowledged that other
courts have held that an employee manual can provide a good-cause exception to the at-will doctrine, but distinguished those cases from the
facts before it since a safety manual, not an employee manual, was at
issue. 15 2 In Salimi v. Farmers Insurance Group,lSS however, the Colorado
139. 752 F.2d at 490. If an employment contract is for a definite term, just cause is

usually required to terminate an employee before the term has expired. See, e.g., Alpern v.

Hurwitz, 644 F.2d 943 (2d Cir. 1981); Chapin v. Klein, 128 Ariz. 94, 623 P.2d 1250 (Ariz.
Ct. App. 1981); Rosecrans v.Intermountain Soap & Chem. Co., 100 Idaho 785, 605 P.2d
963 (1980).
140. 752 F.2d at 490.
141.

FOOTNOTE ADDED TO BALANCE WITH TEXT.

142. Id. at 490-91.
143. Id. at 490.
144. Id.
145. 35 Colo. App. 1, 530 P.2d 984 (1974).

146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.

Garcia, 752 F.2d at 491.
Id. (citing Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co., 114 N.H. 130, 316 A.2d 549 (1974)).
See Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co., 114 N.H. 130, 316 A.2d 549 (1974).
42 Colo. App. 465, 590 P.2d 513 (1979).
684 P.2d 265 (Colo. Ct. App. 1984).
Garcia, 752 F.2d at 491.

152. Corbin, 684 P.2d at 267.
153. 684 P.2d 264 (Colo.Ct. App. 1984).
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Court of Appeals found that such a claim would survive a motion to
dismiss. The plaintiff in Corbin, like the plaintiff in Garcia, never alleged
the good-cause exception. Plaintiffs would be well advised to cover all
bases by alleging such a claim in federal court since Colorado has left
this door open.
One other avenue may be available to plaintiffs, depending on the
specific facts of their claims. In Lampe, the Colorado Court of Appeals
stated in dicta that a public policy exception to the at-will doctrine could
be found if an employee is discharged for exercising a specifically enacted right or duty; such as the right to file for workmen's compensation
or the duty to serve on a jury. 1 54 The public policy exception should
not be alleged in all cases, however. In Corbin, the Colorado Court of
Appeals ruled that the public-policy exception "is not available when
• . .the statute at issue provides to the employee a wrongful discharge
remedy." 155 It is recommended that future plaintiffs in Colorado determine if there is a statutory remedy which may preclude the public policy
at-will exception.
C.

Ellis v. El Paso Natural Gas Company
1.

Facts

In Ellis v. El Paso Natural Gas Company, 1 5 6 the Tenth Circuit applied
New Mexico law to the at-will employment issue. The plaintiff, Ellis, had
been employed by the defendant for almost thirty years.15 7 Following a
dispute with his supervisor, Ellis used the problem solving procedures
set out in the defendant's personnel manual to appeal the supervisor's
decisions. El Paso retaliated against Ellis by denying him promotions
and pay increases, demoting him, and allegedly forcing his constructive
58
discharge. 1
2.

The Tenth Circuit Opinion

On appeal, Ellis made two claims: (1) a claim in tort for retaliatory
discharge; and (2) a claim of breach of implied contract based on the
defendant's personnel manual.' 5 9 The trial court had ruled that the
claim for retaliatory discharge was barred by the New Mexico Court of
Appeals ruling in Bottiliso v. Hutchison Fruit Company. 16 0 The Tenth Circuit noted that Vigil v. Arzola,'"6 a New Mexico Court of Appeals decision handed down after the trial court's decision, had held that a cause
of action for retaliatory discharge exists "when the discharge of an em154. Lampe v. Presbyterian Medical Center, 41 Colo App. 465, 590 P.2d 513, 515
(1978).
155. 684 P.2d at 267.
156. 754 F.2d 884 (10th Cir. 1985).
157.
158.

Id. at 885.
Id.

159. Id.
160. 96 N.M. 789, 635 P.2d 992 (N.M. Ct. App. 1981).
161. Vigil v. Arzola, No. 5921 (N.M. Ct. App.) (cited in Ellis, 754 F.2d at 885).
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ployee contravenes some clear mandate of public policy."1 6 2
In Ellis, Ellis admitted that his discharge did not involve public policy considerations, but argued that New Mexico courts would recognize
the tort of retaliatory discharge in a situation involving a non-public policy discharge if presented with the facts of his case. 163 The court disagreed, stating that Vigil had thoroughly reviewed the existing authority
and legal commentary and had limited its holding to cases involving discharges which contravene public policy.164 Therefore, the Tenth Circuit refused to expand the ruling of Vigil to include Ellis' retaliatory
65
discharge claim. 1
Regarding the breach of implied contract claim, Ellis argued that
the defendant assured him that it would continue to supply him with
wage increases and promotions if he performed his work satisfactorily. 166 He relied on the personnel manual to support this argument.
The personnel manual stated that the company "will sever the employment relationship in a fair and consistent manner" and "will establish a
67
fair and consistent method" to resolve employee disputes. '
The Tenth Circuit noted that New Mexico does recognize implied
employment contracts, 168 but agreed with the trial court's finding that
the provisions of the personnel manual "are too indefinite to constitute
a contract. . . . The language is of a non-promissory nature and merely
a declaration of defendant's general approach to the subject matter discussed." 16 9 Thus, the court did not find an implied contract requiring
just cause for termination.
3.

Alternative Strategies in the New Mexico At-Will Arena

As in Garcia,170 the Tenth Circuit took a conservative approach in
Ellis in refusing to expand New Mexico's public policy exception to the
at-will rule. Future plaintiffs arguing before the federal courts would be
well advised to couch retaliation claims in public policy language. In
Ellis, the plaintiff could have argued that he was exercising a right under
the personnel manual, and that firing an employee for doing so leads to
animosity between employer and employees, and results in lower economic production.
For implied contract claims, it is recommended that future plaintiffs
develop a full evidentiary record of specific intent manifested by the em162. 754 F.2d at 885 (quoting from Brief for Appellee at 33).
163. Id. at 885-86.
164. Id. (citing Vigil (from Brief for Appellee at 28): "We do not abrogate the at will
rule; we only limit its application to those situations where the employee's discharge results from the employer's violation of a clear public policy.").
165. 754 F.2d at 886.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Id. (citing Forrester v. Parker, 93 N.M 781, 606 P.2d 191 (1980) and Hernandez v.
Home Educ. Livelihood Program, Inc., 98 N.M. 125, 645 P.2d 1381 (N.M. Ct. App.), cert.
denied, 98 N.M. 336, 648 P.2d 794 (N.M. 1982)).
169. 754 F.2d at 886 (quoting the trial court).
170. 752 F.2d 488 (10th Cir. 1984); See supra notes 136-151 and accompanying text.
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ployer, in addition to introduction of the personnel manual. As a question of fact, plaintiffs will find it difficult to win such a claim on appeal in
federal court unless the trial court's interpretation of facts is clearly
erroneous. 171

Stewart Beyerle

171.

See

FED.

R. Civ. P. 52(a).

LANDS AND NATURAL RESOURCES
OVERVIEW

During the period of this survey, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals continued its traditional role as an important forum for legal issues
involving public lands and natural resources, such as federal regulation
of water development to protect endangered species' and the implied
duties of an oil and gas lessee to a lessor when forming a unitization
agreement. 2 This article will discuss seven of the most significant public
lands and natural resources cases decided by the Tenth Circuit during
this survey period. These decisions dealt almost entirely with statutory
and regulatory issues, pointing to the continued dominance of the administrative agencies in this field.
I.

A.

SECTION 404 PERMITS

Background

The regulation of dredge and fill activities has been one of the most
controversial regulatory programs resulting from the plethora of environmental statutes enacted in the 1960's and 1970's. 3 However, regulation of the dumping of refuse, including dredge and fill material, into
the nation's waterways has been in existence since 1899 under the Riv4
ers and Harbors Act (RHA).
Until the 1960's, regulation under the RHA was primarily concerned with navigational hazards. 5 In 1968, the Army Corps of Engineers (the Corps), which has responsibility for issuing permits for the
1. Riverside Irrigation Dist. v. Andrews, 758 F.2d 508 (10th Cir. 1985).
2. Amoco Prod. Co. v. Jacobs, 746 F.2d 1394 (10th Cir. 1984).
3. Since its enactment, section 404 of the Clean Water Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1344 (1982),
has been litigated in numerous instances. For a comprehensive discussion of section 404
cases involving wetlands, see Want, Federal Wetlands Law: The Cases and the Problems, 8 HARV.
ENVTL. L. REV. 1 (1984). Among the statutes which resulted in controversial environmental regulatory programs were the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA), 42
U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370 (1982); the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7642 (1982); the Federal Water Pollution Control Act (FWPCA), as amended by the FWPCA Amendment of
1972 and the Clean Water Act Amendment of 1977, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1982) (of
which section 404 is a part) (The 1972 amendment completely replaced the FWPCA and it
is now commonly referred to as the Clean Water Act.); and the Resource Conservation and
Recovery Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6987 (1982).
4. The Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899 § 13, 33 U.S.C. § 407 (1982) (known as the
Refuse Act of 1899). The Act provides that:
It shall not be lawful to throw, discharge, or deposit, or cause ... to be thrown,
discharged, or deposited either from or out of any ship, barge, or other floating
craft of any kind, or from the shore, wharf, manufacturing establishment, or mill
of any kind, any refuse matter of any kind or description whatever other than that
flowing from streets and sewers and passing therefrom in a liquid state, into any
navigable water of the United States or into any tributary of any navigable water
from which the same shall float or be washed into such navigable water.
Id.
5. See Note, Water Law--When Water Quantity Regulation is Not Water Quantity Regulation,
20 LAND & WATER L. REV. 523, 524 (1985).
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disposal of dredged or fill material, broadened the scope of its permit
review to include public interest factors, such as environmental considerations. 6 In 1970, the Fifth Circuit specifically upheld the Corps' inclu7
sion of environmental considerations in the permit issuance process.
When the Federal Water Pollution Control Act (the Clean Water
Act) was amended in 1972,8 Congress, recognizing the Corps' longstanding role in regulating dredge and fill activities, enacted section
404, which reaffirmed the Corps' authority to issue permits for depositing dredge and fill materials which the Clean Water Act defines as
pollutants.9
The Clean Water Act expanded the scope of the permitting process
beyond the "navigable waters" limitation of the RHA to include all the
"waters of the United States."' 0 Initially the Corps was unwilling to expand its jurisdiction but was finally forced to do so as a result of Natural
Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Calloway,"I which held that Congress had
defined "navigable waters" under the Clean Water Act so as to extend
"federal jurisdiction over the nation's waters to the maximum extent
permissible under the Commerce Clause.... [Als used in the Water Act,
12
the term is not limited to the traditional tests of navigability."'
Under section 404, the guidelines for issuing perm its are established by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)13 and the regulatory procedures for reviewing permits require the consideration of many
factors, including a variety of environmental effects. 14 The Corps is also
required to consider related statutory guidelines, such as those set out
in the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA)' 5 and the Endangered
16
Species Act (ESA).
During the survey period the Tenth Circuit decided two important
section 404 permit controversies. In Riverside Irrigation District v. Andrews, 17 the court decided whether the Corps had the authority to deny a
section 404 permit on the basis of indirect effects of the operation of a
proposed dam. In Utah v. Marsh, 18 the court resolved a constitutional
challenge to the reach of section 404 permits by holding that the permit
requirement extends to a landlocked, intrastate lake.
6. See Want, supra note 3, at 5 n.39; see also Note, supra note 5, at 525.
7. Zabel v. Tabb, 430 F.2d 199 (5th Cir. 1970). See Note, supra note 5, at 525.
8. Amendments to the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86
Stat. 816 (1972) (codified at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1982)).
9. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(6) (1982).
10. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7) (1982). The Corps' current regulatory definition of"navigable waters" (waters capable of transport of interstate or foreign commerce) under the
RHA appears at 33 C.F.R. § 329.4 (1985).
11. 392 F. Supp. 685 (D.D.C. 1975).
12. Id. at 686.
13. 33 U.S.C. § 1344(b)(1). See Liebesman, The Role of EPA's Guidelines in the Clean
Water Act § 404 Permit Program-JudicialInterpretationand Administrative Application, 14 ENVTL.
L. REP. 10272 (1984).

14.
15.
16.
17.
18.

40 C.F.R. § 230 (1985).
42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370
16 U.S.C. §§ 1532-1543
758 F.2d 508 (10th Cir.
740 F.2d 799 (10th Cir.

(1982). See Note, supra note 5, at 530.
(1982). See Note, supra note 5, at 530-31.
1985).
1984).
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Riverside Irrigation District v. Andrews
1. Background

In this long-awaited opinion 19 the court decided whether the Corps
exceeded its authority by denying the Riverside Irrigation District (the
District) and the Public Service Company of Colorado (PSC) the authority to operate under a nationwide permit for the deposit of fill material
(basically sand and gravel) under section 404 of the Clean Water Act. 20
The District planned to build a dam on Wildcat Creek, a tributary of the
South Platte River. The stored water was to be used to cool a large
adjoining power plant owned by PSC, as well as for irrigation. 2 1 Because Wildcat Creek is a part of the "waters of the United States" as
defined in the Clean Water Act, 2 2 the District had to obtain a permit for
depositing the fill material necessary for construction of the earthen
2
dam. 3

Under the section 404 permit guidelines, nationwide permits issued
by the Corps automatically allow for the deposit of dredge and fill
materials without an individual application for a permit, 24 provided that
certain conditions are met.2 5 Although the planned deposits met most
of the conditions, the Corps denied the District's claim that its activities
came under the nationwide permit because the increased consumption
of water by the proposed reservoir would deplete the streamflow and
thereby affect an important riparian habitat of the whooping crane, an
endangered species, located approximately 250 miles downstream. 26
The Corps initially required the District to take one of two mitigation
measures. The first required replacement of the water consumed by the
reservoir and the second required the improvement and maintenance by
the District of the whooping crane habitat. 27 The failure of the District
to implement either of these mitigation measures would trigger the requirement that the District apply for an individual permit under section
404 and comply with the requisite public notice and hearings
19. Riverside began to take form on June 6, 1978, when a Fish and Wildlife Service
employee contacted the Corps about the planned dam. Riverside Irrigation District v.
Stipo, 658 F.2d 762, 764 (1981). The implications of the case brought it to the attention
of many commentators during the course of the litigation process. See, e.g., Parish and
Morgan, History, Practiceand Emerging Problems of Wetlands Regulation: Reconsidering Section 404

of the Clean Water Act, 17 LAND & WATER L. REV. 43, 76 n.129 (1982); Tarlock, The Endangered Species Act and Western Water Rights, 20 LAND & WATER L. REV. 1 (1985); Want, supra

note 3, at 23; Note, supra note 5; G. Hobbs, The Endangered Species Act and State Water
Allocation Systems: Conflict and Resolution In the Platte River and Colorado River Basins
(April 1985) (This paper was presented at "Water and Colorado's Future, Who Turns the
Tap?," A Conference of Continuing Legal Education in Colorado, Inc.) (on file at the
Denver University Law Review offices)[hereinafter cited as G. Hobbs].
20. 758 F.2d at 510-11.
21. Riverside Irrigation Dist. v. Stipo, 658 F.2d 762, 763 (10th Cir. 1981).
22. 758 F.2d at 511; see 33 C.F.R. § 323.2(a) (1985).
23. 758 F.2d at 511.
24. 658 F.2d at 764; see 33 U.S.C. § 1344(e)(1) (1982); 33 C.F.R. § 330 (1985).
25. 33 C.F.R. § 330.4-5(b) (1985).
26. Riverside Irrigation Dist. v. Andrews, 568 F. Supp. 583, 585 (D. Colo. 1983).
27. 658 F.2d at 766.

DENVER UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 63:2

requirements 28
The District brought suit in federal district court, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief and review of the agency action. It claimed
that the Corps exceeded its authority by considering effects other than
the effect of placing fill materials. 29 An interlocutory appeal to the
Tenth Circuit was taken by the Corps after the trial court refused to
dismiss the suit for lack ofjurisdiction and failure to exhaust administrative remedies. The court held that there was jurisdiction for judicial review because the Corps' action clearly denied the District the right to
proceed under a nationwide permit. In addition, the court noted that it
was unrealistic to expect the District to proceed with construction in order to test the permitting process, given the severe penalties such a
30
course of action would entail.
The case was then remanded to the district court for a "determination whether the [Corps] has exceeded [its] statutory authority."' 3 1 The
district court held that the Corps had acted within its authority and was
required by both the Clean Water Act and the Endangered Species Act
to deny permission to operate under the nationwide permit.3 2

The

Tenth Circuit, Judge McKay writing, affirmed the district court's opinion, stating that the plaintiffs had failed to show compliance with all the
requirements of the nationwide permit and, therefore, had to apply for
33

an individual permit.

2.

The Endangered Species Act and Section 404

The Tenth Circuit relied on the fact that a nationwide permit is conditioned on the discharge not destroying or adversely affecting the critical habitat of a threatened or endangered species. 34 In addition, the
court found that the Corps has the authority to require an individual
permit because the pertinent guidelines require the agency to look at all
effects on the "aquatic environment" caused by the depositing of the fill
35
material.
What sets this case apart from most section 404 permit cases is that
the adverse effect was associated with the eventual use of the dam and
not with the placing of the fill materials in the stream. 3 6 Thus, the
Corps sought to establish its authority to regulate not only the water
quality effects of dredge and fill activities, but also the downstream effects of changes in water quantity resulting from dredge and fill activities. The court found that the Corps' focus on streamflow depletions
resulting from dredge and fill activities did not change the review re28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.

Id.
758 F.2d at 511.
658 F.2d at 767.
Id. at 768.
568 F. Supp. 583, 589 (D. Colo. 1983).
758 F.2d 508, 513-14 (10th Cir. 1985).
Id. at 511; see 33 C.F.R. § 330.4(b)(2) (1985).
758 F.2d at 512 (citing 33 U.S.C. § 1344(f)(1)(E) (1982)).
758 F.2d at 511-12.
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quired by the ESA.1 7 The court quoted from TVA v. Hill:3 8 "[F]ederal
agencies [must] 'insure that actions authorized .

.

. by them do not . . .

result in the destruction or adverse modification of habitat of [endan'3 9
gered] species... .' This language admits of no exception."
The Clean Water Act and its accompanying regulations contain language authorizing the consideration of water quantity effects as well as
water quality effects. 40 The court stated that because the ESA and the
Clean Water Act require the Corps to consider all environmental impacts of a discharge, requiring the Corps to ignore indirect effects would
be "to require it to wear blinders that Congress has not chosen to
4
impose." I
3.

The Wallop Amendment and the Interstate Compact

The District further argued that the denial of a permit violated section 101(g) of the Clean Water Act (the Wallop Amendment), 4 2 which
does not allow a state's right to allocate water within its jurisdiction to
be impaired. Citing Connecticut Light & Power Co. v. Federal Power Commission,43 the court held that a general policy statement "cannot nullify a
clear and specific grant of jurisdiction .... ,,44 The Tenth Circuit, however, concluded that the Wallop Amendment evidenced a congressional
intent that an accommodation be reached when a state's right to allocate
water interferes with the federal interest in environmental protection
and held that the individual permit was the best method of accommodating the conflicting interests. 4 5 The court also found that the Corps' denial of the nationwide permit did not deny Colorado its right to use the
water allocated by the South Platte River Compact, but instead only re46
quired an application for an individual permit.

37. Id.; see also National Wildlife Federation v. Coleman, 529 F.2d 359, 373-74 (5th
Cir.) (where a federal agency was required to consider both direct and indirect effect of
proposed highway construction on a crane habitat as part of its duty under section 7 of the
Endangered Species Act), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 979 (1976); Nebraska v. Rural Electrification Administration, 12 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1156 (D. Neb. 1978) (where the court invalidated an individual section 404 permit for a failure to assure that adequate streamflow to
the whooping crane habitat would be maintained), appeal vacatedand dismissed, 594 F.2d 870
(8th Cir. 1979).
38. 437 U.S. 153 (1978).
39. Id. at 173 (citing 16 U.S.C. § 1536 (1976)).
40. 758 F.2d at 512.
41. Id.
42. 33 U.S.C. § 12 51(g) (1982). The Wallop Amendment provides that:
It is the policy of Congress that the authority of each State to allocate quantities
of water within its jurisdiction shall not be superseded, abrogated or otherwise
impaired by this [Act]. It is the further policy of Congress that nothing in this
[Act] shall be construed to supersede or abrogate rights to quantities of water
which have been established by any State. Federal agencies shall cooperate with
State and local agencies to develop comprehensive solutions to prevent, reduce
and eliminate pollution in concert with programs for managing water resources.
Id.
43. 324 U.S. 515 (1945).
44. 758 F.2d at 513 (quoting Connecticut Light & Power, 324 U.S. at 527)).
45. 758 F.2d at 513.
46. Id. at 513-14.
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Analysis
7

4
Riverside arose after Nebraska v. Rural Electrification Administration,
which also concerned a dam project along the Platte River system. In
that case the Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) requested a consultation
with the REA under section 7 of the ESA. The FWS made a determination that the proposed Greyrock Dam could jeopardize the continued
existence of the endangered whooping crane by affecting the same criti48
cal habitat involved in Riverside.

Prior to the beginning of construction of the Wildcat Creek dam,
formal consultation between the FWS and the Corps was initiated under
the ESA. The FWS thereafter issued a biological opinion that concluded
that the project would have an adverse effect on the cranes' critical
49
habitat.
Work by the Platte River Whooping Crane Habitat Maintenance
Trust (the Trust), however, has suggested that high water runoff into the
Platte River can actually destroy the roosting sites of the cranes. Furthermore, the Trust has also determined that the scouring action of the
river, which keeps the sandbars and meadows on which the cranes roost
free of vegetation, can be duplicated by mechanical means. 50 Therefore, ironically, the control of runoff by dams on Platte River tributaries
may be beneficial to the cranes' habitat.
The Tenth Circuit, however, did not decide the case on the merits
of the adverse impact claim, but instead on the District's failure to show
"that the [discharge] will not destroy a threatened or endangered species
as identified in the Endangered Species Act or destroy or adversely
modify the critical habitat of such species."15 ' Because of the limited
scope of the court's ruling, the District may still be able to construct the
Wildcat Creek project if it is able to acquire an individual permit,
although it clearly will be difficult for the District to overcome the FWS's
determination of possible adverse effect. However, given the research
findings of the Trust, 5 2 further study may show that the District can proceed with the project without endangering the whooping cranes or their
habitat.
The most significant aspect of Riverside is the recognition of the
Corps' right to regulate the instream flow of rivers under the section
47. 12 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1156 (D. Neb. 1978), appeal vacated and dismissed, 594
F.2d 870 (8th Cir. 1979); see also supra note 37 and accompanying text.
48. 12 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) at 1170.
49. 658 F.2d at 764.
50. G. Hobbs, supra note 19, at 3-4. The Platte River Whooping Crane Maintenance
Trust was established as a result of a settlement following the Nebraska v. Rural Electrification Association decision. The Trust has acquired 6,000 acres of land along the Platte River
within the whooping crane habitat with the intention of maintaining the habitat. The
Trust's work has shown that the cranes cannot stand in water deeper that eight inches and
that high runoff in 1983 and 1984 destroyed roosting sites within the habitat.
51. 758 F.2d at 514 (emphasis added) (citing 33 C.F.R. § 330.4(b)(2) (1985)).
52. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
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404 permit process. 53 Thus, the federal government has the power,
through a section 404 permit, to establish a minimum instream flow requirement. This new "regulatory property right" 54 is understandably
threatening to water rights owners comfortable with decisions that have
generally limited federal rights to claim reserved instream flows for federal reservations. 55 Furthermore, the threat of a denial of a section 404
permit and the restraints associated with possible mitigation measures
could drastically limit plans for new water developments with an associ56
ated effect on a state's water allocation plans.
In addition, the court has reinforced the legitimacy of using the section 404 permit process as a forcing mechanism for the consideration of
environmental impacts on wildlife caused by development of water resources. The definition of "navigable waters" under the Clean Water
Act has extended its provisions to virtually all streams and wetland areas. 5 7 These wetland areas are of immeasurable importance to wildlife,
especially to certain threatened and endangered species that depend on
specific, but rapidly disappearing, wetland environments for survival. 5 8
This decision strengthens and reinforces the Corps' duty to consider all
effects on threatened and endangered species, insuring that the public
interest in preserving an irreplaceable resource is among the initial issues considered in the early stages of construction, thereby discouraging
fiascos like the Tellico Dam. 59 Because the "major federal action" requirements which trigger NEPA60 are not necessary for the section 404
permitting process, any state or private water development project
which involves dredge and fill activity is subject to public scrutiny of its
environmental effects.
C.

Utah v. Marsh

In another section 404 permit case, the Tenth Circuit considered
the constitutionality of the EPA's definition of waters subject to regulation under the section. In Utah v. Marsh 6i the Tenth Circuit affirmed
62
the trial court's summary judgment for the federal government.
During 1978 and 1979, the State of Utah Division of Parks and Recreation (the Parks Division) built several concrete boat launching ramps
53. See Tarlock, The Endangered Species Act and Western Water Rights, 20 LAND & WATER L.
REV. 1, 20-21 (1985).
54. Id. at 3.

55. Id. at 14-15.
56. Id. at 14-19.
57. 33 C.F.R. § 323.2(a) (1985). See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
58.

Note, EnvironmentalLau-Nationwide Permitsfor Categoriesof Waters Issued by the Corps

of Engineers Under FWPCA Section 404: A Legitimate Administrative Interpretation Ratified by Congress?, 61 N.C.L. REV. 904 (1983); see also supra note 3 and accompanying text.
59. TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978). Operation of the Tellico Dam was enjoined,
although construction was virtually completed, because it was found that the dam would
threaten the habitat of the snail darter, a small and previously almost unknown species of
fish.
60. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C) (1982).
61. 740 F.2d 799 (10th Cir. 1984).
62. Id. at 801,805.
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at a marina and boat harbor on Utah Lake. During the construction of
the ramps a small cofferdam was placed in the lake across the mouth of
the boat harbor. After construction was completed the dam was removed and the material was placed in the lake to be used as a foundation
63
for a parking lot.

After the construction was finished, the Parks Division was notified
by the District Engineer of the Army Corps of Engineers that the placement and removal of the dam was a violation of the Clean Water Act
because the state had failed to obtain a permit under section 404.64 The
State of Utah brought suit against the Corps seeking a declaratory judgment that the Corps has no regulatory jurisdiction over Utah Lake and
an injunction against any interference with the state's operations and
activities in, on, and around the lake. Contending that the lake is a navigable body of water with no navigable tributary or outlet extending
outside the state, the state claimed that the lake "is beyond the constitu' 65
tional reach of the regulatory authority of Congress."
The Corps alleged that the lake was subject to its regulatory powers
because the lake affects interstate commerce through non-resident recreation, irrigation of crops sold in interstate commerce, and a commer66
cial fishery that markets its fish in interstate commerce.
Section 404 requires a permit for the discharge of dredged or fill
material into the navigable waters when the activity would bring the waters into a new use, impair their flow or circulation, or reduce their
reach. 6 7 "Navigable waters" as defined in the Clean Water Act means
the "waters of the United States including the territorial seas." '6 8 The
Corps has further defined "waters of the United States" as including "all
... waters ...

such as isolated wetlands and lakes ...

and other waters

that are not part of a tributary system to interstate waters or to navigable
waters of the United States, the degradation of which could affect inter69
state commerce."
The state did not argue that the commerce clause is an improper
measure of the federal government's regulatory power over water, but
instead argued that section 404 goes beyond the bounds of the commerce clause when applied to Utah Lake. The state supported its argument with the standard line of Supreme Court cases concerning federal
regulation of navigable waters. 70 However, the Tenth Circuit pointed
out quite correctly that these cases refer to the definition of "navigable
waters" under the Rivers and Harbors Act and not under the Clean
Water Act.
63.
64.
65.
66.

71

Id. at 801.
Id.
Id.
Id.

67. Id. at 802. See 33 U.S.C. § 1344(0(2) (1982) (section 404).
68. Clean Water Act § 502(7), 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7) (1982).
69.
70.
Ogden,
71.

33 C.F.R. § 323.4(a)(5) (1985) (emphasis added).
740 F.2d at 802-03. This line of cases is based upon the decisions in Gibbons v.
22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824) and The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 557 (1870).
740 F.2d at 803 n.5.
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The court cited its earlier holding in United States v. Earth Sciences,
Inc.72 as support for the constitutionality of the Clean Water Act as an
exercise of congressional power under the commerce clause. The court
73
also cited Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Association, Inc.
as indirect support by the Supreme Court for lower court decisions that
have held that the commerce clause power was broad enough to allow
regulation of environmental hazards. 74 Thus, the court refused to limit
affectCongress' power under the commerce clause to regulate activities
75
ing intrastate waters when interstate commerce is affected.
Although the court did not break any new ground in the opinion,
the issue of what waters are subject to regulation under the Clean Water
Act, and more specifically under section 404, continues to be argued in
the courts 76 and among the commentators. 77 One can only hope that
the breadth and inclusiveness of the court's decision will help to discourage the continued flogging of this particular dead horse.
II.

A.

OIL AND GAS LAW

The "Mutual Participation" Standard in Unitization Programs: Amoco
Production Co. v. Jacobs

Amoco Production Co. v. Jacobs 78 involved the largest production unit
ever attempted in New Mexico and possibly in the United States. The
Bravo Dome Unit is located on what is believed to be a carbon dioxide
bearing formation. This unit is subject to a unitization agreement covering 1,035,000 acres. 79 The unit was originally organized in 1977 by
Amoco Production Co., the plaintiffs in the original declaratory action.
Although Amoco cooperated with other working interest and royalty interest owners in forming the unit, it holds a working interest in seventy80
four percent of the acreage in the unit.
The Jacobs are owners of 2,160 acres that were included in the
Bravo Dome Unit as the result of a 1971 lease with Amoco. 8 1 The Jacobs refused to consent to the unitization agreement and contended
that their land was not included in the unit. They argued that the unitization agreement was invalid because Amoco entered into it in bad
faith. Because the primary term of their lease expired in 1981 without
any drilling or production on their land, they also contended that their
72. 599 F.2d 368 (10th Cir. 19791).
73. 452 U.S. 264 (1981).
74. 740 F.2d at 804 (citing 452 U.S. at 282 & n.2 1).
75. 740 F.2d at 804.
76. See, e.g., United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 106 S. Ct. 455 (1985);
Sierra Club v. United States Army Corps of Eng'rs, 776 F.2d 383 (2d Cir. 1985); Louisiana
Wildlife Fed'n v. York, 761 F.2d 1044 (5th Cir. 1985).
77.

Parish & Morgan, Histoiy, Practiceand Emesging Problems of lVetlands Regulation: Recon-

sidering Section 404 of the Clean 11'aterAct, 17 LAND & WATER L. REV. 43, 51-52 (1982).
78. 746 F.2d 1394 (10th Cir. 1984).
79. Id. at 1395, 1404. The largest unit ever previously formed encompassed 400,000
acres.
80. Id. at 1395-96.

81. Id.
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82
lease with Amoco had expired.
Amoco relied on a provision in the lease that compelled the Jacobs
to consent to any unitization or pooling agreements. The pooling and
expire or termiunitization clause also stated that the lease would not
83
nate during the life of the unit plan of development.
In New Mexico, for a unitization plan to be valid it must be approved by "any governmental authority."' 84 Amoco submitted its plan
to the State Commissioner of Public Lands (Lands Commissioner) and
to the Director of the United States Geological Survey (USGS). The
Lands Commissioner and the USGS approved the plan after it was considered and approved by the New Mexico Oil Conservation Commission
(Commission) .85
TheJacobs filed a petition for rehearing with the Commission which
once again approved the plan, but with additional conditions on the operators to protect the rights of the landowners. The Commission also
in orretained jurisdiction to require further reports from the operators
86
plan.
the
in
changes
and
effects
future
der to consider
Throughout this time the Jacobs refused to consent to their inclusion in the Bravo Dome Unit. Therefore, Amoco sought a declaratory
judgment in federal district court. The district court upheld Amoco's
lease, finding that the unitization agreement lawfully extended the lease
beyond its primary term. The Jacobs appealed this finding to the Tenth
87
Circuit.
Thus, the question on appeal was whether the pooling and unitization clause could validly bind the Jacobs to the unitization plan. The
Jacobs contended that Amoco, in forming the Bravo Dome Unit development plan, abused its authority under the pooling and unitization
clause of the lease. Specifically, theJacobs alleged that Amoco acted in
its own best interest and contrary to the interests of the unit landowners.
They contended that certain provisions of the unit agreement greatly
expanded Amoco's powers under the lease by allowing the working interest holder to set wellhead values and royalty payments on an acreage
the lesbasis, instead of on a source-of-production basis, and expanded
88
sees' right to use the surface of the lessor's property.
The Tenth Circuit, Judge Doyle writing, relied primarily on two earlier Tenth Circuit opinions to set a standard for evaluating unitization
agreements. In Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Peterson,89 the court laid out a

82. Id. at 1394-95.
83. Id. at 1395.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 1395-96.
86. The Oil Commissioner's order was affirmed by the New Mexico District Court and
the New Mexico Supreme Court in Casades v. Oil Commission, No. 14,359 (Nov. 10,
1983). Jacobs, 746 F.2d at 1396.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 1397. The Jacobs argued that these provisions allowed self-dealing by
Amoco and reduced the value of the lessors' property.
89. 218 F.2d 926 (10th Cir. 1954).
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standard for the behavior of oil companies in dealing with lessors under
a unitization agreement. This standard is one of good faith and due
regard for the interests of the lessors. 90 According to the court, the relationship between the lessor and lessee is "analogous" to that of a principal and an agent and, therefore, there is a duty to exercise a high
degree of good faith and loyalty to the advancement of the principal's
interests. 91
In determining whether Amoco acted in good faith in exercising its
authority to unitize the Jacobs' lease interest, the court analyzed Boone v.
Kerr-McGee Oil Industries.92 In this Tenth Circuit case the lessors had
sought cancellation of oil and gas leases, claiming that the lessee
breached its duty by pooling the acreage under the leases. 9 3 The court
held that the test for validity of unit formation was good faith in honestly
effectuating "the object and purpose the parties had in mind in providing
for the exercise of such power." 94 The Boone court upheld the actions of
the lessee in pooling the leases and held that the law presumes good
95
faith and that bad faith must be affirmatively shown.
Applying these rules to the Jacobs' contentions, the Tenth Circuit
found that bad faith was not proven by showing that the lessee's motivation for pooling the leases was to propel the leases into their secondary
term without having to conduct wasteful drilling on each lease site. 9 6
The court, however, felt that the difference in relative positions of a major oil company involved in the largest unit ever attempted and the
owner of a very small tract within the unit justified a higher standard of
97
behavior on the part of the oil company.
The court was unwilling to adopt the "prudent operator" standard,
which is favored in a minority of gas and oil producing jurisdictions,
because it concluded that a prudent operator was necessarily concerned
primarily with his own needs in developing a unit plan. Thus, the court
held that it would be inequitable to bind lessors to the actions of a lessee
when the lessee could freely disregard the lessors' best interests. 9 8 The
court, however, rejected the Jacobs' argument that Amoco was required
to resolve all conflicts in favor of the lessors. The court instead ruled
that both parties were to be held to a standard of "mutual participation." 99 The court concluded that the good faith standard of Peterson
and Boone could best be implemented by requiring the greatest possible
cooperation between the lessee developing a unit plan and the lessors
90. Jacobs, 746 F.2d at 1398 (quoting Peterson, 218 F.2d at 935).
91. 746 F.2d at 1400.
92. 217 F.2d 63 (10th Cir. 1954).
93. 746 F.2d at 1398-99.
94. Id. at 1399 (quoting Boone, 217 F.2d at 65) (emphasis added).
95. 746 F.2d at 1399.
96. Id.
97. Id. The court noted that in such a huge unitization program it was impossible for
the lessee to discharge its duty to the lessor.
98. 746 F.2d at 1401.
99. Id. The court recognized a fiduciary relationship between the principal and agent
in a unitization program.
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affected by the plan.' 0 0
The absence of mutual good faith in the development of the unit
plan by Amoco clearly disturbed the court.' 0 ' Although the court did
not find sufficient evidence of bad faith by Amoco to overturn the district court, it specifically left open to the Jacobs the right to further ac10 2
tion in light of changing conditions.
The court bound the Jacobs to their lease's unitization clause because, in part, the evidence indicated that carbon dioxide production
was such a recent development that there was an insufficient basis for a
showing of bad faith on the part of Amoco. The Commission had
demonstrated its lack of experience with large-field carbon dioxide production by requiring that Amoco continue to report any changing conditions in its development plans.' 0 3 Amoco, despite several years of
development, apparently had yet to drill a paying well in the unit.

10 4

Although the court indicated that more "missionary work" by Amoco
may have avoided this nonproduction problem, the court concluded that
given the uncertainties involved, Amoco's failure to bring the unit into
production was insufficient affirmative proof of bad faith.
In its opinion the Tenth Circuit for the first time clearly established
the duty of a lessee to include the lessors in the development of pooling
and unitization plans as a necessary element of the lessee's burden of
acting in good faith.' 0 5 The court's concern for the interests of the lessors was clearly well founded. The working interest owners under the
Bravo Dome Unit, primarily Amoco, retain virtually all the advantages of
production under the plan. 10 6 Leases, such as the Jacobs', bound the
lessors to whatever conditions were implemented by the oil company
and kept the lease open indefinitely, regardless of whether or not there
0 7
ever was any production.'
There was little evidence of consultation by Amoco with the lessors
whose land was affected by the plan. 10 8 Although the court's standard
of cooperation cannot guarantee the protection of the lessors' interests,
the threat of individual landowners refusing to participate in a plan as
important as Bravo Dome may encourage oil production companies to
deal fairly with the small landowner. Moreover, the court's requirement
of mutuality should not unduly burden the company attempting to form
a unit because the lessors must also act reasonably.
100. Id. at 1401-02.
101. The fact that many years had passed without a successful unitization agreement
supported the court's refusal to apply the "prudent operator" standard. Id. at 1404.
102. Id. at 1406.
103. Id. at 1396, 1404.
104. Id. at 1405.
105. The court disapproved of the original leases providing for a unitization program
in which lessees could act without express approval of individual owners. Id. The court
noted that it might be ditficult to consult the lessor at all times, but that an effort to seek
approval of lessors when possible would be helpful. Id. at 1402.
106. Id. at 1401-02.
107. Id. at 1397.
108. Id. at 1395.
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Favored Nations Clauses: Superior Oil Co. v. Western Slope Gas Co.

In Superior Oil Co. v. Western Slope Gas Co., 10 9 the Tenth Circuit reviewed a "favored nations clause" in a gas purchase agreement. The
clause provided that if the purchaser, Western Slope Gas Co., entered
into a contract with other sellers for the purchase of gas at a higher
price, it would then pay that higher contract price to Superior and
Conoco. I 10
The court, Judge Seth writing for the majority, held that Colorado
law I ' specifically recognizes all federal natural gas price and allocation
regulations. After noting that the federal Natural Gas Policy Act of
1978'12 (NGPA) permits the continuance of such favored nations
clauses in intrastate gas contracts, the court concluded that Colorado
had not barred such "favored nations" clauses as contrary to public
policy.
Judge Doyle pointed out in his dissent that, although federal law
currently allows the "favored nations" clause, the dispute arose before
the NGPA had been enacted and at a time when such clauses were contrary to public policy. 113 Judge Doyle further argued that the regulatory
approach of the Public Utilities Commission would better protect the
interests of natural gas consumers because price controls based on indefinite price escalation clauses, such as the "favored nations" clause,
would inevitably lead to spiraling gas prices.' 14 The dissent also contended that, because of the noncompetitive nature of the product and
the public's interest in the conservation of non-renewable natural resources, the public interest would best be served by regulation by the
Public Utilities Commission.' 15
Although the dissent raised the important issue of what degree of
government regulation best serves the interests of the consuming public, the outcome of the case was effectively predetermined by Colorado's
clear recognition of the validity of "favored nations" clauses. Natural
gas consumers can, therefore, only hope that the legislature heeds Judge
Doyle's logical position.
C.

Geophysical Exploration: Mustang Production Co. v. Texaco, Inc.

In Mustang Production Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 116 the Tenth Circuit held
that, absent an express agreement in a lease, there is no exclusive right
109. 758 F.2d 500 (10th Cir. 1985). The Tenth Circuit's earlier opinion in this case,
604 F.2d 1281 (10th Cir. 1981), is discussed in Eighth Annual Tenth Circuit Survey: Lands and
Natural Resources, 58 DEN. L.J. 415, 433 (1981). In addition, a similar Tenth Circuit opinion, Kerr-McGee Corp. v. Northern Utilities, Inc., 673 F.2d 323 (10th Cir. 1982), is considered in Tenth Annual Tenth Circuit Survey: Lands and Natural Resources, 60 DEN. L.J. 333, 33343 (1983).
110. 758 F.2d at 502 (Doyle, J., dissenting).
Ill. Oil and Gas Conservation Act, CoLo. REV. STAT. § 34-60-102(2) (1984).
112. 15 U.S.C. §§ 3301-3432 (1982).
113. 758 F.2d. at 502 (Doyle, J., dissenting).
114. Id. at 503.
115. Id.
116. 754 F.2d 892 (10th Cir. 1985).
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to conduct geophysical exploration on land subject to oil and gas
leases. 117
Mustang filed suit against Texaco in both Kansas and Oklahoma,
seeking damages and an accounting for geophysical explorations conducted on land under lease to Mustang without Mustang's consent.
Texaco moved to dismiss the actions in both states on the grounds that
Mustang had failed to state a cause of action because Mustang did not
have an exclusive right to conduct such exploration. Both courts dismissed the actions and Mustang appealed to the Tenth Circuit." 8
The Tenth Circuit cited several authorities for the rule that the right
to conduct geophysical exploration is a valuable property right with the
concommitant right in the landowner to recover for entry upon his land
without his consent to conduct such exploration." 19 The court noted,
however, that the exclusive right of exploration of the lessee under the
0
leases was not expressed and would, therefore, have to be implied.12
Implied rights in an oil and gas lease are an essential part of the
lessee's rights to produce under a lease. The court cited the right to
ingress and egress and the right to conduct geophysical exploration as
examples of implied rights.' 2 ' The court, however, stated that such
rights are normally non-exclusive because the landowner retains the
right to make use of his property in any way that does not interfere with
22
the lessee's right to develop the lease.'
The court noted that the exclusive right to drill is an essential aspect of the lessee's right to produce oil and gas upon leased land, and
courts have implied that this is an exclusive right when the lease is silent.' 23 The court further noted that a non-exclusive right to conduct
geophysical exploration does not prevent the lessee from reducing the
oil and gas under the property to his possession. 12 4 Thus, the court was
not convinced by Mustang's argument that exploration would promote
drilling adjacent to Mustang's leases and thereby interfere with Mustang's orderly development of its leases by forcing Mustang to drill offset wells because such drilling could occur with or without
25
exploration. '
The court concluded that the public interest was furthered by allowing exploration in order to encourage the continuing development
of oil and gas lands. 12 Because no other jurisdiction had implied an
117. Id. at 895.
118. Id. at 892.
119. Id. (citing Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Cowden, 241 F.2d 586 (5th Cir. 1957); Ohio
Oil Co. v. Sharp, 135 F.2d 303, 306 (10th Cir. 1943); Wilson v. Texas Co., 237 S.W.2d 649
(Tex. Civ. App. 1951); and I H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, OIL AND GAS LAW § 230 (5th ed.
1982)).
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.

Mustang Production, 754 F.2d at 893-94.
Id. at 894.
Id.
Id.
Id.

125. Id. at 895.
126. Id.
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exclusive right to conduct geophysical exploration and several commentators have supported a non-exclusive right, the court was unwilling to
imply an exclusive right.12 7 The court, thus, left it to the lessee to expressly contract for an exclusive right to conduct geophysical explora28
tion if the lessee finds it advantageous.1
III.

A.

INDIAN LAW

Tribal Termination and Hunting Rights: United States v. Felter

The Tenth Circuit continued its traditional role as an important forum for legal issues involving Indian affairs with its decision in United
States v. Felter, 12 9 which construed the rights of tribal members when federal jurisdiction has been terminated. The court considered whether a
mixed-blood Ute Indian retained the right to hunt and fish within the
Uintah and Ouray Reservation after Congress terminated federal supervision over the property of mixed-blood members of the tribe. 130 In
upholding Felter's right to continue to hunt and fish within the reservation, the Tenth Circuit, Chief Judge Holloway writing, relied heavily on
the Supreme Court's decision in Menominee Tribe v. United States, '3 ' which
held that the Menominee Indian Termination Act of 1954 did not abro32
gate the hunting and fishing rights of the Menominee Indians.'
The government attempted to distinguish Felter from Menominee on
two grounds. The first ground was that the law that granted states jurisdiction over Indians did not apply to Utah as it had to Wisconsin (the
home of the Menominee Tribe). 133 The second ground was that the
Utes' right to hunt and fish was based on an act of Congress instead of a
treaty, which the Supreme Court had cited as the decisive factor in Me127. Id. (citing 1 H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, OIL AND GAS LAW § 218.6 (5th ed. 1982);
Martin, Geophysical Exploration on Severed Mineral Interests in Oklahoma, 36 OKLA. B.A.J. 1889,
1894 (1968); Comment, Implied Rights of the Oil and Gas Owner in the Surface, 26 RocKy MTN.
L. REV. 277, 287 (1954).

128. 754 F.2d at 895.
129. 752 F.2d 1505 (10th Cir. 1985).
130. Act of August 27, 1954, ch. 1009, 68 Stat. 868 (codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 6 7 7 -677aa
(1982)) [hereinafter cited as the 1954 Act]. The 1954 Act provided that an individual
mixed-blood member of the Ute Tribe was no longer "entitled to any of the services performed for Indians because of his status as an Indian." 25 U.S.C. § 677v (1982).
131. 391 U.S. 404 (1968).
132. 752 F.2d at 1508. In Menominee. the Supreme Court held that although the Menominee Indian Termination Act did not specifically address hunting and fishing rights,
the Act had to be read inpari materia with Public Law 280, Act of August 15, 1953, ch. 505,
67 Stat. 588 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1162, 28 U.S.C. § 1360, and 25 U.S.C.
§§ 1321-1326 (1982)), which granted to certain states general jurisdiction over "Indian
country," but with the proviso that "[n]othing in this section... shall deprive any Indian
or Indian tribe . . . of any right, privilege, or immunity afforded under Federal treaty,
agreement or statute with respect to hunting, trapping or fishing or the control, licensing
or regulation thereof." Menominee Tribe v. United States, 391 U.S. 404, 410-11 (1968).
The right to hunt and fish derived from an 1854 treaty. Id. at 406.
133. Before a state can assume jurisdiction under Public Law 280, supra note 132, it
must first obtain the consent of the Indian tribe(s) to be affected. See 25 U.S.C. §§ 132 1(a),
1322(a) (1982). No Indian tribes in Utah, including the Utes, have given this consent.
Felter, 752 F.2d at 1508 n.7.
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nominee. 134 The district court, however, refused to distinguish the case
from Menominee and held that the factual differences should not change
the court's adherence to the principle of "declin[ing] to construe the Act
as a backhanded way of abrogating the hunting and fishing rights of
these Indians." 135
The Tenth Circuit ruled that the 1954 Act did not specifically abrogate the mixed-blood members' right to hunt and fish on reservation
land.13 6 This conclusion comports with the established doctrine that Indian hunting and fishing rights cannot be abrogated in the absence of
explicit congressional language. 137 The court also followed the line of
cases, beginning with Menominee and including the Tenth Circuit case of
Cheyenne-Arapahoe Tribes of Oklahoma v. Oklahoma, 1 38 which have held, in a
variety of factual situations, that Indian hunting and fishing rights can
survive the termination of tribal status, the withdrawal from tribal membership, the cession of tribal lands to the United States, and the dises1 39
tablishment of a reservation.
The government argued that the 1954 Act "unambigously" abrogated the rights of the mixed-blood Utes. The court, however, pointed
out that the Act never mentioned hunting and fishing rights, but instead
provided that mixed-blood members would retain no interest in the
tribe unless provided for by the Act. The court then cited a section of
the Act that provides that mixed-blood members are to retain their
40
rights to assets that cannot be equitably and practicably distributed.'
The district court had pointed out, and the Tenth Circuit agreed, that
fishing and hunting rights and the authority to regulate those rights cannot be equitably and practicably distributed. 14 ' In interpreting the Act,
the court relied on the canon of statutory construction that "statutes
passed for the benefit of dependent Indian tribes . . . are to be liberally
construed, doubtful expressions being resolved in favor of the Indians."' 142 The court soundly rejected the government's argument that
the canon should be interpreted only in favor of the full-blooded members of the tribe because the mixed-bloods are no more than "ordinary
American citizens." 143 The Tenth Circuit pointed out that prior to the
1954 Act the mixed-blood Ute Indians had the right to hunt and fish on
the reservation, an attribute that clearly sets them apart from "ordinary
44
American citizens" who did not enjoy such a right.'
134. Id. at 1508.
135. 546 F. Supp. 1002, 1014 (D. Utah 1982) (quoting Menominee, 391 U.S. at 412).
136. Felter, 752 F.2d at 1509.
137. See, e.g., F. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 468-70 (1982 ed.).
138. 618 F.2d 665 (10th Cir. 1980). The other cases cited include Kimball v. Callahan,
493 F.2d 564 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1019 (1974) and Klamath Indian Tribe v.
Oregon Dept. of Fish and Wildlife, 729 F.2d 609 (9th Cir. 1984), rev'd on other grounds, 105

S. Ct. 3420 (1985).
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.

Felter, 752 F.2d at 1509-10.
Id. at 1510.
Id. at 1511.
Id. (quoting Alaska Pacific Fisheries Co. v. United States, 248 U.S. 78, 89 (1918)).
Felter, 752 F.2d at 1511-12.
Id. at 1512.
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The Tenth Circuit also agreed with the district court that before the
government could convict Felter of a criminal violation, it had the burden of showing that Felter had violated tribal fishing regulations and
14 5
that the government had failed to meet this burden.
B.

Indian Contracts and Tribal Funds: Sac & Fox Tribe v. Apex
Construction Co.

In Sac & Fox Tribe v. Apex Construction Co.,' 4 6 the Tenth Circuit emphasized the distinction between tribal funds, which belong to Indian
tribes and are managed by the United States for the tribes' benefit, and
public monies of the United States. 147 The Sac and Fox Tribe of
Oklahoma (Tribe) had used grant money from the Economic Development Administration of the Department of Commerce to build a museum and cultural center. Several years later, the Tribe discovered
severe defects in the buildings and brought suit against the construction
contractor, the contractor's surety under a performance bond, and the
design engineering firm. 148 The Tribe sought recovery of all monies
paid under the contract on the theory that the contracts were void for
failure to obtain approval of the Secretary of the Interior. 149 In the al15 0
ternative, they sought damages for breach of contract.
The statutory requirement for federal approval of all contracts with
Indian tribes or individuals arises from the trust relationship between
the federal government and Indians. 1 5 1 At the time this requirement
was established, it was regarded as advancing the policy that Indians had
to be protected from unscrupulous white men who would swindle them
out of their lands through contracts for "imaginary services costing exorbitant amounts.' 5 2 This concern arose at a time when the Indian
tribes were considered incapable of protecting themselves from more
sophisticated whites.
In this case, the Tribe attempted to use the approval requirement to
invoke the protection of the federal statute, instead of using civil remedies available in the state courts.1 53 The Tribe most likely believed that
145. Id. at 1512-13. Ms. Felter was a non-Indian for federal purposes after passage of
the 1954 Act, supra note 130. Indian tribes lack jurisdiction to try and punish non-Indians
for criminal offenses. Tribes do, however, have the right to regulate nonmember hunting

and fishing under 18 U.S.C. § 1165, including the right to exclude nonmembers. See F.
COHEN, supra note 137, at 465-66. Presumably the Tribe would have the power to exclude
the terminated members of the Tribe, but the government failed to show any evidence that
Ms. Felter violated tribal regulations.
146. 757 F.2d 221 (10th Cir. 1985).
147. Id. at 222-23.
148. Id. at 221-22.
149. Id. at 222. Approval of contracts between Indians and non-Indians by the Secretary of the Interior is required by 25 U.S.C. § 81 (1982). Unapproved contracts are declared void under the statute.
150. 757 F.2d at 222.
151. Id. at 222-23.
152. Id. at 222 (quoting the unpublished record from the district court. Record, vol. 1,
at 270).
153. 757 F.2d at 222.
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it would receive a more sympathetic ear in a federal court than in a state
court and that the statute's provision for return of all monies paid by the
Tribe would almost certainly result in a more generous recovery than
that which could have been obtained in a breach of contract suit.
Unfortunately for the Tribe, neither the district court nor the Tenth
Circuit found the statute to be applicable to this situation. 15 4 The
Tenth Circuit, citing Brown v. United States,1 55 held that the statute applies only to monies derived from tribal funds.15 6 The grant monies
used for this project were not connected to tribal funds held in trust by
the government. Thus, the court concluded that the procedural requirements of the grant were sufficient protection for the Tribe and that the
construction contracts did not require the specific approval of the
Secretary. 157
The distinction between tribal funds and public monies has been
recognized by the Supreme Court since

19 0 8

158 and has been upheld as

recently as 1970.1511 Consistent with these prior decisions, the Tenth
Circuit held that grant monies do not come within the purview of the
statute. I 60

Timothy A. Richman

154. Id.
155. 486 F.2d 658 (8th Cir. 1973).
156. "Tribal funds are principally raised through the sale of tribal resources or through
treaty payments by the United States for land cessions or other dispositions of tribal property. Although these funds belong to the Tribe, they are held in trust by the United States
and are administered by the Department of Interior." Sac & Fox Tnibe, 757 F.2d at 223. See
generallY F. COHEN, supra note 137. at ch. 9, § D.
157. Sac & Fox Tr4be, 757 F.2d at 222.
158. Quick Bear v.Leupp, 210 U.S. 50 (1908).
denied, 400 U.S. 942
159. Scholder v. United States, 428 F.2d 1123 (9th Cir.), cert.
(1970).
160. Sac & Fox Tribe, 757 F.2d at 223.

SECURITIES

OVERVIEW

During the recent survey period, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals decided three cases involving federal and state securities laws. In
Cowles v. Dow Keith Oil & Gas, Inc.,I the court found that an "unsophisticated" oil driller had not violated securities laws when he sold and managed working interests in oil leases without registering them or
providing geological data to buyers. Wegerer v. First Commodity Corp. of
Boston, 2 a securities fraud which arose out of the sale of copper options,
is notable because the court upheld jurisdiction over shareholder/directors of the close corporation defendant and found them individually liable for damages sustained by the defendant investors. The
last case, N. Donald & Co. v. American United Energy Corp.,3 presented the
narrow issue of whether a court may compel arbitration pursuant to an
agreement between broker-dealers. The court held that arbitration
agreements between broker-dealers are not precluded by federal securities laws and that the trial court had not abused its discretion in compelling arbitration.
I.

A.

the Best Defense: COWLES
4
Dow KEITH OIL & GAS, INC.

IGNORANCE IS

V.

Facts

In 1980 and 1981, the plaintiffs, R. S. Cowles and Gloria B. Cowles,
purchased working interests 5 in three oil and gas leases from defendant,
Dow Keith Oil & Gas, Inc. (Dow Keith Corp.). Investors, including the
Cowles, were not given any geological data on the wells to be drilled
under the three leases. 6 Dow Keith Corp. did not register the securities
with either the Oklahoma Securities Commission or the Securities Ex7
change Commission.
The Cowles sued Dow Keith Corp. as an issuer of securities, and
1. 752 F.2d 508 (10th Cir. 1985).
2. 744 F.2d 719 (10th Cir. 1984).
3. 746 F.2d 666 (10th Cir. 1984).
4. 752 F.2d 508 (10th Cir. 1985).
5. A working interest, also called an operating interest, is an interest embodying operating rights and/or the right to share in production or revenues from the producing
venture. The receipt of production or revenues will increase as the production of revenues from the producing venture increase, without any termination of such right to receive
production or revenue after the return of the amount of any related advance payment.
Federal Power Commission Order No. 411, 46 F.P.C. 1178, 1180 (1971). A working interest in oil, gas, or mineral leases is a security under the Oklahoma Securities Act, OKLA.
STAT. tit. 71, § 2(20)(R) (Supp. 1984), the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77b(1)
(1982), and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78c(10) (1982).
6. 752 F.2d at 510. The opinion does not discuss what information, if any, was given
by the defendants to the Cowles.
7. Id. OKLA. STAT. tit. 71, § 301 (Supp. 1984) provides: "It is unlawful for any person

435
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Dow Keith (Keith) as a "control person" of Dow Keith Corp., alleging
violations of section 12(2) of the Securities Act of 1933 (the 1933 Act), 9
section 10(b)' 0 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the 1934 Act),
and Rule lOb-5 promulgated thereunder," and registration requirements of the Oklahoma Securities Act.' 2 The Cowles also raised common law claims for breach of contract and conversion. The district
3
court entered judgment for the defendants on all counts.'
to offer or sell any security in this state unless (1)it is registered under this act or (2) the
security or transaction is exempted under section 401."
The analogous federal provisions appear in section 5(c) of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 77e(c) (1982), which states that it is unlawful to offer or sell, in interstate commerce or
through the mails, a security that has not been registered, section 3, 15 U.S.C. § 77c
(1982), which exempts certain securities and transactions from the provisions of the 1933
Act and section 4 of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77d (1982), which provides that the provisions of section 5 do not apply to certain exempted securities and transactions.
8. A "control person" is defined as "every person who, by or through stock ownership, agency, or otherwise, or who, pursuant to or in connection with an agreement or
understanding with one or more other persons by or through stock ownership, agency, or
otherwise, controls any person liable under sections 77k or 771 ....
"15 U.S.C. § 77o
(1982).
9. Section 12(2) is an anti-fraud provision which provides that any person who:
(2) offers or sells a security. . . by the use of any means or instruments of
transportation or communication in interstate commerce or of the mails, by
means of a prospectus or oral communication, which includes an untrue statement of a material fact or omits to state a material fact . . . and who shall not
sustain the burden of proof that he did not know, and in the exercise of reasonable care could not have known, of such untruth or omission, shall be liable to the
person purchasing such security from him ....
15 U.S.C. § 771(2) (1982).
10. 15 U.S.C. § 78j (1982).
11. Under Rule lOb-5:
It shall be unlawful for any person. . . by the use of any means of instrumentality of interstate commerce...
(1) To employ any device, scheme or artifice to defraud,
(2) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact . . . or

(3) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the
purchase or sale of any security.
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1984).
Courts have implied a private right of action under Rule lOb-5. See, e.g., Blue Chip
Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975); Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life
& Casualty Co., 404 U.S. 6 (1971).
12. Section 408(a) of the Oklahoma Securities Act, which is analogous to section 12 of
the 1933 Act, provides:
(a) Any person who
(1) offers or sells a security in violation of Section 201(a) [anti-fraud
provisions], [section] 301 [broker-dealer registration], or [Section]
404(b) [registration requirements] of this title. . . . or

(2) offers or sells or purchases a security by means of any untrue statement of a material fact or any omission to state a material fact . . . and
who does not sustain the burden of proof that he did not know, and in
the exercise of reasonable care could not have known, of the untruth or
omission, is liable:
(i) in the case of an offer or sale of a security by such means, to
the person buying the security from him . . ..

(ii)

in the case of a purchase of a security by such means, to the
person selling the security to him . . ..

OKLA. STAT. tit. 71, § 408(a) (Supp. 1984).
13. 752 F.2d at 510. The district court found that the defendants had proved that (1)
the working interests were exempt from registration; (2) the geological reports were not
material so there was no cause of action under Rule 1Ob-5; (3) there was no breach of the
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The Tenth Circuit Decision
1. The Majority Opinion

The Tenth Circuit, Judge Barrett writing for the majority, affirmed
the district court's decision. After a surprisingly long discussion of the
appropriate standard of appellate review, 14 Judge Barrett focused on
the alleged violation of the Oklahoma Securities Act. 15 At trial, the defendants had asserted, as an affirmative defense to the claim of lack of
registration, that they had complied with the requirements set forth in
section 401(b) (15) of the Oklahoma Securities Act, and were, therefore,
entitled to exemption from registration. 16 On appeal, the Cowles alleged that the defendants had not satisfied the elements of that exemption because they had not proved: (1) that Dow Keith reasonably
believed all buyers were purchasing for investment purposes,1 7 (2) that
no commission or other renumeration had been paid in connection with
the sale, 18 or (3) that Dow Keith reasonably believed that the buyers
were capable of bearing the economic risk and evaluating the business
risk of the prospective investment. 19 The majority opinion suggested
that because the Cowles and other investors had contacted Dow Keith
"seeking to invest," the first requirement was met: the defendants reasonably could have believed that all buyers were purchasing for investment. 2 0

Next, the court held that although drilling and completion

costs were excessive, the overcharges were "inadvertant and unintentional," were corrected when discovered and, therefore, did not constioperating agreement; (4) since the defendants had disclosed all they knew to the plaintiffs,
there was no common law fraud; and (5) because there was neither intent nor damages,
the conversion claim failed. Id. at 512-13.
14. 752 F.2d at 510-11.
15. Id. at 511-12; see supra note 12 and accompanying text.
16. Section 401(b)(15) of the Oklahoma Securities Act provides an exemption for a
transaction meeting the following requirements:
A. Any sale from or in this state to not more than thirty-two persons of a
unit consisting of interests in oil, gas or mining titles or leases or any certificate of
interest or participation, or conveyance in any form of an interest therein, or in
payments out of production pursuant to such titles or leases, whether or not offered in conjunction with, or as an incident to, an operating agreement or other
contract to drill oil or gas wells or otherwise exploit the minerals on the particular
leases, whether or not the seller or any purchasers are then present in the state, if:
1. the seller reasonably believes that all buyers are purchasing for
investment;
2. no commission is paid or given directly or indirectly for the solicitation of any such sale excluding any commission paid or given by and
between parties each of whom is engaged in the business of exploring
for or producing oil and gas or other valuable minerals;
3. no public advertising or public solicitation is used in any such solicitations or sale; and
4. sales are effected only to persons the seller has reasonable cause to
believe are capable of evaluating the risk of the prospective investment
and able to bear the economic risk of the investment;
OKLA. STAT. tit. 71, § 401(b)(15) (Supp. 1984).

17.
18.
19.
20.

OKLA. STAT.
OKLA. STAT.
OKLA. STAT.
752 F.2d at

tit. 71, § 401(b)(15)(A)(l) (Supp. 1984). See supra note 16.
tit. 71, § 401(b)(15)(A)(2). See supra note 16.
tit. 71, § 401(b)(15)(A)(4). See supra note 16.
511-12.
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tute disguised commissions. Since no commissions had been paid to the
21
defendants, the second element of the exemption was established.
The court stated that it had several reasons for believing that Keith had
met the third requirement of the exemption; that is, that Keith reasonably believed that the investors were able to evaluate and financially bear
the risks of the investment. The fact that the Cowles sought out Keith
wanting to invest, the fact that the Cowles had discussed the investment
with an individual (Mr. Cowles' dentist) who had already invested with
Keith, and the fact that Keith knew that the Cowles were paying for the
investment in cash, together showed that Keith had reason to believe the
22
Cowles could evaluate and financially bear the investment risks.
The majority also found that the defendants had not violated the
registration requirements of the 1933 Act because there was no public
offering. 23 The opinion relied on the district court's findings: (1) that
the Cowles were not approached by Keith but rather had themselves
initiated the investment transaction, and (2) that the operation was such
a small one, involving only shallow wells, that the Cowles "had about as
much means of acquiring information and knowledge as did the defendant." The court held, therefore, that the defendants had no duty to reg24
ister under federal law.
Furthermore, the court held that the defendants had not violated
the anti-fraud provisions of the 1934 Act by failing to provide investors
with geological or similar data, because such data is not "material" information in the context of minor drilling operations involving only
25
shallow wells.
2. Judge McKay's Dissent
Judge McKay argued in dissent that the defendants had not proved
that each investor was capable of evaluating the risks of the investment
and, consequently, the defendants could not use the section
401(b)(15)(A)(4) exemption as an affirmative defense.2 6 Judge McKay
offered two reasons for his conclusion. First, the majority relied on
Keith's testimony to establish that the third requirement of the exemption had been met. Judge McKay reasoned that to allow a claimant to
establish an exemption based solely on his own testimony would under21. Id. at 5.12 (citing the District Court's Finding of Facts #2 1).
22. Id. at 511-12.
23. Id. Section 4(2) of the 1933 Act provides that a transaction by an issuer not involving any public offering is exempt from the registration requirements set forth in section 5. 15 U.S.C. § 77d(2) (1982). The court's discussion appears to be directed toward a
section 12(1) violation (offer or sale of a security in violation of the registration requirements set forth in section 5). 15 U.S.C. § 77e (1982). The Cowles claimed the defendants
had violated section 12(2) which imposes liability on both public offerings and exempt
transactions of securities (with one exception not relevant here). Thus, registration is irrelevant to a section 12(2) violation. See generally L. Loss, FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES

REGULATIONS 1016, 1019-27 (1983).
24. 752 F.2d at 512.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 514 (McKay, J., dissenting).
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27
Secmine the registration provisions of the Oklahoma Securities Act.
ond, Judge McKay argued that the defendants' proof of the Cowles
sophistication fell short of the standard established in Oklahoma case
29
law, 28 noting that Keith had not even spoken to some of the investors.
Judge McKay also maintained that the majority had focused on the
wrong party in determining whether the defendants were exempt from
state and federal registration laws. The majority focused upon the
seller's lack of sophistication, when, according to Judge McKay, the investor's lack of sophistication is the relevant criterion in determining
30
whether the exemption requirements have been met.

C. Analysis
The Cowles decision establishes a dangerous precedent: a seller's lack
of sophistication may be a defense to claims that the seller has violated
registration requirements. This reasoning places Cowles at odds with
Oklahoma case law, under which the defendant has the burden of proving each element of the exemption, including the sophistication of each
investor. 3 ' Moreover, an analysis of decisions under securities regulation statutes suggests that the Cowles decision is also at odds with the
underlying purpose of the general regulatory scheme of such statutes.
The requirements set forth in exemption section 401(b)(15) of the
Oklahoma Securities Act 32 are similar to the requirements of a Rule 506
exemption under the 1933 Act.33 Rule 506, promulgated under Regulation D, is a safe harbor;3 4 compliance with its requirements assures an
27. Id.
28. Id. (citing Parrish v. Ben-Jon Oil Co., 666 P.2d 1308 (Okla. Ct. App. 1983) (investor's initial on prospectus was not sufficient to prove investor was able to evaluate risks
and bear economic risk of investment) and Lambrecht v. Bartlett, 656 P.2d 269 (Okla.
1982) (defendant failed to prove that all investors were sophisticated)).
29. 752 F.2d at 514 (McKay, J., dissenting).
30. Id.
31. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
32. See supra note 16.
33. Rule 506 provides:
(a) Exemption. Offers and sales of securities by an issuer that satisfy the conditions in paragraph (b) of this Rule 506 shall be deemed to be transactions not
involving any public offering within the meaning of section 4(2) of the 1933 Act.
(b) Conditions to Be Met
(1) General Conditions. To qualify for exemption under this Rule 506, offers
and sales must satisfy all the terms and conditions of Rules 501 through 503.
(2) Specific Conditions
(i) Limitation on Number of Purchasers. The issuer shall reasonably believe that
there are no more than 35 purchasers of securities from the issuer in any
offering under this Rule 506 ...
(ii) Nature of Purchasers. The issuer shall reasonably believe immediately
prior to making any sale that each purchaser who is not an accredited
investor either alone or with his purchaser representative(s) has such
knowledge and experience in financial and business matters that he is
capable of evaluating the merits and risks of the prospective investment.
17 C.F.R. § 230.506 (1984).
34. SEC Act Release No. 6389, 24 S.E.C. Dock. 1444, 1451 n.33 (1982). For a history
of the development of Regulation D, see Stem, PotentialLiability of PurchaserRepresentatives,
39 Bus. LAw. 1801 (1984).
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issuer of a 4(2) exemption from registration. 3 5 In light of judicial decisions addressing the 4(2) exemption, the Cowles holding appears
discordant.
In SEC v. Ralston Purina Co.,36 for instance, the Supreme Court
stated that an offering to investors "able to fend for themselves" is a
transaction "not involving any public offering."'3 7 The Supreme Court
also stated that because the purpose of the 1933 Act was to protect investors by promoting full disclosure of information thought necessary to
informed investment decisions, the exemption question turned on the
knowledge of the offerees. 3 8 The Court held that in determining
whether securities are exempt from registration, one must ask whether
the offeree needs the protection which registration affords, as evidenced
by whether the offerees39have access to the kind of information that registration would disclose.
In Ralston Purina, the Supreme Court implied, 40 and federal courts
of appeal have widely held, 4 1 that sophistication is not a substitute for
access to the type of information a registration statement would disclose. Indeed, in G. Eugene England Foundation v. First Federal Corp.,42 a
Tenth Circuit decision, the court indicated that the investor's sophistication, without more, was not enough to satisfy exemption requirements
under Rule 506. In that case, the buyer of an unregistered security
sought rescission of an exchange agreement in which the buyer received
shares of stock in an oil company. The defendant asserted that the exchange transaction was exempt from registration because the transaction was not a public offering. 43 The Tenth Circuit affirmed the trial
court's finding that rescission should be granted; although the founder
and president of the plaintiff-corporation had prior business transactions with the company issuing the unregistered security, there was no
35. SEC Act Release No. 6389, 24 S.E.C. Dock. 1166, 1178 n.33 (1982).
36. 346 U.S. 119 (1953).
37. Id. at 125.
38. Id. at 124, 126-27.
39. Id. at 127. Courts have distilled the Ralston Purina holding into a two-part test: (1)
whether the offerees need the protection registration affords, and (2) whether the offerees
have access to the kind of information registration would disclose. See, e.g., Mason v. Marshall, 412 F. Supp. 294, 300 (N.D. Tex. 1974), aff'd, 531 F.2d 1274 (5th Cir. 1976).
40. 346 U.S. at 125. The Court said that an offering might be exempt if made to
executive personnel "who because of their position have access to the same kind of information that the [1933 Act] would make available in the form of a registration statement."
41. See, e.g., Doran v. Petroleum Management Corp., 545 F.2d 893, 900 (5th Cir.
1977) (setting forth four factors bearing upon whether an exemption is warranted: the
number of offenses and their relationship to each other and to the issuer (held to include
the knowledge of the offenses), the number of units offered, the size of the offering, and
the manner of the offering); Andrews v. Blue, 489 F.2d 367, 373-74 (10th Cir. 1973) (holding that exemption may not be based solely upon the sophistication of the offeree, without
regard to his actual knowledge concerning the issuer); Hill York Corp. v. American International Franchise, Inc., 448 F.2d 680, 687-89 (5th Cir. 1971) (discussing the same four
factors set forth in Doran); United States v. Custer Channel Wing Corp., 376 F.2d 675, 678
(4th Cir.) (stating specifically that sophistication is not a substitute for access to the kind of
information which registration would disclose), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 850 (1967).
42. 663 F.2d 988 (10th Cir. 1973) (cited in Cowles. 752 F.2d at 512).
43. 663 F.2d at 990.
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evidence of what knowledge he possessed concerning either the stock or
the company, nor was he shown to be in a position to know such information as would have been disclosed by registration. 4 4 In apparent opposition to these cases, however, the majority in Cowles implied that the
Dow Keith Corp. offering was exempt from registration because the
plaintiffs were no less sophisticated than Keith, having "about as much
means of acquiring information and knowledge as did the defendant."
Thus, the court replaces the "access to information" criterion of Ralston
Purina with one of its own; under Cowles it seems that a seller need not
prove that the buyer of securities had access to appropriate information
as long as the seller can prove that the seller did not have appropriate
information to disclose to the buyer!
A recent case decided by the Oklahoma Supreme Court is further
evidence that the Cowles decision misapplied the requirements of the section 401(b)(15) exemption. In PIC Oil Company, Inc. v. Grisham,4 5 the
Oklahoma Supreme Court discussed a registration exemption provision
in the Oklahoma Securities Act which states that transactions involving
limited partnership interests in oil ventures, when both the buyer and
seller are in the oil business, are exempt transactions and are therefore
not subject to the securities laws. 4 6 The rationale offered for this exemption was that experienced buyers and sellers do not need the protection of the securities laws. If, on the other hand, an experienced buyer
was dealing with a novice seller, the experienced buyer would be protected because the novice seller would be required to disclose his lack of
experience. According to the court, the Oklahoma legislature had desired to afford this protection to both inexperienced and experienced
buyers.

47

If Keith and Dow Keith Corp. were indeed the unsophisticates perceived by the majority in Cowles, then a correct application of the
401(b)(15) exemption requirements, in light of the legislative policies
expressed in PIC Oil, would have afforded the Cowles the protection the
Oklahoma legislature had hoped to provide because Keith would have
been forced to disclose his lack of experience through registration.
D.

Conclusion

The Cowles decision appears to run contrary to the letter and the
spirit of both state and federal securities regulations. However, the
Cowles court emphasized the fact that the case involved a minor operation of very shallow wells, and that the buyers sought out the seller of
the securities at issue in the case. The court noted that for these reasons, Cowles was not a "typical securities fraud case." ' 48 Thus, the precedential value of Cowles may be minimal if (1) the holding is applied only
44. Id.

45.
46.
47.
48.

702 P.2d 28 (Okla. 1985).
OKLA. STAT. tit.
71, § 2(20)(R) (Supp. 1984).
702 P.2d at 31 &n. 1l.
Cowles, 752 F.2d at 511-12.
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within similar minor drilling operations or (2) the holding is applied
only to the narrow confines of disputes arising under the Oklahoma
401(b) (15) exemption.
II.

INDIVIDUAL LIABILrY OF SHAREHOLDER/DIRECTORS IN SECURITIES
FRAUD ACTIONS:

WEGERER V. FIRST COMMODITY

CORP. OF BOSTON 49

A.

Facts

In April of 1978, Louis and Judith Wegerer responded to a newspaper advertisement placed by the defendant, First Commodity Corporation of Boston (FCCB). A few days later, the Wegerers received the first
of numerous telephone calls from Robert Jones, an account executive
for FCCB. These calls continued until May of 1978, when Jones convinced the Wegerers to purchase two copper commodity options contracts. Two days after the sale of the second options contract, the sale of
commodity options was temporarily halted by the Commodity Futures
Trading Commission. Within a short period of time, the Wegerers' cop50
per contracts were worthless.
The Wegerers subsequently sued FCCB, Jones, 5 1 and Richard and
Donald Schleicher, brothers who were the principal officers and sole directors of FCCB, and who at the time owned 100% of FCCB. The
Wegerers alleged that the defendants had fraudulently induced them to
purchase the copper contracts in violation of federal securities law. The
Wegerers also raised claims of fraud and conspiracy to defraud under
52
Kansas law.
The trial court awarded the Wegerers $15,000 in actual damages
and $1,000,000 in punitive damages. Following a motion for remittitur,
the trial court reduced the ward to $10,775 in actual damages and
$250,000 in punitive damages. 53 The defendants appealed, raising
54
eight allegations of error.
49. 744 F.2d 719 (10th Cir. 1984).
50. Id. at 721-22. The defendants presented no evidence at trial; all facts were supplied by the plaintiffs.
51. Because Robert Jones was never served, he was not a party to the suit. Id. at 720
n.l.
52. Id. at 722.
53. Id.

54. Id. The defendants alleged that the district court erred by: (1) refusing to give
their requested instruction on justifiable reliance; (2) refusing to grant a new trial after
finding that the $1,000,000 punitive damage award was excessive; (3) denying their motions for directed verdict and a new trial; (4) submitting instructions on conspiracy and on
corporate officers, directors and employees as co-conspirators, since officers, directors or
employees of a corporation acting in their official capacity on behalf of a corporation cannot conspire with their corporation; (5) holding that it had personal jurisdiction over the
Schleichers; (6) admitting a consent decree signed by the Schleichers and the Commodity
Futures Trading Commission in 1976 into evidence; (7) admitting the testimony of two
FCCB customers; and (8) ruling that various complaints filed with the Commodity Futures
Trading Commission by unrelated parties could be used for cross-examination of any
defendant.
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The Majority Opinion

Judge Barrett, writing for the majority, discussed four of the eight
issues raised by the defendants: 55 (1) the trial judge's rejection of the
defendants' proffered jury instructions on justifiable reliance; (2) the admission into evidence of a consent decree executed by the Schleichers;
(3) whether the individual defendants could be held liable under either a
conspiracy charge or an alter ego theory; and (4) the trial court's finding
of personal jurisdiction over the Schleichers.
The defendants' first two contentions were dismissed by the court
after brief discussion and were not particularly significant issues in the
opinion. First, the court upheld the trial court's instruction on justifiable reliance, stating that the instruction given regarding the defendants' theory of the case need not be framed in the specific language
selected by the defendants. 56 The court then held that a "consent decree" 5 7 executed in 1976 by FCCB and the Schleichers was properly
58
admitted into evidence.
The court's discussion of the defendants' third and fourth contentions proved more controversial. 59 After disposing of the first two issues, the court turned its attention to the defendants' argument that the
district court erred in instructing the jury on conspiracy. 60 The defendants argued that under May v. Santa Fe Trail TransportationCo. ,61 an officer, director or employee of a corporation, acting in an official capacity
on behalf of the corporation, cannot conspire with the corporation. The
majority, acknowledging that May set forth the general rule, stated that
May also implicitly recognized an exception: an officer, director, or employee who personally benefits from the illegal activities in a way which
is separate and distinct from that of the corporation may be held to be a
participant in a conspiracy with the corporation. 62 The majority placed
primary importance on the fact that the Schleichers had signed the 1976
consent decree in their individual capacities, indicating that the
55. Id. at 722-28. The remaining allegations of error were summarily held to be without merit. Id. at 728.
56. 744 F.2d at 723.
57. A "consent decree" is a settlement agreement whereby a defendant agrees to
cease activities which a government agency asserts are illegal. A consent decree has no
precedential value. See generally A. BROMBERG & L. LOWENFELS, SECURITIES FRAUD & COMMoDrrIEs FRAUD § 1.3, at 329 (1984).
58. 744 F.2d at 724 (citing United States v. Barbieri, 614 F.2d 715. 719 (10th Cir.
1980) (in which a criminal indictment was admissible to show intent and knowledge) and
Kerr v. First Commodity Corp. of Boston, 735 F.2d 281 (8th Cir. 1984) (wherein the 1976
consent decree was admitted for the limited purpose of proving FCCB's knowledge and
intent to defraud but only insofar as the consent decree was relevant to the issue of punitive damages)). Contra Lipsky v. Commonwealth United Corp., 551 F.2d 887, 893-94 (2d
Cir. 1976) (consent decree and references to SEC complaint are not admissible).
59. In fact, Judge McKay's dissent focussed exclusively on these two issues. See infra
text accompanying notes 68-80.
60. 744 F.2d at 724.
61. 189 Kan. 419, 370 P.2d 390 (1962).
62. 744 F.2d at 725. As the Tenth Circuit noted, the exception is set forth in Greenville Publishing Co. v. Daily Reflector Inc., 496 F.2d 391, 399 (4th Cir. 1974) and Jewel
Foliage Co. v. Uniflora Overseas Florida, 497 F. Supp. 513, 518 (M.D. Fla. 1980).
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Schleichers and FCCB had acted separately. Additionally, the court determined from the record that there had been three incidents of personal gain. First, because FCCB's earnings had flourished, the
Schleichers had made a large profit on a sale of FCCB stock. Second,
the Schleichers had sold several FCCB sales offices, the proceeds of
which went directly to the Schleichers. Third, FCCB had loaned money
to the Schleichers at six percent interest with favorable repayment
terms. The majority held that these circumstances showed that the
Schleichers had derived a personal benefit from the fraudulent sale of
commodity options, thus bringing them within the exception implicitly
63
recognized in May.
Alternatively, the majority stated that even if the Schleichers had
not received a personal benefit, the facts supported application of the
alter ego doctrine to find individual liability of the defendants. 64 Under
that doctrine, FCCB's existence as a corporate entity would be disregarded; the Schleichers' reliance on the May rule would be inappropriate because the torts of employee Jones, imputed to FCCB, would be
65
imputed to the Schleichers.
The final allegation of error discussed by the majority involved the
trial court's finding of personal jurisdiction over the Schleichers.
Although the majority acknowledged that jurisdiction over individual officers may not be obtained by acquiring jurisdiction over the corporation, 6 6 the majority held that the jurisdictional requirement was met
because the plaintiffs had presented a prima facie case of conspiracy,
67
thus allowing jurisdiction under the Kansas long-arm statute.
C. Judge McKay's Separate Opinion
Judge McKay concurred in part, but dissented from the majority
opinion on the issues of conspiracy and personal jurisdiction. 68 Much of
Judge McKay's dissent was devoted to a discussion of the "personal
gain" exception. Judge McKay first challenged the majority's reliance
on the fact that the consent decree was executed by the defendants indi63. 744 F.2d at 726.
64. The alter ego doctrine fastens liability on the individual who uses a corporation
merely as an instrumentality to conduct his or her personal business, and such liability
arises from fraud or injustice perpetrated on persons dealing with the corporation. The
corporate form may be disregarded only where equity so requires. 1 W. FLETCHER,
CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 41.10 (perm. ed. 1983).
65. 744 F.2d at 726-27.
66. Id. at 727 (citing Escude Cruz v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 619 F.2d 901 (1st

Cir. 1980) and Wilshire Oil Co. v. Rifle, 409 F.2d 1277 (10th Cir. 1969)).
67. 744 F.2d at 727. The Kansas long-arm statute provides:
Any person, whether or not a citizen or resident of this state, who in person or
through an agent or instrumentality does any of the acts hereinafter enumerated
thereby submits the person . . . to the jurisdiction of the courts of this state as to
any cause of action arising from the doing of these acts:
(2)

commission of a tortious act within this state;

KAN. STAT. ANN. §

68.

60-308(b)(2) (1980).

744 F.2d at 728-30 (McKay, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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vidually. He argued that the individual execution of the consent decree
was insufficient to establish that the Schleichers were acting outside of
their official capacities. 6 9 Next, Judge McKay cited authority which suggests that the mere ownership or sale of stock does not constitute the
type of personal gain necessary to vitiate the general rule that a corporation cannot conspire with its officers. 70 With respect to the profits received by the defendants from sales of regional offices, Judge McKay
disagreed with the majority's interpretation of the record. 7 1 Judge McKay stated that the trial court record was ambiguous and could have
been interpreted to mean that the defendants were to receive the profits
as a result of their stock ownership and not directly from the purchasing
parties. 7 2 Finally, Judge McKay stated that the low-interest loans made
by FCCB to the Schleichers did not show that the individual defendants
acted outside their official capacities for personal gain in connection
73
with the transactions at issue in the suit.
Judge McKay concluded that the evidence relied upon by the majority constituted regular incidents of an officer-corporation relationship
and did not establish a personal gain sufficient to invoke the "personal
gain" exception to the May rule. 7 4 Judge McKay stated that under the
majority's analysis, the exception would swallow the rule because many
common methods of remuneration would fall under the "personal gain"
exception. 75 Therefore, under Judge McKay's analysis, only the corporation (through its employee Jones) could be said to have defrauded the
Wegerers. Hence, since conspiracy requires the participation of at least
two actors, no conspiracy occurred in this case.
Judge McKay next addressed the majority's application of the alter
ego doctrine, stating that the case at bar was easily distinguishable from
alter ego cases previously decided in Kansas. 76 In contrast to the undercapitalized, one-man corporations described in Kansas case law, 77 FCCB
69. Id. at 728.
70. Id. (citingJewel Foliage Co., 497 F. Supp. 513) (interest arising from majority ownership is not separate and distinct benefit) and Stanfield v. Osborne Industries, Inc., 7 Kan.
App. 2d 416, 643 P.2d 1115 (1982) (whether defendants would benefit derivatively was
immaterial because all acts complained of by plaintiff were totally related to official corporate responsibilities)).
71. The portion of the record in question was extracted from one defendant's deposition:
QUESTION: So within three to four years you expect to realize six million dollars
from the sale of these offices?
ANSWER: Correct.
QUESTION: Where will the proceeds of that sale go?
ANSWER: Proceeds of the sale will go to myself and my brother.
744 F.2d at 729 (McKay, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. See Sampson v. Hunt, 233 Kan. 572, 665 P.2d 743, 751-52 (1983) (citing Kirk v.
H.G.P. Corp. Inc., 208 Kan. 777, 494 P.2d 1087 (1972) (wherein the court, applying the
alter ego doctrine, imposed personal liability on the principal stockholder who was also
the officer, manager, principal creditor and principal employee of the corporation) and
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was a national operation with several hundred employees. 78 Furthermore, Judge McKay argued that the alter ego doctrine applies only when
the plaintiff would suffer an injustice by the court's acknowledgement of
the corporate entity. Judge McKay found no indications that the Wegerers would be unable to recover a judgment from the corporation in this
case, and there was therefore no indication that they would suffer injus79
tice by recognition of the corporation's existence.
Judge McKay concluded that because the Wegerers had failed to
establish either a conspiracy or the applicability of the alter ego doctrine, no tort had been committed in Kansas by the individual defendants. Consequently, there was no basis for jurisdiction under the Kansas
long-arm statute.8 0
D.

Analysis

The major point of contention between the majority and the dissent
was whether the individual defendants, Richard and Donald Schleicher,
had received personal gains sufficient to bring them within the exception to the May rule. A survey of case law in other jurisdictions leads to
the conclusion that the majority may have misapplied the appropriate
standards.
The first application of the "personal gain" exception, also known
as the "independent stake exception," appeared in Greenville Publishing
Co. v. Daily Reflector, Inc.81 In Greenville, the plaintiff alleged that an individual defendant had conspired with a corporation (a newspaper in
which the defendant was president, director and stockholder) to suppress competition for newspaper advertisers in violation of anti-trust
laws. 8 2 The individual defendant also had received a percentage of advertising revenues from a second newspaper with which he was affiliated. 8 3 The court held that for the purposes of summary judgment, it
was reasonable to infer that the defendant would personally benefit
from his affiliation with the second newspaper by the elimination of
competition. Because the individual defendant had an independent
stake in suppressing the competition, the conspiracy claim was permit84
ted to stand.
Successful invocations of the "independent stake exception" have
been rare.8 5 In Jewel Foliage Co. v. Uniflora Overseas Florida,8 6 the plaintiff
Kilpatrick Bros., Inc. v. Poynter, 205 Kan. 787, 473 P.2d 33 (1970) (wherein the court
disregarded successive corporations when defendant disregarded corporate formalities
and entities were severely undercapitalized)).
78. 744 F.2d at 730 (McKay, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
79. Id.
80. Id.

81. 496 F.2d 391 (4th Cir. 1974).
82. Id. at 399.
83. Id. at 399-400.
84. Id.

85. For examples of successful use of the exception, see Coleman Motor Co. v.
Chrysler Corp., 525 F.2d 1338 (3d Cir. 1975) (individual employee-managers owning
dealerships could conspire with car manufacturer); Johnston v. Baker, 445 F.2d 424 (3d
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corporation attempted to hold a principal stockholder liable for the defendant corporations' "dumping" of Guatemalan foliage on the American market, allegedly in violation of the Anti-Dumping Act. 8 7 Because
the plaintiff had not alleged that the individual defendant had an interest
in suppressing competition, other than his majority ownership of stock
88
in the defendant corporations, the Greenville exception did not apply.
The court held that an interest arising out of stock ownership "is not the
89
type of separate and distinct stake to which the exception is directed."
A Fifth Circuit decision reflects Judge McKay's concern that holdings such as that in Wegerer may cause the general rule to be swallowed
by the exception.9 0 In H & B Equipment Co. v. International Harvester
Co., 9 ' the plaintiff argued that the defendants, International Harvester
and the manager of an International Harvester distributorship, had conspired illegally to restrain trade. The plaintiff asserted that because the
manager had the opportunity to purchase an ownership interest in a distributorship if he "did a good job," the manager had a personal stake in
the alleged illegal trade restraints.9 2 The court pointed out that any
benefit the manager might have received was indistinguishable from
other forms of compensation, such as salary. 9 3 Also, there was no economic entity, other than the corporation, involved in the case. Thus,
"[w]ithout such an organization legally distinct from [International Harvester], it would be impossible for an employee to have an interest that
was truly 'independent.' ,,94
A similar situation was presented to the Tenth Circuit in Holter v.
Moore.9 5 The court in Holter held that a real estate agent could not conspire with a broker-employer for anti-trust purposes, absent invocation
of the "independent personal stake" doctrine. 9 6 In a footnote, the court
delineated the parameters of the "independent personal stake" doctrine: "[It] applies only when the officer has an outside economic interest, such as ownership of a competing corporation, through which he
'9 7
will benefit from the restraint."
Two recent decisions addressing conspiracy to violate anti-trust
laws strongly suggest that the majority misapplied the "independent
personal stake" exception. In Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube
Cir. 1971) (individual who was president of hotel corporation had conspired with third
parties in an effort to force hotel tenant to abandon premises).
86. 497 F. Supp. 513 (M.D. Fla. 1980).
87. 19 U.S.C. §§ 160-171 (1976), repealed by Pub. L No. 96-39. § 106(a). 93 Stat. 193
(1979) (effective January 1, 1980).
88. 497 F. Supp. at 518.
89. Id.
90. See supra text accompanying note 75.
91. 577 F.2d 239 (5th Cir. 1978).
92. Id. at 244.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. 702 F.2d 854 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 937 (1983). This opinion was written by Judge McKay. Judges Holloway and Logan joined in the opinion.
96. Id. at 857.
97. Id. at 857 n.8.
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Corp. ,98 the Supreme Court was faced with the issue of whether a corporation and its wholly-owned subsidiary could conspire to restrain trade
in violation of the Sherman Act. 9 9 The Court held that the two entities
were incapable of conspiracy inasmuch as the "officers of a single firm
are not separate economic actors pursuing separate economic
interests."l 0 0
The second anti-trust case was decided by the United States District
Court for the District of Columbia after the Copperweld decision was
handed down. In Rothery Storage & Van Co. v. Atlas Van Lines,' 0 ' the
plaintiffs contended that the Atlas Van Lines board of directors and the
defendant corporation had conspired to promulgate a policy which resulted in an illegal restraint of trade. 10 2 The court held that while the
new policy might well result in the accrual of distinct benefits to the
directors, there was no conspiracy because the plaintiffs had failed to
prove facts sufficient to invoke the independent stake exception. '0 3 The
court carefully distinguished the Greenville case, upon which the Wegerer
majority relied, by pointing out that the "independent personal stake"
in Greenville resulted from an interest that was completely unrelated,
wholly divergent and possibly inconsistent with the individual defendant's corporate ownership. ' 0 4 This was in stark contrast to Rothery Storage, where the personal benefits alleged were "wholly consistent" with
the interest of Atlas and its agents. The court in Rothery Storage pointed
out that a stockholder/director of a company "does not hold an impermissible personal benefit or act 'on his own behalf simply because his
effort to advance the interests of the corporation would increase the
value of his stock interest and the dividends paid to him."' 1 5 Such advantages, the court determined, are merely incidental to the advantage
06
to the corporation.1
In light of these cases, it appears that the Wegerer majority molded
the "independent stake" exception to render the Schleichers personally
liable to the Wegerers. Although the Schleichers may have received
benefits from the alleged conspiracy, those benefits were not unrelated,
divergent or inconsistent with their corporate ownership. In short, the
benefits received were not independent of FCCB, but arose through the
Schleichers' ownership of FCCB stock. And, as the dissent suggests, a
finding of personal liability was not necessary to effectuate recovery for
the Wegerers because there was no suggestion that FCCB would not be
able to satisfy the judgment against it.
Assuming, arguendo, that the Schleichers did receive a personal ben98. 104 S. Ct. 2731 (1984).
99. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants violated section 2 of the Sherman Act,

15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1976).
100. 104 S. Ct. at 2741.
101. 597 F. Supp. 217 (D.D.C. 1984).
102. Id.

103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 228-29.
106. Id. at 229.
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efit and therefore were capable of conspiring with FCCB, there is case
law which suggests that a finding of personal jurisdiction over an absent
conspirator cannot be achieved by a rote application of the applicable
long-arm statute. The "conspiracy theory of jurisdiction" is summarized in a recent Delaware Supreme Court case:
First, the acts of each co-conspirator are attributable to
each of the other co-conspirators. Therefore, any act by a conspirator in furtherance of the conspiracy which takes place in
the jurisdiction is attributable to the other conspirators. Consequently, if the purposeful act or acts of a conspirator are of a
nature and quality that would subject the actor to the juisdiction of the court, all of
the conspirators are subject to the juris0 7
diction of the court.'
At present, there is a split of authority as to whether participation in
a conspiracy will give rise to jurisdiction over the absent conspirator.10 8
The jurisdictions which accept the theory apply various tests to determine whether a state's exercise ofjurisdiction is proper. The tests range
from requiring an allegation of conspiracy coupled with an act or event
in the forum state' 0 9 to the requirement that a defendant make a prima
facie factual showing that: (1) a conspiracy existed; (2) the defendant
was a member of the conspiracy; (3) there was a connection between the
defendant and the transaction in the forum state; (4) the defendant was
aware of the effect of the transaction in the forum state; (5) the defendant derived some benefit from the activity; and (6) the absent conspirator exercised direction and control over the in-state conspirator. 1 10
E.

Conclusion

The Wegerer majority contorted the "independent personal stake"
exception to find that the Schleichers were conspirators. Then, without
benefit of discussion or analysis, the court apparently adopted the most
lenient approach to the conspiracy theory ofjurisdiction. As the dissent
pointed out, there was no suggestion that the plaintiffs could not recover from FCCB. The majority opinion adds yet another unnecessary
tentacle to the far-reaching doctrine of conspiracy.
107. Istituto Bancario Italiano v. Hunter Eng'g Co., 449 A.2d 210, 222 (Del. Super. Ct.
1982). This case surveys the decisions addressing the conspiracy theory of jurisdiction.
108. Id. The conspiracy theory ofjurisdiction has been rejected in I.S. Joseph Co., Inc.
v. Mannesmann Pipe & Steel Co., 508 F. Supp. 1023 (D. Minn. 1980) and Kipperman v.
McCone, 422 F. Supp. 860 (N.D. Cal. 1976).
The courts accepting the conspiracy theory ofjurisdiction include Williams v. Garcia,
569 F. Supp. 1452 (E.D. Mich. 1983) (dicta); Dixon v. Mack, 507 F. Supp. 345 (S.D.N.Y.
1980); Gemini Enterprises v. WFMY Television Corp., 470 F. Supp. 559 (M.D.N.C. 1979);
Mandelkorn v. Patrick, 359 F. Supp. 692 (D.D.C. 1973); Maricopa County v. American
Petrofina, Inc., 322 F. Supp. 467 (N.D. Cal. 1971).
The Sixth Circuit has neither adopted nor rejected the theory. Chrysler Corp. v. Fedders Corp., 643 F.2d 1229, 1237 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 893 (1981).
109. See Maricopa County v. American Petrofina, Inc., 322 F. Supp. 467, 468-69 (N.D.
Cal. 1971).
110. Dixon v. Mack. 507 F. Supp. 345, 348-50 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
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v AMERICAN UNITED ENERGY CORP."'

The plaintiffs in N. Donald Co. were two broker-dealers who had
purchased stock issued by defendant American United Energy Corporation (American United). The plaintiffs filed suit against American
United, three broker-dealer companies, and others 1 2 alleging that the
defendants were engaged in an illegal scheme to sell stock in the public
3
market at a fraudulently inflated price." 1
The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants' actions violated several
federal and state securities" 14 and anti-racketeering laws," 5 and constituted common law fraud. 1 6 The three broker-dealer defendants asked
the district court to stay judicial proceedings and compel arbitration between themselves and the plaintiffs pursuant to the rules of the National
Association of Securities Dealers (NASD), of which the plaintiffs and the
three concerned defendants were members. 1 7 The district court
granted the request and abated the suit pending the outcome of arbitration proceedings. The district court denied the plaintiffs' motion to stay
arbitration and the plaintiffs subsequently appealed. The sole issue on
appeal was whether the district court had committed reversible error in
staying the judicial proceedings pending completion of arbitration." 18
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's ruling on two grounds. First, the court concluded that arbitration agreements between members of a self-regulatory agency are valid and are
not precluded by the non-waiver provisions of the federal securities
laws." 9 Second, the court held that the trial court had discretion to
determine whether arbitrable claims were so intertwined with non-arbitrable claims 120 that resolution of all claims must take place in the judi111. 746 F.2d 666 (10th Cir. 1984).
112. The broker-dealer defendants were Edward Brown Securities, Inc., Western Capital & Securities, Inc., and Rooney, Pace Corp. Several officers and directors of American
United, along with American United's auditors, were also named as defendants.
113. 746 F.2d at 668.
114. Id. The plaintiffs alleged violations of: (1) section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the 1934 Act), 15 U.S.C. § 78j (1982) and Rule lOb-5 promulgated
thereunder, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1984); (2) sections 12(1) and 12(2) of the Securities
Act of 1933 (the 1933 Act), 15 U.S.C. §§ 771(1) and 771(2) (1982); and (3) the Colorado
Securities Act, CoLo. REV. STAT. § 11-51-123 (Supp. 1984).
115. 746 F.2d at 668. The anti-racketeering acts allegedly violated were (1) the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1982),
and (2) the Colorado Organized Crime Control Act, COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-17-101 (Supp.
1984).
116. 746 F.2d at 668.
117. The plaintiffs and the broker-dealer defendants were members of the National
Association of Securities Dealers (NASD). As members of NASD, the plaintiffs had agreed
before this dispute arose to arbitrate disputes with other broker-dealer members of NASD.
Id.at 669.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 670. See infra notes 129-30 and accompanying text on the issue of arbitration agreements among members of self-regulated organizations.
120. The non-arbitrable claims were those claims made against other defendants in the
case. 746 F.2d at 670.
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cial forum. 12'
On appeal, the plaintiffs argued that the arbitration agreement at
issue was invalid for several reasons. First, the plaintiffs asserted that an
arbitration agreement is void when it operates to deprive the federal
12 2
court of its exclusive jurisdiction over federal securities law claims.
The plaintiffs also contended that arbitration agreements are void if they
deprive plaintiffs of a judicial forum in cases involving alleged securities
laws violations. The plaintiffs argued that this conclusion was mandated
124
by Wilko v. Swan 123 and Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith v. Moore,
cases in which arbitration agreements made incident to securities
purchases were held invalid as violations of federal securities laws. The
plaintiffs further argued that Colorado law required the court to void the
arbitration agreement with respect to claims alleging violations of the
12 5
state securities act.
The court did not address the plaintiffs' claims regarding exclusive
jurisdiction and Colorado law. Nor did the court engage in any substantive discussion of Wilko. 12 6 The court did briefly examine portions of
the Securities Act of 1933 (the 1933 Act)12 7 and the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 (the 1934 Act), 1 28 concluding that broker-dealers do not
enjoy the non-waiver protections afforded to the individual purchaser of
shares of stock. 1 29 The court then distinguished Moore on the ground
that its holding related to a customer-broker arbitration agreement,
rather than to mutual members of NASD. The court determined that
the law "appears to be" that arbitration agreements between NASD
members are valid and enforceable and are not precluded by either the
30
1933 Act or the 1934 Act.1
The court acknowledged two exceptions to the rule that arbitration
121. Id. at 671.
122. Id. at 669. The 1934 Act provides that federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction
over claims arising under that Act. 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1982). The 1933 Act grants concurrent jurisdiction to federal and state courts. 15 U.S.C. § 77v(a) (1982).
123. 346 U.S. 427 (1953). The Wilko decision held that under section 14 of the 1933
Act, which declared void any binding stipulation to waive compliance with any provision of
the 1933 Act, an arbitration agreement requiring a plaintiff to arbitrate section 12(2)
claims was void.
124. 590 F.2d 823 (10th Cir. 1978) (arbitration agreement requiring customer to arbitrate 1933 Act and 1934 Act claims is void).
125. 746 F.2d at 669 (citing Sandefer v. Reynolds Securities Inc., 44 Colo. App. 343,
618 P.2d 690 (1980) (in which the Colorado Court of Appeals, applying Wilko, held that an
agreement requiring arbitration of a Colorado Securities Act claim is void)). Sandefer was
subsequently overruled by Sager v. District Court, 698 P.2d 250 (Colo. 1985). See infra
note 139.
126. The court noted merely that the "Supreme Court has spoken generally on this
question . . . in Wilko ....
" 746 F.2d at 670.
127. See supra note 114.
128. See supra note 114.
129. 746 F.2d at 670. Section 28(b) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(b) (1982), provides that nothing in the 1934 Act shall be construed to modify existing law with regard to
the binding effect on self-regulatory organizations to settle disputes between members and
participants. This section has been recognized as creating an exception to the Wilko doctrine. See, e.g., De Lancie v. Birr, Wilson & Co., 648 F.2d 1255, 1259 (9th Cir. 1981);
Brown v. Gilligan, Will & Co., 287 F. Supp. 766, 773-75 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
130. 746 F.2d at 670.
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agreements between NASD members are enforceable. 13 1 Under the
first exception, when a broker is fraudulently induced to become a
NASD member, the arbitration agreement contained in the NASD rules
and regulations is not binding. The plaintiffs' pleadings did not bring
32
them within this exception.1
Under the second exception, set forth in Allegaert v. Perot, 133 a Second Circuit case, when there is a "wholesale fraud of institutional
dimensions," 134 the public has an overriding interest in judicial resolution and arbitration agreements will not be enforced. The Tenth Circuit
refused to apply this exception, distinguishing the Second Circuit case
and finding that the plaintiffs' evidence had not established "wholesale
13 5
fraud of institutional dimensions."
Finally, the plaintiffs contended in the alternative that even if the
arbitration agreement was valid, the arbitrable and non-arbitrable claims
were so intertwined that arbitration should be denied or stayed in order
to preserve the district court's jurisdiction over the non-arbitrable
claims. 13 6 The court gave this argument little consideration, stating that
"the trial court has discretion whether to stay arbitration pending ajudi13 7
cial resolution of non-arbitrable claims."'
Five months after N. Donald Co. was decided, the Supreme Court
handed down Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd. 13 8 The Supreme Court's
holding in Byrd may bear significantly upon the precedential value of the
39
Tenth Circuit's decision in N. Donald Co.'
The plaintiff in Byrd, a private investor, had signed a customer's
agreement with defendant Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., which provided
that "[a]ny controversy between you and the undersigned arising out of
or relating to this contract or the breach thereof, shall be settled by arbitration."' 40 When the plaintiffs account declined in value, he filed suit
alleging various federal and state law violations. Dean Witter moved to
compel arbitration of the state claims. 141 The district court denied the
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. 548 F.2d 432 (2d Cir. 1977) (when there is fraud of institutional dimensions,
broad policy implications preclude mandatory arbitration).
134. Id. at 437.
135. 746 F.2d at 670.
136. Id. For cases applying the intertwining doctrine, see cases cited infra note 143.
137. 746 F.2d at 671.
138. 105 S. Ct. 1238 (1985).
139. See also Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984) (wherein the Supreme
Court held that because the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 1 (1982), preempted state
law voiding arbitration clauses, statutory state claims are arbitrable) and Sager v. District
Court, 698 P.2d 250 (Colo. 1985) (holding that in light of the Southland and Byrd decisions,
the non-waiver provision of the Colorado Securities Act, CoLo. REV. STAT. § 11-51-125(7)
(Supp. 1984), is void under the supremacy clause).
140. 105 S. Ct. at 1239.
141. Id. Since Dean Witter did not attempt to compel arbitration of the plaintiff's Rule
lOb-5 claim, the Supreme Court did not decide whether Rule lOb-5 claims were subject to
arbitration. Justice White indicated in his concurrence that Rule lOb-5 claims may be arbitrable. 105 S. Ct. at 1244 (White, J., concurring). A Colorado federal district court judge
recently allowed arbitration of a Rule lOb-5 claim based on the implicit suggestions in
Byrd. Brinton v. Dean Witter Reynolds Inc., 85-Z-665, June 28, 1985.
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motion; the Ninth Circuit affirmed. 142 The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve whether the "intertwining" doctrine, applied by the
Ninth Circuit in Byrd, and by the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits in other
cases,' 4 3 could be utilized to deny arbitration. The Supreme Court held
that the Federal Arbitration Act 14 4 requires district courts to compel arbitration of pendant arbitrable claims when one of the parties has filed a
motion to compel arbitration.' 4 5 The Court reasoned that the main
purpose of the Federal Arbitration Act - to ensure judicial enforcement
of privately made agreements to arbitrate - would be frustrated if
46
courts utilized the "intertwining doctrine" to stay or deny arbitration. 1
The Court acknowledged that their decision might lead to concurrent
proceedings in judicial and arbitration fora, but emphasized that express
Congressional intent required courts to "rigorously enforce agreements
' 14 7
to arbitrate, even if the result is 'piecemeal' litigation."
The policy expressed in Byrd is clear. Pursuant to the Federal Arbitration Act, arbitration agreements will be enforced. The precise effect
Byrd will have upon the Tenth Circuit's decision in N. Donald Co., however, remains uncertain. In Byrd, Dean Witter assumed that the plaintiffs allegations under the federal securities statutes were not
arbitrable.1 48 For that reason, Dean Witter sought to compel arbitration only of state law claims. 14 9 Consequently, the Supreme Court, in
Byrd, declined to resolve whether the Federal Arbitration Act mandated
arbitration of claims arising under section 10(b) and Rule 1Ob-5.15 0 The
Court's analysis, if applied in N. Donald Co., would require arbitration of
state statutory and common law claims, but would not necessarily disturb claims raised under the federal acts. Additionally, it is noteworthy
that the action in Byrd was brought against a broker-dealer by a private
investor rather than another broker-dealer. 15 1 Thus, the Supreme
Court did not directly address the Tenth Circuit's proposed distinction
between the investor/broker relationship and the broker/broker relationship. With regard to state law claims, the distinction appears implicitly to be dissolved. All such claims must be arbitrated. In the federal
area, however, the distinction's validity has not been questioned.
Most significantly, the Byrd Court directly confronted and abrogated
the "intertwining" doctrine. 15 2 Arbitration agreements must be enforced as to state law claims, irrespective of judicial economy or other
142.

105 S. Ct. at 1240.

143. See Miley v. Oppenheimer & Co., 637 F.2d 318, 334-37 (5th Cir. 1981); Belke v.
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 693 F.2d 1023 (11 th Cir. 1982).
144. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (1982). The Act provides that written arbitration agreements
contained in contracts "shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable ......
105 S. Ct. at
1241.
145. 105 S. Ct. at 1241.
146. Id. at 1241-42.
147. Id. at 1242-43.
148. Id. at 1239-40.
149. Id. at 1239.
150. Id. at 1240 n.l.
151. Id. at 1239.
152. Id. at 1240-41.
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considerations. 153 Contrary to the Tenth Circuit's ruling in A. Donald
Co., trial courts do not have the discretion to stay or deny a1 5requested
4
arbitration where an agreement to arbitrate has been made.
Aichelle Johnson

153. Id.
154. Id.

TAXATION
OVERVIEW

This article discusses and analyzes four cases, each of which revolves around provisions of Subtitle F, Procedure and Administration,
of the Internal Revenue Code.' Two of the cases deal with relatively
new provisions of the Code: section 6702, providing a civil penalty for
frivolous income tax returns, and section 6402(c), mandating interception of tax refunds to reimburse states for child support provided by the
state. In addition, a case in which the civil fraud penalty of section
6653(b) was applied against a tax protester and a case in which a waiver
of tax court jurisdiction under section 6213(d) was allegedly procured
through misrepresentation have been reviewed.
I.

PROTESTING FRIVOLITIES UNDER
BORGESON V.

A.

I.R.C. § 6702:

UNITED STATES

Background

This last year marked the first time that a federal court of appeals
was faced with a challenge to a frivolous return penalty imposed pursuant to I.R.C. § 6702.2 Created by the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982 (TEFRA),3 and effective for returns filed after
September 3, 1982, section 6702 allows the IRS to assess a flat $500
penalty against individual taxpayers filing "purported" returns which
are intentionally made out incorrectly, usually as a protest against the
tax laws. This new penalty may be imposed regardless of whether any
tax is due. The IRS has wasted no time in using its new-found weapon
against individuals who have, in fact, paid all taxes owing (usually because of mandatory withholding by their employers), but have filed protest-type returns, often calculating excessive refunds due them based on
unauthorized deductions.
1. This article concerns tax cases handed down by the Tenth Circuit between June,
1984 and May, 1985, and was completed on June 15, 1985.
2. I.R.C. § 6702 (1985) provides:
(a)

CIVIL PENALTY-If-

(1)

any individual files what purports to be a return of the tax imposed by

subtitle A but which (A) does not contain information on which the substantial
correctness of the self-assessment may be judged, or
(B) contains information that on its face indicates that the
self-assessment is substantially incorrect; and

the conduct referred to in paragraph (1) is due to (A) a position which is frivolous, or
(B) a desire (which appears on the purported return) to delay
or impede the administration of Federal income tax laws, then such
individual shall pay a penalty of $500.
(2)

(b) PENALTY IN ADDITION To OTHER PENALTIES

-

The penalty imposed by sub-

section (a) shall be in addition to any other penalty provided by law.
3. Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-248, 96 Stat. 617
(1982).
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Almost two dozen cases challenging the IRS's imposition of this
new penalty have now made their way to the various circuit courts of
appeals. Because deficiency procedures do not apply, 4 all began as refund suits in district courts. Except in one instance, 5 the lower courts
had found that the penalty was properly imposed. All of the appeals
courts found the same, many finding the appeal itself frivolous and assessing costs and attorneys' fees against the taxpayer in addition to the
6
penalty itself.
Section 6702 was enacted to combat the "rapid growth in deliberate
defiance of the tax laws by tax protestors [sic]." 7 Prior to its enactment,
available penalties were tied to the taxpayer's tax liability, so that "if a
taxpayer ha[d] paid at least the correct amount of tax through estimated
tax or wage withholding, there [was] no penalty for filing a protest
return." 8
The new section allows the IRS to assess the $500 civil penalty
whenever the tax return meets two criteria. Section 6702(a)(1) addresses the information provided on the return from which the self-assessed tax liability is calculated. The self-assessed tax must be able to be
calculated from the face of the return. The first criterion of section 6702
is met if the necessary information ismissing 9 or if the information
given indicates that the self-assessment is incorrect.' 0 The second criterion is a mens rea requirement: the incorrectness of the return under section 6702(a)(1) must be due to a frivolous position,'' or a desire to
12
delay or impede the administration of the income tax laws.
To date, the cases dealing with section 6702 at the circuit court
level have involved relatively straight-forward tax protester returns.
Outside of Borgeson v. United States 13 and Thomas v. United States,' 4 the
cases fall neatly into three fact patterns: 1) no information is provided
4. In most situations, when the IRS decides that a taxpayer owes the government
more money, the taxpayer has the option of challenging the decision in tax court without
first paying the disputed amount, provided he strictly complies with a series of specific
procedural prerequisites. Termed "deficiency procedures," this option is not available to
challenge a section 6702 penalty imposition. I.R.C. § 6703(b) (1985). Under section
6703(c)(1), only 15 percent ($75) need be paid, rather than the full penalty (as required by
section 6702), in order for district court jurisdiction to attach. Also, the taxpayer must
timely file a claim for refund after paying the alleged deficiency before he will be allowed
administrative review prior to judicial review. I.R.C. § 6 7 03(c)(2).
5. The district court's decision, reversed by the Ninth Circuit, was unpublished. Jenney v. United States, 755 F.2d 1384 (9th Cir. 1985).
6. See, e.g., Olson v. United States, 760 F.2d 1003 (9th Cir. 1985) (double costs plus
$1,000); Paulson v. United States, 758 F.2d 61 (2d Cir. 1985) (double costs plus $2,500);
Boomer v. United States, 755 F.2d 696 (8th Cir. 1985) (double costs plus $500).
7. S.REP. No. 494, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 277, reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 781, 1023.

8. Id.
9. I.R.C. § 6702(a)(l)(A) (1985).
10. I.R.C. § 6702(a)(l)(B) (1985).
II. I.R.C. § 6702(a)(2)(A) (1985).
12. I.R.C. § 6702(a)(2)(B) (1985).
13. 757 F.2d 1071 (10th Cir. 1985). See inifra
notes 22-29 and accompanying text.
14. 755 F.2d 728 (9th Cir. 1985) (only issue on appeal being section 6703's time limits for court access).
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on the return (usually asterisks are substituted for correct information); 15 2) a deduction is taken for the taxpayer's own labor; 16 or 3) 17a
"war tax" deduction or credit is taken in protest of military spending.
Three challenges to section 6702 have come before the Tenth Circuit. In Martinez v. IRS 18 and Betz v. United States,' 9 the taxpayers' returns failed to provide any information from which tax liability could be
computed. 20 The taxpayers' fifth amendment violation claims were
summarily dismissed on appeal. 2 1 Borgeson v. United States2 2 involved a
different type of protest.
B.

Borgeson v. United States

In Borgeson, the taxpayer's return was filled in, signed and timely
filed, but the perjury clause of the return (which reads: "Under penalties
of perjury, I declare that I have examined this return, including accompanying schedules and statements, and to the best of my knowledge and
belief, it is true, correct and complete . . .")had been struck. Citing
I.R.C. § 6065,23 which requires a perjury clause on returns, the Tenth
Circuit, in a per curiam opinion, concluded that "[t]he absence of the
verification precludes the IRS from judging the 'substantial correctness'
of the return because the required 'information' that the return has been
verified under 'penalty of perjury' is absent." ' 24 The Tenth Circuit took
the position that the correctness of a self-assessment cannot be judged
25
without the return's perjury clause remaining intact.
15. See Boday v. United States, 759 F.2d 1472 (9th Cir. 1985); Paulson v. United
States, 758 F.2d 61 (2d Cir. 1985); Boomer v. United States, 755 F.2d 696 (8th Cir. 1985);
Betz v. United States, 753 F.2d 834 (10th Cir. 1985); Martinez v. IRS, 744 F.2d 71 (10th
Cir. 1985); Baskin v. United States, 738 F.2d 975 (8th Cir. 1984).
16. See Olson v. United States, 760 F.2d 1003 (9th Cir. 1985); Wardell v. United
States, 757 F.2d 203 (8th Cir. 1985); Anderson v. United States, 754 F.2d 1270 (5th Cir.
1985); Lovell v. United States, 753 F.2d 1077 (7th Cir. 1984); Madison v. United States,
752 F.2d 607 (11th Cir. 1985); Davis v. United States, 742 F.2d 171 (5th Cir. 1984);
Holker v. United States, 737 F.2d 752 (8th Cir. 1984).
17. See Wall v. United States, 756 F.2d 52 (8th Cir. 1985);Jenney v. United States, 755
F.2d 1384 (9th Cir. 1985); Kahn v. United States, 753 F.2d 1208 (3d Cir. 1985); Welch v.
United States, 750 F.2d 1101 (1st Cir. 1985).
18. 744 F.2d 71 (10th Cir. 1984).
19. 753 F.2d 834 (10th Cir. 1985).
20. Neither district court opinion was published and no further description of the
actual returns was given in either court of appeals decision.
21. Betz, 753 F.2d at 835; Martinez, 744 F.2d at 72. The taxpayers claimed that requiring such information violated their privilege against self-incrimination.
22. 757 F.2d 1071 (10th Cir. 1985).
23. I.R.C. § 6065 (1982) provides:
Except as otherwise provided by the Secretary, any return, declaration, statement,
or other document required to be made under any provision of the internal revenue laws or regulation [sic] shall contain or be verified by a written declaration
that it is made under the penalties of perjury.
24. Borgeson, 757 F.2d at 1073 (quoting I.R.C. § 6065).
25. The court went on to describe a return without a perjury clause as a "nullity." Id.
Because section 6702 requires the filing of a "purported" return, the court's language
arguably blurs the distinction, made crucial for certain statutes of limitations purposes
under Badaracco v. Commissioner, 104 S.Ct. 756 (1984), between not filing a return and
filing a false or fraudulent one.
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Although the legislative history2 6 indicates section 6702 was intended to reach tax (or spending) protests such as Martinez and Betz, it is
less clear that section 6702 was intended to reach a struck perjury
clause. Borgeson is the only appellate level decision which addresses tax
return information not used in the calculation of tax liability. This
Tenth Circuit decision has given section 6702(a)(1)(A) its most expansive interpretation to date. In Borgeson, the Tenth Circuit stated that the
substantial correctness of the return could not be judged because of the
struck perjury clause. 27 Section 6702, however, does not specifically address the correctness of the return, but is limited to the correctness of
the self-assessment contained in the return. "[A]lthough the term 'selfassessment' is not given a precise definition in section 6702, it refers to
'the amount of tax shown on the return.'

",28

The Borgeson court stressed the importance of requiring a perjury
clause on the return. "The perjury charge based on a false return has
been deemed 'one of the principal sanctions available to assure that
honest returns are filed.' "29 However, the court's assertion that be-

cause the perjury clause is required, the correctness of the self-assessment cannot be judged without it -

would seem to open the door to

section 6702 penalty assessments based on omissions unrelated to the
calculation of tax liability.
II.

FRIVOLITY TURNED FRAUDULENT UNDER I.R.C. § 6653(b): ZELL V.
COMMISSIONER

30

Lucien Zell, a retired Air Force Colonel, joined the tax protest
movement in 1976. Zell claimed thirteen exemptions on his 1976 withholding exemption certificate (Form W-4), filled in his 1976 and 1977
return with asterisks, and did not file any returns for 1978 or 1979.
Based on the information provided on his 1976 W-4 form, his pension
was paid to him with virtually no with-holding. 3 '

As a result, Zell's pro-

26. S. REP. No. 494, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 277, reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 781, 1024.
27. Borgeson, 757 F.2d at 1073.
28. Kahn v. United States, 753 F.2d 1208, 1213 (3d Cir. 1985) (quoting S. REP. No.
494, 97th Cong., 2nd Sess. 277, reprintedin 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWs 781, 1024).
Kahn is a very detailed and thoughtful analysis of the constitutionality of section 6702. It
is the only opinion to address the possibility of an indigent taxpayer, who would be denied
both administrative and judicial review because of inability to pay the $75 penalty. See
supra note 4.
29. Borgeson, 757 F.2d at 1073 (quoting Vaira v. Commissioner, 52 T.C. 986, 1005,
rev'don other grounds, 444 F.2d 770 (3d Cir. 1971)).
30. 763 F.2d 1139 (10th Cir. 1985).
31. I.R.C. § 3402(a)(1) (1976) requires "every employer making payment of wages"
to withhold taxes. I.R.C. § 3401(a) (1976) defines wages as "all remuneration ... for
services performed by an employee for his employer." Treas. Reg. § 31.3401(b)(ii) (1976)
requires withholding on "amounts received as retirement pay for service in the Armed
Forces." Although the employer/employee relationship terminates upon retirement, a
pension in the form of deferred compensation is still considered subject to I.R.C. § 3402's
withholding requirements.
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test took him beyond the frivolous return penalty of I.R.C. § 670232 and
into a tax deficiency assessment situation, from which additions to tax
33
(calculated as a percentage of the tax deficiency) are possible.
An underpayment due to "negligence or intentional disregard of
rules and regulations (but without intent to defraud)" is subject to an
addition to the tax owed of five percent of the underpayment.3 4 An underpayment due to fraud is subject to an addition to the tax owed of fifty
percent of the underpayment. 3 5 Zell was assessed the fifty percent fraud
penalty from which he timely sought a redetermination in tax court.
36
The tax court upheld the assessment.
On appeal, Zell argued that his case was indistinguishable from
Raley v. Commissioner,3 7 in which the Third Circuit found the fifty percent
penalty unwarranted under the facts of that case. The Zell court distinguished Raley based on the numerous letters which Raley had sent to the
various federal agencies and officials, advising them of his refusal to pay
taxes. The Raley court found this evidence diluted the government's
38
case to less than clear and convincing proof of intent to defraud.
Raley also had filed false withholding forms and incomplete tax returns.
The Raley court stated:
Were this the only evidence before us, we might be inclined to
agree with the Government that Raley intended to defraud the
Government. However, also before us are the letters which
Raley wrote and mailed to various federal officials. . . . The
letters

. . .

make it clear that Raley intended to call attention to

his failure to pay taxes. It would be anomalous to suggest that
Raley's numerous attempts to notify the Government are sup39
portive, let alone suggestive, of an intent to defraud.
Zell did not send any letters prior to the IRS commencing its investiga40
tion and thus could not come under Raley.
The Zell court went on to discuss the elements required to find
32. I.R.C. § 6702(2)(A) (1985) allows a flat penalty assessment of $500 for the filing
of frivolous returns. See supra note 2.
33. I.R.C. § 6653 (1985). See infra notes 34-35 for provisions.
34. I.R.C. § 6653(a)(1) (1985) provides as follows:
(a) NEGLIGENCE OR INTENTIONAL DISREGARD OF RULES AND REGULATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INCOME, GIFT, OR WINDFALL PROFrr TAXES:

(1)

IN GENERAL-If any

part of any underpayment (as defined in subsection (c)(I)) of any tax imposed by
subtitle A, by chapter 12 of subtitle B or by chapter 45 (relating to windfall profit
tax) is due to negligence or intentional disregard of rules or regulations (but
without intent to defraud), there shall be added to the tax an amount equal to 5
percent of the underpayment.
35. I.R.C. § 6653(b)(1) provides as follows:
(b) FRAUD (1) IN GENERAL-If any part of any underpayment (as defined in subsection (c))
of tax required to be shown on a return is due to fraud, there shall be added to
the tax an amount equal to 50 percent of the underpayment.
36. Zell v. Commissioner, T.C.M. 1984-152 (CCH), affid, 763 F.2d 1139 (1985).
37. 676 F.2d 980 (3d Cir. 1982).
38. Raley, 676 F.2d at 983.
39. Id. at 983-84.
40. "In 1978 and 1979, [Zell] neither filed nor disclosed to the IRS that he was not
filing. Thus he was not, as was the petitioner in Raley, openly in defiance of the IRS during
all of the years involved in this dispute." Zell, 763 F.2d at 1145. It is anomalous that a tax

460
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fraud under section 6653(b). The Tenth Circuit first considered the
conduct required and followed the Fifth and Eighth Circuits in adopting
4
the "affirmative act" test of Spies v. United States. '
In Spies, the taxpayer was convicted of the felony of attempting to
defeat and evade income tax. The Internal Revenue Code section relied
on for the conviction 4 2 had a lesser included offense of willful failure to
pay or file. The Supreme Court found the additional element required
for conviction under the evasion offense, a felony, to be an affirmative
act as opposed to a mere omission (an "attempt" rather than a "failure"). Both offenses required the conduct or omission to be "willful,"
43
since defined by the Supreme Court as meaning intentional.
In 1978 and 1979 Zell did not file any returns and yet was assessed a
fraud penalty on deficiencies for each of these years. The affirmative act
found to warrant imposition of the penalty was Zell's completion of the
withholding certificates (W-4 forms) for the Air Force. 4 4 On determining that the affirmative act test of Spies was thus met, the court then had
to struggle with the mens rea required for this act.
The Spies court was concerned with a criminal offense requiring intent to evade or defeat a tax. The current relevant statute, 45 its lesser
included offenses, and most of the other criminal statutes under the Internal Revenue Code explicitly require willfulness. 4 6 When these criminal statutes address statements made by a defendant, conviction usually
requires these statement to be false or fraudulent. 4 7 Although under the
tax laws intent to evade is often equated with intent to defraud, 48 the
protester trying to avoid a fraud penalty is now encouraged, if not required, to further clog
the system with a deluge of useless letters.
In his concurring opinion,Judge Barrett agreed that the two cases were indistinguishable in their relevant facts, but found Raley itself wrongly decided, believing the penalty
proper in both Zell and Raley. Id. at 1147 (Barrett, J., concurring).
41. 317 U.S. 492 (1943).
42. I.R.C. § 145(b) (1939).
43. The Spies Court had stated: "Willful but passive neglect of the statutory duty may
constitute the lesser offense ...." 317 U.S. at 499. In United States v. Bishop, 412 U.S.
346 (1973), the Court clarified its position:
The Court, in fact, has recognized that the word "willfully" in these statutes generally connotes a voluntary, intentional violation of a known legal duty....
The Court's consistent interpretation of the word "willfully" to require an
element of mens rea implements the pervasive intent of Congress to construct penalties that separate the purposeful tax violator from the well-meaning, but easily
confused, mass of taxpayers.
Id. at 360-61.

44. Zell, 763 F.2d 1145-46.
45. I.R.C. § 7201 (1985).
46. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 7201 (1985) ("Any person who willfully attempts.
); I.R.C.
§ 7202 (1985) ("Any person ... who willfully fails . . .");
I.R.C. § 7203 (1985) ("Any
person . . .who willfully fails. ..");
I.R.C. § 7204 (1985) ("Any person ... who willfully
furnishes . . .or who willfully fails to furnish . ); I.R.C. § 7205 (1985) ("Any individual
who willfully supplies . . .or who willfully fails to supply.
47. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 7204 (1985) ("willfully furnishes a false or fraudulent statement
I.R.C.
.); § 7205(a) (1985) ("who willfully supplies false or fraudulent information
.. "); I.R.C. § 7205(b) (1985) ("who willfully makes . . .any false certification . . .").
48. See H. BALTER &J. GuiDorri, TAX FRAUD AND EVASIONs 2-2 (5th ed. 1983):
Although the revenue statutes provide civil penalties where an underpayment in a
tax return is due to fraud and criminal penalties for a taxpayer "who willfully
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only distinction between attempt to evade and willful failure to file made
by the Supreme Court in Spies was the affirmative act, or conduct,
required.
Tax courts have repeatedly found that false withholding certificates
combined with failure to file returns is sufficient proof of fraud for imposition of the fifty percent fraud penalty under section 6653, where the
taxpayers had previously filed proper returns. 4 9 However, little discussion has been given in these cases to whether the taxpayer must be
found to have intended to deceive or merely intended to make a
misrepresentation.
The Tenth Circuit has twice addressed this distinction under a criminal statute of the Internal Revenue Code. In both United States v.
Smith 50 and United States v. Hudler,5 1 the defendants were convicted of

willfully supplying false or fraudulent information to their employers on
their withholding certificates. 52 In both cases, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the convictions: -[t]he criterion is not whether the employer and
the government were, or could have been, deceived. The crime is the
willful furnishing of false or fraudulent information." '5 3 It was "incumbent upon the government to establish only that [defendant] had will' 54
fully supplied false information.
The common law definition of fraud requires intent that another rely
upon one's misrepresentation. 5 5 The civil penalty statute in Zell speaks
attempts in any manner to evade or defeat any tax," one is unable to find any
definition of these terms in the statutes. In practice, the two concepts are the
same, and the courts do not hesitate to use the terms fraud and evasion interchangeably and cumulatively.
49. Wilhelm v. Commissioner, T.C.M. 1984-296 (CCH); Bratton-Bey v. Commissioner, T.C.M. 1982-19 (CCH); Best v. Commissioner, T.C.M. 1981-251 (CCH); Cook v.
Commissioner, T.C.M. 1980-415 (CCH). For similar holdings without mention of previous filing of returns by taxpayers, see Zozoya v. Commissioner, T.C.M. 1985-60 (CCH);
Gregory v. Commissioner, T.C.M. 1985-62 (CCH); Rogers v. Commissioner, T.C.M.
1984-116 (CCH).
50. 484 F.2d 8 (10th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 978 (1974).
51. 605 F.2d 488 (10th Cir. 1979).
52. I.R.C. § 7205(a) provides:
(a) WITHHOLDING ON WAGEs-Any individual required to supply information to
his employer under section 3402 who willfully supplies false or fraudulent information, or who willfully fails to supply information thereunder which would require an increase in the tax to be withheld under section 3402, shall, in addition

to any other penalty provided by law, upon conviction thereof, be fined not more
than $1,000, or imprisoned not more than I year, or both.
53. Hudler, 605 F.2d at 490.
54. Smith, 484 F.2d at 10. In Smith, the indictment itself read "false and fraudulent."
Id. at 8 (emphasis added); see also United States v. Smith, 487 F.2d 329 (9th Cir. 1973), cert.
denied, 416 U.S. 989 (1974); United States v.Malinowski, 472 F.2d 850 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
411 U.S. 970 (1973); cf. United States v. Snider, 502 F.2d 645 (4th Cir. 1974) (Conviction
under the same statute was reversed, the court finding the term "false" in the statute to
require deceptiveness. The defendant had claimed three billion allowances on his withholding certificate.).
55. Fraud is defined as "an intentional perversion of truth for the purpose of inducing
another in reliance upon it to part with some valuable thing belonging to him or to surrender a legal right," BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 788 (4th ed. 1968), and as "anything calculated to deceive another to his prejudice and accomplishing the purpose," BALArerNE'S
LAw DICTIONARY 497 (3d ed. 1969).
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only to fraud; 5 6 it does not address willfully making false statements.
The Zell court quoted two definitions of the required state of mind.
First, it quoted a definition of fraud from Mitchell v. Commissioner :57
" '[t]he intent required is the specific purpose to evade a tax believed to
be owing.' "58 The defendant in Mitchell filed a false return and argued
on appeal that the evidence established only negligence. The defendant
conceded the government's allegation that he filed the returns "with the
59
intent that they should be accepted as true and correct."
In the same paragraph, the Zell court redefined the required state of
mind as "one which, 'if translated into action, is well calculated to cheat
or deceive the government.' ",60 The text of the quoted treatise first
states: "Generally speaking, there must be an intent to mislead or defraud before the [fraud] penalty can be imposed. . . .The first and basic element in fraud is a fraudulent intent .... ",61
In considering imposition of the fraud penalty, it would seem that
not only must the issue of intent versus negligence be addressed, but
also the issue of intent to deceive versus intent to make a false statement, without the intent that the statement be relied upon. These distinctions are particularly important in light of the increasing frequency
62
of tax protest activity.
In Zell, the Tenth Circuit found that an affirmative act which is an
intentional misrepresentation is per se fraudulent under section 6653.
"[The taxpayer] filed false W-4 forms, thus committing an 'affirmative
act' of misrepresentation sufficient to justify the fraud penalty." '6 3 If this
language is limited to the facts of the case, the common law definition of
fraud could be met as well. The taxpayer's misrepresentation was not
obviously incorrect (he claimed thirteen exemptions) and nothing on
the withholding certificates indicated that his statements were false.
Thus it could be found that he intended that the misrepresentation be
relied upon, but nothing in the opinion indicated that this was of import.
III.

THE

VALIDITY OF A WAIVER UNDER

I.R.C. § 6213(d):

ARDALIAN V' UNITED STATES

A.

Background

Under present tax law, there are two avenues (plus a safety valve)
for obtaining judicial review of disputes between taxpayers and the IRS.
The first is through the tax courts, which were created by legislation and
56.

I.R.C. § 6653(b) (1985).

See supra note 35.

57. 118 F.2d 308 (5th Cir. 1941).
58. Zell, 763 F.2d at 1143 (quoting Mitchell, 118 F.2d at 310).
59. Mitchell, 118 F.2d at 309.
60. Zell, 763 F.2d at 1143 (quoting 10 MERTENS, LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION

§ 55.10, at 46 (1984)).
61.

10 MERTENS, § 55.10, at 46.

62. See, e.g., United States v.Snider, 502 F.2d 645 (4th Cir. 1974); see also supra note
54.
63. Zell, 763 F.2d at 1146.
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are now under article I of the United States Constitution. 64 To get into
tax court, both the taxpayer and the IRS must take action. The IRS
must initially send a notice of deficiency to the taxpayer; then the taxpayer must petition the tax court for a redetermination of this deficiency
within ninety days of when the notice was mailed. 6 5 Each of these ac66
tions is an independent prerequisite to tax court jurisdiction.
The other avenue is through the federal district courts, whose basic
jurisdiction in the federal tax arena is set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1346.67
In Flora v. United States,68 the Supreme Court found this section to mean
that "full payment of the assessment is a jurisdictional prerequisite to
suit."' 69 Thus, if a taxpayer is able to pay the full amount of the deficiency assessed and then makes a timely claim for refund from the IRS
which is denied, 70 he may properly invoke district court jurisdiction
without any action needed from the IRS.
Collection of a disputed deficiency may not commence until an assessment has been made. 7 ' An assessment may not be made until a notice of deficiency has been mailed to the taxpayer and ninety days have
lapsed without the taxpayer filing a petition in tax court. 7 2 Thus,
although the IRS is not required to mail a notice of deficiency, 7 3 in order to collect it must ordinarily do so. A safety valve is provided by
I.R.C. § 6213(a) 74 which states that if an assessment is made without the
required statutory notice and waiting period, one may seek injunctive
75
relief in district court to prohibit collection.
If a taxpayer does not dispute the deficiency determined, there is
nothing to prevent him from simply agreeing that the deficiency is cor64. I.R.C. § 7441 (1985).
65. I.R.C. § 6213 (1985). The taxpayer has 150 days if the notice is addressed to a
person outside the United States.
66. Musso v. Commissioner, 531 F.2d 772 (5th Cir. 1976) (notice of deficiency prerequisite); DaBoul v. Commissioner, 429 F.2d 38 (9th Cir. 1970) (same); Healy v. Commissioner, 351 F.2d 602 (9th Cir. 1965) (timely filing of petition prerequisite); Vibro Mfg. Co.,
Inc. v. Commissioner, 312 F.2d 253 (2d Cir. 1963) (same).
67. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(1) (1985) provides:
(a) The district courts shall have original jurisdiction,
concurrent with the United States Court of Claims, of:
(1) Any civil action against the United States for the recovery of any internal-revenue tax alleged to have been erroneously or illegally assessed or collected, or any penalty claimed to have been collected without authority or any
sum alleged to have been excessive or in any manner wrongfully collected under
the internal-revenue laws.
68. 362 U.S. 145 (1960).
69. Id. at 146.
70. See I.R.C. § 7422(a) (1985).
71. I.R.C. § 6632 (1985).
72. I.R.C. § 6213(a) (1985).
73. I.R.C. § 6212 (1985) only authorizes notices of deficiency.
74. I.R.C. § 6213(a) (1985) provides in pertinent part:
Notwithstanding the provisions of section 7421(a) [the Anti-Injunction statute],
the making of such assessment or the beginning of such proceeding or levy during the time such prohibition is in force may be enjoined by a proceeding in the
proper court.
75. See United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 90 F.2d 699 (7th Cir. 1937); Dierks v. United
States, 215 F. Supp. 338 (S.D.N.Y. 1963); United States v. Williams, 161 F. Supp. 158
(E.D.N.Y. 1958); Dorsey v. United States, 84-2 U.S. Tax Cas.
9643 (D. Cal.).
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rect. One of the goals of an IRS auditor is to reach an agreement with
the taxpayer as to the deficiency. 76 If the taxpayer agrees to the deficiency, one of several forms is drawn up which explicitly states that the
77
taxpayer is consenting to the immediate assessment of the deficiency.
If signed, the taxpayer waives his right to a deficiency notice. In this
manner, the IRS can obtain an assessment, allowing collection to commence, without the issuance of a deficiency notice. 78 Without a deficiency notice, the taxpayer cannot seek tax court review and must prepay the deficiency for district court jurisdiction should he later wish to
contest the deficiency. By signing the waiver, the taxpayer has cut off
one possible avenue of judicial review of any subsequent tax dispute.
B.

Ardalan v. United States

In Ardalan v. United States, 79 a waiver of deficiency notice had been
executed, but the taxpayers claimed they had been misled into signing
it. 80 The taxpayers did not petition the tax court for a redetermination,
though a notice of deficiency had been sent, 8 t presumably assuming the
waiver prohibited this. Nor did they pre-pay the deficiency before seeking district court relief.8 2 Their claim was for refund of the taxes they

had paid and abatement of the deficiency assessed. The Tenth Circuit
found that the district court had been without jurisdiction to consider
83
the matter without full prepayment under Flora.
In addition to the claim that they had been misled into signing the
waiver, the taxpayers in Ardalan claimed they were not subject to United
76. "Upon completion of an examination, the examiner will explain the basis of the
proposed adjustments to the taxpayer. . . and make an effort to obtain an agreement to
the proposed tax liability." INTERNAL REVENUE MANUAL, Part IV, Audit: Income Tax, Ch

4200 § 4240, Instructions to Examiners, 424(12).1(2), Soliciting Agreements (11-2-81), at
7309-225(CCH).
77. Form 4549 is used for field audits, Form 1902 for office audits. Each lists changes
made of items calculated on an original return for a particular year. Form 870 does not
include a break-out of items, and may include more than one taxable year. Every one of
the forms contains a consent provision immediately above the signature line for the taxpayer which reads similar to that found on Form 1902-B:
I do not wish to exercise my appeal rights with the Internal Revenue Service or to
contest in the United States Tax Court the findings in this report. Therefore, I
consent to either: (1)The immediate assessment and collection of the balance
due shown ....

or (2) the overpayment shown ....

78. Associated Mutuals, Inc. v. Delaney, 176 F.2d 179 (1st Cir. 1949).
79. 748 F.2d 1411 (10th Cir. 1984).
80. Id. at 1412.
81. Curiously, neither opinion gives the date when the notice of deficiency was sent.
The waiver was signed on August 5, 1979, 149 days after the IRS, on March 9, 1979,
"notified the [taxpayers] that they owed an additional $3,852 in taxes for the year 1977."
Id. at 1412. Presumably this notice was a "30-day letter" which usually precedes the issuance of the statutory deficiency notice, or "90-day letter." If the notice was sent after the
waiver, the taxpayers would have a strong case of deprivation of property without any legal
process if the waiver was a result of misrepresentations made by government officials.
82. Ardalan v. United States, 534 F. Supp. 721 (D. Colo. 1982). Apparently, there
were two district court opinions. In the published decision of Judge Kane, the government's motion to dismiss was granted in part and denied in part. The appeal to the Tenth
Circuit, however, was by the taxpayers from a dismissal with prejudice of their suit for
refund and the granting of summary judgment in favor of the United States.
83. Ardalan, 748 F.2d at 1414. See supra note 67.
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States income taxation. 8 4 Judge Kane of the United States District
Court for the District of Colorado discussed the requirements of Flora,
but found them inapplicable. "Here, unlike Flora, the plaintiffs are not
challenging the amount of tax that the IRS claims they owe; they are
'85
instead challenging the determination they they owe any tax at all."

The district court found this situation sufficiently distinguishable from
Flora8 6 to warrant an exception to the full pre-payment requirement.
Judge Kane dismissed the plaintiff's claim for abatement, relying generally on the Anti-Injunction statute, 8 7 but retained jurisdiction to consider the claim for refund.
The Tenth Circuit disagreed. The taxpayers in Ardalan had paid
$215 in taxes when they filed a joint income tax return for the year in
question. The IRS had subsequently determined that they owed not
only the taxes paid, but several thousand dollars more. By claiming a
refund of the $215 paid, the taxpayers were attempting to split an indivisible tax liability, just as the taxpayer in Flora had. The entire amount
in dispute had to be paid before the district court could entertain any
challenges to its validity. 8 8

The Tenth Circuit then discussed the taxpayers' claim that they
were being unconstitutionally deprived of all judicial forums, having
been misled into signing a waiver of tax court jurisdiction, and not having the funds to pre-pay the deficiency determined. 89 The court addressed this claim as "without merit," citing White v. Commissioner90 as
authority. In White, the IRS already had collected the disputed amount
and the suit was thus a legitimate suit for refund under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1346(a). The taxpayer in White had claimed that her waiver had been
nullified by an accompanying letter stating she was consenting under
protest. The White court had found the waiver to be valid, stating "[t]he
plaintiff cites no authority to support her contention that the effect of
the letter was to compel the IRS to disregard her signature on the
form." 9'
On its face, this statement would indicate the validity of a
waiver will be determined from the four corners of the waiver only. It
84. Ardalan, 748 F.2d at 1412. The taxpayers were Iranian citizens during the taxable
year, though they had been registered as permanent residents of the United States prior to

the tax year. Id.
85. Ardalan, 534 F. Supp. at 725.
86. In Flora, the issue was whether certain losses were ordinary or capital in nature.

The IRS recharacterized the losses as capital and determined a deficiency based on the
recharacterization. The taxpayer paid part of this deficiency and then filed suit in district
court under 28 U.S.C. § 1346 for a refund of the partial payment he had made. Flora, 362
U.S. at 147.
87. The Anti-Injunction statute, I.R.C. § 7421(a) (1985) provides:
(a) TAx-

Except as provided in sections 6212(a) and (c), 6213(a), 6672(b), 6694(c),
7426(a) and (b)(1), and 7429(b), no suit for the purpose of restraining the assessment or collection of any tax shall be maintained in any court by any person,
whether or not such person is the person against whom such tax was assessed.
88. Ardalan, 748 F.2d at 1414.
89. Id.
90. 537 F. Supp. 679 (D. Colo. 1982).
91. While, 537 F. Supp. at 686.

DENVER UNIVERSITY L4 W REVIEW

[Vol. 63:2

would appear, however, that whether tax court jurisdiction was or was
not denied by the waiver was moot and unnecessary to a determination
of the taxpayer's refund claim.
In Ardalan, if the waiver was indeed induced by misrepresentations,
and if waivers are to be taken at face value, the taxpayers were, in fact,
denied access to the tax court for at least a portion of the statutory period to which they were entitled after the notice of deficiency had been
sent. 9 2 Contrary to the facts in White, irreparable harm from this denial
would be a possibility; the taxpayers in Ardalan could neither obtain district court review without full payment nor approach the tax court because of the waiver. Both of these conclusions were reached by the
Ardalan court itself. The court stated: "[A] taxpayer cannot claim a constitutional deprivation if he/she permits the statutory time for filing such
an appeal in the Tax Court to expire . . . . The same may be said of a
waiver .... .. 93 The court seemed to miss the taxpayers' contention
that they had been misled into signing the waiver. The court stated that
it was not considering the effectiveness of the waiver; the only issue was
whether the district court had jurisdiction. This jurisdictional issue was
determined solely by whether full prepayment of the deficiency had
94
been made before bringing suit.
It would not appear that the taxpayers urged jurisdiction under
I.R.C. § 6213(a). 9 5 The Tenth Circuit decision does not mention the
possibility, though the district court opinion does state: "The government correctly asserts that the Anti-Injunction statute prohibits this
court from considering plaintiff's abatement request." 9 6
As a decision on 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(1) jurisdiction, the court properly found none to exist without full prepayment. The suit, however,
was also for abatement of the deficiency. The plaintiffs claimed access to
the tax court had been denied by a waiver induced by misrepresentations. As to this claim, the court first seemed to agree with the taxpayers
that the waiver had barred tax court jurisdiction, but then, went on to
disclaim any consideration of whether the waiver was or was not effective. 9 7 Other district courts have considered the effectiveness of such
waivers without prepayment in suits for injunctive relief against assessments. These decisions have been reviewed on the merits by appellate
courts.

98

The Ardalan court stated that "[b]ecause consideration of this
threshold jurisdictional issue [the 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(1) prepayment
requirement] disposes of this appeal, this court does not need to ad92. See supra note 80.
93. Ardalan, 748 F.2d at 1414.
94. Id.
95. See supra note 73.
96. 534 F. Supp. 721, 722 (D. Colo. 1984); see also supra note 86.
97. 748 F.2d at 1414 (citing White, 537 F. Supp. at 683-84).
98. See, e.g., Philadelphia & Reading Corp. v. Beck, 676 F.2d 1159 (7th Cir. 1982);
Wheeler v. Holland, 218 F.2d 482 (5th Cir. 1955); Associated Mutuals, Inc. v. Delaney,
176 F.2d 179 (1st Cir. 1949).
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dress the other issues on appeal raised by the [taxpayer]." 99 One of
these other issues was the allegation of unconstitutional deprivation of
access to eitherjudicial or administrative courts because of misrepresentations by the IRS inducing a waiver of tax court jurisdiction. The court
refused to consider whether the waiver was, in fact, induced by misrepresentations. It also failed to state whether the waiver would be effective
to bar tax court jurisdiction if it were induced by misrepresentations. 0 0
Both issues would seem to require disposition before declaring the
claim of deprivation of all judicial forums to be without merit.
IV.
A.

DIVVYING UP OF CHILD SUPPORT UNDER I.R.C.
RUCKER V. SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY

§ 6402(c):

Background

A young couple gets married and has a child, but things do not go
well and a divorce soon follows. The wife, the custodial parent, applies
for welfare and, in order to qualify, assigns her rights to child support
from her former husband to the state.' 0 ' Meanwhile, the husband has
remarried and has a child by his new wife. The new couple, because
they have a child and earn little money, qualify for the earned income
credit (EIC). 10 2 They must file a joint income tax return to get the
EIC. 10 3 Meanwhile, the state, supporting the first child through Aid to
Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) payments, has notified the
IRS of its claim to the husband's tax refund. 10 4 The full refund is
mailed to the state and the new couple is sent a notice of the action
instead of a check for the refund.
This scenario has been presented to four federal district courts' 0 5
since Congress authorized the tax-intercept program in 1981.106 Three
10 7
of these cases have been reviewed by the circuit courts of appeals.
Each court which has considered the matter has struggled valiantly to
99. Ardalan, 748 F.2d at 1413.
100. The court's use of the White decision would indicate, if anything, that a waiver is to
be assessed only by its facial validity in determining whether tax court jurisdiction has
been effectively waived. See also Boger v. Commissioner, T.C.M. 1981-629 (CCH) (where
the tax court found that it had no jurisdiction to consider the taxpayer's allegations of
illegal conduct by a government official).
101. 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(26) (1982).
102. I.R.C. § 43 (1985).
103. I.R.C. § 43(d) (1985).
104. 42 U.S.C. § 664(a) (1985).
105. Coughlin v. Regan, 584 F. Supp. 697 (D. Me. 1984); Nelson v. Regan, 560 F.
Supp. 1101 (D. Conn. 1983), afd, 731 F.2d 105 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 175
(1984); Sorenson v. Secretary of Treasury, 557 F. Supp. 729 (W.D. Wash. 1982), afd, 752
F.2d 1433 (9th Cir.), cert. granted, 105 S. Ct. 3475 (1985); Rucker v. Secretary of Treasury,
555 F. Supp. 1051 (D. Colo. 1983), rev'd, 751 F.2d 351 (10th Cir. 1984).
106. Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-35,§§ 2321, 2331, 2332,
2336, 95 Stat. 860 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 602, 654, 657, 664 (1982) and 26 U.S.C.
§ 6402 (1982)).
107. Sorenson v. Secretary of Treasury, 752 F.2d 1433 (9th Cir.), cert. ganted, 105 S.
Ct. 3475 (1985); Rucker v. Secretary of Treasury, 751 F.2d 351 (10th Cir. 1984); Nelson v.
Regan, 731 F.2d 105 (2d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 175 (1984).
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sort out the myriad constitutional and jurisdictional issues involved,10 8
with very little guidance provided by the new law itself.
The Tenth and Second Circuits found that the tax-intercept program does apply to EICs in Rucker v. Secretary of Treasury 10 9 and Nelson v.
Regan," l0 respectively. The Ninth Circuit has subsequently disagreed in
Sorenson v. United States. II I
At issue is section 2331 of The Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act
of 1981 (OBRA). 1 2 The entire section is one page long, adding provisions to title 42 dealing with AFDC'" 3 and to I.R.C. § 6402 dealing with
overpayments and refunds. The OBRA additions require the Secretary
of the Treasury to remit certain refunds to a state which provides AFDC
payments to support a child, rather than to the delinquent non-custodial
4
parent taxpayer.' 1
B.

Legislative History

Concerned with the ever-rising national welfare rolls, Congress, in
1974, considered various proposals which would give both states and
individuals incentives to look beyond the federal coffers for needed
funding of basic living expenses of the poor. Congress considered two
incentives for individuals with children. At the time, four out of five
AFDC recipients were single parents whose partners were neither in the
home nor sending support payments for the care of their child.' 1 5 In
108. These issues include: 1) whether the notice was sufficient; 2) whether due process
requires a pre-deprivation hearing; 3) whether it is the state or federal government's responsibility to provide either; 4) whether both spouses have an interest in an EIC or
whether it is divisible into portions; 5) whether a spouse has standing to assert his/her
partner's rights; 6) whether a claim for refund and IRS denial or the passage of six months
is a prerequisite to a refund suit; 7) whether the Anti-Injunction and Declaratory Judgment
Acts relating to tax cases apply; 8) whether the state or the federal government is the
proper defendant; 9) whether sovereign immunity has been waived; and 10) whether the
eleventh amendment prohibits refund suits.
109. 751 F.2d 351 (10th Cir. 1984).
110. 731 F.2d 105 (2d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 175 (1985).
111. 752 F.2d 1433 (9th Cir.), cert. granted, 105 S. Ct. 3475 (1985).
112. See supra note 106.
113. See 42 U.S.C. § 664 (1982) ("Collection of past-due support from Federal tax
refunds").
114. 42 U.S.C. § 664(a) (1982) provides in part:
Upon receiving notice from a State agency . . . that a named individual owes
past-due support which has been assigned to such State . . . the Secretary of the
Treasury shall determine whether any amounts, as refunds of Federal taxes paid,
are payable to such individual (regardless of whether such individual filed a tax
return as a married or unmarried individual). If the Secretary of the Treasury
finds that any such amount is payable, he shall withhold from such refunds an
amount equal to the past-due support, and pay such amount to the State agency
I.R.C. § 6402(c) (1982) provides in part:
(C)

OFFSET OF PAST-DUE SUPPORT AGAINST OVERPAYMENTS -

The amount of any overpayment to be refunded to the person making the overpayment shall be reduced by the amount of any past-due support . . . owed by
that person of which the Secretary has been notified by a State. . . . The Secretary shall remit the amount by which the overpayment is so reduced to the State
to which such support has been assigned . ...
115. S. REP. No. 1356, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 42, reprintedin 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws

8133, 8145.
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most cases, such support was a legal right of the custodial parent (actually of the child), which Congress felt was not being adequately drawn
upon by the then-present system. 116 By transferring this right from an
indigent single parent to a state agency, it was felt the collection process
in place would be more readily utilized."i 7 Thus, an additional requirement was added for a state's AFDC program to qualify for federal
matching funds. The requirement stated that these programs now had
to "provide that, as a condition of eligibility for aid, each applicant or
recipient will be required . . . to assign the State any rights to support
from any other person such applicant may have .....
118 The federal
and state governments would divide any reimbursements so received. 19
Another incentive considered 120 was a limited negative income tax
to compensate, in part, for the social security taxes paid by low-income
earners supporting children.121 Social security taxes are a flat tax with
no minimum cut-off' 2 2 and were thus felt to provide a disincentive to
working as opposed to receiving tax-free welfare support. Termed an
earned income credit (EIC), this provision did not survive conference
committee scrutiny in 1974, but was enacted in the Tax Reduction Act
of 1975.123 As the Senate Report stated: "[T]he most significant objective of the provision should be to assist in encouraging people to obtain
employment, reducing the unemployment rate and reducing the welfare
rolls."1 24 As the credit is available only to custodial parents,1 2 5 the target group is largely AFDC recipients.
The OBRA revisions unfortunately produced a conflict between the
state and individual incentives previously created by the assignment of
child support and EIC provisions respectively. The intent of section
2231 of OBRA was to take advantage of a collection vehicle already existing in the Internal Revenue Code, bypass the taxpayer as to any refund due him, and apply this refund directly to the debt owed by the
12 6
taxpayer to the state.
When the taxpayer's refund includes an EIC, the federal government is providing an EIC to a recipient and for a purpose unintended by
Congress when it created the EIC. It is arguable that with the bitterness
often accompanying domestic separations, the application of EICs to
past-due child support is more of a disincentive to work than is the with116. Id. at 8149.
117. Id. at 8152.
118. 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(26)(A) (1982).
119. 42 U.S.C. § 658(a) (1982).
120. The incentive was actually reconsidered. This was the third year the Senate approved this provision. The earned income credit was finally enacted the following year.
See infra note 122.
121. S. REP. No. 1356, supra note 114, at 8134.
122. I.R.C. § 3101 (1974).
123. Pub. L. No. 94-12, § 204, 89 Stat. 30 (1975) (codified at 26 U.S.C. § 43 (1976)).
124. S. REP. No. 36, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in 1975 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 54, 84.

125. I.R.C. § 43(c)(1)(B) (1975).
126.

S. REP. No. 139, 97th Cong., IstSess. 521, reprinted in 1981 U.S. CODE CONG. &

AD. NEws 396, 787.

470

DENVER UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 63:2

27
holding of social security taxes.1
Unfortunately, the position of the tax-intercept amendments in
OBRA indicates that EICs are to be included in the tax-intercept program. The new subsection (c) of I.R.C. § 6402 begins: "The amount of
any overpayment to be refunded to the person making the overpayment
shall be reduced by the amount of any past-due support .... ." This
language dovetailed with then-existing subsection (a) which provided:
"[I]n the case of any overpayment, the Secretary . . . may credit the
amount of such overpayment . . . against any liability in respect of an
internal revenue tax . . . and shall refund any balance to such
28
person."1
The term "overpayment" is defined in I.R.C. § 6401. This section
was amended in the legislation creating the EIC to include EICs. EICs
have ever since been explicitly included in the term "overpayments" by
section 6401.129 Congress did not amend section 6401 when it created
the tax-intercept program, nor has it done so since then.

C.

The Case Law

The first federal court of appeals to consider whether EICs are sub30
ject to the tax intercept program was the Second Circuit in Nelson.'
The district court held that Congress had not intended EICs to be included in the tax intercept program, 13 1 and the Second Circuit agreed.
When Rucker 13 2 came up to the Tenth Circuit, Nelson had been decided,
but two other district court opinions had found the opposite Congressional intent. The United States District Court for the Western District
of Washington, in Sorenson v. Secretary of Treasury,13 3 followed the plain
meaning rationale and the United States District Court for the District of
Maine, in Coughlin v. Regan, 's4 found the EIC to be divisible, with only
the obligated spouse's "portion" of the EIC subject to being
intercepted.
127. "[T]he Secretary shall . . . notify the person making the overpayment that so
much of the overpayment as was necessary to satisfy his obligation for past-due support
has been paid to the State." I.R.C. § 6402(c) (1981).
128. I.R.C. § 6402(c) (1981); I.R.C. § 6402(a) (1982).
129. "[I]f the amount allowable as credits under subpart C of part IV of subchapter A
of chapter 1 (relating to refundable credits) exceeds the tax imposed by subtitle A ....
the amount of such excess shall be considered an overpayment." I.R.C. § 6401(b)(1)
(1985). The earned income credit, section 43, is under the subpart C referenced.
130. 731 F.2d 105 (2d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 175 (1985).
131. Nelson v. Regan, 560 F. Supp. 1101 (D. Conn. 1983),afd, 731 F.2d 105 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 175 (1984).
132. Rucker v. Secretary of Treasury, 751 F.2d 351 (10th Cir. 1984), rev k 555 F. Supp.
1051 (D. Colo. 1983). See also supra text accompanying note 105.
133. 557 F. Supp. 729 (W.D. Wash. 1982), affid, 752 F.2d 1433 (9th Cir.), cert. granted,
105 S. Ct. 3475 (1985).
134. 584 F. Supp. 697 (D. Me. 1984).
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Rucker v. Secretary of Treasury

The Colorado federal district court which heard Rucker13 5 did not
get past the jurisdictional question. The plaintiff, the new wife of the
obligated father, sought declaratory and injunctive relief, despite having
received her "portion" of the refund after having brought suit. Judge
Kane found that the case had been rendered moot by the plaintiffs ultimate receipt of a refund and dismissed the suit for lack of a case or
36
controversy. 1
On appeal, the Tenth Circuit reversed and remanded. For a married couple to take advantage of an EIC they must file a joint return.
The EIC is based on the couple's combined earnings.' 3 7 The court,
through Judge Seymour, found the full EIC due to a couple to be an
interest of the couple as a family unit.' 3 8 As such, either spouse had
standing to sue for any portion of the EIC which had been intercepted.
In this case, a portion of the EIC due plaintiff's family unit had been
intercepted; thus, the plaintiff had standing on behalf of the family unit,
despite having received her "portion" from the IRS.
The Tenth Circuit then, in a rather summary fashion, dispensed
with the remaining jurisdictional queries, finding the restraints surrounding tax cases inapplicable to a tax-intercept suit. "The intercept
program operates only after tax assessment and collection, when the
federal government ceases to have an interest in the tax refunds.
[P]laintiff's claims for earned income credit benefits are not barred by
sections 7422(a) and 6532 of the Internal Revenue Code."' 3 9 These
sections both concern jurisdiction to hear a taxpayer's claim for a refund.14 0 Plaintiff's claim, however, was for "declaratory and injunctive
relief."' 14 ' Neither the Anti-Injunction Acti 4 2 nor the Declaratory Judgment Act,' 4 3 each of which restricts district court jurisdiction in tax
cases, was mentioned by the court. 144
135. Rucker v. Secretary of Treasury, 555 F. Supp. 1051 (D. Colo. 1983), rev'd, 751
F.2d 351 (10th Cir. 1984).
136.

Rucker, 555 F. Supp. at 1053.

137.
138.
139.
140.
(a)

Treas. Reg. § 1.43-2(d) (1980).
Rucker, 751 F.2d at 355.
Id. at 356.
I.R.C. § 7422(a) (1982) provides:
No SUIT PRIOR TO FILING CLAIM FOR REFUND--

No suit or proceeding shall

be maintained in any court for the recovery of any internal revenue tax alleged to
have been erroneously or illegally assessed or collected, or of any penalty claimed
to have been collected without authority, or of any sum alleged to have been
excessive or in any manner wrongfully collected, until a claim for refund or credit
has been duly filed with the Secretary, according to the provisions of law in that
regard, and the regulations of the Secretary established in pursuance thereof.
I.R.C. § 6532 (1982) concerns periods of limitation on suits by taxpayers for refund (subsection (a), six months from date of required filing of claim for refund), by the United
States for recovery of erroneous refunds (subsection (b)), and by persons other than taxpayers (subsection (c), 9 to 12 months from date of levy or request for return of property).
141. Rucker, 751 F.2d at 353.
142. I.R.C. § 7421(a) (1982).
143. 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (1982).
144. Contra Vidra v. Egger, 575 F. Supp. 1305 (E.D. Pa. 1982) (suit for refund after
filing claim sole remedy). But see Nelson v. Regan, 731 F.2d 105 (2d Cir.) (both restraints
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The Tenth Circuit then went on to discuss the merits of the case,
specifically whether Congress intended EICs to be subject to the taxintercept program. In so doing, the court determined that either spouse
has standing to bring suit for any portion of an EIC withheld from a
joint return, that the transfer of EICs by the IRS to parties other than
the taxpayers may be challenged by a suit for injunctive and declaratory
relief against the United States government, and that a claim for refund
14 5
is not a necessary prerequisite to such suit.

The Tenth Circuit's finding that EICs are not subject to the taxintercept program may well be a true reflection of Congressional intent.
The actual language of the Code, however, requires the opposite result.
The tax-intercept amendment to the Code is written in mandatory terms
to the Secretary of the Treasury. The use of the word "overpayment" in
the amendment, as well as its placement in the Code, makes EICs specifically included by existing Code definitions. The Tenth Circuit decision,
rational as it may be, would seem to add to the confusion. In jurisdictions where the issue has not been adjudicated or where a court has
followed the plain meaning of the Code provisions, 14 6 the IRS is required to withhold EICs. On the other hand, in jurisdictions where a
court has determined that Congress did not intend for a new provision
to be read in conjunction with an old one, the IRS is required not to
withhold them.
Diane K. Young

only applicable where tax liability at issue), rert. deied. 105 S. Ct. 175 (1984); Sorenson v.
Secretary ofTreasury. 752 F.2d 1433 (9th Cir.), cert. granted, 105 S. Ct. 3475 (1985) (same
holding concerning Declaratory Judgment Act).
145. Neither spouse had filed a claim for refund of the husband's "'portion" of the EIC.
l'he wife's "portion" had been refunded after she liled a claim for such with the IRS.
Rucker. 751 F.2d at 355.
146. Sorenson v. Secretary of [reasury. 752 F.2d 1433 (9th Cir.), cerl. gratied, 105 S.
Ct. 3475 (1985).

UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT REVIEW

OF TENTH CIRCUIT DECISIONS

I.

UNITED STATES V. YOUNG: SUPREME COURT RULES THAT

OVERWHELMING EVIDENCE OF GUILT PREVENTS PROSECUTOR'S
CONDUCT FROM CONSTITUTING PLAIN ERROR

United States v. Young I belongs to an unfortunate line of criminal
cases in which the predominate issue concerns attorney misconduct
rather than the accused's guilt or innocence. ChiefJustice Burger, writing for a five member majority, reversed the Tenth Circuit's decision
which had reversed the district court's conviction of Young. 2 The controversy which brought the case up to the Supreme Court involved the
question of whether attorney misconduct during Young's trial fell under
the "plain error" exception to Rule 52(b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. Rule 52(b) permits an appeal, absent a timely objection,
of "plain errors" or "defects" in trial proceedings which affect substantial rights. 3 The Supreme Court ruled that the misconduct, which included prosecutorial remarks regarding Young's intent to defraud and
personal beliefs that Young was guilty, constituted harmless error. Disagreeing with the Tenth Circuit's finding of "plain error," the Supreme
Court reinstated Young's conviction in light of the "overwhelming evidence" of guilt which eliminated any doubt that the prosecutor's re4
marks unfairly prejudiced the jury.
A.

Facts

Billy G. Young, vice president and general manager of Compton
Petroleum Corporation, entered into a contract with Apco Oil Corporation to deliver monthly supplies of "sweet crude" oil. 5 By substituting a
mix of fuel oil and high gravity condensate for sweet crude oil and by
obtaining false certification on delivery invoices, Young deceived Apco
and prompted the FBI investigation which ultimately led to his
6
indictment.
At trial, after the prosecution had summarized the evidence against
Young, defense counsel began his own summation in which he claimed
that the prosecution had presented the case unfairly, had poisoned the
1. 105 S. Ct. 1038 (1984).
2. 736 F.2d 565 (10th Cir. 1984).
3. FED. R. CRIM. P. 52 provides:
(a) Harmless Error. Any error, defect, irregularity or variance which does not
affect substantial rights shall be disregarded.
(b) Plain Error. Plain errors or defects affecting substantial rights may be noticed although they were not brought to the attention of the Court.
4. 105 S. Ct. at 1049.
5. Id. at 1040.
6. Id. at 1041.
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7
jurors' minds, and had "deliberately withheld exculpatory evidence."
The defense attorney also asserted that no person in the courtroom, including the prosecutor, believed that Billy Young intended to defraud
Apco. 8 Instead of objecting to the defense counselor's summation, the
government prosecutor attempted to refute the allegation that the government did not believe in its own case by proffering his personal impression that Young did in fact defraud Apco:
"I think [defense counsel] said that not anyone sitting at this
table thinks that Mr. Young intended to defraud Apco. Well, I
was sitting there and I think he was.... I think he did [intend to
to give our personal impressions
defraud]. If we are allowed
9
since it was asked of me."-

Defense counsel neither objected to the prosecutor's statements
nor requested any curative instructions from the bench.' 0 Young was
found guilty of mail fraud and of knowingly making false statements and
was sentenced to four years imprisonment and fined $39,000.11
B.

The Tenth Circuit Opinion

On appeal, the Tenth Circuit reversed and remanded the case for
retrial, ruling that the remarks made by the prosecutor during his closing rebuttal constituted prosecutorial misconduct.1 2 The court held this
misconduct to be "sufficiently egregious to constitute plain error."
Thus, defense counsel's failure to object was not fatal to appellate review. 13 The Tenth Circuit's opinion can be viewed as a swift, albeit cursory response to attorney misconduct. The court apparently believed
that a weak response to this problem could only lead to an increase in
7. Id. (citing Trial Record at 542).
8. Id.
9. Id. (quoting Trial Record at 549) (emphasis in Tenth Circuit opinion). The prosecutor also stated:
"I don't know whether you call it honor and integrity, I don't call it that, [defense
counsel] does. If you feel you should acquit him for that its your pleasure. I
don't think you're doing your job as jurors in finding facts as opposed to the law
that this Judge is going to instruct you, you think that's honor and integrity then
stand up here in [an] Oklahoma courtroom and say that's honor and integrity; I
don't believe it."
Id. at 1041-42 (quoting Trial Record at 552).
10. Id. at 1042.
11. Id.
12. United States v. Young, 736 F.2d 565, 570 (10th Cir. 1983), rev'd, 105 S. Ct. 1038
(1984). Circuit Judge Seth and District Judge Brimmer handed down a per curium opinion addressing two issues. The first issue involved the admissibility of hearsay testimony
of a witness who had died three years prior to trial. The second issue concerned the impropriety of remarks made by the prosecutor in final argument. The court dealt extensively with the hearsay issue and found that the defendant's sixth amendment right to
confrontation was not violated by the admission of the deceased witness' statements. The
court, only briefly addressing the alleged prosecutorial misconduct, cited several statements made by the prosecutor and concluded that the transcript "spoke for itself." Id. at
567-70. Circuit Judge McWilliams dissented without writing an opinion.
13. Id. at 570. The court gave little credence to the argument that the prosecutor's
comments merely countered the defense counsel's assertion that the prosecutor did not
believe Young intended to defraud Apco. According to the court, improper conduct on
the part of opposing counsel should be met with an objection, rather than an improper
response. Id.
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the frequency of misconduct. 14 In reaching its conclusion, however, the
court did not annunciate any legal distinctions by which one could discern whether an error was harmless, or whether it was "plain" and thus
reversible absent objection.
C.

The Supreme Court Opinion
1. The Majority

The Supreme Court, Chief Justice Burger writing for the majority,
stated that the principal issue to be resolved in Young was not merely
whether the prosecutor's remarks amounted to error, but whether that
error was so damaging as to require reversal absent a timely objection.15
Disapproving of the courtroom activity involved, the Court chastised
both the prosecution and the defense by emphasizing that "[t]he kind of
advocacy shown by this record has no place in the administration ofjustice and should neither be permitted nor rewarded .... 1,,6 Similarly, the
Court stated that the trial judge was obligated to "maintain decorum"
7
and to immediately rectify any breach of courtroom propriety.'
Following these initial reprimands, however, the Court invoked the
"invited response" rule which permits an attorney to mitigate an opposing counselor's improper comments by responding with remarks of like
caliber.' 8 The Court stated that a balancing process is required to determine whether such invited responses merely righted the scale or
whether they were overreactions, detrimental to the administration of
justice. 19 According to this rule, "the issue is not the prosecutor's license to make otherwise improper arguments, but whether the prosecutor's 'invited response,' taken in context, unfairly prejudiced the
defendant."' 20 If this delicate balance is attained, otherwise improper
14. The court inferred that such misconduct is a recurring problem in the Tenth Circuit, citing United States v. Rios, 611 F.2d 1335 (10th Cir. 1979) (prosecutor's closing
rebuttal accusing defense investigator of contriving defense testimony constituted plain
and prejudicial error); United States v. Latimer, 511 F.2d 498 (10th Cir. 1975) (prosecutor's argument, which was outside the scope of proven facts, asserted personal belief of the
prosecutor and thus constituted prejudicial error; new trial granted); United States v. Ludwig, 508 F.2d 140 (10th Cir. 1974) (unprofessional defense conduct does not allow similar
conduct on the part of the prosecutor; prosecutor's personal opinion of the integrity of the
police constitutes prejudicial error); United States v. Coppola, 479 F.2d 1153 (10th Cir.
1973) (prosecutor's own opinion as to guilt constituted ethical violation).
15. 105 S. Ct. at 1046.
16. Id. at 1043.
17. Id. at 1044. With the admitted advantage of hindsight, the Court noted that the
better remedy would have been for the district court judge to intervene and admonish the
errant party, thus eliminating the need for an "invited response" by opposing counsel.
This language led Justice Brennan, in his concurring and dissenting opinion, to conclude
that the majority had decided that federal prosecutors do not have a "right" to reply but
must object. Id. at 1050 (Brennan,J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). See infra
note 26.
18. 105 S. Ct. at 1044. See Lawn v. United States, 355 U.S. 339 (1958) (prosecutor's
opinion as to credibility of government witness in response to defense counsel's statements that witnesses were perjurers did not unfairly prejudice the defendant; invited response rule invoked).
19. 105 S. Ct. at 1045.
20. Id. The Court admonished the Tenth Circuit for not abiding by previous
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2
comments would not warrant reversing a conviction. '
In applying this rule to the facts, the Court found that the prosecutor's remarks, although inappropriate and amounting to error, did not
rise to the level of plain error because they did not undermine the fun22
damental fairness of the trial nor contribute to a miscarriage ofjustice.
Although the majority admitted that the prosecutor's expression of personal opinion was improper and unnecessary, the Court concluded that
any potential harm from such remarks was mitigated by the jury's understanding that the remarks were merely in response to the defense counsel's attack on the prosecutor's integrity. 23 The Court also asserted that
the prosecutor's judgmental interjection was inconsequential because
"the overwhelming evidence" of Young's intent to defraud Apco eliminated any doubt that the government's advocacy may have prejudiced
the jury's decision. 24 Thus, although the prosecutor's conduct was
deemed error by the Court, it did not constitute plain error and therefore did not warrant the Tenth Circuit's reversal absent a timely objec25
tion from defense counsel.

2.

Justice Brennan's Concurring and Dissenting Opinion

Although Justice Brennan concurred with the majority on three specific points,2 6 he vigorously disagreed with the majority's use of the "invited response" doctrine and criticized the Court for "reaching out" to
apply the plain error analysis on its own instead of remanding the question to the circuit court.
Justice Brennan believed that the majority's "invited error" analysis
was flawed for several reasons. First, Justice Brennan stated that because federal prosecutors are held to a higher standard of conduct than
ordinary plaintiff's attorneys, they have " 'the responsibility of a minister of justice and not simply that of an advocate.' ",27 Accordingly, the
Supreme Court precedent which directed that prosecutorial comments be weighed within
the context of the factual situation. Critical of the Tenth Circuit's seemingly flippant use
of the plain error exception to the contemporaneous objection rule, the Court stated that
the exception should be used sparingly and only in circumstances in which a miscarriage of
justice would otherwise result. See United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 163 n.14 (1982)
(extension of the plain error rule would encourage trial participants to seek appellate review of questionable errors which would, in turn, interfere with the speedy administration
of justice).
21. 105 S. Ct. at 1045. The majority was quick to point out that its use of the balancing test was not to be interpreted as "suggesting judicial approval--or encouragement-of
response-in-kind that inevitably exacerbate the tensions inherent in the adversary process." Id.
22. Id. at 1048.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 1049.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 1050. He agreed that federal prosecutors do not have a right to reply to
defense improprieties; rather, they should object to the trial judge, see supra note 17. Furthermore, he agreed that federal courts may establish rules of conduct, violation of which
constitutes error. Finally, he agreed that the Tenth Circuit's reversal could not stand. 105
S. Ct. at 1050.
27. Id. at 1052 (quoting MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-13
(1980); STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE § 3-5.8, at 3.88 (2d ed. 1980)).
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majority's holding "trivialized" this higher standard which federal prosecutors are required to meet. 28 Furthermore, Justice Brennan asserted
that finding an error to be reasonable, or necessary to counterbalance
opposing error, was inherently contradictory, and had the effect of
"minimizing the gravity" of the attorney misconduct. 2 9 Similarly, Justice
Brennan stated that the majority's righting the scale argument, "smacks
of the 'sporting theory of justice.' ",30 He thought it "cavalier" for the
Court, after enumerating the possible risks inherent in the invited response doctrine, to decree that the prosecutor's assertions in this case
31
did not unduly influence the jury.
Aside from disagreeing with the invited response concept, Justice
Brennan criticized the majority for not remanding the case to the Tenth
Circuit in conformance with usual practice. He stated that deciding such
cases is not only at variance with long established procedure and a misunderstanding of the Court's role, but also sets an unwise precedent. As
a result, the Court may become increasingly involved in matters more
appropriately handled at the circuit court level. 3 2 According to Justice
Brennan, Court procedure requires that the Supreme Court outline appropriate standards and remand cases to the circuit courts for application of such standards. 33 With this premise, Justice Brennan suggested
that the Court should have simply instructed the Tenth Circuit to address the two-pronged plain error test; whether the conduct prejudiced
the verdict when viewed in context and whether the conduct " 'seriously
affect[ed] the.., integrity or public reputation of [the] judicial proceed28. 105 S. Ct. at 1052. Justice Brennan also noted that a government prosecutor is
inherently more persuasive to a jury and hence, misconduct by a government attorney
carries more weight than similar responses by a defense attorney.
29. Id. at 1053.
30. Id. at 1052 n.4 (quoting Pound, The Causes of PopularDissatisfaction With The Administation of Justice, 29 A.B.A. REP. 395, 404-06 (1906)).
31. 105 S. Ct. at 1054. Justice Brennan also criticised the Court for concluding in two
brief paragraphs that the evidence of Young's guilt was "overwhelming." In support of
this finding, the Court stated that since the jury acquitted Young of the most serious
charges (interstate transportation of stolen property), the prosecutorial misconduct obviously did not unduly influence the jury. Yet, Justice Brennan pointed out that Young's
acquital of serious charges runs contrary to any assertions of "overwhelming" guilt. Such
an outcome seems more likely to reflect a compromise verdict, raising the question of how
prejudicial the prosecutorial misconduct actually was. Id. at 1055. Furthermore, because
Young was convicted of "intent" crimes, credibility was of more concern than if he were
accused of non-intent crimes. The improper attacks on Young's credibility by the prosecutor could thus have had a far more prejudicial impact upon the jury.
Moreover,Justice Brennan cited substantial evidence to negate any intentional wrongdoing by Young. Young had only an eighth grade education and may have been convinced
by corporate officers of the legality of the certification practices he was involved in. The
fact that Apco had received and tested the blend for seven months before noting the violations also refutes any obvious violations on Young's part. Additionally, government witnesses testified that the complex standards were incomprehensible and that they
personally did not believe Young actually intended to defraud Apco. Id. at 1055 n.15.
32. Id. at 1056.
33. Justice Brennan stated that it was "impossible" for any Supreme Court Justice to
"make the kind of conscientious and detailed examination of the record" which the issue
of prejudicial error required. Id. (citing United States v. Hasting, 461 U.S. 499 (1983)
(Stevens, J., concurring)).
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ings.' -34 Justice Brennan reminded the majority that the Court's primary function is to resolve and supervise issues of federal law, not to
correct factual errors. By engaging in specific factual determinations
and thereby distinguishing plain error from harmless error, the Court,
according to Justice Brennan, has veered onto a course which could lead
35
to future encounters with issues better resolved by the lower courts.
3. Justice Stevens' Dissenting Opinion
Justice Stevens' dissent did not focus upon the plain error doctrine,
central to both the majority's and Justice Brennan's opinions. Instead,
Justice Stevens stated that a reversal in criminal convictions is proper if
trial error either reflects prosecutorial misconduct or is obviously prejudicial to the accused. 3 6 Since the Court unanimously concluded that the
prosecutor's response to defense counsel's closing argument had
crossed the lines of permissible conduct of the legal profession, the
prosecutorial misconduct constituted error and therefore warranted a
reversal.3 7 According to Justice Stevens, the second element of prejudice was also evident. Stating that he did "not understand how anyone
could dispute the proposition that the prosecutor's comments were obviously prejudicial," Justice Stevens noted that the majority neither affirmed nor denied that the prosecutorial misconduct prejudiced the
accused. In fact, the majority merely stated that the error did not "un38
fairly" prejudice the jury.
Justice Stevens, however, disagreeing with Justice Brennan, did not
believe that the case should be remanded. Justice Stevens did not find
the Tenth Circuit's opinion to be as cryptic as the majority and Justice
Brennan, in their opinions, would have one believe.3 9 According tojustice Stevens, the Tenth Circuit was capable of discerning the difference
between harmless and plain error and, although not articulated, the
court must have engaged in such an analysis. For this reason, the Tenth
Circuit's decision deserved the respect usually afforded circuit courts.
Thus, Justice Stevens would have simply affirmed the court's judgment,
eliminating an unnecessary remand or a dubious and unprecedented de40
cision on the merits.
D. Conclusion
Violations of the ABA Code of Professional Responsibility deserve
34. 105 S. Ct. at 1056 (quoting United States v. Atkinson, 297 U.S. 157, 160 (1936)).
35. 105 S. Ct. at 1056.
36. Id. at 1057 (citing Namet v. United States, 373 U.S. 179 (1983)).
37. 105 S. Ct. at 1057.
38. Id. at 1058. According to Justice Stevens, the majority came to such a conclusion
partly because the prosecutor's response was invited and partly because "the Court is convinced that respondent is guilty." Id. at 1057.
39. Id. Because prior case history was reviewed by the Tenth Circuit and the transcripts appeared to speak for themselves, Justice Stevens believed that the court had sufficient grounds to conclude that the conduct was egregious enough to constitute plain
error.

40. Id.
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stern and unqualified judicial condemnation. 4 1 The inability of the
Court to take a firm stance against attorney misconduct does not aid in
clarifying an already confusing area. While an attorney's improper comments may be so prejudicial to the jury as to make an order from the
bench seem effete, the countervailing concerns regarding proper judicial proceedings would seem to override such fears. By accepting an
invited response analysis, the Court creates a gray zone of attorney conduct where the distinctions between "error" and "reasonableness" are
inherently blurred. Moreover, after Young, whether an attorney merely
rights the scale as opposed to tipping the scale depends upon subtle and
subjective distinctions.
Litigators are trained to be aggressive and our judicial system fosters the adversarial resolution of claims. Because government prosecutors represent the people, our society expects that they will try each case
with the utmost zeal. Yet caution must be taken to prevent judicial contestants from adopting the rules of all-out war. Prosecutors, as well as
all other attorneys, must remember that the desire to win should always
be tempered with the dignity of the legal profession, and judges must
oversee judicial proceedings to ensure the proper decorum of the courtroom. A travesty of justice is committed, and the esteemed position of
the profession is denigrated, when officers of the court neglect their obligations. These concerns become even more compelling when a person's freedom is at stake, as in a criminal case.
The Tenth Circuit is chastised by the majority and Justice Brennan
for its cryptic ruling. Although one would usually expect a circuit court
to spell out the technical reasons behind its rulings, it would be surprising, as Justice Stevens noted, if the Tenth Circuit did not have either, if
not both, of the traditional premises in mind when deciding the issue of
plain error. One would think that the Supreme Court would show more
respect for its circuit courts. In light of the potential increase of appeals
on issues concerning "plain error," prudence alone would seem to supply reason enough to give the Tenth Circuit the benefit of such doubt in
United States v. Young. Finally, the Supreme Court's use of an invited response analysis may also encourage, rather than discourage, the type of
misconduct presented in this case.
II.

WILSON

v.

GARCIA: THE SUPREME COURT DETERMINES THE

APPLICABLE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS FOR
CIVIL RIGHTS SUITS

Section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act 4 2 provides a procedural rem41. The MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILrrY DR 7-106(C) (1980) provides:
In appearing in his professional capacity before a tribunal, a lawyer shall not:
(4) Assert his personal opinion as to the justness of a cause, as to the credibility
of a witness, as to the culpability of a civil litigant, or as to the guilt or innocence
of an accused; but he may argue, on his analysis of the evidence, for any position
or conclusion with respect to matters stated herein.

42. 42 U.S.C § 1983 provides:
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edy to every person deprived of constitutional rights by action of state
authority. The statute does not set forth a specific statute of limitations.
Historically, state law has supplied the applicable time period. Pursuant
to section 1988, 4 3 federal courts can apply state law to section 1983 actions where federal law is deficient and the state law is not inconsistent
with the federal Constitution. Thus, in section 1983 actions, federal
courts are faced with the task of determining which state statute of limitations controls the federal claim. Not surprisingly, the circuit courts
have differed substantially in their approaches to this problem. 44 Responding to this divergence in the circuit courts, the Supreme Court, in
Wilson v. Garcia,4 5 attempted to resolve this problem by setting forth a
standard by which federal courts are to characterize all section 1983 actions for the purpose of applying state statutes of limitation. Affirming
the Tenth Circuit, 4 6 the Supreme Court held that the appropriate state

statute of limitation applicable to claims arising under section 1983 is
best determined by characterizing all such claims as personal injury actions. Wilson v. Garcia involved the balancing of states' interests in reasonable time limitations with the federal interests in uniform and easily
applied rules. In so doing, the Court clarified the procedure involved in
applying statutes of limitations to section 1983 claims and left the substantive determination of actual time limits contained in such statutes to
the states.
A.

Facts

Gary Garcia brought an action in federal court under section 1983
against Richard Wilson, a New Mexico state police officer, and Martin
Vigil, the chief of the state police, seeking damages for deprivation of his
constitutional rights. 4 7 Garcia filed suit approximately two years and
nine months after the incident purportedly took place. 4 8 The defendants moved to dismiss on the ground that the action was barred by the
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or
usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to
be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by
the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law,
suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
43. 42 U.S.C. § 1988 provides in pertinent part:
[I]n all [civil rights] cases where [the laws of the United States] are not adapted to
the object, or are deficient in the provisions necessary to furnish suitable remedies and punish offenses against law, the common law, as modified and changed
by the constitution and statutes of the State wherein the court having jurisdiction
of such civil or criminal cause is held, so far as the same is not inconsistent with
the Constitution and laws of the United States, shall be extended to and govern
the said courts in the trial and disposition of the cause ....
44. See infra note 55.
45. 105 S. Ct. 1938 (1985).
46. Garcia v. Wilson, 731 F.2d 640 (10th Cir. 1984).
47. 105 S.Ct. at 1940. Garcia alleged that Wilson viciously beat him on his face and
body with a "slapper" (a strip of leather weighted at one end with a piece of lead) and then
sprayed his face with tear gas. He further alleged that the hiring of Wilson as a state police
officer constituted negligence because the chief knew, or should have known, that Wilson
had been previously convicted of several serious crimes. Id.
48. Id.
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two-year New Mexico statute of limitation dealing with tort claims
against a government employee. The district court denied the motion,
holding that the New Mexico statute providing a four-year limitation period for "all other actions not herein otherwise provided for," applied to
section 1983 actions because such actions were best characterized as actions based on statute rather than tort. 4 9 The Tenth Circuit affirmed the
trial court's refusal to dismiss, but held that the appropriate statute of
limitation for section 1983 actions brought in New Mexico was the New
Mexico statute providing a three year limitation period for personal in50
jury actions.
B.

The Tenth Circuit Opinion

The Tenth Circuit delivered an en banc opinion in order to harmonize its decisions in this area, resolve prior inconsistencies, and establish
a uniform approach for application of statutes of limitation in future
cases. 5 1 First, the court stated that although federal courts are bound by
a state's construction of its own statutes of limitation, it is a federal ques52
tion whether a particular state statute is applicable to a federal claim.
Second, the Tenth Circuit noted the lack of guidance from both the
Supreme Court 53 and Congress in setting forth a method by which a
uniform statute of limitation for section 1983 claims could be determined. 5 4 The Tenth Circuit then outlined the different approaches
taken by the twelve circuits. 5 5 According to the court, these diverse ap49. The trial court's decision directly contravened a previous decision of the New
Mexico Supreme Court in DeVargus v. New Mexico, 97 N.M. 563, 642 P.2d 166 (1982),
which held that the New Mexico Tort Claims Act provided the most closely analogous
state cause of action to section 1983 claims.
50. 731 F.2d at 651.
51. Id. at 642. Garcia was one of four decisions handed down by the Tenth Circuit on
the same day in an attempt to fix the limitation periods for the entire circuit. See Hamilton
v. City of Overland Park, 730 F.2d 613 (10th Cir. 1984) (Kansas' two-year statute for injuries to the rights of another not arising out of a contract applied to section 1983 actions);
Mismash v. Murray City, 730 F.2d 1366 (10th Cir. 1984) (because no Utah statute of limitation expressly applied to actions for injury to the rights of another, the four-year statute
for actions not otherwise provided for by law applied to section 1983 claims); McKay v.
Hammock, 730 F.2d 1367 (10th Cir. 1984) (the three-year statute for all other actions not
provided for by law applies to section 1983 actions in Colorado). All three cases, like
Garcia, involved alleged actions of police officers against arrestees or potential arrestees.
52. 731 F.2d at 643 (citing Knoll v. Springfield Township School Dist., 699 F.2d 137,
141-42 (3d Cir. 1983) and Pauk v. Board of Trustees, 654 F.2d 856, 866 n.6 (2d Cir.
1981), cert. denied. 455 U.S. 1000 (1982)).
53. The Court's previous guidance in selecting the proper statute of limitation period
included such ambivalent instructions as: "the state law of limitations governing an analogous cause of action," Board of Regents v. Tomanio, 446 U.S. 478, 483-84 (1980); "to
adopt the local law of limitation," Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 180 (1976); "apply
the most appropriate one provided by state law," Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, 421
U.S. 454, 462 (1975).
54. 731 F.2d at 643.
55. For example, while the First Circuit characterized a section 1983 action as sounding in tort in a wrongful termination case, see Ramirez de Arellano v. Alvarez de Choudens,
575 F.2d 315 (1st Cir. 1978), it disregarded this characterization in a subsequent case
dealing with the wrongful termination of a public employee, applying instead a state statute covering racial discrimination claims, see Burns v. Sullivan, 619 F.2d 99, 106 (1st Cir.),
cert. denied, 449 U.S. 893 (1980). This stands in contrast to the Second and Ninth Circuits'
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proaches typify the ambiguity stemming from the judicial and congressional lack of guidance in the area. The court asserted that "[t]he
fundamental point of disagreement in selecting a statute of limitations
for civil rights actions is whether such claims should be characterized in
terms of the specific facts generating a particular suit, or whether a more
general characterization ... should be applied regardless of the discrete
56
facts involved."
The court decided to adopt a general characterization for all civil
rights claims based upon its perception of the nature of such claims,
rather than relying upon the specific facts underlying each action. 57 The
Tenth Circuit concluded that the comparison of civil rights claims with
particular state actions would lead to several problems. For example,
because virtually any section 1983 claim could be fitted under a number
of state causes of action, the resulting uncertainty encourages both parties to argue state factual analogies favorable to their respective positions. 58 Further, the court stated that such unequal treatment of similar
claims, especially in the context of socially sensitive civil rights litigation,
may lead to the inference that the holdings are result oriented, thereby
weakening the efficacy of the ruling. 59 As a result, the Tenth Circuit
concluded that articulation of one uniform characterization describing
the essential nature underlying all section 1983 claims would best facili60
tate the selection of a limitation period reflecting federal values.
The court indicated that there were two ways in which to reach this
result. It could characterize the fundamental nature of civil rights claims
as actions on liability created by statute, or it could treat such claims as
actions for injury to the rights of another.6 1 Because the Tenth Circuit
believed that every section 1983 claim essentially arises from personal
injuries, it concluded that, henceforth, all section 1983 claims should be
uniformly characterized as actions for injury to personal rights for statcharacterization of all section 1983 claims as actions created by statute (rather than as
common law torts), see Pauk v. Board of Trustees, 654 F.2d 856, 866 (2d Cir. 1981), cert.
denied, 455 U.S. 1000 (1982); Plummer v. Western International Hotels Co., 656 F.2d 502
(9th Cir. 1981); the Fourth Circuit's treatment of all section 1983 actions as personal injury claims, Almond v. Kent, 459 F.2d 200, 204 (4th Cir. 1972), and the Third Circuit,
which determined which limitation would be applicable in state court had the action been
brought under state law in Aitchison v. Rafiani, 708 F.2d 96, 101 (3d Cir. 1983). The
remaining circuits, generally, have varied within this range. See generally Garcia v. Wilson,
731 F.2d 640, 643-48 (10th Cir. 1984) (outlining the cases in each circuit dealing with the
limitations period to be applied to section 1983 actions).
56. 731 F.2d at 648.
57. Id. at 649.
58. Id. at 650.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id. The first choice was rejected for two reasons. Section 1983 is solely a procedural statute and, hence, one cannot go into court, allege a violation of section 1983, and
expect any remedy to be forthcoming absent a substantive cause of action. Also, not every
state has a statute of limitation applicable to an action created by statute and, thus, states
with no such statute would be forced to engage in the very type of characterization the
court attempted to dispose of in its opinion. Id. at 650 n.3.
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ute of limitation purposes. 62
C.

The Supreme Court Opinion
1. The Majority

Realizing that the circuit courts were applying various methods and
criteria in evaluating the applicability of state statutes of limitations
when section 1983 actions were involved, the Supreme Court granted
certiorari. 6 3 Writing for the majority, Justice Stevens agreed with the
Tenth Circuit's premise that, under section 1988, federal law rather than
state law controls the characterization of section 1983 claims for statute
of limitation purposes. 64 This conclusion was based upon the Court's
interpretation of the " 'predominance of the federal interest' " involved
in utilizing the borrowing procedures of section 1988.65 Thus, only the
length of the limitation period and closely related questions of tolling
66
and application are left to the states.
The Court then addressed the issue of whether characterization of
section 1983 claims should be uniform, or whether the claims should be
analyzed individually based upon each claim's specific facts. Aware that
a section 1983 claim can be analogized to several forms of action, each
of which may be governed by a different statute of limitation, the Court
noted that Garcia could have utilized state tort claims for false arrest,
assault and battery, or the special New Mexico statute which allows recovery for torts perpetrated by its agents. 6 7 The Court asserted that
Congress intended the application of statutes of limitations to section
1983 claims to be an "uncomplicated task

. . .

rather than a source of

uncertainty .
"..."68
Thus, because two or more periods of limitation
could apply to each section 1983 claim, the Court concluded that Congress would not have sanctioned an interpretation of the statute under
which the facts of each case determine the limitation period. 6 9 Continuing its historical review, the Court stated that when section 1983 was
enacted, it was "unlikely that Congress actually foresaw the wide diversity of claims that the new remedy would ultimately embrace." ' 70 The
Court therefore concluded that section 1983 "is fairly construed as a
directive to select, in each State, the one most appropriate statute of
62. Id. at 651. Thus, the New Mexico three year statute of limitations for injuries to
the person applied, under which Garcia's claim was timely filed.
63. 105 S. Ct. 79 (1984).
64. 105 S. Ct. at 1943.
65. Id. (quoting Burnett v. Grattan, 104 S. Ct. 2924, 2929 (1984)).
66. 105 S. Ct. at 1943.
67. Id. at 1941. The Court cited Polite v. Diehl, 507 F.2d 119 (3d Cir. 1974), as being
illustrative of the problems which arise when different periods of limitation are applied in
the same case. In Polite, the plaintiff was unlawfully arrested, beaten, coerced into pleading
guilty, and then had his car towed away. The court applied a one-year statute of limitations to the false arrest claim, a two-year personal injury statute to the beating and coerced
plea claims, and a six-year statute to the towing claim. 105 S. Ct. at 1946 n.33.
68. Id. at 1946-47.
69. Id. at 1946.
70. id.
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limitations" for all claims under section 1983.71
Finally, the Court agreed with the Tenth Circuit's conclusion that
characterization of section 1983 claims as actions for recovery for personal injuries is the "best alternative available."' 7 2 The Court noted that
when section 1983 was first enacted in 1871, Congress was primarily
concerned with actions which "plainly sounded in tort."' 73 The Court
concluded that, if Congress had been presented with the issue, it would
have characterized section 1983 as allowing remedies for injuries to personal rights. 74 Consequently, the Court affirmed the Tenth Circuit's decision, ruled that the three-year New Mexico statute governing personal
75
injury applied, and permitted Garcia to bring his cause of action.
2.

Justice O'Connor's Dissent

In a stinging dissent, Justice O'Connor admonished the majority for
declaring that all section 1983 claims must be considered analogous to
one narrow class of tort. Although she agreed that characterizations of
section 1983 claims were a matter of federal law, she saw no justification
for abandoning the Court's previous practice of applying the statute of
limitation of the most analogous state claim. Justice O'Connor stated
that, by deviating from traditional practices, the Court abrogated the
very policies embodied in section 1988.76
Furthermore, Justice O'Connor considered the majority to be
"groping" in its attempts to discern how Congress in 1871 would have
characterized such claims. 7 7 In her most persuasive argument, Justice
O'Connor cited three recent congressional attempts to standardize section 1983 periods of limitation, all of which failed. 78 To her, this failure
clearly indicated a lack of congressional concern for uniformity in such
limitation periods. Thus, according to Justice O'Connor, this normally
persuasive tell-tale of congressional intent was ignored by the majority. 79 Moreover, she argued that a state's ability to legislate detailed and
71. Id. at 1947.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 1948.
74. Id. Further, one of the Court's concerns appears to have been that the borrowed
periods of limitations not discriminate against the federal civil rights remedy. Id. at 1949.
The Court stated that by characterizing all claims under section 1983 as personal injury
claims, the risk that the choice of a state statute of limitations will not serve federal interests is minimized. According to justice Stevens, because personal injury actions constitute
the major part of the volume of civil litigation in state courts today, it is unlikely that a
period of limitations would ever be fixed in a way that would discriminate against federal
claims. Id.
75. Id. at 1949.
76. Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
77. Id. at 1951.
78. Id. S. 436, 99th Cong., ist Sess. (1985) (bill presented to the Senate Judiciary
Committee proposing an amendment to section 1983 which would bar actions brought
under it which are not filed within 18 months of accrual of a right of action); S. 1983, 96th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1979) (proposed bill barring section 1983 actions unless they are filed
within four years of accrual of a right of action); see also H.R. 12874, 94th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1976).
79. 105 S. Ct. at 1951-52 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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specific periods of limitation for diverse section 1983 claims is effectively
foreclosed by the Court's decision since the supremacy clause would dictate that all contrary state legislative proposals be superseded. 8 0 Finally,
Justice O'Connor asserted that, because section 1983 claims are usually
joined with claims in tort or contract, which are not section 1983 claims,
the same factual situation will now be governed by two or more separate
statutes of limitation. 8 1 Thus, lower courts will now be faced with the
confusing task of severing section 1983 claims from non-1983 claims
82
arising out of the same facts.
D.

Analysis and Conclusion

In Garcia, the Supreme Court fashioned an opinion in response to
its inherent uneasiness and irritation with a lack of uniformity in the circuit courts. The decision supplies, at least facially, a uniform rule of
application within individual states. However, this uniformity is predicated upon arguments which are not overwhelmingly convincing. For
instance, the Court pronounces a federal interest in easily applied,
firmly defined, and uniform rules, yet cites no congressional authority in
support of its findings. In fact, the Court's historical deductions are almost oracular, lacking in any legislative language to support its conclusions. The Court's holding entailed a departure from the established
protocol of interpreting legislative inability to act as an indication of
congressional sentiment.8 3 Although the Court is probably correct in its
belief that, at the time section 1983 was enacted, Congress did not anticipate the wide diversity of claims the remedy would ultimately embrace,
the Court's attempt to discern what the forty-second Congress would
have done is inappropriate given the recent legislative considerations of
the specific question. Recent bills which have addressed and ultimately
rejected the standardization of limitation periods were not even men84
tioned in the majority's opinion.
Furthermore, the Court's assurance that uniform application of
state statutes of limitations will not discriminate against the federal civil
rights remedy does not withstand scrutiny. 85 Forcing admittedly diverse
actions into the narrow confines of a single limitation period is unwise.
Although the Court presumes that such a limitation would never discriminate against or be inconsistent with federal law, it is reasonably
foreseeable that a section 1983 claim not sounding in tort will be barred
by a short state limitation period, requiring the plaintiff to assert other
state causes of action and perhaps defeating federal jurisdiction.
As Justice O'Connor intimates, the "half baked conformity"
80. Id. at 1952.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. " [C]aution must temper judicial creativity in the face of legislative ... silence.'"
Wilson v. Garcia, 105 S. Ct. at 1952 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (quoting Ford Motor Credit
Co. v. Milhollin, 444 U.S. 555, 565 (1980)),
84. See supra note 78.
85. See supra note 74.
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achieved by the Court's decision "does not so much resolve confusion as
banish it to the lower courts." 8 6 For example, the Court's expansive
definition of what constitutes a personal injury leaves unresolved the
question of whether, when faced with a bald assertion of a section 1983
violation, trial courts will be able to blindly apply the state tort statute of
limitation or be forced to sift through the factual situation to determine
if a personal injury claim has been made. Probably, a court's duty under
Garcia is to ascertain that a section 1983 claim is made by the facts, and
then to apply the state personal injury statute of limitation regardless of
87
the nature of those facts.
Statutes of limitation should reflect pragmatic considerations,
whether they be the frailty of human memory or the lasting testimony of
written agreements. Although the majority of section 1983 claims are
personal injury claims, and thus warrant a timely resolution of disputes,
other section 1983 actions involve claims sounding in contract, the character of which may not necessitate a more restrictive limitation period.
The Court appears to have disregarded this fundamental reason for varying limitation periods, preferring to mandate uniformity in an effort to
avoid inherent complexities of fact finding. And yet, complexities are
often inextricable portions of the law. Uniformity and simplicity do not
always solve underlying problems, even though they may facilitate some
judicial efficiency.
It appears that in Wilson v. Garcia, the Supreme Court, while in pursuit of a bright line rule, put far too much emphasis on standardizing
section 1983 procedure, without due consideration of the substantive
difficulties inherent in such actions. Perhaps a better resolution would
have been to leave Congress the task of outlining the various factual
situations which give rise to section 1983 claims and the specific limitation periods each cause of action.
III.

CAPITAL CITIES CABLE, INC. V. CRISP: SUPREME COURT RULES THAT
FEDERAL LAW PREEMPTS STATE ATrEMPTS TO REGULATE THE
RETRANSMISSION OF CABLE TELEVISION SIGNALS

In Capital Cities Cable, Inc. v. Crisp,8 8 the Supreme Court held that
state regulation of the retransmission of signals by cable television operators is preempted by federal law in the form of Federal Communications Commission (FCC) regulations. In so holding, the Court
86. 105 S. Ct. at 1952-53 (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting). Justice O'Connor noted that one
aspect of this confusion had arisen even before "the ink of the Tenth Circuit's decision was
dry." In the Tenth Circuit cases handed down the same day as Garcia in order to harmonize decisions, see supra note 51, Kansas had a two-year statute for injury to the ights of
another, Utah had no such provision and had to rely on a four-year residuary statute, and
Colorado had two periods governing injury to personal rights. The Tenth Circuit resolved
this confusion by applying a three-year residuary statute, Id. at 1953.
87. Thus, Garcia mandates the anomalous situation in which a tort statute of limitation
is applied to a section 1983 wrongful termination claim which is based solely upon the
statutory right to be free from discrimination in entering into a contract. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 1981.
88. 104 S. Ct. 2694 (1984).
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invalidated an Oklahoma statute which required that cable television operators delete all alcoholic beverage advertisements received from outof-state sources and reversed the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals which
had upheld the validity of the state regulation.8 9 Interestingly, the
Tenth Circuit based its decision partly upon the Supreme Court's recent
summary dismissal of a similar case which challenged, on first amendment grounds, the constitutionality of state regulation of alcohol advertisements. 90 The Supreme Court's reversal in Capital Cities, however,
was predicated upon federal preemption, an issue the Tenth Circuit did
not even address.
A.

Facts

Cable operators owning franchises in Oklahoma brought suit
against Crisp, the director of the Oklahoma Alcohol Control Board, for
unconstitutionally restraining their right to commercial free speech. 9 '
Crisp was charged with the primary responsibility of enforcing
Oklahoma laws regulating the sale and consumption of alcoholic beverages. Under the threat of criminal prosecution by the Alcohol Control
Board, the cable operators were required by Oklahoma law 9 2 to "block
out" network advertisements of wine. 93 Although it was technically prohibited for cable operators to solicit or accept advertisements for alcoholic beverages, it had become standard practice for the state to allow
relays of out-of-state programing that included advertisements for
wine. 94 When Crisp notified the cable operators that this acquiescence
was to end, the cable operators sought declaratory and injunctive relief,
contending that the Oklahoma law and constitution 9 5 violated the fed89. 699 F.2d 490 (10th Cir. 1982).
90. Queensgate Inv. Co. v. Liquor Control Comm'n, 459 U.S. 807 (1982). Queensgate
involved a summary dismissal of an Ohio Supreme Court decision upholding, under the
twenty-first amendment, see infra note 97, state regulations which prohibited retail liquor
permit holders from advertising retail prices of alcoholic beverages. The regulation was
deemed constitutional by the Ohio court despite first and fourteenth amendment challenges (freedom of speech and equal protection). For a discussion of Queensgate, see infra
note 103.
91. 699 F.2d at 492.
92. Under the Oklahoma Alcoholic Beverage Control Act, the advertisement of "alcoholic beverages or the sale of the same within the State of Oklahoma," is prohibited, except for on-premises signs which are strictly regulated. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 37, § 516
(West Supp. 1984).
93. Since hard liquor is not generally advertised on television and 3.2% beer was not
by definition an "alcoholic beverage," the enforcement of the advertising ban was directed
soley at wine commercials. 699 F.2d at 492. Despite the fact that the FCC's regulations
and federal copyright law prohibit cable operators from altering or modifying television
signals relayed to subscribers, see 17 U.S.C. § 111(c)(3) (1982); 47 C.F.R. § 76.55(b)
(1984); and note 120 infra, the Oklahoma attorney general had declared that prohibitions
against alcoholic beverage advertising applied to cable television in the same manner as
they applied to broadcast television. 699 F.2d at 492.
94. Id.
95. OKLA. CONST. art. XXVII, § 5: "It shall be unlawful for any person, firm or corporation to advertise the sale of alcoholic beverage within the state of Oklahoma except for
one sign at the retail outlet bearing the words, 'Retail Alcoholic Liquor Store'." This section has subsequently been repealed and recodified in the Oklahoma Constitution. OKLA.
CONST. art. XXVIII.
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eral commerce and supremacy clauses, denied them their first amendment right of free speech, and deprived them of the fourteenth
96
amendment guarantee of equal protection.
Crisp moved to dismiss the case, asserting overriding twenty-first
amendment concerns.9 7 Basing its decision on a four-part analysis articulated by the Supreme Court in CentralHudson Gas and Electric Corp. v.
Public Service Commission,9 8 the district court concluded that while the asserted governmental interest of protecting the health and welfare of the
public was substantial, the regulations only indirectly advanced the goal
of reducing alcohol consumption and "were more extensive than necessary to serve that interest." 9 9 The district court entered summary judgment for the cable operators, pursuant to which it issued a declaratory
judgment stating that the pertinent Oklahoma laws violated the United
States Constitution.10 0 Permanent injunctions were also entered by the
court against Crisp, preventing him and the Alcohol Control Board from
enforcing the law against the plaintiffs. Crisp's attempts to stay the permanent injunctions were unsuccessful. 10 1
In October of 1982, in Queensgate Investment Co. v. Liquor Control Commission,' 0 2 the Supreme Court dismissed, without an opinion, an appeal
from the Supreme Court of Ohio involving substantially the same issues
as Capital Cities. 10 3 In November, the Tenth Circuit heard oral arguments on Crisp's appeal.
B.

The Tenth Circuit Opinion

The Tenth Circuit focused upon the extent to which the Supreme
Court's dismissal of the Queensgate case should be ascribed precedential
96. The equal protection claim was based upon the disparity of treatment between the
print and broadcast media. Oklahoma permits advertisements for alcoholic beverages that
are carried in newspapers and other publications printed outside of the state but sold in
the state. 699 F.2d at 493 n.l.
97. The twenty-first amendment grants the states power to prohibit liquor sales within
their boundries and to regulate the time, places, and circumstances under which liquor
may be sold.
98. 447 U.S. 557, 563-66 (1980). In determining the validity of a regulation which
affects commercial speech, the following questions were presented in Central Hudson: 1)Is
the commercial speech protected by the first amendment? [Does it concern a lawful activity
and is it not misleading?] 2) Is the asserted governmental interest substantial? 3) Does
the regulation directly advance the governmental interest asserted? and 4) Is the regulation more extensive than is necessary to serve the governmental interest?
99. 699 F.2d at 493.
100. See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
101. 699 F.2d at 493.
102. 459 U.S. 807 (1982).
103. See supra note 90 and infra note 106. The Ohio Supreme Court in Queensgate applied the Central Hudson four-part test and held that the speech involved was protected,
that the govenmental interest in discouraging the excessive consumption of alcoholic beverages was substantial and within the powers granted to the states under the twenty-first
amendment, that the regulations controlled alcoholic beverages rather than speech, that
the regulations did in fact advance the governmental interest, and, finally, that the prohibition against such advertising was the narrowest method available to prevent excessive consumption. Queensgate Inv. Co. v. Liquor Control Comm'n, 69 Ohio St. 2d 365-67, 433
N.E.2d 138 (1982).
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weight in deciding Crisp's appeal. 10 4 Acknowledging the Supreme
Court's ruling in Hicks v. Miranda,'0 5 that a summary dismissal is a decision on the merits of a case and that such a summary disposition is binding upon the lower federal courts until direct decisions by the Supreme
Court indicated otherwise, the Tenth Circuit felt compelled to abide by
the Queensgate decision. According to the court, although a summary disposition merely upholds the judgment of a lower court and does not
necessarily reflect the Court's agreement with the lower court's opinion,
the precedential effect of such summary dismissals " 'prevent[s] lower
courts from coming to opposite conclusions on the precise issues
presented and necessarily decided by those actions'....,,106
The Tenth Circuit thus held that the Control Board's regulations in
Capital Cities were binding on the cable operators. Believing that the
Supreme Court's dismissal in Queensgate mandated this result, 10 7 and apparently unimpressed with potential preemption problems, 10 8 the court
ordered that the permanent injunctions be dissolved, reversing the district court's summary declaratory judgments. 10 9
C.

The Supreme Court Opinion

Justice Brennan, writing for a unanimous Court, reversed the Tenth
Circuit Court of Appeals' decision without reaching the first and fourteenth amendment claims presented by basing the decision upon federal
pre-emption grounds. 1O After outlining the constitutional boundaries
104. 699 F.2d at 495.
105. 422 U.S. 332, 344 (1975).
106. 699 F.2d at 496 (citing Mandel v. Bradley, 432 U.S. 173, 176 (1977)). According
to Justice Brennan's concurrence in Mandel, upon which the Tenth Circuit relied, the test
for determining the precedential value of a summary disposition requires a court to first
ascertain that the constitutional issues were the same as those in the case in question and,
second, if they were, the court must ascertain that the judgment was in fact based upon the
constitutional issues rather than " 'some alternative nonconstitutional ground.' " 699 F.2d
at 496 (quoting Mandel v. Bradley, 432 U.S. at 177) (Brennan, J., concurring)). To the
Tenth Circuit, the issues in Queensgate appeared substantially similar: whether the twentyfirst amendment, in the face of individuals' constitutional interests, authorized state regulation of alcoholic beverages. The court stated that, because it could discern no nonconstitutional grounds on which the Supreme Court could arguably have decided Queensgate, it
felt that the Queensgate dismissal was binding. 699 F.2d at 497. However, noting that the
Supreme Court in Mandel warned that some courts were too preoccupied by summary
dismissals and failed to undertake an independent examination of the merits, the Tenth
Circuit painstakingly went through the merits, applied the Central Hudson test, see supra note
98, and essentially ruled in accord with the Ohio Supreme Court in Queensgate. 699 F.2d at
498-99.
107. The court stated: "We recognize that the cable operators especially are placed in a
difficult position; however, nothing in the First Amendment prohibits this result." 699
F.2d at 502.
108. The pre-emption issue had been raised at the district court level. See infra note
110.
109. Capital Cities, 699 F.2d at 502.
110. 104 S. Ct. at 2698. The Court justified this deviation from its normal practice of
restricting its review to issues presented in the circuit court's ruling by stating that while
the issue of pre-emption was barely acknowledged by the circuit court, it had been pled in
the district court and the district court had made sufficient findings to enable the Court to
resolve the question. Id. at 2699-2700.
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of FCC regulatory authority,"' the Court stated that the FCC, acting
under the Cable Communications Act of 1934,112 "has unambiguously
expressed its intent to pre-empt any state or local regulation of [the]
entire array of signals carried by cable television systems." ' 13 A form of
"dualism" has been implemented by the FCC, permitting state and local
authorities to grant franchises to cable operators while the FCC retains
the exclusive power to regulate all operational aspects of cable communications, including signal carriage and technical standards. 1 4 Nonfederal officials are given responsibility only for the non-operational aspects of cable franchising." 5 Furthermore, specific federal regulations
have been enacted, including the FCC's "must carry" rule requiring
cable operators to transmit "in full" broadcast signals significantly
viewed in local communities.'16 The Court thus concluded that the
Oklahoma advertising ban, by reaching beyond the regulatory power
vested in local regulatory authorities, had trespassed into the FCC's exclusive domain."i 7 Since the FCC's regulations were found to be based
upon rational and reasonable foundations, the state regulations had to
succumb to the enumerated federal interests.
Addressing the twenty-first amendment issue, the Court stated that
while the amendment permits the states to regulate the importation and
use of intoxicating liquors within their borders, such regulation does not
permit the states to "ignore their obligations under other provisions of
the Constitution." ' " 8 Thus, although the twenty-first amendment is an
exception to the extensive power of the commerce clause, a state's
power to indirectly regulate substantial state interests is limited when
federal authority is directly interfered with. 19
1ll. Id. at 2700-01. The Supreme Court noted that an administrative regulation has
the same force and effect as a federal statute and is subject to judicial review only to ascertain if the administrator has exceeded his statutory authority or has acted in an arbitrary
and capricious manner. As long as the administrator's choice is reasonable and reflects
the congressional intent, it should not be disturbed. Thus, the Court ruled that the Commission's comprehensive authority includes the power to regulate cable communication
systems. Id. at 2701.
112. 47 U.S.C. § 152(a) (1934).
113. 104 S. Ct. at 2701.
114. Id. at 2702 n.8. Under this "deliberately structured dualism," the FCC also retains control over pay cable, leased channel regulation, access, and areas of franchise responsibilities. Id.
115. These responsibilities include bonding agreements, maintenance of rights of way,
franchise selection, and conditions of operation and construction. Report and Order Terminating Rulemaking Proceedings, 40 Fed. Reg. 34,608, 34,611 (1975).
116. 104 S. Ct. at 2703-04.
117. Id. The Court outlined three well-established principles to determine whether a
federal regulation will pre-empt a state law: 1) Has Congress expressed a clear intent to
pre-empt state law? 2) Has Congress, despite the absence of explicit language, drafted
such comprehensive federal legislation that its intent to occupy the entire field is evident?
and 3) Is compliance with both state and federal law impossible, or does the state law
stand as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress? Id. at 2700. Further, the Court concluded that "the FCC's preemptive
intent could not be more explicit or unambiguous." Id. at 2703 n.10.
118. Id. at 2707.
119. Id. Although the Court accepted Oklahoma's judgment that regulation of liquor
advertisement represented a reasonable means to achieve temperance in the state, the
legitimacy of Oklahoma's interest was weakened by the fact that the state's regulation of

1986]

SUPREME COURT REVIEW

Pragmatic considerations were also cited by the Court in support of
the FCC's hegemony in the field. 120 Whereas local broadcasters are
able to receive notification of advertisements prior to transmission,
cable operators receive numerous transmissions by satellite and must
retransmit the signals without notification of the timing or content of
advertisements contained in those signals. 12 1 To develop the capacity
to monitor the signals and delete every wine commercial before retransmission would be a "prohibitively burdensome task." Citing the district
court, the Supreme Court agreed that "[tihere exists no feasible way for
12 2
[the cable operators] to block out the wine advertisements."'
Therefore, the Court concluded, "the application of Oklahoma's alcoholic beverage advertising ban to out-of-state signals carried by cable
operators in that state is preempted by federal law and ... the Twenty23
first Amendment does not save the regulation from preemption."'
D. Analysis and Conclusion
Capital Cities Cable, Inc. v. Crisp merits scholarly attention, not so
much for its insight into the law of federal pre-emption, an aspect of the
case which has been rendered less significant by the Cable Communication Policy Act of 1984,124 but for its illustration of the problems the
lower federal courts face in attempting to ascribe weight to Supreme
Court summary dispositions. For instance, the Supreme Court's opinion, resting as it does on an issue not even addressed by the Tenth Circuit, must be disconcerting to the court of appeals. Two factors existed
which, if focused upon by the Tenth Circuit, might have led to a different outcome. First, given that pre-emption arguments were raised at the
district court level, it is somewhat surprising that the Tenth Circuit did
not address the issue. Second, the Tenth Circuit repeatedly stated that
the issues in Queensgate were substantially similar to those present in Capital Cities and that the Queensgate holding did not rest upon any alternative
advertisements for alcoholic beverages was underinclusive. For instance, the fact that advertisements for liquor and 3.2% beer were permitted in local newspapers and magazines
printed out of state but sold within Oklahoma tended to lessen the necessity of
Oklahoma's cable ban. The Court took this factor into account when it concluded that the
limited state interest did not outweigh the significant interference with federal objectives.
Id. at 2709.
120. The Copyright Revision Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-118 (1982), includes a
section on compulsory licensing of cable operators. Royalties are paid into a fund in return for the waiving of a requirement to receive permission from a copyright owner before
retransmission of instant broadcast signals. 17 U.S.C. § 111. Congress had to include
such a clause because cable operators would face insurmountable technical and logistical
obstacles if they were required to block out all programs for which they had not obtained
direct permission from the copyright owner to use. 104 S. Ct. at 2703-04.
121. Id. at 2705.
122. Id.
123. Id. In justifying its holding, the Court stated that if the state regulations were
allowed to be enforced, the public would be deprived of specialized broadcast and nonbroadcast cable services, limiting the programming options available to the public. d. at
2707.
124. See infra notes 127-35 and accompanying text.
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nonconstitutional grounds. 12 5 However, although Queensgate involved
the question of whether the twenty-first amendment enhanced states'
authority to regulate commercial speech concerning alcoholic beverages, it did not involve nearly the degree or magnitude of interstate concerns as those confronted in Capital Cities. 126 Thus, although the issues
may have been similar, the underlying considerations and constitutional
implications may have been less prevalent in Queensgate than in Capital
Cities.
More significantly, however, the Supreme Court's opinion failed to
offer any guidelines concerning the future application of summary dismissals, leaving the Tenth Circuit uncertain if its interpretation of the
weight to be accorded summary dismissals was correct. The Court
never addressed whether Queensgate did in fact rest on constitutional issues substantially similar to those in Capital Cities, avoiding the whole
morass by simply addressing the issue of federal pre-emption. Thus,
although the decision was clear-cut for the Supreme Court, it left the
door open for future miscalculation of the weight to be ascribed summary dismissals.
For the purposes of federal pre-emption law, the ramifications of
the Capital Cities decision may not be as broad as one might expect in
light of the recent passage of the Cable Communications Policy Act of
1984.127 The Act reaffirms and strengthens state and local authority to
regulate cable transmissions and curtails Capital Cities' judicial advocation of relaxed FCC policies.' 2 8 For instance, the Act codifies the pro29
gram of "deliberately structured dualism" which previously existed,'
but gives states broader authority to regulate franchising grants, including fees and renewal, rate regulation, program content and rights-of0
way. 13
Thus, although the Capital Cities decision made it appear that local
governing bodies were under the imminent threat of being pre-empted
by more liberal federal regulations, with the passage of the Act localities
no longer need feel that their powers are exercised at the grace of the
FCC.' 3 On the other hand, while some view the recent relaxation of
125.

See supra note 106.

126. For instance, the advertisement in Queensgale involved a newsletter distributed locally in Cincinnati. 69 Ohio St. 2d 361, 433 N.E.2d 138 (1982). In fact, the Supreme
Court's dismissal was based upon "want of substantial federal question." 459 U.S. 807
(1982).
127. 47 U.S.C.A. §§ 521-559 (West Supp. 1985).
128. See, e.g., 47 U.S.C.A. § 552(c) (West Supp. 1985) ("Nothing in this subchapter
shall be construed to prohibit any State or any franchising authority from enacting or enforcing any consumer protection law, to the extent not inconsistent with this subchapter."); 47 U.S.C.A. § 556(a) ("Nothing in this subchapter shall be construed to affect
any authority of any State, political subdivision, or agency thereof, or franchising authority, regarding matters of public health, safety, and welfare, to the extent consistent with the
express provisions of this subchapter.").
129. See supra note 114 and accompanying text.
130. See 47 U.S.C.A. §§ 541-547 (Part III, Franchising and Regulation) (West Supp.
1985).
131. H. R. REP. No. 934, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 19-20, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONC.
& AD. NEWs 4655, 4656-57 (The Cable Act "'[e]stablishes the authority of local govern-
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FCC regulations' 3 2 as a sign that local and state governing bodies are
now permitted to fill in the vacated interstices of cable regulation,' 3 3 it
can be asserted that the policies behind the FCC's easing of restrictions
fail to support this interpretation.' 3 4 Rather, the FCC's relaxation of
regulations has a dual purpose: to permit cable subscribers greater access to cable services and to foster new and innovative communications
services.1 3 5 When viewed in this light, strict regulations by local governing bodies would be contrary to FCC goals. In any event, the extent
to which state regulations of the kind involved in CapitalCities might be
upheld under the Act remains to be seen.
Finally, when one strips away the varnish of legal theories abundant
in this decision, a pragmatic consideration comes to the fore. Specifically, while dressing this ruling up in appropriate legal characterizations,
the Court seems to have been driven to its conclusion by the confines of
technological reality: there exists no feasible way for cable operators to
block out wine advertisements when signals from outside the state are
received. Because the Supreme Court did not reach the first and fourteenth amendment arguments, later cases involving local or state cable
regulations which allegedly violate first and fourteenth amendment
rights will find little support from Capital Cities.' 3 6 Unfortunately, the
Capital Cities case and the enactment of the Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984 seem to give rise to more questions than are answered by
the decision, particularly in the areas of the constitutionality of state regulation of out-of-state signals and the precedential weight of summary
dismissals; issues which were raised by the Tenth Circuit and left unresolved by the Supreme Court.
Joseph E. Kovarik

ments

to regulate cable television through the franchise process" and -[glrants local gov-

ernments substantial authority to enforce franchise agreements.").
132. 104 S. Ct. at 2703.
133. See Note, The 1984 Cable Flip Flop From Capital Cities v. Crisp to the Cable Communications Policy Ad.l, 34 AM. U.L. REV. 557, 589 (1985); see also Meyerson, The Cable Commnnmialions Polio" Ac of 1984:.4 Balancing Art on the Coaxial Wires,
I
19 GEO. L. REV. 543, 551 (1981).
134. i04 S. Ct. at 2703. The Court in Capital Cities noted that the recent deregulatory
trend is designed to further the FCC's goal of program diversity and should not be interpreted as an abdication of regulatory power by the FCC.
135. Id.
136. Preferred Communications v. City of Los Angeles, 754 F.2d 1396 (9th Cir.) (cable
operator brought action against Los Angeles claiming that the city's regulatory procedure
of auctioning the exclusive right to provide cable services in certain areas violated tie
operator's first and fourteenth amendment rights; court held that limited access violated

the first amendment where the facilities involved were capable of carrying more tian one
system), cert. granted, 106 S. Ct. 380 (1985).

